Exploring financing options for higher education in Jamaica by Nkrumah-Young, K
________________________________ 
Exploring Financing Options for Higher

Education in Jamaica

Kofi K. Nkrumah-Young 

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Business Administration,

Higher Education Management

University of Bath

School of Management

August 2005

Copyright 
Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rest with its author.

This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is

understood to recognise that its copyright rest with its author and that no quotation from

the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without the prior written

consent of the author.

This thesis may be made available for consultation within the University Library and may

be photocopied or lent to other libraries for the purposes of consultation.

Kofi K. Nkrumah-Young 
1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures ……………………………………………………...…… 6 
List of Tables ……………………………………………………………. 7 
List of Equations ………………………………………………………… 9 
Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………… 10 
Abstract ………………………………………………………………….. 11 
List of Abbreviations …………………………………………………..... 12 
Chapter One - The Research Problem …………………. 15 
The Context ………………………………………………..…..… 15 
Evolution of Higher Education in Jamaica ………………….… 21 
Chapter Two - Options Available for Financing Higher 
Education……………………………………………...... 24 
Introduction.………………………………………….………..…. 24 
Financing Options and their Consequences.………..…….......... 24 
Deciding on an Option …………………………………………... 33 
Resource Allocation Options and their Consequences………… 38 
Initial Approaches to Resource Allocation in Higher Education ………….. 38 
Operations Management Contribution …………………………………….. 42 
Input versus Output RAM 
...………………………………………... 42 
Quality and the Operations Management Debate ………………...... 47 
Productivity and the Operations Management Debate …………….. 51 
Accountability and Resource Allocation Models ………………………….. 52 
Governance and the Accountability Perspective …………………... 55 
Management and the Accountability Perspective…………..……..... 57 
Earmarked versus Blocked Grant ………………………………….. 59 
Accountability-Resource Allocation Link. ……...………………..... 61 
Economists’ Perspective ……………………………………………............ 62 
A Framework for Determining a suitable RAM ……………..... 64 
Conclusion ……………………………………………………….. 67 
2 
Chapter Three - Research Methodology.……………. 68

Introduction …………………………………………………… 68

Approach to the Research.………………………………..…… 68

Research Strategy.……………………………..…………….... 75

Main Strategy……………………………….…………..……………… 75

Sub-

Strategy...…………………..………………………..…………….. 76

Empirical Stage...…..………………………………………….. 79

Data Collection ……..…………………………………………………. 80

Sampling …………………...………………………………………….. 85

Data Analysis………………..………………………………….……… 86

Testing for Reliability and Validity……………..… …………..………. 88

Triangulation……………………………..……………………..……… 90

Use of Literature Review ……………………...………………… ……. 90

Limitation and Delimitations……………..……………………………. 92

Ethics……………………………………..……………………………. 92

Conclusion.……………………..………………………..…… 93

Chapter four - The Jamaican Higher Education

Financing Policies Since 1962………………………... 94

Introduction …………………..……………………………….. 94

The Mixed System – 1962-1973….…………………………… 94

Features of the Mixed System ……………………………………....… 94

Resource Allocation Method under the Mixed System ………….......... 97

Consequences of Fee Paying …………………………………….......... 101

Free Education 1973 – 1986 …………..…………...…………. 105

Features of the Free Education System

……………….……………….. 106

Resource Allocation Method during the Free Education Era….………. 107

Consequences of Free Education Policy………..……………….……... 109

Cess 1986 – 1993 ……………………...………………...……. 118

Features of the Cess …………………………………………………… 119

Resource Allocation Method during the Period of the Cess ….……….. 120

Consequences of the RAM and the Policy of the Cess

………………... 125

Cost Sharing Since 1993 ……………………………..…..…… 136

Features of Cost Sharing ………………………………………………. 137

Resource Allocation Method during the Cost Sharing Era

……………. 138

Consequences of RAM and the Cost Sharing Policy ………………..... 142

Summary …………………………………………….………. 151

3 
Chapter Five - Assessing the Jamaican Model …….... 156

Introduction…………………………………………..…...….. 156

Assessing the Models used for Financing HE …………...…... 157

Total State Financing 1983 – 1986 …………………...….................... 158

Cess: The Reason it was Changed ………………………………….... 161

Assessing the Jamaican Cost Sharing Policy ………………………… 162

General Conditions ………………………………….…………… 162

Issues from the General Pre-Conditions………….…..…………... 165

Sub-routes to Cost Sharing ………………………………………. 168

Issues from the Sub-routes ………………………….……………. 170

Assessing the Jamaican Resource Allocation Model ……....... 173

Locating the Jamaican RAM ……………………..........…………….. 175

Jamaican RAM and transparency ……………………………...…….. 176

Jamaican RAM and the HE Market Issue…………………..………… 178

Jamaican RAM and Accountability ……………………………...…... 181

Jamaican RAM and the Quality Assurance Mechanism ………...…... 184

Conclusion …………………………………..………………. 186

Chapter Six - Conclusions, Recommendations and

Reflections………………………………………...… 189

Addressing the Questions ……….………………...……….… 189

Theoretical Underpinnings ……………………………….….. 191

Recommendations …………………………………..……….. 192

Recommendations for Changes to the Financing of HE

…………..…. 192

Recommendation for changes to RAM ……………………………… 197

Reflections……………………………………….…………... 204

Research methodology ……………………………….….………….... 204

Higher Education Management ……………………………..… ..…… 206

Resource allocation in HE …………………………………………… 207

Conclusion……………………………………………………. 208

Appendix I: Allocation to Jamaican TLIs since 1995 …………........ 209

Appendix II: Enrolment in Jamaican TLIs since 1995 …………….. 210

Appendix III: Excerpts from the Estimates of Expenditure ………... 211

Appendix IV: Financing the UWI, Ministry Paper 351/01 ………… 212

Appendix V: Excerpt Commonwealth Year Book 1965 …………… 225

Appendix VI: Excerpt from Budget Speech 2nd May 1973 ……….. 226

4 
Appendix VII: SLB Loans 1970 – 1994 …………………………… 227

Appendix VIII: Boarding Grants 1973 – 1986 ……………………... 228

Appendix IX: UWI Cost Allocation Proposal pre 1972 ……………. 229

Appendix X: Projected Effects of the UWI Proposal ………………. 230

Appendix XI: The UWI Expense Sharing Models …………………. 231

Appendix XII: The UWI Enrolment since 1948 …………………… 238

Appendix XIII: The UTech Enrolment since 1986 ………………… 240

Appendix XIV: Jamaica’s Economic Indicators 1970 – 1980............ 241

Appendix XV: UTech’s Costing Methodology …………………….. 242

Appendix XVI: UTech’s Financial Records since 1960 …………… 255

Appendix XVII: UWI’s Financial Records since 1961 ………….…. 262

Appendix XVIII: Interview Questions and Objectives …………….. 270

Appendix XIX: List of Documents ………………………………… 274

References ………………………………………………………….. 283

Further Reading …………………………………………………….. 297

5 
LIST OF FIGURES

NUMBER CAPTION	 PAGE

2.1	 Decision Tree for a Financing Option for HE …………………. 37 
2.2	 Orr's Trajectories and Congruence of a Coordination 
Framework………………………………………………………… 50 
2.3	 The Relationship between Accountability, RAM, Governance 
and Management………………………………………………… 55 
2.4	 The Processes of the Input Model of Resource Allocation….. 60 
2.5	 The Accountability, Governance, Management Relationship.. 62 
2.6	 The RAM Debate Pendulums…………………………………... 65 
3.1	 Knowledge Claims, Strategies of Inquiry and Methods 
Leading to Approaches and the Design Process (Cresswell 
2003 p.5)………………………………………………………….. 69 
3.2	 Punch (2000 p.18) Simplified Model of Research (Without 
Hypothesis) .……………………………………………………... 69 
3.3	 Framework of the Research Project…………………………… 74 
3.4	 (Flick 2002 p.44) Circular Model of the Research Process …. 86 
3.5	 Inductive Logic of Research in a Qualitative Study 
(Cresswell 2003 p.132)………………………………………….. 88 
4.1	 Resource Allocation Process of the Caribbean HE System, 
1962-1973………………………………………………………… 98 
4.2	 Resource Allocation Process of the Non-HEI in the Jamaican 
Education System, 1962-1973………………………………….. 100 
4.3	 Resource Allocation Process for HE under Free Education, 
1974-1986………………………………………………………… 107 
4.4	 Resource Allocation Process of the Non-HEI under Free 
Education, 1974-1986…………………………………………… 108 
4.5	 Financial Problems as a Consequence of Free Education 
Policy and the RAM during that Period, 1973-1986………….. 112 
4.6	 Resource Allocation Flow for National TLIs during the Cess, 
1986-1993………………………………………...………………. 120 
4.7	 Resource Allocation Process for UWI, 1984-1994…………… 125 
4.8	 Financial Problems of the UWI during the Cess, 1986-1993.. 126 
4.9	 Resource Allocation Process for Jamaican TLIs since 1993.. 138 
4.10	 Resource Allocation Process for UWI 1994 -2004...…………. 141 
5.1	 Jamaica's Position on the HE Financing Decision Tree……... 162 
5.2	 Jamaica's Placement on the RAM Debate Pendulums……… 173 
5.3	 The Van Vught Continuum on Measuring the Governance of 
Commonwealth Universities (Richardson and Fielden 1997 
p.48……………………………………………………………….. 181 
5.4	 Effects of the Jamaican RAM on Accountability, Governance 
and Management of HEI………………………………………… 182 
5.5	 Jamaica's Position on the Orr (2005) Trajectories of the 
Funding-Quality Assurance Link……………………………….. 185 
6.1	 Proposed Unified Process for Resource Allocation in the 
Jamaican HE System……………………………………………. 202 
6 
LIST OF TABLES

NUMBER CAPTION	 PAGE

1.1	 Jamaican Government Funding of HEI Per Student, 1995-
2002……………………………………………………………….... 15 
1.2	 Percentage Government Contribution to TLIs In Jamaica, 
1995-2002………………………………………………………….. 16 
1.3	 Distribution of Students in TLIs in Jamaica 1995-2002……….. 16 
1.4	 Government's Contribution to the Teacher Training Colleges 
1995-2002………………………………………………………….. 17 
2.1	 Assumptions of the Invisible Hand Theorem…………………… 26 
2.2	 Gradstien's (2003) Analysis of the Effects of Educational 
Subsidy in 21 Countries…………………………………………... 29 
2.3	 Conditions and Results from Financing Options……………….. 34 
2.4	 Negotiated Funding versus Formulaic Funding………………... 41 
2.5	 Framework of the HE Production Process (Adopted from 
Jackson and Lund 2000)…………………………………………. 43 
2.6	 Burke's Responses to the Critics on Performance Funding….. 47 
2.7	 Inputs and Outputs of HE According to Massy (1996 p.58)..… 48 
2.8	 Effects of Performance Funding (Massy 1996, p.320)………... 49 
2.9	 Link Between Accountability and RAM…………………………. 53 
2.10	 RAM-Operations Management Matrix…………………………... 66 
3.1	 Cresswell (2003 p.6) Alternative Knowledge Claim…………… 70 
3.2	 Sampling Decisions in the Research Process…………………. 85 
3.3	 Using Literature in Qualitative Study (Creswell 2003 
p.31)……. 91 
4.1	 Income Analysis of the UWI, 1962-1973……………………….. 96 
4.2	 Receivable Management Analysis of the UWI, 1962-1973…… 102 
4.3	 Growth Rate in HE Enrolment During the Fee Paying Era, 
1963-1973………………………………………………………….. 105 
4.4	 Growth Rate in Enrolment during Free Education, 1973-
1986……………………………………………………………….... 110 
4.5	 Analysis of the Receivables of the UWI During Free 
Education, 1973-1986…………………………………………….. 113 
4.6	 Financial Results of CAST, 1974-1986…………………………. 115 
4.7	 UWI Cess 1986-1987……………………………………………... 119 
4.8	 Receivable Management Ratios of UWI during the period of 
the Cess, 1986-1993……………………………………………… 126 
4.9	 Liquidity Ratios of the UWI, 1986-1993………………………… 128 
4.10	 Liability Situation of the UWI and CAST, 1974-1993…………. 128 
4.11	 Interest Cost of the UWI: Random Selection Of Three Years 
Between 1986 and 1993…………………………………………. 131 
4.12	 Cast/UTech Financial Results, 1987-1993…………………….. 132 
4.13	 Enrolment Growth of HE, 1986-1993…………………………… 136 
4.14	 UTech’s Bases for Tuition Fees Since 2002…………………… 139 
4.15	 Bases for Allocating Shared Cost at UTech…...……………. 140 
4.16	 UTech’s Financial Results Since Cost Sharing, 1994-2003….. 143 
4.17	 UWI Financial Results Since Cost Sharing, 1994-2003………. 144 
7 
NUMBER CAPTION	 PAGE

4.18	 UWI's Receivable Management: A Comparison Of The 4 Eras 144

4.19	 Receivable Management Ratios of UWI, 1994-2003…………. 145

4.20	 Receivable Management Ratios of UTech, 1994-2004……….. 145

4.21	 Enrolment Growth Rate in Government Supported HEIs in

Jamaica, 1986-2003………………………………………………. 151

5.1	 Assessment of the Jamaican Conditions during Free

Education With the Conditions Precedent for Total State

Financing of HE……………………………………………………. 159

5.2	 Assessment of Jamaica's Conditions During Cost Sharing

Against the General Conditions Precedent…………………….. 163

5.3	 Illustration of the effects of Cost Control……………………….. 165

5.4	 School Enrolment by Age Group and Consumption Quintile…. 167

5.5	 Assessment of Jamaica's Conditions for the Sub-Routes of

Cost Sharing Against the Conditions Precedent………………. 169

5.6	 Mean Annual Per Capita Consumption of Education of

Tertiary Household by Consumption Quintile, 1992-2002……. 171

5.7	 Source of Application to SLB and Distribution of Benefits by

Quintile, 2002……………………………………………………… 171

5.8	 Distribution of Matriculated Students (Age Group 17-24 Yrs)… 171

5.9	 Out of School Rate by Age Group and Consumption Quintile.. 172

5.10	 Highest Qualification of Persons Out of School (Age Group

17-24 Yrs), 2002…………………………………………………… 172

6.1	 Illustration of Allocating Funds for teaching of HEI …..……….. 200

6.2	 Illustration of the Final Allocation to HEI………………………… 201

8 
LIST OF EQUATIONS

NUMBER CAPTION	 PAGE 
2.1	 Formula for Incremental Budgeting…………… 40 
2.2	 Fixed Formula Funding…………………………. 40 
2.3	 Australian Relative Formula for Pricing……….. 40 
2.4	 Australian Relative Funding Formula…………. 40 
2.5	 Denmark’s Taximeter Formula………………… 41 
4.1	 Sharing UWI Recurrent Cost, 1963 – 1973….. 99, 231 
4.2	 Sharing UWI Non-Recurrent Cost, 1963 – 
1973………………………………………………. 99, 231 
4.3	 Sharing UWI Total Cost 1963 – 1973………… 99, 231 
4.4	 PCC per Faculty per Campus, UWI, 1974 – 
1984………………………………………………. 109, 233 
4.5	 PCC per Faculty, UWI, 1974 – 1984………….. 122, 233 
4.6	 Sharing UWI Recurrent Cost, 1974 – 1984….. 233 
4.7	 Sharing UWI Recurrent Cost - Campus 
Countries, 1974 – 1984………………………… 233 
4.8	 Sharing UWI Total Cost - Campus Countries, 
1974 – 1984……………………………………… 234 
4.9	 PCC per Faculty per Campus, UWI, since 
1984……………………………………………… 142, 236 
4.10	 Sharing UWI Total Cost - Campus Countries 
since 1984……………………………………….. 122,236 
4.11	 UTech’s Formula for Calculating PCC, since 
2002……………………………………………… 140 
4.12	 Calculating Tuition Fee, UTech since 2002….. 140 
4.13	 Calculating Tuition Fee, UWI since 1994…….. 142, 237 
5.1	 Breakeven Analysis……………………………... 165 
6.1	 Douglas (1992) Marginalist Pricing Formula…. 194 
6.2	 Proposed HE Marginalist Pricing Formula: 
Stage 1…………………………………………… 194 
6.3	 Proposed HE Marginalist Pricing Formula: 
Stage 2…………………………………………… 194 
6.4	 Calculating the Internal Rate of Return for HEI 195 
6.5	 Using IRR and PCC to Calculating Price of HE 195 
6.6	 Czech Republic Formula for Calculating 
Resources for HEI………………………………. 198 
6.7	 Proposed Formula for Calculating Resources 
for Jamaican HE Programmes………………… 200 
6.8	 Proposed Formula for Calculating Contribution 
per Student for Jamaican HE Programmes….. 201 
6.9	 Proposed Formula for Calculating Allocation to 
Jamaican HEI…………………………………… 201 
9 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge with thanks all the persons in Jamaica and the several 
countries that were visited who granted interviews and their time for 
consultation. Special thanks to Richard Mawditt of the University of Bath for 
his continuous assistance and support in more ways than one; to Dr. Rae 
Davis, the President of UTech who not only encouraged me to pursue this 
course of study but also contributed to the data collection and review; to Ms 
Elizabeth Williams, archivist of the UWI, Ms Glenda Dalling and the other 
librarians of UTech who were very instrumental identifying the relevant 
historical documents; to Ms Ingrid Vickerman, Ms Carmen Johnson and Mrs 
Paulette Bell-Kerr for assisting in the cleaning up stages. 
The work could not have been completed without the superb guidance given 
by my supervisor Professor Philip Powell. Philip, your leadership and 
direction were most helpful. Thanks. 
I also acknowledge the support of my dear wife Marlene and our boys Kofi 
(Jnr.) and Jean Pierre who were most supportive and understanding during the 
period of research. 
Finally I wish to dedicate this study to the memories of my mother Linda 
Maud Sparks-Pearce, the architect of my development, who passed on a few 
months before the completion of this thesis and not getting the chance to see 
another result of her handy work. Mama, your efforts were not in vain. 
10 
ABSTRACT

The government of Jamaica (GOJ) funds seventeen tertiary level institutions (TLIs) 
inclusive of two Higher Education Institutions (HEIs). An initial review of the funding to 
these institutions suggested that the allocations were arbitrary as there were no correlation 
with their enrolment and missions. This led to the identification of the financing policies 
for HE which gave rise to the main question “What are the consequences (intended and 
unintended) of the different models adopted by Jamaica for the financing of higher 
education?” Also in tracing the evolution of HE in Jamaica four sub-questions arouse 
which were: 
1.	 What are the consequences of an unchanged financing model for a system that 
has shifted from a single provider to diverse providers? 
2.	 What are the consequences of financing both a national higher education 
system and a regional one? 
3.	 What were the philosophical underpinnings to the allocation of resources to 
HE in Jamaica? 
4.	 What models are available to the Jamaican government for allocating 
resources to HE? 
The fourth sub-question was used as the basis for the literature search and review. The 
issues of equity and efficiency were identified from the review as the main reasons for the 
state involvement in financing HE. Frameworks for analysing the consequences of the 
various Jamaican policies were also built from the study of the literature. The other 
questions were used as the background to the discussion and recommendations. 
Ground theory was the strategy of inquiry. The research drew on the views of Punch 
(1998) that the research questions and problems should direct the research instead of ones 
knowledge claim. Using interviews and documents and following the multiple processes 
of coding analysing and recoding as well as the use of the inductive logic, the research 
eventually identified some theoretical underpinnings which informed the recommendations 
for changes to the financing and resource allocation methodology for the Jamaican HE 
system. 
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CHAPTER 1

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

THE CONTEXT 
The government of Jamaica (GOJ) funds seventeen tertiary level institutions (TLIs). These 
consist of two universities, the University of the West Indies (UWI) and the University of 
Technology, Jamaica (UTech); the Edna Manley College of the Visual and Performing 
Arts; the College of Agriculture, Science and Education, (CASE); seven multi-discipline 
colleges; and six single discipline teacher-training colleges. The government’s stated 
financing policy is that the UWI is funded on a per student basis in relation to a percentage 
of the economic cost and all the other institutions are funded on the basis of recovery for 
staff cost. This policy raises the question of a rationale for the different bases of funding 
the institutions. The Jamaican government’s funding of TLIs since 1995 is shown in Table 
1.1. 
Table 1.1: The Jamaican Government Funding of TLIs per Student 
1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 
Ja$ 
UWI 178.28 229.90 303.64 242.11 166.12 188.16 162.87 
UTech 24.52 42.08 79.92 161.78 71.89 103.16 124.02 
Edna Manley 52.67 66.10 142.39 269.91 316.19 247.31 581.44 
College 
CASE 101.22 160.61 394.58 227.38 231.21 180.58 280.16 
Multi-Discipline 21.58 34.30 47.39 43.13 53.64 52.64 58.92 
Colleges 
Teachers' 70.66 100.47 115.88 107.21 116.05 117.75 150.43 
Colleges 
The table shows that there is no consistency in the funding. The University of Technology, 
Jamaica, which is one of the two government-funded universities, is given the second 
lowest amount per student. The community colleges have been the only ones getting less. 
The average per student, per year is $87; the community colleges receive $45; the teacher 
training colleges, $111; the UWI, $210; the CASE, $225 and the Edna Manley College 
$235. 
A second observation is that the total sums granted do not relate to enrolment. Table 1.2 
shows the percentage contribution to HEIs in Jamaica. 
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Table 1.2  Percentage Government's Contribution to each TLIs in Jamaica 
1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 
UWI 68% 64% 65% 53% 53% 49% 44% 
UTech 8% 11% 13% 24% 17% 20% 23% 
Edna 
Manley 
College 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 
CASE 3% 3% 3% 4% 5% 4% 5% 
Multi-
Disciplinary 
Colleges 9% 9% 9% 8% 12% 12% 13% 
Teachers' 
Colleges 10% 10% 9% 9% 12% 12% 13% 
Table 1.3 however shows the population distribution of students in those institutions. 
Table 1.3 Student Distributions in the Tertiary Level System in Jamaica 
1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 
UWI 29% 29% 33% 33% 36% 31% 35% 
UTech 25% 26% 24% 23% 26% 24% 23% 
Edna 
Manley 
College 3% 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
CASE 2% 2% 1% 3% 2% 3% 2% 
Multi-
Disciplinary 
Colleges 31% 29% 28% 28% 24% 28% 29% 
Teachers' 
Colleges 11% 11% 12% 12% 11% 12% 11% 
Comparison of the two tables reveals that there is no correlation between funding and 
enrolment dispersion in the tertiary system in Jamaica. 
Further analyses of the figures also reveal that even though the government has stated two 
bases of funding the institutions, these are not being honoured. The basis for funding the 
UWI suggests that the funding should have been moving consistently with the growth in 
the enrolment figures (see Appendices I and II). Also, contrary to the stated policy UTech 
has not been receiving the full amount to cover its staff cost. This was seen from the 
analysis of the financial statements of that institution. 
Table 1.4 shows that within the category of the single discipline teachers’ colleges the 
contribution per unit varies significantly. This is because institutions are funded on the 
basis of staff complement. 
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Table 1.4: Government's Contribution per Student to the Teacher-Training Colleges 
1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 
JA $ 
Church 75.45 106.36 119.35 116.86 131.46 137.83 167.91 
G.C. Foster 99.15 128.44 149.38 123.52 125.33 102.59 374.82 
Mico 63.61 90.32 125.48 110.69 125.05 151.11 174.45 
St. Joseph's 85.94 122.70 126.10 115.23 117.47 83.62 93.82 
Shortwood 67.34 100.93 103.85 107.61 120.08 137.97 151.00 
Sam Sharpe 68.01 93.43 91.08 81.50 82.68 78.02 108.07 
Average 70.66 100.47 115.88 107.21 116.05 117.75 150.43 
The issue of government funding of education in Jamaica has been a contentious one. 
Between 1972 and 1986 the policy was that of free education to the tertiary level. There 
was a change of government in 1980 and in 1986 the new regime placed a cess on higher 
education. This resulted in much student protest. In 1989 the government again changed 
hands and in 1993 another policy of cost sharing was implemented. It is clear that under 
the policy of cost sharing, consideration needs to be given to issues such as equity, 
efficiency and consistency. It is therefore against this background that it was decided to 
study the matter with the aim of arriving at a workable solution to address the problems 
identified above. 
The study is concerned with higher education (HE), which is a sector within the tertiary 
system. It is necessary to define HE because of the loose manner in which the term is 
used. This chapter will do the following: 
1.	 Discuss the definitions of HE and determine a suitable one for Jamaica 
2.	 Give a brief overview of the evolution of HE in Jamaica 
3.	 Raise the research questions in the context of the evolution. 
The definitions of HE have been divided into two categories: simple and technical. The 
simple definitions give HEI a monolithic meaning; it is any form of education after a 
certain stage. The simple definitions quoted are: 
1.	 Post-secondary education (www.mnvu.org/mnvu/265.jsp). 
2.	 Post-16 or post-secondary education 
(www.studyukguide.com/jsp/content_server/faqs/glossary/) 
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3.	 Refers to education, training, research, and community service outreach at the post-
secondary level (www.usaid.gov/pubs/sourcebook/usgov/glos.html) 
4.	 Educational provision above Level 3 (i.e., above A level and the Advanced level 
GNVQ) and its equivalents in Scotland. 
(www.leeds.ac.uk/educol/ncihe/nr_411.htm) 
With the technical definitions, HE is much more than post-secondary education. It is 
regarded as that form of post-secondary education which results in at least a certain level 
of certification. The description of such certification, however, depends on the educational 
system of the particular country. In the case of England, the level is the Higher National 
Diploma; for Australia it is a degree granted by a recognized HEI; for the USA it is at the 
associate degree level. 
The technical definitions are: 
5.	 Higher education courses are generally above the standard of GCE A-levels or National 
Vocational Qualification (NVQ) Level 3. They include degree courses, postgraduate 
courses and Higher National Diplomas. HE takes place in universities and HE colleges, 
and in some further education colleges. (www.hefce.ac.uk/glossary/glossary.htm) 
6.	 Post-secondary education offered by a university or other recognized HEI, or through 
Open Learning Australia, leading to the award of a degree or higher level qualification. 
(www.anta.gov.au/textOnly.asp) 
7.	 This form of education includes study beyond secondary school at an institution that 
offers programs terminating in an associate, baccalaureate, or higher degree, or 
equivalent degrees in other countries. (nces.ed.gov/pubs/esn/n99u.html) 
8.	 Education provided by a college or university (www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-
bin/webwn ) 
To determine which, if any, of the above definitions relate to Jamaica one has to trace the 
usage of the term in that country. Post-secondary education in Jamaica has evolved since 
its independence in 1962. Until recently HE was a distinct sector with reference to 
university education. In the estimates of expenditure of the country from 1962 to 1967, 
funds were allocated to the education sector in five categories as follows: 
1.	 Primary and all-age education – Primary went up to 12 years of age and all-age to 15 
years. 
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2.	 Secondary education – From 12 years of age to 19 years depending on the type of 
institution. The junior secondary schools stopped at age 15 and the high schools 
stopped at age 17 or 19 if the institution offered pre-university studies. 
3.	 Teacher training – According to the Sherlock Report 1989 the teacher-training colleges 
offered education equivalent to the secondary level. According to the report, 
“historically, Teachers’ Colleges and the Jamaica School of Agriculture were regarded 
as offering education at the level of secondary schools. The latter fell under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture.” 
4.	 Technical education – This consisted of the College of Arts, Science and Technology 
(CAST) and the technical high schools. 
5.	 Higher education – This was solely the University of the West Indies (UWI). 
Between 1968 and 1988 there were various reconfigurations of the education sector, 
however, HE was always the highest category and consisted only of the UWI. In 1989 the 
categories were reduced to three with the UWI joining the tertiary education grouping. 
1.	 Primary 
2.	 Secondary 
3.	 Tertiary: UWI, CAST, the College of Agriculture, teacher training colleges and the 
community colleges 
It is this latter categorisation that has complicated the discussion because in this grouping 
are various institutions with different missions. Also, as will be shown further, this new 
grouping did not result in a single model for funding the tertiary sector. 
Tertiary education was defined in the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) Labour Market 
Information Newsletter of Jamaica, issue number 38, June 2001, p.1 as “All tertiary 
programmes requiring matriculation of a minimum of four Caribbean Examination Council 
(CXC)/General Certificate Examination (GCE) subjects, including English and 
Mathematics, having a minimum duration of two years, and leading to the award of a 
certificate, diploma, associate degree or degree.” 
The definition has sought to provide a description for the tertiary education sector but has 
not solved the issue of Jamaica’s use of the term “higher education”. Howe (2003 p. 49) 
opined that tertiary education and higher education are used inter-changeably to be 
inclusive. He quotes Peters as saying “that education and training provisions in these third 
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level institutions may and in fact do include non-university and university level 
programmes, technical and vocational education and training, professional and 
paraprofessional training and continuing education programmes.” While Howe’s 
deliberation illustrates that the term “tertiary education” is inclusive, it still does not clarify 
the use of the term “higher education” in the Jamaican context. Based on historical usage 
in the Jamaican educational system, HEI refers to those institutions, which have the power 
to award at least the bachelor’s degree. As such the government funded HEIs in Jamaica 
were regarded in the study as UWI since 1948 and UTech since 1986. Both institutions 
have governing instruments, which give them the authority to grant and confer degrees. 
The other institutions do not have such powers but offer tuition leading to the granting of 
degrees by the University Council of Jamaica or the Council of Community Colleges of 
Jamaica. 
The financing policies for education in Jamaica have varied according to the priorities of 
the governing political parties or the economic circumstances of the country. The Hon. 
Omar Davis, the Minister of Finance for Jamaica (since 1993), in an interview granted for 
the study pointed out that prior to 1973 
We have various approaches, which evolved over time, and essentially a part of the 
fees were assumed to be the responsibility of the Government, and in the case of the 
University of the West Indies – it has always been paid as a grant and then the 
remainder would be the responsibility of the student. As regards to the teacher 
training colleges, there was no specific calculation, the government sort of funded 
those which were ran by them and so I think the issue of specific policies by the 
government only evolved after there was a growing number of persons seeking 
tertiary education and then it became a financial problem. 
A review of the national budget documents since 1962 reveals that the cost of primary 
education has always been a total call on the national budget. The other levels in the 
education system, however, did not have this consistency in policy hence there were shifts 
from time to time. The records revealed that there were four policy shifts since 1962. 
These were: 
� 1962 – 1973: Mixed system 
� 1973 – 1986: Free education 
� 1986 – 1993: The cess on HE 
� Since 1993: Cost sharing 
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It is in this context that the main research question arises: “What are the consequences 
(intended and unintended) of the different models adopted by Jamaica for the 
financing of higher education?” 
EVOLUTION OF HE IN JAMAICA 
During the period of colonial control, the elites of the Jamaican society sent their children 
to the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Canada for higher education. 
This proved to be expensive and was of concern to the local elites and the colonial office. 
At the same time the Moyne Commission was established in 1938 to investigate the cause 
of the frequent labour unrests and anti-colonial agitation in the islands. It recommended, 
among other things, improvements to the education system of the West Indies. This 
coincided with the concerns of the local elite and was the germ for the establishment of 
higher education in the anglophone Caribbean, which was posed as a solution to the 
undesirable practice of journeying to other lands in quest of educational improvements at 
the higher level. 
In 1943 the Asquith Commission on Higher Education in the colonies was established and 
its report argued for a single, unitary and residential University of the West Indies (Howe, 
2000, p 17). The bases for such a system argued Cobley (Howe, 2000, pp. 12–13), were as 
follows: 
1.	 It would help to cultivate a West Indian Outlook. 
2.	 It would help to build a cadre of “responsible and well informed leaders in the 
Caribbean as it passed through a process of democratization and progress towards 
self-determination”. 
3.	 A single university could become the intellectual centre of the region. 
It was against this background that the University College of the West Indies (UCWI) 
began in 1948 signalling the entry of the Anglophone Caribbean in the field of higher 
education. Cobley (Cited by Howe 2000) also pointed out that the syllabi and the awarding 
of degrees were the responsibility of the University of London through the Inter-University 
Council (IUC) for higher education in the colonies. Before long, however, signals were 
given to change the system and following the Cato Report (1958) a royal charter was 
granted which saw the establishment of the UWI from the UCWI in April 1962, as an 
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autonomous body to grant its own degrees. Notwithstanding the new status of the 
institution, the single unitary nature of the higher education system for the anglophone 
Caribbean remained. The intention of the Governments of the Caribbean that HE was to 
be the sole responsibility of the UWI also remained. It was against this background that 
the Minister of Finance for Jamaica in 1963 proposed the establishment of the Permanent 
University Grants Committee (UGC) for the funding of that institution. 
In addition to the UWI, the other colleges fulfilled the role of lower level providers 
satisfying the intermediary need between secondary and HE. In 1982 the Government of 
Jamaica, under the leadership of the Minister of Education, Dr. Mavis Gilmore, attempted 
to change the unitary nature of the higher education system in Jamaica. Dr. D. H. Irvine 
was appointed to develop the proposal for the change. He proposed the establishment of a 
National Polytechnic of Jamaica, which was to be complementary to the UWI. The 
College of Arts, Science and Technology (CAST) was to be the vehicle for the new 
system, which would absorb the teachers’ colleges and the College of Agriculture (Irvine 
1982). The new HEI was to have come into existence in October 1983. The proposal did 
not receive full acceptance and hence died a natural death. 
CAST, however, which was to be the hub of the proposed system was nonetheless granted 
new authority when its Scheme was revised in 1986 to enable it to grant degrees (The 
Jamaica Gazette Supplement 128A Vol. CIX, Friday, March 14, 1986 No. 25A). CAST 
thence entered the higher education sector. Further development came in 1995 when the 
government decided to grant full university status to CAST and it thereafter became the 
University of Technology, Jamaica (UTech). This was validated in The University of 
Technology, Jamaica Act, 1999 which established Charter Day as September 1995. 
Since UTech, other publicly funded institutions have been allowed to join the HE arena in 
that the UWI has entered into arrangements with some colleges for the joint teaching of 
programmes. These are: 
�	 The Edna Manley School for the Performing Arts, Jamaica for the Bachelor of Arts 
in Dance, Music, Theatre and the Visual Arts 
�	 Mico Teachers' College, Jamaica for a Bachelor of Education in Special Education 
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�	 Shortwood Teachers' College, Jamaica for a Bachelor of Education in Early 
Childhood Education 
As of September 2005 the Mico Teachers’ College will become Mico University College 
affiliated with the UWI. HE in Jamaica has therefore shifted from a unitary system (UWI 
only) to one that is diverse (UWI, UTech and some programmes within the colleges). The 
study will show that the funding model used by the government has not shifted to 
recognise the new entrants to the higher education system. This has led to the first sub-
question of the research, which is: 
5.	 What are the consequences of an unchanged financing model for a system that 
has shifted from a single provider to diverse providers? 
Another peculiarity of the Jamaican HE system is its dual nature. In the case of the UWI, 
Jamaica is only part-owner (regional ownership) while the other institutions are the sole 
responsibility of Jamaica (national ownership). A second sub-question arises also and that 
is, 
6.	 What are the consequences of financing both a national higher education 
system and a regional one? 
The dual nature also resulted in different processes for allocating resources and hence a 
third sub-question is 
7.	 What have been the philosophical underpinnings to the allocation of resources 
to HE in Jamaica? 
The answer to the third sub-question may lead to a fourth and that is, 
8.	 What models are available to the Jamaican government for allocating 
resources to HE? 
Based on the questions raised the objectives of the research were therefore to: 
1.	 Analyse the different HE financing models adopted by Jamaica since 1962 and 
identify the consequences of each. 
2.	 Analyse and identify issues involved in maintaining both a national and regional 
HE system. 
3.	 Identify and analyse the philosophical underpinnings for a Jamaican model. 
4. Recommend, if appropriate, a model suitable for the current Jamaican context. 
Chapter two will address the fourth question and hence it will review the options available 
for the financing of HE and allocating resources to HEI. 
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CHAPTER 2

OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR

FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION

The questions raised in Chapter 1 indicated the need to explore the various methods for 
financing and allocating resources to HE. The purpose of such an exploration is to provide 
a background and possible framework for assessing the various models that were adopted 
by Jamaica. There were two main aspects of the search for an appropriate financing model 
for Jamaica: the extent and method of paying the full cost of education (i.e., tuition, 
accommodation, living expenses and material) and the method of channelling the resource 
from the state to the institutions. The former is the financing method and the latter is the 
resource allocation method (RAM). This chapter focuses on how those issues have been 
dealt with in the literature. 
The question that drove the inquiry of the literature search was the fourth sub-question 
“What models are available to the Jamaican government for allocating resources to HE?” 
The search led first to the broad issue of financing HE and subsequently to the narrow 
focus of how the resources have been channelled to the HEIs. The chapter is therefore 
divided in two sections, namely: 
o Financing options and their consequences 
o Resource allocation options and their consequences 
At the end of each section theories about the issues were identified as forming the bases for 
the assessment of the Jamaican models in chapter 5. 
FINANCING OPTIONS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
The survey of the literature reveals three broad options for financing HE. These are total 
private financing (privatisation), total state financing (tax funding), and shared financing 
between the state and private means. 
Privatisation of HE has as its basis the libertarian view that the primary aim of institutions 
is individual liberty and this is achieved through the operation of the private markets (Barr 
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2004). The absence of the state’s role in education is especially driven by empirical 
libertarians as exemplified in Hayek’s theory of 1944 that the primacy of individual 
freedom, the value of the market and the affirmation that the pursuit of social justice is 
fruitless and harmful (ibid). More specifically there have been three arguments for 
privatisation of HE (Sanyal 1998). The first is the efficiency argument, which states that 
economic efficiency is achieved only if private entities pay directly for the services. 
Brazil, Japan and the Philippines were cited as examples where private university 
expenditure per student was 30–40 percent of that of the public institutions. The second is 
from the quality perspective and suggests that given individual choice, private institutions 
appear to be superior in quality because they are freely chosen when less costly public 
alternatives are available. Sanyal noted that this view was proffered by Schneider (1997) 
who pointed out that in Pakistan a sectarian teacher-training institution was able to increase 
the motivation of the staff and students and improve the work ethics (ibid). The third 
argument is based on equity and stated that where there are resource constraints growth in 
access is only feasible by encouraging demand driven private sector institutions. 
Enrolment rate at a much lower cost, for instance, was increased in Japan and South Korea 
as a result of their reliance on private provisions. Eicher and Chevaillier (2002) pointed 
out that the main reason cited for private financing of HE is guaranteed equity through 
acquired private benefits by way of higher income and social status, greater efficiency in 
consumption, better health, increased political efficacy and greater access to and better 
understanding of culture, science and technology. Notwithstanding the benefits being 
derived by individuals in the consumption of HE, the arguments above are insufficient to 
justify the absence of state funding. The reasons will be revealed as we proceed. 
The socialist viewpoint, with its aim of equality, freedom and fraternity was primarily 
responsible for state involvement in education and in particular, HE. The socialists 
believed that social justice or equality could best be achieved through a totalitarian state or 
egalitarianism. They believed that that the state should be in charge of the production and 
financing of all aspects of education (Barr 2004). 
In recent times state intervention has been proffered in order to achieve market efficiency 
and equity because the market is likely to be highly inefficient and also inequitable to the 
extent that knowledge, power and access to capital markets are correlated with socio-
economic status (ibid.). Barr (2004, p. 293) further stated, “Social welfare is maximised 
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through the pursuit of economic efficiency and social justice (or equity)”. The reason for 
intervention for the sake of efficiency is failure of one or more of the assumptions of the 
“invisible hand” theorem. This states that the market is efficient only in the context of 
pure competition, complete market, absence of market failure and the availability of 
perfect information. The standard assumptions are summarised in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Assumptions of the Invisible Hand Theorem 
Basis Standard Assumptions Results of Failure 
Pure competition o Firms must be price takers 
o All have equal powers 
o Monopolies and oligopolies 
o Discrimination 
Complete market o All goods and services are supplied 
at prices that cover the cost of 
production 
o Missing markets – market 
fails to supply public 
goods. 
o Certain risk are uninsurable 
o Capital market fails to 
provide loans 
o The is no future market for 
skills being developed 
o Absence of complementary 
commodity 
Absence of 
market failure 
o Goods produced are not open to the 
society as a whole for use 
o Utility of the individual is derived 
only from the goods purchased and 
consumed and not from some other 
individual 
o Average cost does not exceed 
marginal cost 
o Public goods – goods and 
services if provided for all 
are opened for use by all 
members of the society 
o Externalities – cost and 
benefits accrue to the 
society as a whole and not 
just to the persons who 
carry out the activity 
o Increasing returns to scale 
Perfect 
information 
o Consumers are fully aware of the 
availability and nature of the goods 
that are produced 
o Inferior goods are produced 
and purchased 
o Consumers cannot properly 
determine price 
o Consumers are uncertain 
about future benefits 
The failure of the assumptions as shown in Table 2.1 has justified state intervention in the 
markets by way of regulations, financing, production and income transfers (ibid.). With 
the issue of social justice, it is believed that inequity occurs because of three countervailing 
pressures: fear of the efficiency losses of high taxation; the fact that the rich generally have 
more power; and the idea that the poor might want some inequality to remain in the hope 
of benefiting if they too become rich (ibid.). 
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Those who therefore justify total state financing of HE usually base their arguments on the 
grounds of efficiency or equity (social justice). Harrison (1997) extracted the issues of 
externalities, social returns, equality of opportunity and equity as the bases cited for total 
state financing of HE. The arguments he identified were as follows: 
o	 Externalities: HE benefits the society as a whole because of knowledge transfers 
through research and development, which lead to improved production techniques 
and increased outputs. This is linked to failure of the assumptions regarding the 
absence of market failure. 
o	 Social returns: Graduates will pay higher taxes as a result of their higher earnings. 
It is therefore assumed that society will be repaid with the additional taxes. 
o	 Equality of opportunity: Social justice demands that government ensures that each 
person in the society is given an equal chance to benefit from HE. Total state 
funding is therefore assumed to ensure that no one is excluded from HE because of 
inability to pay. 
o	 Equity: Equality is achieved if there is redistribution of income from the rich to the 
poor. It is therefore believed that with the state managing the returns from labour it 
is able to redirect resources from the rich to the poor. 
Some economists also point to the production argument to support total financing of HE. 
Accordingly, they have cited evidence to prove that societies with a more educated 
populace are able to produce more effectively and efficiently than those with an 
uneducated workforce. Eicher and Chevailler (2002) pointed to the economists who 
believe that education is a “pure public good”. Barr (2004b) also summarises the other 
arguments for and against total state financing of HE. He calls them the “often-asserted” 
propositions which are the humanitarian, moral, social and fiscal arguments. 
The Humanitarian argument states that HE is a basic right and should therefore be free. 
Barr (2004b) however countered that “Food is a basic right, yet competitive supply at 
market prices is un-contentious. The equity objective is not free higher education, but a 
system in which no bright person is denied a place because he or she comes from a 
disadvantaged background.” The moralist states that it is immoral to charge for education, 
however it is countered that it is also immoral if someone is malnourished but such is not 
an argument for making food free for everyone, including the rich. Malnourishment 
suggests income transfers so that everyone can afford a healthy diet. The Social argument 
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claims that private financing promotes elitism. Barr believes that there is nothing 
inequitable about intellectually elite universities. The equity objective he believes should 
be a system in which the ability of the brightest students to study at the most intellectually 
demanding universities is unrelated to their socioeconomic background. The fiscal 
argument points out that graduates earn more and hence pay more income tax and if future 
taxes are greater than present public expenditure then that justifies public expenditure on 
HE. The opponents of this belief noted that only a quarter of Britain’s revenue is derived 
from income tax and most of it (82%) is from those without degrees 
Barr (2004) also expressed the opinion that even though HE is not a public good and the 
consumers are well informed about the market, it does conform reasonably well to the 
standard assumptions of the “invisible hand” theorem. He, however, did not agree that the 
level of conformity merited total state financing (tax funding). Tax funding he claimed 
was unaffordable, inefficient and regressive. Resource limitations were the reason for un-
affordability. Inefficiency was based on the fact that there were also private returns as well 
as social returns to HE. Since HE was consumed mainly by the more fortunate in the 
society, tax funding was deemed to be regressive. 
The literature revealed that as demand for HE increased and placed a strain on economies, 
the egalitarian argument diminished and increasingly it was observed that universal 
support was unsustainable, and instead of engendering equality, it caused inequity. Vawda 
(2003) argued that public expenditure generally favoured the more fortunate in the society 
because “decisions about the subsidisation of different levels of education are often not 
based on student characteristics and financial need but rather on the number of personnel 
and extent of capital expenditure proposed”. Gradstien (2003) in his analysis of 21 
countries showed that public spending on education was skewed towards benefiting the 
richest sector of the population. This is shown in Table 2.2 where only Panama, Romania 
and South Africa were the exceptions. In all the other countries the subsidy to the poorest 
sector of the population was under 20% and the richest quintile was the one benefiting 
from public subsidy. 
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Table 2.2 Gradstien’s (2003) Analysis of the effects of Educational Subsidy in 21 countries 
Country 
Year 1
st 
– 
Poorest 
2
nd 
3
rd 
4
th 
5
th 
– 
richest 
Armenia 1996 7 17 22 25 29 
Cote d’Ivoire 1995 14 17 17 17 35 
Ecuador 1998 11 16 21 27 26 
Ghana 1992 16 21 21 21 21 
Guinea 1994 9 13 21 30 27 
Jamaica 1992 18 19 20 21 22 
Kazakhstan 1996 8 16 23 27 26 
Kenya 1992/3 17 20 21 22 21 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
1993 14 17 18 24 27 
Madagascar 1993/4 8 15 14 21 41 
Malawi 1994/5 16 19 20 20 25 
Morocco 1998/99 12 17 23 24 24 
Nepal 1996 11 12 14 18 46 
Nicaragua 1993 9 12 16 24 40 
Pakistan 1991 14 17 19 21 29 
Panama 1997 20 19 20 24 18 
Peru 1994 15 19 22 23 22 
Romania 1994 24 22 21 19 15 
South Africa 1993 21 19 17 20 23 
Tanzania 1993 13 16 16 16 38 
Vietnam 1993 12 16 17 19 35 
It is also believed that total reliance on the state for financing HE operated best in the 
context of a centrally-planned economic system. It also hindered the growth in size and 
quality of HE and limited access to the less fortunate (Barr 2003). In Britain the real 
funding per student fell drastically by over 40% between 1980 and 1997; Australia was 
forced to introduce fees in 1989 in order to maintain quality; and the mixture of private and 
public funding of the American universities gave them the edge over their publicly funded 
Canadian counterparts. On the issue of access Barr stated that the argument that “free 
education” promoted access did not stand empirical testing because in 2002, 81% of the 
children from professional backgrounds gained access to higher education in the U.K. and 
only 15% of those from unskilled backgrounds were successful. 
The unsustainability and the inequity of total public financing of HE have therefore led 
many countries to re-introduce private contribution to HE. Increasingly it is recognized 
that HE is of benefit to both the individual and the society, hence responsibility for 
payment should be shared. The most recent description of the joint responsibility is called 
cost sharing (Johns et al 1983; Psacharopoulos 1995; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002; 
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Bevia and Iturbe-Ormaetxe 2002; The Investment Payoff 2005; Ziderman and Albrecht 
1995; Higher Education: The Lessons of Experience 1994). Currently, in most countries, 
tuition fee payment is the main topic for discussion, with Germany and the Scandinavian 
countries resisting its re-introduction (Kaiser et al 2003). 
The human capitalists and the public economists also support private as well as tax funding 
for HE. In addition to the social returns, the human capitalists believe that education has a 
private return to which the beneficiary should contribute. This is exemplified in Eicher 
(1998) who stated, “Education is an investment in man. It increases his productivity and 
hence his earnings. A rational person will therefore determine his level of studies so as to 
maximise the difference between cost and benefits and one therefore cannot see why the 
main beneficiary of the investment should not take part in its funding.” The public 
economists believe that “in countries where public powers have a strong control over the 
institutions, fees increase their autonomy and their capacity for innovation” (ibid). They 
also believe that private contribution can be effective in three ways: coordinating the 
demand and supply of education in the various disciplines; motivating students to study as 
the effects on their pockets would discourage inefficient use of university resources; 
perform the function of price in informing about the perceived value of programmes 
(Kupper 2002; Ziderman and Albrecht 1995; Eicher and Chavaillier 2002). Cost sharing 
however does not by itself solve the problems of market efficiency and equity and so this 
has led to sub-options. These will now be addressed. 
Having accepted joint financing of HE, the next issue has to do with the methodology to 
determine the share of the funding and the level of fees to be charged to students. This has 
given rise to debates about capacity to pay and state intervention in the setting of fees. 
Carlson (1992) cited by Ziderman and Albrecht (1995) offered the methodology used of 
“affordability” as a means of determining fees as he thought that it should be based on the 
capacity to pay. He used the disposable income of the students’ household and the earning 
potential of graduates to calculate “affordability”. In assuming that 10% of the average 
household’s income was disposable and 10% of a graduate’s future income was a suitable 
contribution, he estimated that students could contribute 28% of the direct cost of HE and 
15% in the case of the poorest 30% of the population. Ziderman and Albrecht (1995, p 40) 
pointed out that the weakness in the methodology was that “the use of 10% of household 
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income to measure affordability is based on reasonable assumptions rather than on 
objective measurement of willingness to pay”. 
The alternative mode of addressing capacity to pay was to measure the price elasticity of 
demand for HE. The methodology measured the extent to which increase in tuition fees 
affected access to HE. Several empirical studies showed that the demand for HE is 
inelastic in relation to tuition fees. This meant that a moderate price increase would not 
discourage enrolment and would result in increase revenue (Ziderman and Albrecht 1995). 
Leslie and Brinkman (1988) found that in the USA the elasticity coefficient was -0.62, 
which suggested that a 10% increase in tuition fees would cause a decline in enrolment of 
6.2% (ibid.). 
Price elasticity was discounted on the grounds that it only measured the response to tuition 
fees and not the total cost. Also it did not explain the effect of price changes on the poorest 
sector of the society. Stager (1989), as cited by Ziderman and Albrecht (1995), adjusted 
for other costs such as books and accommodation and determined a coefficient of -1.46 
meaning that a 1% increase in the total cost of HE would result in a 1.5% decline in 
enrolment. The demand for HE was therefore determined to be elastic in relation to total 
cost. Studies also revealed that the poorest group was most responsive to increases in 
tuition fees. Gertler and Glewwe (1989) (cited by Ziderman and Albrecht 1995, p. 41) 
revealed that in the case of Peru “the poorest 25% of the population was about three times 
as sensitive to price changes as were the richest 25%”. Barr (2003, p. 8) described the 
issue of the responsiveness of the poorest group to HE costs as the equity problem: 
“Upfront charges are also inequitable. Better-off families can pay charges directly; and 
even a cash-strapped middle-class parent can borrow on good terms using family home as 
security. Thus, the options for borrowing are best for those who need them least”. 
The equity problem has been used to justify governments’ use of price control in HE. 
Britain, for instance, does not allow flexible fees for HE but mandates a flat fee regardless 
of institution and programme. Eicher (1998) suggests that price control is the wrong 
solution for the equity problem and that it should be addressed through targeted assistance. 
Mingat et al (1985) also argued for targeted support to needy students as the more effective 
means of dealing with the equity problem. They believed that “cost recovery in higher 
education, coupled with the use of the public resources thus freed to expand lower levels of 
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education, would probably result in an unequivocal enhancement of equity in the education 
sector as a whole” (ibid, 12). 
The discussion on the mitigating circumstances to relieve the equity problem has led to 
proposals about a loan and/or selective bursary scheme to reduce the financial hardships of 
needy students, graduate tax (GT) and income contingent loans (ICL) (Johnes and Johnes 
1994; Eicher 1998; Financing Higher Education in Eastern and Southern Africa 2002; 
Creedy 1994; Jacobs 2002; Barr 2003; Kupper 2002). Gracía-Peñalosa and Wälde (2000) 
pointed out that GT is a public loan, which is repaid over the span of the beneficiary’s 
working life. The difference with the ICL was that repayment started only after the 
recipient’s income has reached a certain level, annual repayment varied with salary level 
and repayment stopped once the loan and interest has been fully repaid. 
The Australian system of the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), adopted in 
1989 has been cited as the most developed form of income contingent repayment scheme 
in existence. This is a deferred charge system where students repay a cost of their 
education after graduation and in proportion to their earnings (Karmel 1998; Chapman 
2001; Chapman and Ryan 2002). Chapman and Ryan 2002 concluded from their study 
that HECS result in an overall increase in participation in HE and that it did not decrease 
participation of the prospective students from relatively poor families. They also pointed 
out that the success of a deferred payment scheme such as HECS was dependent on an 
appropriate administrative mechanism. According to them, success was dependent on a 
unique income identification system to accurately record individuals’ income over time 
and also an efficient collection mechanism. That was because of the propensity of humans 
to avoid repayment obligations. In the absence of these, they emphasised, income 
contingent approaches will not work. 
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DECIDING ON AN OPTION 
If efficiency and equity are the grounds for state intervention in HE then total state 
financing of HE could prevent those problems only in the context of a centrally-planned 
economy. It also follows that privatisation of HE can only occur in the context of perfect 
market competition and that joint private/public financing is suitable under imperfect 
market conditions. This, therefore, leads to the conditions precedent for deciding which 
option to choose for financing HE. This is summarised in Table 2.3. The model proposes 
that in order for an option to be considered feasible certain preconditions must be met. 
Thereafter the path and eventual outcome could be plotted on the decision tree, Figure 2.1. 
According to Table 2.3 the conditions precedent for privatisation of HE are those of perfect 
market conditions where the private and social rates of return would have to be in 
equilibrium so that all programmes would have an equal chance to be demanded. There 
would also have to be freedom of access to any provider of HE services. There should also 
be no barriers to entry for anyone wishing to provide the service. All the conditions listed 
in the privatisation row are derived from the assumptions of the invisible hand theorem. 
The table also suggests that the conditions necessary for total state financing are those 
associated with a centrally planned environment. In the centrally-planned system the state 
controls the total resource requirements of the HEIs to ensure that there is a proper balance 
between the societal needs for high-level trained individuals and the availability of these. 
Cost would be controlled through the employment practice of university staff being 
employees of the state as well as the enrolment management. Another intention of state 
control would be to prevent the equity problem and this would be prevented by placing 
limits on private benefits as individuals would be prevented from earning a premium for 
their educational qualification. 
Recent developments have indicated that central control has proven to be inefficient, 
producing moral hazards as individuals are not encouraged to be productive. Albrecht 
(2003) pointed out that Germany with a highly-centralised system had a very low 
completion rate with a 4-year degree taking a student, on average, 7 years to complete. 
The system also favoured the more affluent as 59% of the students enrolled were from the 
upper or upper middle class and only 13% were from the lower class families. State 
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control also results in loss of academic freedom. This will be discussed more fully in the 
section on governance. 
Table 2.3: Conditions and Results from Financing Options 
Options Conditions Precedent 
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� Free market conditions - social and private rate of returns are in equilibrium 
� No price control - institutions are allowed to determine the fees to be charged 
� The state does not offer any support to HEI 
� Subsidy may be granted to students in the form of vouchers to attend institutions 
of their choice 
� No state accountability mechanism either to supervise or control 
� Freedom of access for all education service providers 
� Staff are employees of the individual institutions and not the state 
� Institutions are free to compete for students and research grants 
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� Total state control of educational planning and the education productive processes 
o Detailed planning done only by the state 
o HEIs operate as agents of the state 
o Enrolment controlled by the state (matriculation requirements and 
quantity) 
o HE staff are employees of the state 
o State dictates staffing needs of HEI 
� No market competition 
o State organises staffing on rational bases to ensure no advantage over 
particular institutions 
o Salaries and wages determined by the state 
o Uniform wage rates regardless of job function in the HEIs 
o Employers not allowed to compete for graduates 
o Graduates are not paid higher salaries than non-graduates 
o No distinction among the HEIs on the basis of quality 
� No resource constraints 
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� Disequilibria between social and 
private rates of return to higher 
educational offerings 
� Market based accountability model 
� Students are allowed free choice of 
institutions 
� Staff are employees of the 
institutions and conditions of service 
are decided on between the 
institutions and staff 
� Institutions determine their own fees 
� Government determines its 
contributions independent of 
institutions’ fees 
Upfront Charges 
� Severe budgetary constraints 
Mortgaged Type Loan Programme 
� Institution specialising in lending for 
human capital development 
� Large enough capital fund for the loan 
programme 
� Labour market certainties 
Income Contingent Loan Programme 
� National budget can manage upfront 
cost of university operations 
� Taxation system is able to track all 
citizens throughout their lifetime 
� Information to encourage participation 
from low-risk high return graduate 
� Opting out provision for early 
repayment 
� Provision for society to absorb risk for 
non-payment 
Graduate Taxes 
� Mandatory participation 
� Efficient income tax collection system 
In the absence of the centrally-planned or the perfect market conditions state subsidy is 
expected to maintain the benefits, both social and private, of HE. The interventions 
options are upfront charges, upfront charges with loans for the needy, loans with income 
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contingent repayment schemes or loans with graduate taxation. The choice of any of the 
sub-options would be dependent on the preconditions outlined in the third row of Table 
2.3. The general preconditions for shared costs of HE under the imperfect market are state 
supervision, students’ freedom of choice, institutions’ autonomy and government’s 
freedom to determine its level of contribution. 
Barr (2003) also suggests that central planning and control are more applicable to a total 
state-funding regime. In assessing the UK, he determined that there was a contradiction in 
policy when he compared the financing policy to “a wedding and four funerals” – one of 
the funerals being the level of central planning which negated the benefit of the 
introduction on an ICL scheme (the wedding). He stated that “in good communist 
tradition, the central planner determines both price and quantity” and that “in the same 
tradition, control is heavily bureaucratic”. When price (fee) is left to be determined by the 
players in the market then the interplay will lead to efficiencies. The institutions therefore 
should be left to set their own price based on their perception of quality and the demand for 
their services. Government, based on its own resource limitations, can determine the 
extent of its support; and the students, based on their expectation of future benefits, can 
decide how much to pay to cover the difference between the institutional charges and the 
government’s provision. 
The discussion so far, with the sub-options, only addresses the mechanism for pricing and 
quality; however it does not address the equity problem, the case of adverse selection and 
the moral hazard that would result. Countries favouring upfront charges for their students 
are those who have severe budgetary constraints, as they are unable to provide the advance 
funding. While up-front charges are designed to address the institutions’ need for funds it 
does not address the equity issue which arises from students of less advantaged 
background being unable to access HE. The provision of a loan for needy students also 
has problems because of the risks associated with non-payment resulting in high-risk 
premium. Regular financial institutions are not structured to lend for the purpose of human 
capital development as they have taken a risk averse position of collateralised lending. 
The uncertainty and intangible nature of further earnings also creates difficulties for this 
type of lending. 
ICL and GT are considered equity participation schemes to avoid the ill-effects of the 
mortgage type loan scheme. They reduce the cost of risk by risk pooling among 
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participants and risk shifting to society. Risk pooling is possible because the higher 
income participants absorb the cost of the lower earners and those unable to pay. Risk 
shifting is when the society, as in the case of the Australian system, absorbs the cost of 
those in default. Jacob (2002), however, thinks that there are still the potential problems of 
adverse selection and the moral hazard. The problem of adverse selection occurs when 
there are too many high risk-low return graduates and the low risk-high return graduates 
opt out of participation. Moral hazard arises when beneficiaries do not exert enough effort 
to avoid default on payments. Jacob (2002), however, offered four solutions which are: 
1.	 Government generating information on the risk characteristics, abilities and 
motivation of students so that the problem may be tackled directly. 
2.	 An opting out clause as is the case of the Australian system where low risk high 
return students will be provided with an incentive to participate. The opting out 
clause would be made possible if there were a fixed limit to the default premium, 
hence repayment would not be larger than the principal plus the interest. Early 
settlement would therefore be encouraged. 
3.	 Allowing the cost of default to be borne by the society thereby separating 
repayment conditions from risk-characteristics, preference and abilities of the 
students. 
4.	 Making participation obligatory so that low risk students are forced to participate. 
Jacob’s proposals therefore dictated the preconditions for ICL and GT. GT, Gracía-
Peñalosa and Wälde (2000) concluded, is more efficient and more egalitarian than ICL 
because it avoids reverse redistribution. For GT to work, however, there must be 
mandatory participation. ICL, however, can be built with the option for early exit thereby 
avoiding adverse selection and the moral hazard. In any case the preconditions specified in 
Table 2.2 are necessary. 
ICL are therefore best suited for avoiding the moral hazard and adverse selection and GT is 
the best solution to avoid reverse redistribution but it has to be based on mandatory 
participation. Both ICL and GT require an efficient income tax monitory system to ensure 
compliance. They also are dependent on the country’s ability to provide funds in advance 
to the HEI and depend on an efficient collection system to recoup this advance. Those 
countries that are unable therefore, to provide this mechanism, are advised to resort to the 
traditional loan mechanism to assist the less advantaged of the society. 
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The framework of preconditions can therefore be used to guide the process towards a 
financing option for HE of a country. The decision tree as per Figure 2.1 outlines the path 
available. If the conditions associated with central planning and the monopolistic market 
are fulfilled then the state can take the path of “no tuition” and full financial support for 
HE. When the conditions for perfect market competition exist then the path of 
privatisation may be followed. In the case of partial public subsidy, a country has to 
decide whether to have upfront charges or deferred payments. In the case of upfront 
charges there must be a loan scheme to assist the needy. The choice of the type of loan 
scheme will be dependent on the country’s ability to manage the risk of non-payment as 
this would have to take precedence over the desire to deal with the equity problem. 
Figure 2.1- Decision Tree for a Financing Option for HE 
Financing HE 
State Support 
Total State 
Support 
Free 
Education 
Partial State 
Support 
Cost 
Sharing 
Up Front 
Charges 
Students 
with Problems 
Loans 
Mortgaged 
Type 
Income 
Contingent 
Students 
without Problems 
Pay Fees 
Deferred 
Payment 
Graduate 
Tax 
Loans 
Mortgaged 
Type 
Income 
Contingent 
No State 
Support 
Privatisation 
It is acknowledged that states do not, as a matter of course follow the path suggested by the 
decision tree. This is usually because they are more driven by political and ideological 
reasons. The point is, however, being made that if the issues of equity, efficiency and 
resource availability are the driving forces then the decision tree will suggest the path. 
The options available to the Jamaican government for financing HE are privatisation, total 
state financing and allowing those who derive direct benefits to make a contribution. 
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There are preconditions to each option and these are outlined in Table 2.3. The ability to 
satisfy the precondition will determine the path to take on Figure 2.1. The figure also 
illustrates that with the path of upfront charges the society would be faced with students 
who would encounter no problems and those who would not be able to find the upfront 
sums. Assistance could be meted out to the students with problems by the provision of 
loans, whether mortgaged typed or income contingent. The literature also suggests that 
ICL is the preferred option to deal with the equity issue without causing moral hazard or 
adverse selection. 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION OPTIONS AND THEIR

CONSEQUENCES

A decision for state involvement in the financing of HE leads to the other issue of the 
method to channel support to the HEIs. Chevaillier and Eicher (2002) pointed out that 
public funding exerts influences on the functioning of HEIs according to the manner in 
which the funding reaches them. As such, they opined, there is a search for the best 
funding procedures that would stimulate the type of behaviour most desirable. For this 
reason consideration of any RAM must involve analyses of the philosophical 
underpinnings used to influence the functioning of HEIs. The literature reveals several 
debates which will now be discussed. 
Initial Approaches to Resource Allocation in HE 
Michael (2002) phrases the first debate in terms of political funding strategy versus 
formula funding strategy. The political funding strategies, Michael pointed out, were 
“characterised by negotiation and responses to critical stakeholders’ wishes” and 
allocations were made according to an institutional political base, institutional negotiating 
strength and unpredictable circumstances. Ziderman and Albrecht (1995) classified all 
situations “where transfers are not related to objective institutional criteria as ‘negotiated’ 
allocations procedures.” According to them, in that process “decision making does not 
depend on specific institutional characteristics (such as the number of students enrolled) 
but much more so on political relationships between actors”. Three types of negotiated 
systems identified were: 
i.	 Incremental budgeting – Institutions receive a flat increment on their previous 
budget. 
ii.	 Ad hoc negotiations – bilateral agreement between institution and government 
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body. 
iii. Fixed revenue agreement – agreement to release to institutions a fixed percentage 
of revenue. 
The common feature among the three was that there was little relationship between the 
activity of the HEI and the funding that was received. “Changes in activities, such as 
enrolment increases, do not necessarily translate into funding increases, nor do funding 
increases necessarily imply taking on new activities” (Ziderman and Albrecht 1995, p. 
112). It is difficult to classify incremental budgeting and fixed revenue agreement as 
negotiated RAM because they are mathematically derived and not subject to regular 
changes. The original basis could have resulted from negotiations but so do the 
components of any formula. This study therefore views negotiated funding as that which 
results from bilateral agreements between the state and the institution, is for a specific 
period and has no rational structure. 
The point was also made that negotiated funding “enables the government to maintain a 
high degree of political control over the university system as a whole as well as over 
individual institutions” (ibid. p.108). Such a system provides no incentive for efficiency 
and does not enable HEIs to be adaptive to the labour market or students’ demand. In 
Brazil for example, between 1983 and 1988 the Federal Government’s contribution to HEI 
remained constant while the enrolment fell by 7%. Ziderman and Albrecth (1995, p.114) 
therefore concluded that “while negotiated funding has been the dominant form of funding 
for universities in the developing world, it has not served higher education well”. They 
also expressed the view that many of the problems encountered did not stem from the 
funding approach per se, but from restrictions on the receiving institution’s ability to 
control its operations. In some cases restrictions were placed on enrolment and ability to 
seek additional funds to supplement declining government income and to redeploy 
resources to be efficient and responsive to changing external demands. 
Michael (2002) opined that the Political Funding Strategy violated the principle of 
predictability because allocations are subjected to political wind and there may be little or 
no logic between institution’s allocations. He also thought that the approach was attractive 
to ambitious politicians and institutional leaders with a large political power base. 
In addressing the issue of predictability and objectivity in funding, the formulaic 
approaches were introduced. The aim was to eliminate subjectivity as the allocations were 
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to be based on quantitative factors. Formulaic funding “is simply an algebraic expression 
of the relationships among quantifiable factors for the purpose of apportioning funds 
among different institutions” (Michael 2002). Based on this definition, Ziderman and 
Albrecht’s three-fold classification of negotiated funding was rejected and incremental 
funding and fixed revenue agreement were determined to be formulaic funding models. 
With incremental funding the expression is as follows: 
TA1 = Y0 * r (2.1) 
Where TA1 = Total allocation for year 1 
Y0 = Previous year’s allocation 
r = Rate of increase 
The expression for fixed income agreement may be written as follows: 
TA = NI * p (2.2) 
Where NI = National income 
p = Percentage contribution 
Weiler (2000) pointed out that formulaic funding was focussed initially on input factors 
but increasingly have moved in the direction of output indicators. Other examples of 
formulaic RAM from the opposite viewpoint of input and output are given below. 
i. Based on inputs (The Australian Relative Funding Model) 
P1 = B/S * G1 (2.3)

TA = �(P *S) (2.4)

Where P1 = Price per student in cluster 1 
B = Pre-determined macro-budget 
S = The number of weighted students 
G1 = The weight of students in cluster 1 
ii. Based on outputs (Denmark’s Taximeter Model) 
TAa = � {Ss(Ts + Os +Ps )} (2.5) 
Where TAa = Total allocation for institution A 
Ss = Successful students per field of study 
Ts = Tariff for teaching per field of study 
Os = Tariff for joint costs per field of study 
Ps = Tariff for practical training per course of study 
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Orr (2002) believed that formulaic funding “replaces politicised decision-making 
concerning the higher-education budget with programmed decision-making determined by 
an agreed data input.” As such, he concluded that it resulted in a stable, reliable and 
transparent procedure for allocating funding. On the negative side, however, Orr (2002) 
opined that it offered little flexibility and proved difficult to implement in places where 
there was the absence of reliable data. Michael (2002) also observed favourable and 
unfavourable consequences of formulaic funding. Advantages included the fact that it 
enabled uniformity in the institutional variables, it led to budget simplification, it could be 
used for bench-marking and it reduced funding conflicts, politicking and budgetary 
uncertainties. The disadvantages included rigidity, over-reliance on quantitative factors, 
and maintenance of historical inequity, linear interpretations and homogenisation of the 
HEI. Weiler (2002) adds that formulaic funding serves as a communication tool as its 
structure conveys governments’ priorities. The characteristics and consequences of the 
initial debate on resource allocation are summarised in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 - Negotiated Funding versus Formulaic Funding 
Characteristics Consequences Examples 
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� Results of bilateral 
agreement 
� No consistency 
from year to year 
� No discernable 
quantitative basis 
for allocation 
� High level of political control 
� No incentive for efficiency 
� Not adaptive to students’ needs 
� Unstable - Arbitrary allotment 
� No predictability 
� Input funding not 
based on any set 
quantifiable factors 
� Guyana where 
proposals for 
expenditure have to be 
submitted annually for 
approval 
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� Algebraic 
expression based 
on quantitative 
factors 
� Political control is limited to the 
manipulation of the initial factors 
� Could by its structure offer 
incentives for efficiency 
� Stable 
� Reliable 
� Transparent 
� Predictable 
� Fixed income funding 
� Incremental budgeting 
� Input funding based 
on quantitative factors 
� Output funding 
Formulaic funding by itself does not address all the issues related to the funding of HE. 
This is illustrated in the example of Honduras where the constitution provided for 6% of 
the total expenditure of the country to be allocated to the National Autonomous University 
of Honduras (UNAH). The university continued to offer courses that were not relevant to 
the labour market or students’ demands, its administrative staff ratio to total expenditure 
was 50% while 0.1% of its budget was used for purchasing books. The result was that the 
middle class was attracted to the expensive private institutions. 
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Operations Management Contribution 
The discipline of operations management has offered some factors as bases for computing 
resource allocation. Operations management is “the systematic direction and control of the 
processes that transform inputs into finished goods and services” (Krajewski and Ritzman 
1993). In the educational system there is often confusion between “inputs”, “process” and 
“outcomes”, hence the necessity for clarification. Layzell (1998) pointed out that the 
teaching workload is sometimes wrongly classified. For instance, many states of the USA 
use it as a performance measure but “while this is an important measure of institutional 
resource use and says something about an institution’s internal budget process, it does not 
say anything about institutional outcome.” “Output” is related to “input” and “process” 
and can be considered as the result of input and processing, hence the formula: 
INPUT + PROCESS = OUTPUT 
Jackson and Lund (2000: 33) developed a table outlining the production process. In it they 
identified the outputs as “students” and “staff.” Students were identified in terms of 
completion rates, academic standards, employability and progression to further study. 
Staff members were identified in terms of teaching and administrative workload. In 
agreement with Layzell, the framework of Jackson and Lund was adjusted to exclude 
staffing as an educational output. Research was also added to the list to compete the HE 
production components (see Table 2.5) 
Input versus Output RAM 
Operations management has raised the debate about the benefits of input and output 
methods of resource allocation. Chevaillier and Eicher (2002) phrased the operations 
management debate in terms of activity-linked funding as against results-based funding. 
Activities they defined as “inputs” and results are viewed as “outputs”. 
Activity-linked funding seeks to allocate resources to the institution by focusing on the 
microfactors of production of the education process. The microfactors are: 
�	 Human resources for instruction, research and administrative support (inclusive of 
salaries, fringe benefits and professional profiling) 
�	 Travelling activities 
�	 Provision of materials 
�	 Overheads 
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� Provision of Equipment and furnishing 
� Maintenance activities for plant and equipment 
According to this model funding is allocated on the basis of estimated costs for the 
educational inputs (Ziderman and Albrecht 1995). 
Table 2.5 - Framework of the Higher Education Production Process as Adopted from Jackson and 
Lund (2000) 
Inputs Process Outputs 
Matriculated Students entering Induction to the programme 
the higher education system /learning environment 
Staff - FT and PT establishment, Design of curricula and 
individual and collective assessment 
expertise, experience, Teaching and learning, e.g., 
qualifications (both academic and strategies and methods; 
teaching), age, recruitment, effectiveness, innovation 
appointment, induction, Student guidance and support, 
preparation for teaching and e.g., academic and personal tutor 
development systems, careers advice, 
handbooks and other information, 
project supervision Promoted Students – those who 
have been successful at one level 
and are qualified to move on to 
Physical resources, e.g., Student record system, e.g., the next level. 
accommodation, facilities, recording and reporting 
specialist equipment, library and achievement 
information technology resources 
Financial resources, e.g., cost Management and 
Graduates – those who have 
completed all the stages and 
receive certification 
per student, cost per staff administrative systems 
External inputs, e.g., Review and evaluation process, 
involvement of employers, use of e.g., peer review, student 
external facilities or equipment feedback, employer feedback 
Research problems, ideas and a 
priori methodologies 
Empirical work – Data 
collection and analysis; testing 
and/or development of hypotheses 
Research publications 
and results 
Balderston (1995, p. 156–157) categorises “line item” or “object classes” as a form of 
input model of resource allocation. Layzell (1998) classifies “incremental” or “historic 
adjusted budgeting” as well as “formula budgeting” under the input model because they 
are “needs based” and result in a focus on what goes into the educational process. In 
incremental budgeting, the government begins by allocating to each university a certain 
sum based on past experience and then discusses how much increase or decrease to be 
effected in the coming year (Massy 1996, p. 38). Layzell (1998) has a limited view of 
formula budgeting as he defined it as “a mathematical basis for requesting and/or 
allocating funds to institutions of higher education, using a set of cost and staffing factors 
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in relation to specified inputs”. According to this definition, all forms of formula funding 
are input RAM. As discussed earlier, initially formulae were based on input factors but 
this has long since changed. Ziderman and Albrecht (1995) committed the same error as 
Layzell when they classified formula budgeting as one their three types of input-based 
RAM along with line-item budgeting (LIB) and program budgeting 
Output models of resource allocation distribute funds to institutions according to targeted 
outcomes. In its simplest form, output RAM seeks to fund institutions by the number of 
students attaining a particular level. Funding would be the product of the successful 
students at an agreed rate. “Performance-based budgeting” according to Massy (1996) is a 
form of output RAM and is more complex. Jones (1997) stated that with performance-
based budgeting “resources flow only after the recipient of the funds can demonstrate that 
a specific outcome has, in fact, been produced.” Carter (1994) lists four characteristics of 
performance-based budgeting (Layzell, 1998): 
1.	 It presents the major purpose for which funds are allocated and sets measurable 
objectives. 
2.	 It reports on past performance and uses common cost classifications that allow 
programmes to be compared rather than focusing on line comparisons. 
3.	 It offers management flexibility to reallocate money as needed and provides 
rewards for achievement or penalties for failure. 
4.	 It incorporates findings from periodic programme evaluations that are supported by 
credible information that can be independently audited. 
El-Khawas and Massy, unlike Ziderman and Albrecht (1995) describe the UK system as an 
output model (Massy 1996). They concluded that the U.K. system: 
�	 Focuses on assessable outcomes rather than plans, promises and assertions 
� Divides the assessment work into separate educational and research components. 
HEFCE (2003, p. 13) pointed out that the future year’s amount may be adjusted if the 
institution “failed to meet the requirements of their funding agreement … This usually 
arises because institutions are unable to recruit or retain the number of students for which 
the previous year’s grant was allocated”. This claw-back mechanism definitely illustrates 
that the English system is based on outputs rather than input. 
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Kaiser et al (2001) informs us that Denmark instituted an output RAM in 1992 which was 
called the “taximeter-model” where funding was directly linked to the number of students 
who passed their exams. The 1995 evaluation revealed that there was more focus on 
students’ need as a result of output funding. The 1998 evaluation showed that even further 
improvements were made to the system, as there was an increased focus on “value for 
money”. It was observed that managers were more eager to find the best offer when 
buying new equipment or choosing a bank, unprofitable activities were more rapidly 
discontinued, and the institutions had improved their ability to adjust and take new 
initiatives, whereas before the reform they would often wait and do nothing until a real 
crisis occurred. 
Ziderman and Albrecht (1995) proffer three adverse consequences of input RAM. 
According to them, 
1.	 It could affect the access policy of HEI because funding is linked to enrolment of 
matriculated students hence it could result in an open-ended commitment on behalf 
of the government. The governments would then be forced to reduce the unit cost 
to control expenditure. In turn, the institutions would increase capacity in order to 
maintain funding levels and eventually would grow beyond their capacity, which 
would result in the lowering of quality. 
2.	 It fails to provide incentives for efficiency because unit costs are not set against 
cost norms to outputs nor are there any incentives to reduce costs. 
3.	 It leads to problems with respect to responsiveness: the government determines 
supply, hence the institutions were unconcerned with market demands, 
homogeneity among institutions was promoted, and research budgets for small 
institutions may be restricted when the same criterion is used to determine both 
teaching and research. 
Ziderman and Albrecht (1995) could only draw on the experience of the Netherlands 
which was experimenting with output RAM. According to them the Netherlands was able 
to cut the drop out rate of HEI from 50% to 20% between 1987 and 1983. Joseph Burke 
(2002) noted that in the USA, linking performance to budgeting took two different forms; 
namely, performance funding and performance budgeting. Performance funding was tied 
to results while performance budgeting was where past performance was used as a factor to 
determine the budget for a future period. Based on the distinction, Burke determined that 
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19 (38%) states in the USA practice performance funding and 27 (54%) practice 
performance budgeting. He also examined the arguments for and against performance 
funding. The favourable factors were that it did the following: 
o	 Added performance as a factor in state funding, hence resulted in the states linking 
funding to qualitative and quantitative factors of student learning or services. 
Institutions then are encouraged to become more effective and efficient in the use 
of resources and more responsive to the needs of students. 
o	 Linked planning and budgeting unlike funding for inputs where budgeting and 
planning were disconnected. 
o	 Urged state officials to identify their priorities and encouraged dialogue with 
campus leaders. Institution and policy makers are willingly focussed in the same 
direction. 
o	 Fostered both external accountability and institutional improvement. 
o	 Pressed campuses to become more client - and less provider-centred. 
o	 Centred attention on undergraduate education. 
o	 Rewarded good – and penalized poor – campus performance. 
o	 Decentralized authority without loss of accountability. 
o	 Stimulated concern with institutional as opposed to individual performance. 
Burke also examined the arguments against performance funding as practiced in the USA 
and concluded that the criticisms were focused on the means and implementation rather 
than the ends and goals. In relation to the specific arguments, Burke rejected five of the 
nine arguments and offered mitigating reasons to explain the others. Table 2.6 is a 
summary of the criticisms and Burke’s responses to them. Points 2, 3, 5, 6 & 7 were 
refuted and mitigating reasons were offered for point 1, 4, 8 & 9. 
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Table 2.6 - Burke's Responses to the Critics on Performance Funding 
Burke’s Responses 
1. “The absence of acceptable direct measures of student 
learning outcomes explains in part the heavy emphasis on 
process indicators as surrogates for educational quality.” 
2. Some critics take the concept of diversity too far when 
they claim that each campus is unique. 
7 of 11 states use indicators to distinguish the mission of 
the 2 year against the 4 year institutions 
Subject HE to shifting state 
priorities 
Favours traditional over non-
traditional campuses 
Produces budget instability 
Punishes the poorest institutions 
Combines the incompatible 
purposes of external 
accountability and institutional 
improvement 
Creates excessive costs for data 
collection and analysis 
Stresses efficiency over quality 
Arguments 
Fails because of the difficulty of 
assessing results in HE 
Diminishes campus diversity 
3. The average change is small (1–6%) and the setting of 
weights, standards and scoring reduces the possibility of 
budget swings hence “the fear of budget instability really 
represents more anxiety than reality”. 
4. Moving resources from institutions with poor performance 
may make improvement difficult. A programme where 
loss of funds would come only after repeated failure to 
improve would reinforce the idea that campuses are 
competing more against their own past performance rather 
than other campuses, would mitigate this issue. 
5. External accountability and institutional improvements are 
not incompatible but complimentary as both share the 
ultimate goal of improved performance.  The argument is 
therefore not valid. 
6. The benefits outweigh the costs (NPEC 1997) 
7. The choice of indicators does not support this charge. In a 
study it was revealed that 64% of the indicators related to 
undergraduate education and 10% to economic and 
workforce development. 
8. Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky and Minnesota dropped 
their performance funding programmes because of political 
shifts and changing priorities 
These, however, were the exceptions rather than the rule. 
The priorities are not new as they have always been 
concerned with efficiency and effectiveness. 
9. The dearth of information about the non-traditional 
campuses has been the cause rather than the funding 
mechanism. 
Quality and the Operations Management Debate 
Operations management also linked the matter of quality to resource allocation. Table 2.7 
summarises the inputs and outputs links to the quality of HE. It specifically groups the 
tangible and the less tangible aspects of how to judge the quality of inputs as against the 
quality of outputs (Massy 1996, p.58). 
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Table 2.7.  Inputs and Outputs of Higher Education According to Massy (1996 p. 58) 
Tangible Less Tangible 
Inputs New students matriculating 
Faculty time and effort 
Students time and effort 
Staff time and effort 
Building and equipment 
Quality and diversity of matriculation students 
Quality of effort put forth by faculty 
Quality of effort put forth by students 
Quality of effort put forth by staff 
Quality, age, and style of building; age and quality 
of equipment 
Outputs Library holdings 
Supplies, travel, etc. 
Student enrolment in courses 
Degrees awarded 
Research quality: awards 
Quality of library holdings 
Quality of education obtained 
Quality of education obtained 
Quality of research performed; articles and 
citations 
Service to the general public Quality of services rendered 
In considering the two aspects of quality as shown in Table 2.7 the difficulty in judging 
quality is seen. For instance, when looking at the tangible elements of staff time as could 
be depicted from work schedule, it is not as easy to determine the quality of effort put in by 
staff. 
Harvey and Knight outlined five views of quality of which “the exceptional view” judges 
quality on the performance of the input factors and the “value for money view” relies on 
the end product for its judgement. The quality of inputs does not necessarily result in the 
same quality of outputs because there may be problems in the processing. There is, 
however, no uncertainty about ex post judgment of a finished product. The value for 
money view therefore provides a better basis for judging quality. This supports Layzell’s 
(1998) suggestion that input RAM ignores quality as it focuses on the “cost to continue.” 
Performance RAM, on the other hand is merit-based and by rewarding improvement in 
outputs it forces more to be done with less. 
There is the argument, however, about the “quality trap” which implies that to allocate 
resources to an institution for good performance and punish another for failure would 
result in the good being better and the bad being worse. The bad would be starved of the 
resources necessary for the improvements. Sir Howard Newby, Chief Executive of 
HEFCE, reiterated this view in an address to the first cohort of students of the DBA in 
Higher Education Management at the University of Bath (February 17, 2003). In answer 
to a question, he pointed out that unlike the allocation process for research; HEFCE limited 
the use of quality factors for allocating resource for teaching because it would result in 
punishing the students who were not at fault. In the case of research, he further stated that 
it was only the institution that suffered as a result of poor assessment. This view could 
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lead to a preference for an input RAM because it seems to stress the point that in order to 
improve quality, funding would be placed on the input factors of the educational 
production process.  A similar view was detected in the British Government’s white paper 
“The Future of Higher Education” (2003) which proposed a rebalancing of funding based 
not only on research and student numbers but on the strength in teaching.  The document 
also proposed individual rewards for teaching excellence.  The effort therefore could result 
in a reliance on input factors in the resource allocation system for British HE.   
Burke (2002) pointed out that the difficulty in linking quality to performance rests with the 
inability of the performance indicators to “capture fully the essential but elusive character 
of quality in higher education”.  Massy (1996, p. 318) believed, however, that one cannot 
simultaneously pursue high-assay investment, avert the consequences of poor performance, 
and contain unit costs.  Something must give, he stated, and that something depended on 
the expected academic unit’s behaviour and the restructuring environment within which 
the resource was embedded.  This is outlined in Table 2.8, which gives the effects of 
performance funding. 
Table 2.8 Effects of Performance Funding (Massy 1996, p.320) 
Funding v. performance No Discretion 
( A) Q = Design Q 
Departmental Discretion on Quality 
( B) Q = Frontier ( C) Q < Frontier 
No linkage with 
performance 
Incentives don’t matter 
Fails on investment 
criterion 
No incentive for 
maintaining Q 
Fails on investment 
criterion 
No incentive for 
maintaining Q 
Fails on investment 
criterion 
Positive linkage with 
performance 
Incentives don’t matter 
Partly meets investment 
criterion 
Provides incentives for 
exemplary Q 
Partly meets investment 
criterion 
Provides incentives for 
exemplary Q 
Partly meets 
investment criterion 
Symmetric linkage with 
performance: rewards and 
penalties 
Incentives don’t matter 
Fully meets investment 
criterion 
Can’t fall into the “quality 
trap”. 
Provides full incentives 
Fully meets investment 
criterion 
Can’t fall into the “quality 
trap”. 
Provides full incentives 
Fully meets investment 
criterion 
May fall into the 
“quality trap”. 
Massy suggested that: 
1. In a heavily centralised environment where the institution or academic unit had no 
discretion about quality, it did not matter what form of RAM was used, as 
incentives did not matter.  Input RAM creates this type of environment. 
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2.	 Where there is no link to performance, there is no incentive to either maintain or 
improve quality. 
3.	 Linking funding to performance (i.e., output RAM) provides incentives to maintain 
and improve quality. 
4.	 Offering reward and penalties however, would result in the quality trap in cases 
where there were insufficient insights about quality and the requisite services 
needed to support the growth of quality consciousness. Massy (1996, p.322) 
suggests that in such a case, an effective quality program alongside the symmetric 
performance-based funding, could mitigate the problem of the quality trap. 
Table 2.8 therefore suggests that in order to assess the effects of any RAM on quality it 
would be necessary to ask two questions 
1.	 What is the HEIs’ level of discretion of quality? Are they operating at or below the 
quality frontier? 
2.	 Does the RAM support the HEI discretion on quality? 
Figure 2. 2: Orr’s Trajectories and Congruence of a Coordination Framework 
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Orr (2005) points to a link between RAM and the quality assurance mechanism (QAM). 
According to him, funding provides a steering function for the HEIs and the QAM 
performs a mapping function (i.e., to clarify or explain the performance of universities). In 
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order to properly indicate the effects of the funding on the quality of the institution it was 
necessary that both complemented each other. For this reason the type of QAM should 
correlate with the funding method. This is explained by Orr’s trajectories and congruence 
of a coordination framework, Figure 2.2 
On the vertical axis were plotted the funding methods and the QAM was on the horizontal 
axis. The RAM and the QAM were divided in three groups each. The discretionary 
budget was the first RAM and included all forms of funding methods whereby the State 
allocated by way of detailed input methods. The other methods were performance and 
voucher. Input control QAM correlated with discretionary budgeting as it judged the 
effects of the funding on the input mechanisms. Compulsory accreditation systems were 
classified as input control QAM because with it the state established input standards 
against which it judged the universities. Such a system Orr explained has the disadvantage 
of the state stifling innovation if the standards are too conservative. Also there is no way 
of measuring when the funding is sufficient as the HEI diverts its efforts away from the 
accredited courses. This has resulted in the move to more output control measures 
whereby the university is responsible for producing a particular number of graduates, 
which are funded by the state. As such output QAM is congruent to performance funding. 
Voluntary accreditation systems were classified in the marketing category of QAM. This 
is because the university may choose to participate in order to place itself better in the 
market. This system is more suitable for a voucher system in order to inform the students 
about the better institutions. The coordination framework leads to the Orr questions about 
assessing RAM and quality. These are: 
1. Does the funding method correlate with the method of quality assurance? 
2. Does the quality assurance method enhance the information provided via the 
funding method, or is it just bureaucracy? 
The Orr framework therefore suggests that the RAM and QAM need to be correlated in 
order for judgement to be expressed on the use of the funding. Massy, however, makes a 
more direct link as he believes that performance funding could in some circumstances lead 
to improvements or maintenance of quality. 
Productivity and the Operations Management Debate 
Operations management has also introduced the concept of productivity to the resource 
allocation discussion. Bok, Zemsy and Massy (Cited by Massy 1996) pointed out to the 
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Hungarian government that incremental budgeting has mainly negative incentives because 
it gave university officials no reason to effect savings since reduction in expenditure led to 
reduced state appropriations. As a result officials would be inclined to spend all the money 
they received, whether they needed it or not, and exaggerate their problems and needs in 
order to receive more money in the future. Such a system also contains no incentive to 
consolidate or shut down inefficient programs. 
The traditional way of measuring productivity in HE which has been the use of input 
factors such as staff/student ratios and the amount of funds spent on the different operating 
elements such as libraries, research and administration, have often been quoted (Winkler, 
1990; Massy, 1996). Productivity is defined as “the ratio of output to input in an 
organisation” (Price & Mueller, 1986 cited by Massy 1986). This definition is for a single 
output/input environment. For the multiple input/output environments, however, Massy 
(1996) defines productivity in terms of benefit to costs as per equation hereunder: 
Productivity = 
Total cost 
This leads to Blackman and Wolff’s (1989) idea of gross productivity, which is “the 
number of units of output produced per unit of input, with no attempt to adjust for any 
accompanying changes in product quality” (ibid). Output RAM influences the numerator, 
hence its increase, with the denominator being constant, results in an increase in 
productivity. By focusing on output the Government could exercise the market function by 
adjusting its purchase-contract prices and quantities in response to changes in absolute or 
relative institutional performance (ibid). Input RAM affects the denominator, therefore, its 
increase, with the numerator being constant, signifies a decrease in productivity. The logic 
of the mathematical argument of productivity therefore proves that controlling outputs is 
better for influencing productivity rather than for controlling inputs. 
Accountability and RAM 
Accountability is “the obligation of institutions to report to others, to explain, to justify and 
to answer questions about how resources are being used and to what effect” (De Boer and 
Goedegebuure in File and Goedegebuure 2003, p.212). The public needs to ensure that the 
institutions’ budgets are not overspent thereby requiring further appropriations, funds are 
not inappropriately used, and the cost of education is not unnecessarily high. Massy (1996, 
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p. 38) cautioned that “without accountability institutions have tilted too far towards 
research and scholarship, failed to adapt to student aspirations and needs, and paid too little 
attention to efficiency.” A relationship has been detected between the models of 
accountability and resource allocation. Ferlie et al (1996) cited five models of 
accountability which are further placed in two broad categories. The link between the 
accountability models and RAM is depicted in Table 2.9. Concerning the concept of 
accountability to staff, Ferlie et al reported that in a National Health Service survey this 
concept received poor ratings. They also determined that the problem with the downward 
accountability had to do with the absence of a mechanism to ensure compliance with 
stakeholders’ views. The classical public administration model and the market-based 
models were the ones with some form of traction. These will be assessed against the type 
of RAM. 
Table 2.9: The Link between Accountability and RAM 
Base Sub-
Categories 
Traits Links 
with 
RAM 
Type of Control 
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Accountability 
Upwards 
Classical public administration 
doctrine 
Local decision makers are 
regarded as agents of those 
who appoint them 
Input Ex ante control system 
which include state 
regulated admissions 
requirements, curriculum, 
examination system, staff 
employment and revenue 
and expenditure, 
Accountability 
to Staff 
Board members are 
accountable to the professional 
groupings 
Input Professional dialogue and 
representation on governing 
boards 
Accountability 
Downwards 
Influence and responsibility 
are devolved  
Input Informal dialogue and stake 
holder meetings 
M
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The New 
Rights Model 
Citizens are viewed as 
consumers 
Output Ex post factors judged 
against quantified standards 
Management 
by Contract 
Providers of services are held 
accountable to their purchasers 
through agreed contracts 
Output Ex post based assessment 
against contract 
Careful monitoring of the inputs has been the traditional form of accountability as per the 
classical public administration doctrine but as Massy pointed out governments are moving 
away from this system and relaxing line-item control. The U.S. system was quoted as an 
example where chancellors, in an atmosphere of severe appropriations cuts, were able to 
negotiate the change from LIB by pointing out that they could not be held responsible for 
making the university more efficient without the power to allocate and reallocate resources 
internally. Accountability and micromanagement do not mix because when decisions 
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about the quantity of input are taken at the governmental level, institutions can shift the 
blame for reducing quality of outputs (Massy, 1996). 
Accountability was the original reason proffered for state management of HE but on the 
other hand, as Jongbloed (File and Goedegebuure 2003) pointed out, the trend towards 
institutional autonomy has been accompanied by a demand for more accountability. Both 
could be achieved by output funding because “reduced state intervention in operational 
matters implies that governments are less concerned with how funds are spent (on inputs) 
and increasingly interested in the achievements (the outputs) produced from the funds.” 
Thomas (2001) suggested, that in the English system accountability started with the 
financial agreement between the funding body (HEFCE) and the institution receiving the 
funds. The financial agreement is in broad terms and implies a weighted volume of 
activity, which is being funded against the resource being allocated (HEFCE 2003). If 
funding is provided for additional places and the institution fails to recruit as targeted, then 
funding is reduced. This, however, is subject to a second chance being given to enable the 
institution to overcome start-up difficulties. By so doing HEFCE ensured that additional 
resources led to increased activities. Input RAM, however, does not guarantee increased 
activities. As was pointed out with the German system, spending more on inputs did not 
result in educating more students. The output models therefore provide better bases for 
accountability because they offer mechanisms for benchmarking and judging results. A 
system of ex post control which judges institutions by results against contracts or standards 
therefore provides a better basis for taking action. 
Accountability and its relationship with resource allocation must also be judged in the 
context of the governance and management systems adopted by a country because it is the 
glue which ties the two together. The relationship between the four is illustrated in Figure 
2.3. Both the RAM and the method of accountability inform each other. Accountability 
balances the conflict between governance and management and the RAM supports both. 
The rationale for this statement will become clearer in the ensuing discussion. 
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Governance Accountability Management 
RAM 
Figure 2.3: The Relationship between Accountability, RAM, Governance and Management 
Governance and the Accountability Perspective on RAM 
Peril and Promise (2000), a World Bank Task Force review of HE in developing countries, 
stated, “the term ‘Governance’ indicates the formal and informal arrangements that allow 
higher education to make decisions and take action.” The report also distinguishes 
between external and internal governance. The former has to do with the relationship 
between the HEI and its supervisors and the latter with the lines of authority within the 
institution itself. This description projects governance as a plan, but it could also be 
viewed as an interactive relationship among actors and this is born out by Boer and 
Geodegebuure (File and Goedegebuurre 2003) who defined Governance as “the structure 
of relationships that brings about organisational coherence, authorised policies, plans and 
decisions”. Balderston (1995, p.55) brought both aspects together as he defined 
governance as “the distribution of authority and functions among the units within a larger 
entity, the modes of communication and control among them, and the conduct of 
relationships between the entity and the surrounding environment.” 
The nature of the financing relationship with the HEI has often caused problems for its 
decision making and policy framework as society wrestles with the issues of funding and 
control. Academic independence is usually a cherished phenomenon in universities and 
this independence has been seen as necessary in order for the organisation to continue to 
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generate knowledge in teaching and research as well as the conscience of the society. 
According to the Columbia Encyclopaedia’s definition, academic freedom is “the right of 
scholars to pursue their research, to teach, and to publish without control or restraint from 
the institutions that employ them.” On the other hand there is the matter of accountability 
for the expending of funds. The battle between academic independence and public 
accountability is therefore brought to light in Shattock’s (1983) statement that “universities 
may be autonomous self-governing corporations but in budgetary terms they are firmly tied 
to a comprehensive system of government resource allocation and expenditure control.” 
For many years it was thought that input RAM, negotiated budgeting and earmarked 
funding offered the best means of balancing the conflict between management and the 
governance elements of the HE system. However, these have proven inefficient and 
problematic for administration. The system of governance associated with these funding 
models has been described by Peril and Promise (2000) as state control. The report noted 
that many developing countries have gravitated toward state control, as they believe that 
governments are entitled to control systems that they fund. State control of higher 
education however has tended to undermine many major principles of good governance 
because the direct involvement of politicians has generally politicised higher education, 
widening the possibilities for corruption, nepotism and political opportunism (ibid.). The 
alternative governance system suggested is state supervision where the state is responsible 
for broad policies and national direction, and channels its resources in support of its stated 
policies. Under such a system funds are allocated to achieve results, levels of funding are 
determined by objective factors and institutions are at liberty to gain from efficiency 
savings. With these RAMs, governments do not get involved in the minute details of the 
institution’s expenditures as it plays the role of a consumer by procuring the finished 
product at an agreed rate. Faulkner (Zeghal, 1999) pointed out that this system is a form of 
management control which when accompanied with efficiency-oriented measures of 
performance, permits government decision making to choose those programs that will most 
effectively meet its objectives. The HEFCE system of allocating resources to institutions 
using the criteria of enrolment modified by retention, subject rating, unit prices, and quality 
factors, prevents intrusion into an institution’s detailed internal affairs by the funding 
mechanism. By using this model the government focuses on controlling the cost of the 
output (educated students) without being accused of meddling in the internal affairs of the 
institutions it supports. 
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Management and the Accountability Perspective on RAM 
RAM must support the management principles that govern an institution. Therefore, the 
method necessary for accountability should also be compatible with both the RAM and the 
management principles. As societies move towards state supervised system of HEI 
governance, universities find themselves operating in increasingly complex environments, 
which require strategies to strengthen their competitive positions while satisfying students’ 
demands and achieving various quality and performance targets. Leaders of these 
institutions cannot therefore just move with the tide but have to be able to be proactive and 
responsive to service demands. Strategic management, “that set of managerial decisions 
and actions that determines the long-run performance of a corporation” (Wheelen and 
Hunger, 2002, p.2) has become the preferred mechanism to cope with the increasing 
complexity of managing HEI. Wheelen and Hunger (2002) reiterate Chandler’s (1962) 
view that changes in corporate strategies lead to changes in organisational structure. 
Chandler posited that as new strategies were created they stretched the old structure to the 
limit hence new structures had to be created to deal with the new situations. HE 
management systems that are dependent on state control cannot be responsive to changing 
circumstances, as they have to await instructions to act. 
Strategic management can best be practiced in an atmosphere of flexibility, as it requires 
organisations to be responsive to calls of the business environment for change. RAM that 
is bureaucratic and does not support quick decision-making can therefore destroy the 
strategic intent of an organisation. Michael (2002) proposed the “strategic funding 
approach” which could enable HEIs to operate from a strategic management perspective. 
This approach he stated is “based on a long-term projection of the state’s needs and 
direction (economic, social, medical, political, etc.) and the determination and allocation of 
resources to these needs/directions while institutions are free to align themselves with the 
state’s priorities to the extent that they want state’s resources”. The problem with the 
approach, he noted however, was the state’s inability to sufficiently and effectively make 
long-term strategic forecasts. He therefore suggested the “adjustable formulae funding 
strategy” that would allow a portion of the funding approach that is quantifiable to be built 
into a formula, the portion that is political to be handled politically, and the portion that is 
strategic to be handled strategically. In any case the point is made that the development of 
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RAM must take into consideration the thrust for strategic management in HE and the fact 
that this is not supported by input-based, negotiated or line item budgeting. 
RAM that is concerned with objectives and targets and leaves it to the discretion of the 
institution to adopt the relevant strategies and choose the necessary inputs to achieve the 
objectives is the preferred choice. It is understood that in setting strategic objectives, an 
institution would take into consideration government’s policy as well as market demands. 
The government can maintain its influence by linking its support to specific outcomes. 
Hence by using RAMs that are output-based, formulaic and issued as block grants, 
governments will be able to avoid placing stumbling blocks in the strategic path of the 
university while at the same time achieve its political objectives. 
Vilalta (2001) gives an example of the Catalan University system in Spain, which had 
shifted to a programme-based contract formula, which in turn opened the way to a system 
of financing and control of academic outputs for universities in the region. The positive 
results he cited were respect for and promotion of: 
o A new framework for relating with government. 
o Funding based on the results. 
o Predictability in allocation. 
o Promotion of dialogue between government and universities. 
o Possibility of introducing benchmarking mechanisms into the university system. 
o Transparency of the results of universities’ activities. 
o Basis for accountability to society. 
All the above suggest that an output-based RAM invariably leads to a flexible management 
system and market-based accountability. He pointed out, however, that without care in 
designing the accountability structure there could be the following pitfalls: 
o Problems in defining common indicators. 
o Annual revision could lead to inter-institutional mistrust. 
o It could provide a mechanism for extreme competition between universities. 
o It could lead to problems of budget restrictions under conditions of austerity. 
The HE governance authority and its management have to be held accountable for the 
resources which it is allocated and accountability is the factor that balances both 
governance and management. Therefore, any assessment of accountability must take into 
consideration the extent to which the system enables both governance and management. 
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The following questions therefore need to be answered in assessing for accountability in a 
RAM: 
1.	 Type of control: What are the bases on which the state examines the use of the 
resources? Does it use ex ante or ex post factors? 
2.	 Accountability model: What accountability model is used? Is it politically or market 
based? 
3.	 Type of governance system: How does the state monitor the HEIs use of resources? Is 
it a state supervised or state controlled system? 
4.	 Management system: 
a.	 Does the RAM enable independence in the internal planning of the HEI? Does 
the HEI have to await government response before new initiatives? 
b.	 To what extent does the RAM provide the management of the HEI with 
certainty about the availability of the resources? 
c.	 To what extent can management predict the amount to funding to be allocated? 
Earmarked Versus Blocked Grant Debate 
The notion of accountability has also led to the discussion of whether the funds granted 
should be earmarked or issued as blocked grants. Jongbloed (in File and Goedegebuure, 
2003) described earmarked funding as that which can only be used for specified objectives. 
Funds that are not used for the particular expenditure or activity must be returned to the 
funding authority. With blocked grants, on the other hand, the institution can “decide for 
themselves how to finance their operations to produce the intended outcomes”. Line item 
budgeting has been cited as the best example of earmarked funding. This type of funding, 
Sanyal (2002) described, was where the institution receives funding by expenditure 
categories (line-item) such as personnel, investments, teaching, material, travel expense 
and building maintenance. Examples of countries which practice earmarked funding are 
France, Germany, the Czech Republic, China, Nigeria, and Uganda. The provider of the 
funds would consider every detail of inputs in order to have them valued and such costing 
would in turn determine the amount of funds to be provided. Monitoring thereafter is by 
controlling the expenses. The process is illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
In this system the central authority controls the income and approves expenditure by 
objects or activities. The operating units are only responsible for expending the funds 
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according to the approval limits. Expenditure variance reports are most important in this 
system as they provide the information for the monitoring exercise. 
Gobbels-Dreyling (2003) stated that the German system with a strict use of earmarked 
funding depended on a structure of ex ante control to determine adequate use of funds. 
The state regulated the admissions requirements, the framework of the curriculum, the 
examination system and the employment and salary scheme of the staff and the revenue 
and expenditure of the HEI. The system resulted in increased public and political control 
in the 1960s and 1970s and eventually ended with direct state intervention in the internal 
processes of the institutions. The level of inefficiency that resulted in the system was 
shown in the fact that while enrolment was declining expenditure was increasing. It was 
therefore concluded that a complex system like higher education cannot be regulated and 
Figure 2.4: The Processes of the Input RAM 
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controlled centrally because the state’s intention to guarantee the proper spending of funds 
was counteracted by the attempt to regulate in detail (ibid.). 
Of line-item budgeting and its object class which determine the funding, Balderston (1995, 
p.157) stated, “the trouble with the object-class budget is that it is almost completely 
devoid of any conceptual representation of what the institution is doing”. The main 
problems therefore with earmarked funding are that it offers no incentives for efficiency 
gains, it stifles initiative, and it causes encroachment on institutional autonomy. Little 
wonder then that Weiler (1998) stated “no change in higher education financing has been 
more consequential than the change from line-item budgets to block grants (lump sums). 
In the overall move towards greater autonomy … this shift has been the single most 
important factor”. The most significant steps in the transition to block grant funding, 
which Weiler further identified, were allowing universities to use funds from unfilled staff 
positions to cover operating expenditures in teaching and research; allowing limited 
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transfers between line-items; and selecting a number of instructions for pilot projects to try 
out more encompassing schemes of block grants. 
From the experience of the USA Weiler (1998) points out that with block grant funding 
government was able to conceal budget cuts in the total allocation; it enabled performance 
to be tied to specific objectives rather that expenditure demand it resulted in the 
establishment of conditions for a successful autonomy-accountability relationship in the 
education system; caused the debate about the evaluation of outcomes which includes 
indicators for completion rates in different programmes, research productivity, 
employment record of graduates and the number of scholarly awards; and provided the 
opportunity for cross-subsidization between programmes so that the savings in one can be 
invested in another. With the proper framework Weiler suggested blocked grant funding 
appears to be better suited for HE financial administration. 
Accountability-Resource Allocation Link 
The discussions above suggest that the market-based accountability model is consistent 
with the state supervisory governance system as well as the model of management by 
initiatives. It is also consistent with the intention of blocked grant funding. Conversely the 
upward politically-based accountability model is consistent with the state control 
governance system and the model of “rule-led management”. Rule-led management means 
that the HEI administration is unable to take decisions but either has to consult with 
documented instructions or some superior authority. It is also suggested that the RAM 
dictates the accountability-governance-management model. Input-based RAM, whether it 
is negotiated or formulaic, dictates politically-based accountability along with state control 
governance and rule-led management. Output-based RAM, however, suggests market-
based accountability along with state supervised governance and management by 
initiatives. The relationship is illustrated in figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5: The Accountability-Governance-Management Relationship 
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Economist’s Perspective 
Economics is the “study of the means by which societies allocate scarce resources” 
(Friedman, 1994). As such, economists have generated a debate about the interaction 
between demand and supply in RAM of HE. The issue from the perspective of this 
discipline is whether resources to HE should be demand or supply side driven. According 
to Kaiser et al (2001, p.25) demand-driven funding must be seen in the context of the 
introduction of market type mechanisms in public sector institutions. The argument is that 
by providing the client (student) with a limited amount of funds, he being aware of the 
scarcity will behave like a critical consumer and use the funds efficiently. 
They also opined that the criterion to be used to determine the market function of a RAM 
is the question “who receives the resources from the public authorities to fund teaching 
activities?” As such, they believe that the voucher system, where students are given 
negotiating instruments to take to the institutions of their choice, is the only demand side 
RAM. Another criterion suggested for making the distinction was to use the “money 
follow” concept. As such enrolment driven funding could be classified as demand side 
funding since “Students may influence the budget of higher education institutions by their 
choice of programme (voting with their feet)” (ibid. p.27). Kaiser et al counteracted this 
idea by pointing out that this was an insufficient base and other conditions for free market 
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success must also be present. Those were free access of suppliers and customers, market 
transparency and the existence of a price mechanism. Ziderman and Albrecht (1995) 
conclude from a different perspective that demand-side RAM is the voucher system. They 
made a distinction between the criteria for funding and the context within which the 
funding decision is made. According to them input and output funding occur in more 
restricted environments – where institutions are not allowed to distinguish themselves on 
the basis of price, to deploy their resources where they see fit, or to control their 
enrolments. A loosening of these restrictions shifts the system from direct to indirect 
funding. As a result they deemed student-based funding as an adjusted input-based 
funding system, in which student’s choice is the main determinant (ibid.). This study 
accepts the view that the voucher system is the purest form of demand-side RAM, 
however, in an imperfect market the government can use enrolment to determine the level 
of resources to allocate to an institution to assist consumers (students) to address the 
distortions of the market. The money follow student concept though not demand-driven is 
a mechanism to address the inequity in the allocation of funds between institutions. 
Chile, in its 1981 reform, experimented with the voucher system. Brunner and Briones 
(1992) (ibid) revealed that in the Chilean experience: 
i. There was no evidence that it influenced quality 
ii. Inefficiencies remained as the students/staff ratio continued to be high 
iii. Access was biased in favour of the upper income sector of the population. 
They also cautioned that the voucher system could lead to the lowering of quality as 
students would gravitate to institutions of low standard and offering an easy route for 
completion; it would also result in problems for countries where the labour markets do not 
operate smoothly and also undermined the undertaking of costly but essential programmes. 
Palacios (2003) mentioned that economists advocated the voucher system because it 
increases consumer sovereignty thereby increasing efficiency in the education market and 
could be used to target particular social groups, thereby increasing access. Regarding the 
the weaknesses, he stated that it was costly to administer and was susceptible to abuse as 
the case of the Individual Learning Accounts program in the UK proved. Second, it could 
result in adverse public perception about the transfer of funds to private entities. In the 
USA he mentioned, “a major obstacle to the introduction of voucher-like systems is the 
perception that public funds are being used to sponsor religious activities.” 
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FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING A SUITABLE RAM 
The debates on a suitable RAM for HE have been as follows: 
1. Negotiated versus formulaic funding 
2. Input versus output models 
3. Earmarked versus blocked grants 
4. Demand-side versus supply-side driven 
Figure 2.5 depicts the flow, which shows that formulaic funding is preferred to negotiated, 
variable formulae is preferred to fixed formula, output is considered better than input 
RAM, blocked grants is preferred to earmarked funding and supply-driven funding is more 
appropriate than demand-driven funding. 
The accountability-productivity-quality discussion and its result in the Operations 
Management Matrix (see Table 2.10) provide the answer to the first two debates. The 
notion that block grant funding supports output RAM, rewards efficiency and provides 
management flexibility without compromise to accountability worked in favour of that 
type of arrangement. The imperfect market conditions under which education operates, 
however, suggest that the choice of a demand-side funding model (the voucher system) 
would not lead to improved efficiency or quality and could affect access to HE for the less 
advantaged. 
Figure 2.5 summaries the conclusions from the literature. It is concluded that RAM has 
three components namely, transparency/productivity, institutional flexibility and market 
control. The transparency component dictates how the funds are determined, the flexibility 
aspect conveys the extent to which the institution at its own discretion is at liberty to 
redirect the funds as it sees fit and the market control element determines whether it is at 
the command of the client (student) or the producer (institution). The diagram is also 
conveying that formulaic funding has two aspects: variable and fixed. An example of 
fixed formula funding is that which states a percentage of national income for HE. In the 
variable situation the funds vary with an aspect of the productive process, either enrolment 
or graduates. Table 2.10 shows the factors that must be examined when considering the 
transparency/productivity element of the RAM discussion. 
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Figure 2.5: The RAM Debate Pendulums 
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Table 2.10: The Operations Management Matrix for the Choice of a RAM 
Type of Treatment of Accountability Incentives for Efficiency Views of Quality Forms 
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Politically Based - Upward View 
�	 Ex ante control 
�	 State control governance system 
�	 Political based approach using the agency model 
�	 Central planning – lead to massive bureaucracy and 
political control 
�	 Restricts managerial action 
�	 Subjectively determined basis 
�	 Internal planning hampered by uncertainty and 
unpredictability 
Subjectively Determined Exceptional View 
�	 Quality does not 
matter 
Politically-Based - Upward View 
�	 Ex ante control 
�	 State control governance system 
�	 Political-based approach using the agency model 
�	 Central planning – leads to massive bureaucracy and 
political control 
�	 Unresponsive managerial to students needs 
� Expenditure based 
Market-Based – The New Rights Model 
�	 Ex post control 
�	 State supervised governance system 
�	 Links planning to budgeting 
�	 Addresses external accountability and institutional 
improvement concurrently 
�	 Authority decentralised without loss of accountability 
�	 Pushes states to identify their priorities and encourage 
dialogue with institutional leaders 
�	 Results in responsive management to students’ needs 
No Incentive 
�	 Open-ended commitment for 
government if based on 
enrolment 
�	 Increased funding does not 
signal increased productivity 
Incentives for Efficiency 
�	 Rewards good and punishes 
poor performance 
�	 Institutions gain from timely 
completion rates 
�	 Stimulates concern with 
institutional as against 
individual performance 
Exceptional View and 
Fitness for Purpose 
�	 Quality does not 
matter 
Value for money view 
�	 Rewards quality 
and penalises poor 
results 
�	 Quality trap where 
there is no 
consciousness 
about quality 
�	 LIB 
�	 Programme 
budgeting 
�	 Relative 
funding 
�	 Performance 
budgeting 
�	 Performance 
funding 
�	 Taxi-meter 
model 
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CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter the financing options as well as the RAM alternatives were examined. It 
was determined that the choice of a financing option was dependent on a country’s ability 
to satisfy the preconditions associated with each – Table 2.3. In the case of the RAM, the 
preferred model was one that was formulaic, based on output factors, and granted to the 
institution as an unrestricted blocked grant. The choices were based on assessments of the 
RAM against accountability (governance and management inclusive), efficiency and 
productivity. 
Chapter 3 will outline the methodology that was used to gather the data. A summary of the 
data will be presented in the chapter and the analysis against the frameworks outlined in 
this chapter will be done in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The objectives of the chapter are to 
�	 Outline the approach to the research and explain the reasons for taking such an 
approach 
�	 Explain how the approach led to the specific strategies of the research 
� Outline and explain the techniques that were used to gather and analyse the data. 
The section on “Approach to the research” addresses the first objective, “Research 
Strategy” addresses the second objective and that on “Empirical Stage” addresses the third 
objective. 
APPROACH TO THE RESEARCH 
Having identified the research question it was then necessary to develop a framework for 
conducting the study. In designing the framework the researcher contended with 
seemingly opposing approaches as e.g. typified by Creswell (2003) and Punch (2000). 
Creswell (2003) believes that before a framework can be drawn the researcher has to 
consider the knowledge claim that is being brought to the study, the strategy of inquiry to 
be used, and the specific methods of collecting and analysing the data. Such 
considerations, he contends, would enable the researcher to identify whether to use 
quantitative, qualitative or mixed method approaches in the inquiry. Figure 3.1 illustrates 
Creswell’s view. 
Punch on the other hand, does not believe that all social research has to begin from the 
theoretical perspective and epistemology. Research may proceed from the more pragmatic 
approach of questions that need answers, or problems that need solutions (Punch, 1998 and 
2000). Figure 3.2 illustrates Punch’s process. 
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Figure 3.1: Knowledge Claims, Strategies of Inquiry, and Methods Leading to Approaches and 
Elements of Inquiry 
Alternative knowledge 
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Figure 3.2: Punch (2000) Simplified Model of Research (Without hypotheses) 
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The foundation of Creswell’s view was Crotty (1998) who posited four questions in the 
designing of a research proposal. These are: 
1. What methods do we propose to use? 
2. What methodology governs our choice and use of methods? 
3. What theoretical perspective lies behind the methodology in question? 
4. What epistemology informs this theoretical perspective? 
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Crotty defines the terms used as follows:

Methods: The techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse data related to some

research question or hypothesis.

Methodology: The strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice and

use of particular methods and linking the choice and use of methods to the desired

outcomes.

Theoretical perspective: The philosophical stance informing the methodology and thus

providing a context for the process and grounding its logic and criteria.

Epistemology: The theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical perspective and

thereby in the methodology.

Creswell combines epistemology and theoretical perspective and argues that by stating a

knowledge claim a researcher starts a project with certain assumptions about how he would

learn and what he would learn during the inquiry. He further categorises the four schools

of thought about knowledge claims, which are summarised in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Creswell (2003, p 6) Alternative Knowledge Claim Positions 
Post­positivism 
Determination 
Reductionism 
Empirical observation and measurement 
Theory verification 
Constructivism 
Understanding 
Multiple participant meanings 
Social and historical construction 
Theory generation 
Advocacy/Participatory 
Political 
Empowerment issue-oriented 
Collaborative 
Change-oriented 
Pragmatism 
Consequences of actions 
Problem-centred 
Pluralistic 
Real-world practice oriented 
Each knowledge claim and its link with a choice of research approach are hereunder 
explained. According to Cresswell (2003), the key assumptions of the post-positivists are 
that knowledge is conjectural and absolute truth can never be found; research is the process 
of making claims and then refining or abandoning some of them for other claims more 
strongly warranted; data, evidence and rational considerations shape knowledge; research 
seeks to develop relevant true statements that can serve to explain the situation that is of 
concern or that describes the causal relationships of interest; and being objective is an 
essential aspect of competent inquiry. Consequently Creswell concludes that the post-
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positivist’s perspective leads to quantitative research methodology, hence its reliance on 
experiments and surveys. 
Constructivism is described as the belief that all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful 
reality, is contingent upon human practices being constructed in and out of interaction 
between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an 
essentially social context (Crotty, 1998). From this perspective, the goal of research would 
be to rely as far as possible on the participants’ views of the situation being studied 
(Creswell, 2003). This perspective and knowledge primarily leads to a qualitative research 
methodology because of its reliance on the views of the participants. Included would be 
ethnographies, grounded theory, case studies, phenomenological research and narrative 
research. 
Creswell’s third alternate knowledge claim is called an advocacy or participatory form of 
inquiry, based on the belief that participatory action is recursive or dialectical and is 
focused on bringing about change in practice; is focused on helping individuals to free 
themselves from constraints such as those found in media, language, work procedures and 
relationships of power in educational settlings; is emancipatory as it helps to free people 
from the constraints of irrational and unjust structures that hinder self-development and 
determination; and is practical and collaborative because it is completed with others rather 
than “on” or “to” others. Methodologies associated with the advocacy view of knowledge 
claims are feminists’ perspectives, racialized discourse, critical theory (empowering human 
beings to transcend the constraints of race, class and gender), queer theory (advocating 
sexual preference) and disability inquiry (concerned with equal opportunities for the 
disabled). 
For the pragmatist, knowledge claims arise out of action, situations and consequences 
rather than antecedent conditions. Rossman and Wilson (1985) (cited by Cresswell 2003) 
are pragmatists who believe that the research problems take precedence over methods in 
terms of importance. Creswell’s (2003) interpretation of Murphy (1990) about the 
pragmatists’ knowledge claims and their links with research methods are that there is no 
single system of philosophy and reality as researchers can draw liberally from all 
methodological assumptions; and researchers have freedom of choice, hence they can draw 
from the various methods, techniques and procedures of research that best meet their needs 
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and purposes; the world is not an absolute unity, therefore an inquirer can use many 
approaches to collect and analyse data; and truth is regarded as what works at a particular 
time and not based on a strict dualism between the mind and a reality completely 
independent of the mind. The pragmatic investigators can for these reasons, he opines, use 
both qualitative and quantitative data because they work to provide the best understanding 
of the research problem. Creswell therefore concludes that pragmatism opens the door to 
multiple methods, different worldviews, and different assumptions, as well as to different 
forms of data collection and analysis in the mixed methods study. Consequently the 
dependence is on mixed methods research which utilises both quantitative and qualitative 
data collection and analysis in one study. 
Punch (2000), in refuting the role that perspectives play in informing research, makes the 
points that adopting a particular perspective could possibly influence the discourse and 
methods of the research and the way the research questions are asked. The issue of 
perspectives he further argues is applied unevenly across the social sciences and the role 
and importance of perspective are interpreted differently because at the doctoral level it is 
of more concern than at the master’s level. Also when it comes to assumptions about the 
social world, and what constitutes proper techniques and topics for inquiring into that 
world (i.e., paradigm), some areas of social research are heterogeneous and pluralistic 
while others are homogeneous. Punch further points out that some areas of research are 
subject to paradigm disputes more than others. Educational research, he states, is 
heterogeneous and contested while psychological experiments are homogenous and 
relatively free of debates. As a consequence of this, Punch (1998) concludes that research 
should begin from the more pragmatic approach of questions that need answers and 
problems needing solutions. He further makes the point that some research may proceed 
from some particular perspective (e.g. feminist studies, critical theory studies or a 
particular post-positivist study). However, when that is the case, the researcher should 
identify the perspective early and clearly in order to avoid mistaken expectations on the 
part of the reader. 
This author concurs with Punch for the following reasons: 
1.	 Though Creswell used the pragmatic knowledge claim to justify the use of mixed 
approaches to research, he did not establish that there is a necessary link between a 
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particular knowledge claim and the choice of methodology. Punch’s view that the 
research question leads the researcher to the choice of a strategy is – in the author’s 
view – more convincing. 
2.	 The unresolved debates between the post-positivists and the constructivists show 
that there are considerable problems if researchers decide on an epistemology 
before structuring their study. 
3.	 Allowing the research question to determine the methodology provides a better 
basis for the claim of objectivity in the research process. 
The agreement with Punch was a main reason for the design of the research project as 
illustrated in Figure 3.3. The first tasks in the pre-empirical stage were to clarify the 
problem and define the research questions. It was then decided that the type of answer for 
the questions being asked could best be determined from a qualitative research strategy. 
The strategies of data collection and analyses were thereafter determined. 
It can be seen that the framework used (Figure 3.3) differed from Punch’s model (Figure 
3.2) in two ways. First, the literature review was not done at the beginning forming a part 
of defining the problem. Second, the activities in the empirical stage followed a circular 
rather than a linear pattern. The reasons for these differences will be addressed in the 
section on the strategy of the research. Figure 3.3 shows that there were eight main tasks 
to the research. They were: 
1.	 Assessing the research problem 
2.	 Defining the research question 
3.	 Determining the strategies for data collection and analysis 
4.	 Collecting the data 
5.	 Coding the data 
6.	 Developing the tools for the analysis 
7.	 Doing the analysis 
8. Formation of theories: answering the question 
The figure illustrates that at the analytical stage there were unresolved issues, hence there 
was a need for further data collection, codification and analysis. In some cases the 
additional process necessitated the development of new analytical tools and in others there 
was no such need, hence the path from data codification to analysis on the diagram. 
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Figure 3.3: The Framework of the Research Project 
74 
RESEARCH STRATEGY

As has been set out above, the research question drove the research process. The research 
question was used to decide the framework and also used to establish the strategy. The 
main question is: “What are the consequences (intended and unintended) of the different 
models adopted by Jamaica for the funding of HE?” The context also caused four sub-
questions to be raised. 
The questions that flowed from the four sub-questions were: 
1.	 What have been the models for funding higher education in Jamaica? 
2.	 What is the assessment of the models that were tried? 
3.	 What other models has the government considered? 
4.	 What influenced the choice of the models that were adopted? 
5.	 How can models be compared? 
6.	 What are the priority issues that would affect the funding model? 
7.	 Is there a model of best practice for financing higher education operating in the 
world? 
8. Are there governing principles for government funding of higher education? 
These questions raised the issue of the type of data that would be needed to answer them. 
Main Strategy 
Punch (1998) points out that in order to answer the “question” one has to turn to the data, 
which would connect content to method. Data are the evidence or empirical material. 
Quantitative data are in the form of numbers, from counting, scaling or both. The main 
and sub-questions posed could not have been answered by measurement, and hence the 
general strategy for the research was qualitative. Patton (1990) identifies five types of 
research questions for which qualitative strategy fits (Mertens 1998, pp.162 -163): 
1.	 The focus of the research has to be on the process, implementation, or development 
of a program or its participants. 
2.	 The program emphasises individualised outcomes. 
3.	 Detailed, in-depth information would be needed about certain clients or programs. 
4.	 The focus is on diversity among, idiosyncrasies of and unique qualities exhibited 
by individuals. 
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5.	 The intent has to be to understand the program theory – that is, the staff members’ 
(and participants’) belief as to the nature of the problem they are addressing and 
how their actions will lead to desired outcomes. 
The main research question and sub-questions do fit the types mentioned by Patton. 
However, while Patton addressed programs the research dealt with models. Qualitative 
data or “empirical information about the world, not in the form of numbers” (Punch 1998 
p.60) was deemed best to answer the questions posed. Qualitative empirical material, 
include interview transcripts, recordings and notes, observational records and notes, 
documents and the products and records of material culture, audio-visual diary 
information, and personal experience materials (such as artefacts, journals, and diaries) 
(Denzin and Lincoln cited ibid). It was determined that the questions could be answered 
with the use of qualitative data from interview and documentary analyses. The nature of 
these will be addressed in the section dealing with the empirical methods of the research. 
Sub-Strategy 
In addition to the main strategy, there were a number of sub-strategies associated with 
qualitative research. Punch (2000) points to a two-fold strategy. He sees the need to 
describe the planned strategy procedurally as well as generically. For him generically 
means identifying the strategy in general terms, e.g., case study, ethnography, survey or 
quasi-experiment; and procedurally means how the researcher would execute the general 
strategy. Adding Punch’s idea to the main strategy, the research strategy was threefold: 
1.	 Main – meaning the broad strategy of quantitative, qualitative or mixed. 
2.	 Sub-strategies – meaning the specific type of quantitative, qualitative or mixed. 
3.	 Procedural – meaning the strategies that were used to collect and analyse the data. 
Mertens (1998) points to twenty-six types of sub-strategies in qualitative research by Tesch 
(1990) and of these, emphasized seven: 
1.	 Ethnographic research – a method designed to describe and analyse practices and 
beliefs of cultures and communities (Tesch 1990). 
2.	 Case study – “a method for learning about a complex instance, based on a 
comprehensive understanding of that instance obtained by extensive descriptions 
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and analysis of that instance taken as a whole and in its context” (U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 1990, p.14). 
3.	 Phenomenological research – the study of the way in which members of a group or 
community interpret the world and life around them (Holstein and Gubrium, 1994). 
4.	 Grounded theory – “a general methodology for developing theory that is grounded 
in data systematically gathered and analysed” (Strauss and Corbin, 1994 p.273) 
5.	 Participative inquiry – required the participation of all the people in the research 
process either by not explicitly addressing power relations (co-operative inquiry) or 
by the recognition of power issues and a goal of transforming society (participatory 
action research – PAR) 
6.	 Clinical research – the investigation of physical, behavioural, cultural, historical, 
social, emotional, and spiritual ramification of what is going on with the body, what 
is happening with a person’s life and who has what power (Miller and Crabtree, 
1994, p. 342). 
7.	 Focus groups – group interviews that rely, not on a question and answer format of 
interview, but on the interaction within the group (Morgan, 1988). 
In choosing the sub-strategy there was a return to the research question. The question led 
to the purpose, which was to investigate the consequences of policies. Of Mertens’ (1998) 
seven types of qualitative research outlined above, only two could possibly have been used 
to address the research question and the purpose of the study. These were case study and 
grounded theory research. The others were ruled out because they had to do with the study 
of culture or people. As such, they did not fit the nature of the inquiry. 
Case study is defined by Theodorson and Theodorson (1969) (cited by Punch 1998) as: 
A method of studying social phenomena through the thorough analysis of an individual 
case. The case may be a person, a group, an episode, a process, a community, a 
society, or any other unit of social life. All data relevant to the case are gathered, and 
all available data are organized in terms of the case. The case study method gives a 
unitary character to the data being studied by interrelating a variety of facts to a single 
case. It also provides an opportunity for the intensive analysis of many specific details 
that are often overlooked with other methods. 
From the above Punch (1998) draws four characteristics of a case study: 
1.	 It is a bounded system. 
2.	 It is a case of something – the unit of analysis must be determined. 
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3.	 There is an explicit attempt to preserve the wholeness, unity and integrity of the 
case. 
4.	 Multiple sources of data and multiple data collection methods are likely to be used, 
typically in a naturalistic setting. 
In addition to the above Sarantokos (1988, p. 192) points out that a case study studies the 
whole unit in its totality, it is a research of a single unit and perceives the respondent as an 
expert and not just a source of data. 
The aim was to explore the effects of government funding of higher education in Jamaica, 
assess the consequences and suggest changes to the system. In order to carry out the task it 
was determined that it would be difficult to be limited by the confines that a case study 
would place on the project. This was because the boundary limitation was deemed too 
restrictive. It was thought that it would have been better to allow the freedom to go where 
the investigation led. The second problem was to determine what was the case or “what 
was it a case of”. Such would be necessary to determine the unit of analysis. The third 
issue was the unitary nature of a case study, which would have suggested that the study be 
limited to the funding of one university. This was not the intention and to ensure that there 
was no deviation the chosen strategy was grounded theory, although it should be 
mentioned that the two are not necessarily exclude each other. Mertens (1998) points out 
that the defining characteristic of grounded theory is that theoretical propositions are not 
stated at the outset of the study but emerge out of the data. The key features are: 
1.	 The researcher needs to constantly interact with the data. 
2.	 Use of theoretical sampling. 
3.	 Use theoretical, systematic coding procedures. Conceptualise how the substantive 
codes relate to each other as hypotheses to be integrated into a theory. 
4.	 The researcher needs to ask questions of the data that allow him to depict the 
complexity, variation, and nature of the relationships between variables in the 
study. 
Punch (1998) stated that: 
Grounded theory is best defined as a research strategy whose purpose is to generate 
theory from data. ‘Grounded’ means that the theory will be generated on the basis of 
data; the theory will therefore be grounded in data. “Theory” means that the objective 
78 
of collecting and analysing the research data is to generate theory. The essential idea in 
grounded theory is that theory will be developed inductively from data. 
In exploring the model for financing HE in Jamaica, the research drew from several 
sources. The data were analysed and inferences drawn from them. Eventually theories 
emerged and led to recommendations. The theories are summarised in the section on 
“Theoretical Underpinning” in chapter 6. Grounded theory research is both a strategy and 
a technique for doing research. As a strategy it allows the researcher to “derive a general, 
abstract theory of a process, action, or interaction grounded in the views of participants” in 
the study (Creswell, 2003, p. 14). As a technique it dictates a process of collecting and 
analysing the data in order to arrive at a theory. 
Consistent with grounded theory the research did not start with any hypotheses, as there 
were no predictions. Punch (2000, pp. 30–31) advises the use of two questions to 
determine whether hypotheses should be used or not. Those questions were 
1. Can I predict (in advance of the empirical research) what I am likely to find? 
2. If so, is the basis for the prediction rational, a set of propositions, a “theory” from 
which the hypotheses follow, and which “explains” the hypotheses? 
The answer to the first question was negative and hence the decision. Grounded theory 
research has as its objective the generation of theory grounded in the data of the research. 
The research was not one of theory verification; hence it started with an open mind. There 
was therefore no need for an upfront theory or formulation of a hypothesis before the 
empirical work. This was also consistent with the inductive logic technique as outlined by 
Creswell (2003) in Figure 4. Punch (2000) also stated that, “a theory generation study 
aims to generate or develop a theory to explain empirical phenomena or findings. Such a 
study typically starts with questions, moves to data and ends with a theory.” 
EMPIRICAL STAGE 
Having settled on the theoretical approaches to the research as described, the research 
design was then concluded. Figure 3.3 outlines the framework of the project. The next 
step was that of segmenting the activities. Three main activities were planned, the 
objectives of which are listed hereunder. 
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ACTIVITY 1 - Review of Jamaica’s Funding Policies

Objectives 
(i) To identify the HE funding strategies tried in the past. 
(ii) To identify the problems encountered with each strategy. 
(iii) To assess the current HE funding strategy. 
(iv) To ascertain the reasons for the various policies adopted by Jamaica. 
ACTIVITY 2 - Review of Funding Methodologies around the World 
Objectives 
i.	 To identify and categorise the different methodologies. 
ii.	 To examine the benefits and challenges associated with each. 
iii.	 To ascertain the factors that influences the funding policies. 
iv.	 To investigate the possible link between funding strategy and Economic 
development. 
v. To investigate the link between government priorities and their funding policies. 
ACTIVITY 3 – Defining the Criteria for the Jamaican Model 
Objectives: 
i.	 To determine some criteria from the Jamaican experience. 
ii.	 To suggest some criteria for the Jamaican model from the experience of other 
countries. 
iii.	 To ascertain the current and future priorities of the Jamaican Government for 
HE. 
iv.	 To establish the links between funding strategies, government priorities and the 
criteria. 
v.	 To identify the issues relating to the management of HEIs and how funding 
policies can assist in good management. 
vi.	 To identify the statutory, legal and other obligations as they relate to the 
management and funding of HEIs. 
vii.	 To establish the economic issues relating to the financing of HE. 
Data Collection 
Interviews and documents were chosen as the primary sources of data. These were chosen 
as the best methods to answer the questions that were posed. The interviews were 
conducted first. This method is considered flexible and adaptable and was a most 
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convenient way of gathering information from the experts, policy makers and opinion 
makers. A list was compiled of possible interviewees and these people were sent letters 
explaining the nature of the research along with a list of the questions. The initial list 
consisted of: 
�	 CEO, Tertiary Unit Ministry of Education, Youth and Culture 
�	 One past principal of HEI, Alfred Sangster. 
�	 Current principals from the UWI and UTech 
�	 The Minister of Education 
�	 The Minister of Finance 
�	 A Permanent Secretary 
�	 The Opposition Spokesman on Education 
�	 Opinion makers 
The rationales for the list were as follows: 
�	 Government officials – These could offer information and ideas about 
Governments policies, priorities, current practice, massification, widening 
participation and the country’s ability to fund HE vis-à-vis its economic 
development. 
�	 Senior personnel in HE in Jamaica: Being directly affected, these could offer 
information about the HEIs’ experience with the current financing model, and offer 
ideas about governing principles. 
�	 Opinion makers in Jamaica: There were some newspaper columnists who wrote 
regularly on the issue and it was thought that they could inform the research. 
�	 Past and presents Students of HE: Students can give valuable information based 
on their own experiences. They can provide information about their experience in 
paying their way as well as the value they have had since leaving the system. 
�	 Representatives of international organisations that are involved in HE: The 
World Bank and UNESCO are two such organisations that are heavily involved in 
assisting the governments on the issue of financing HE. 
Follow-up calls were made to the offices of all persons. Some persons acknowledged the 
correspondence and declined the interview and a few did not respond to the 
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correspondence or return telephone calls. Interviews were granted by the following 
people: 
�	 The past president of UTech, Hon. Alfred Sangster, O.J. 
�	 The current president of UTech, Dr. Rae Davis. He was also the Chairman of the 
Prime Minister’s Task Force on the Reform of Education in Jamaica. 
�	 The Bursar of the Mona Campus of the UWI, Mrs. Elaine Robinson. 
�	 The Minister of Education, the Hon. Maxine Henry-Wilson 
�	 The Minister of Finance, the Hon. Dr. Omar Davies 
�	 The Assistant Chief Education Officer in Charge of Tertiary Education, Mr. 
Philbert Dyll 
For supplemental information and further clarification short interviews of follow-up 
questions were done with: 
�	 Ms. Patricia Harrison, Manager Finance at UWI 
�	 Ms. Jennifer Cheesman, Planning Officer at UWI 
One of Flick’s (2002) semi-structured interview methods, namely the semi-standardized 
interview was used. Robson defines the semi-structured interview as one where the 
interviewer has worked out a set of questions in advance, but was free to modify the order 
based upon perception of what seemed most appropriate in the context of the conversation. 
The semi-standardized form is suggested by Scheele and Groeben (1998) (cited ibid.) in 
their method for reconstructing subjective theories. Subjective theories mean “that the 
interviewee has a complex stock of knowledge about the topic under study” (ibid). From 
the list of people interviewed it can be seen that use was made of people who by their work 
and interest had acquired a stock of knowledge about government funding of higher 
education. The semi-standardized interview also allowed for follow up questions when 
gaps were identified and clarification was necessary. The method was also chosen because 
the procedure involved coincided with the circular model of the research process. The 
questions posed were in line with the specific objectives identified above. The questions 
posed in relation to the objectives of Activity 1, the review of the Jamaican funding 
models, were 
1.	 What were the Higher Education funding policies used by the Government of 
Jamaica prior to 1990? 
2.	 How were the mechanisms of these policies worked out and implemented? 
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3.	 What problems were encountered? 
4.	 Can you identify any benefits of the policies? 
5.	 Describe the current policy of government funding of Higher Education in 
Jamaica? 
6.	 What is your assessment of this policy? 
7.	 What are the problems experienced with the current policy? 
8.	 How are the problems being dealt with? 
9.	 What are the benefits being derived from the current policy? 
10. Since salary is linked to the current funding model, what do you think of the 
differing salary levels negotiated by government for the HEIs in Jamaica? 
11. How have the economic problems being experienced by Jamaica influenced its 
funding policies? 
12. What do you think are the reasons for Jamaica to have adopting its current policies? 
In relation to Activity 3, “Defining the Criteria for the Jamaican Model,” the questions 
were” 
1.	 What are/should be the expectations of the Jamaican government in relation to HE? 
2.	 How do you see the HEIs fulfilling these expectations? 
3.	 How do you see government funding influencing these expectations? 
4.	 What factors should the government use in determining a funding policy for HEIs 
in Jamaica? 
5.	 How are the following issues relating to the management and funding of HEIs all 
over the world pertinent to HEIs in Jamaica? 
o	 Cost 
o	 Productivity 
o	 Quality 
o	 Equity 
o	 Efficiency 
o	 Access 
o	 Entrepreneurship 
o	 GATS 
o	 Governance 
o	 Social Responsibility 
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6. How can a Jamaican government-funding model influence the above issues? 
The results of the interviews were transcribed and the transcripts were sent to the 
interviewees, requesting their reviews and comments. They were also informed that in the 
event they did not respond it would be assumed that they were in agreement with the 
contents. All except the Minister of Finance and the Bursar of the UWI made revisions. 
The revisions were not substantive as they were mainly typographical or phraseology 
changes. 
The semi-standardized interview as described by Flick (2002) also provided the 
opportunity for testing validity in the research process. Creswell and Miller (2000) 
describe “member checking” as one of nine methods for testing validity. Member 
checking “consists of taking data and interpretations back to the participants in the study so 
that they can confirm the credibility of the information and narrative account.” The 
process, described above, of interviewing, transcribing, and allowing the interviewee to 
review the information, therefore, provided the function of data collection and validation. 
The researcher also was able to travel to the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, 
Germany and the Netherlands to interview experts about the funding of HE. The 
interviews were aimed at clarifying and validating some of the information gathered from 
documents about the international practice of financing HE. The purpose of these 
interviews was opposite to those conducted nationally as the latter served to validate the 
information from the document search. The list of persons interviewed in these countries 
is contained in Appendix XVIII. 
Documentary analysis was the main method of data collection for this study for the 
following reasons. First, the themes and ideas garnered from the interviews were able to 
be tested against those found in the documents and this provided the basis for triangulation. 
Second, the research questions signalled that much of the material had to do with historical 
information and past documents provided the best means of accuracy. Third, there have 
been public debates in Jamaica on the matter and the study re-examined the issues raised in 
light of the fact that a decision has not yet been taken to change the current practice. 
Fourth, since many countries had considered the issue of the social funding of higher 
education and had decided on a model, it was considered useful to examine their 
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deliberations, compare them across countries and consider relevance to the Jamaican 
context. Fifth, because of the wide geographic area the study intended to cover, it was 
deemed too expensive to travel to all the relevant countries to interview people. The 
researcher was, however, able to visit four countries from which additional documents 
were acquired and the opportunity provided for validating some of the documentary 
information with interviews. 
The interviews provided the bases of the search for the relevant documents. The analysis 
of the interviews provided several themes which were used as search ideas. Materials were 
acquired from the libraries of the Ministry of Finance, UWI and UTech, the archives of the 
UWI and UTech, and office correspondence from UTech. Documents were also acquired 
from the World Bank, UNESCO and several organisations dealing with HE financing. 
Most of the documents addressing the international practice were obtained from the 
website of the organisations, electronic journals and databases and directly through 
personal contacts. 
Sampling 
With the issue of sampling, use was made of Flick’s (2002 pp. 61-62) table of sampling 
decisions - Table 3.2. It was realised that the project had to make use of all the sampling 
methods in the table that related to the stages in the research. 
Table 3.2 Sampling Decisions in the Research Process 
Stage in research Sampling methods

While collecting data Case sampling 
Sampling groups of cases 
While interpreting data Material sampling 
Sampling within the material 
While presenting the findings Presentational sampling 
Case sampling is the decision about which persons to interview and sampling groups of 
cases was about the decision about which groups such persons should be taken. These 
decisions were taken during the data collection period. See section on data collection. 
During the analysis of the data it was necessary to decide on which aspect of the interviews 
should be further interpreted (material sampling) and which part of the text should be 
should be selected for interpretation in general or for particular detailed interpretation 
(sampling within the material). Finally decisions had to be made about the aspects of the 
material that would best illustrate the findings. Random sampling and complete collection 
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techniques were neither relevant nor possible. The nature of the research and the intention 
to cover as wide a geographic area as necessary did not allow for either. 
In making the sampling decisions at the various stages, a technique consistent with 
grounded theory research, called theoretical sampling was chosen. Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) according to Flick (2002, p. 64) defines theoretical sampling as “The process of 
data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects codes and 
analyses his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to 
develop his theory as it emerges. This process of data collection is controlled by the 
emerging theory.” In the theoretical sampling process Flick (2002) pointed out were two 
important questions to be answered. These were: 
1.	 What group or sub-groups should data be collected from next? The answer should 
be based on some theoretical criteria. 
2.	 When should the researcher stop integrating further cases? This should be when 
saturation is achieved. 
The use of the theoretical sampling technique resulted in several circles of data collection, 
data analysis and decisions about the need and source of more data. The process was also 
guided by the questions. 
Theory Preliminary 
Assumptions 
Interpretation 
Case 
Collection 
Interpretation 
Case 
Collection 
Interpretation 
Case 
Collection 
Comparing 
Comparing 
Comparing 
Sampling Sampling 
Figure 3.4 Flick (2002, p. 44) Circular Model of the Research Process 
Data analysis 
In the analytical process, the research made use of the inductive logic technique (Figure 
3.5) which was incorporated in the circular model of the research process (Figure 3.3). 
The steps outlined in Figure 3.5 were followed closely. Use was also made of Sarantakos’ 
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(1998, p. 202) ten main steps of grounded theory procedures, which also serve to guide the 
detailed of Flick (Figure 3.4). These were: 
1.	 Identifying the indicators in the research topic. 
2.	 Studying the indicators and comparing them with each other. 
3.	 Coding the indicators, looking for answers and formulating hypotheses. 
4.	 Categorising similar indicators as a class. 
5.	 Naming the class and perceiving it as a coded category, which reflects the 
indicators’ similarities, and the smallest common denominator. 
6.	 Comparing the indicators with concepts and with other indicators; this helps 
to refine them and relate them optimally to the data. 
7.	 Working through more attributes of the categories, refining them and 
getting additional information until the codes are tested and saturated. 
Saturation is when no more information can be gained. 
8.	 Developing and saturating more categories through the process of constant 
comparisons. 
9.	 Including in the theory, concepts and their attributes developed in that way. 
10. Further testing, contrasting and comparing of theories and perhaps refining 
and changing them. 
The circular process (Figure 3.4) was chosen not only because it is associated with 
grounded theory research but also as Flick (2002, p. 43) points out: 
It forces the researcher to permanently reflect on the whole research process and on 
particular steps in the light of the other steps … The close (also temporal) link between 
collecting and interpreting data on the one hand and the selecting of empirical material 
on the other, unlike in the traditional linear method of proceeding, allows the 
researcher not only to ask the following question repeatedly but also to answer it: how 
far do the methods, categories and theories that are used do justice to the subject and 
the data? 
The second difference with the Punch Model (Figure 3.2) was therefore explained by the 
above. Flick (2002, p. 44) (Figure 3.4) detailed the activities in the empirical stage of 
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Figure 3.3. The process of data collection, data analysis and interpretation (Figure 2.3) 
would have to go through several cycles (Figure 3.4) before a satisfactory theory was 
developed. 
From the literature review analytical models were developed and used as tools to further 
examine the data. The conditions precedent chart and the related decision tree were used 
to assess the financing methods used by Jamaica and the operations management matrix 
and the RAM debate pendulum were used to examine the methods of allocating resources 
to HEI in Jamaica. Use was also made of the Orr’s (2005) trajectories and congruence of a 
coordination framework to examine the relationship between the RAM and the quality 
Generalizations or Theories of past 
Experiences and Literature 
Researcher Analyses Data to Form 
Themes or Categories 
Researcher Looks for Broad Patterns, 
Generalizations, or Theories from 
Themes or Categories 
Researcher asks open-ended 
questions of Participants or Records 
Field notes 
Researcher Gathers Information (e.g. 
interviews, observations) 
Figure 3.5: The Inductive Logic of Research in Qualitative Study (Creswell 2003:132) 
assurance mechanism of the country. The data analysis therefore was done by the systems 
and procedures of grounded theory and also by other tools developed or identified during 
the course of the research. 
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Testing for reliability and validity 
An important element of the research was to ensure reliability and validity. A concern of 
the researcher was to ensure that the information gathered from the documents and 
interviews was reliable. Reliability is the consistency of the measurement, or the degree to 
which an instrument measures the same way each time it is used under the same conditions 
with the same subjects (Trochim 2002). “Stability over time can be directly assessed, 
under certain circumstances, by administrations of the same instrument (or by parallel 
forms of the instruments) at two points in time” (Punch, 1998). That was the test/retest 
method for reliability which was thought to be problematic for the project, as it would 
require the use of the same process on separate occasions. The semi-structured interview 
method was not a good candidate for reliability testing. Bell’s (1999) advice was therefore 
taken that such checking mechanism is not necessary unless one was attempting to produce 
a test or scale. She further recommends that the check for reliability should come at the 
stage of the wording of the questions and the piloting of the instrument. As a result, the 
internal consistency method as outlined by Trochim (2002b) was used. This was the 
method where reliability was estimated by grouping questions that measure the same 
concept in the interviews. The manner in which the semi-standardized interview was 
conducted was also a form of test of reliability as it allowed for follow-up and clarification. 
Validity as defined by Cook and Campbell (1979) (cited by Cresswell and Miller 2000) is 
the “best available approximation to the truth or falsity of a given inference, proposition or 
conclusion.” There was a concern about the validity of the information garnered from the 
interviews. Creswell and Miller (2000) state that two perspectives govern the validity 
procedure: the lens the researcher chooses to validate his studies and the researcher’s 
paradigm assumption. As a result, they believe that the use of validity procedures should 
be accompanied with the acknowledgment of the lens being employed in the study and the 
paradigm assumptions of the researchers. This chapter has already pointed out that the 
research did not begin with a set of paradigm assumptions but was being led by the 
research problem and questions. For this reason, the choice of validity instruments was 
dependent on their practical use to the study. Instead of reflecting on the lens and the 
epistemological perspective, the research asked one simple question: “Of the existing 
validity procedures, which were the most practical for the study?” The answers were 
triangulation and member checking. 
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Triangulation is explained in the foregoing section and member checking was discussed in 
the section on interviews. The inferences drawn from the interviews were validated 
against each other as well as the documents – this was triangulation. It was also pointed 
out that the interviewees were sent transcripts of the interviews and asked to review them 
to ensure the correctness. This was the validity testing method called member checking. 
Triangulation 
The use of two, possibly three methods of data collection (documentary analysis, 
interviews and or questionnaires) is called data triangulation. Sarantakos (1988) points out 
that triangulation allows the researcher to: 
� Obtain a variety of information on the same issue 
� Use the strengths of each method to overcome the deficiencies of the other 
� Achieve a higher degree of validity and reliability 
� Overcome the deficiency of single-method studies 
Flick (2002) points out that even though triangulation started as a strategy for validating 
results, the focus has shifted towards enriching and completing knowledge and towards 
transgressing the epistemological potentials of the individual method. 
For all the above reasons, triangulation was considered important in the study. There was 
a thorough analysis of the interviews followed by analyses of the documents. The 
documentary analysis sought further knowledge as well as tested some of the ideas 
expressed in the interviews. 
Use of Literature Review 
It is worthwhile to return to Figure 3.3 to explain the other difference with Punch’s model. 
The literature review was done during the empirical stage. The literature review, however, 
could have been treated in two other ways in the project. Creswell (2003) summarises 
three ways in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Using Literature in a Qualitative Study 
Use of the Literature Criteria Examples of Suitable 
Types of Studies 
The literature is used to 
“Frame” the problem in the 
introduction or the study. 
There must be some 
literature available 
Typically used in all 
qualitative studies, 
regardless of type. 
The literature is presented 
in a separate section as a 
“review of the literature” 
An approach often 
acceptable to an audience 
most familiar with the 
traditional, positivist 
approach to literature 
review 
This approach is used with 
those studies employing a 
strong theory and literature 
background at the 
beginning of a study, such 
as ethnographies and 
critical theory studies. 
The literature is presented 
in the study at the end; it 
becomes a basis for 
comparing and contrasting 
findings of the qualitative 
study. 
This approach is most 
suitable for the “inductive” 
process of qualitative 
research; the literature does 
not guide and direct the 
study but becomes an aid 
once patterns or categories 
have been identified. 
This approach is used in all 
types of qualitative designs, 
but it is most popular with 
grounded theory, where one 
contrasts and compares his 
or her theory with other 
theories found in the 
literature. 
Source: Creswell (2003, p.31) 
The literature review served three purposes: 
1.	 Identifying what already existed in the literature about the financing of HE 
2.	 Providing a source of secondary data to answer the question of what options were 
available to the Jamaican government for the financing of HE 
3. Providing the basis for comparing and contrasting the findings 
The literature review being done at the end of the study is consistent with the use of the 
inductive logic process. Chapter 5 reveals that the frameworks developed from the 
literature review (Chapter 2) were used to compare and contrast the findings of the 
research (Chapter 4). Punch (1998) states that since one rationale for doing grounded 
theory study is to ascertain a satisfactory theory on the topic or sufficient understanding of 
the topic then the researcher could not do much theorising of the issue beforehand. The 
results showed that the policies adopted did not so much emerge from a theoretical 
perspective but rather evolved in reaction to the political environment and the financial 
difficulties of the country. This was a reason for choosing the inductive logic framework 
for the research. 
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Limitations and delimitations 
The limitations experienced had to do with the availability of persons to be interviewed 
and access to documents. It was pointed out earlier that from the proposed schedule of 
interviews some persons did not respond or indicated that they were unavailable. The 
project therefore depended heavily on documentary records as its main source. The 
archive at the UWI was a rich source of information and it was able to fill the gap where 
the interviews could not. The researcher was also allowed free access to the internal files 
of the UTech. 
The study was confined to HEIs. The definition for HE in Jamaica included universities 
and programmes of studies terminating in a degree. It was recognised that the UWI has 
been a HEI since its inception. CAST entered HE in a limited way when it started offering 
degrees in 1986. It fully became an HEI in 1995 when it was granted official university 
status and became UTech. The scope of the study was also limited to those HEI that 
received social funding. For those reasons the study concentrated on the UWI and UTech 
which were the only two institutions that satisfied the criteria of HEI and government 
funding in Jamaica. 
Ethics 
The main ethical issue of the research was the researchers own involvement in one of the 
HEIs. The researcher, therefore, had to be conscious of the connection and guard against 
biases and pre-conceived notions. In order to mitigate the circumstances the following 
precautions were taken 
1. Constant reminders of possible conflicts of interest 
2. The use of the validation and reliability methods before inclusion in the research 
3. A commitment to reflect the truth regardless of who it affected 
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CONCLUSION

By taking the pragmatic approach to the study this researcher focused on the problem of 
HE funding in Jamaica. A pragmatic approach is different from a pragmatic knowledge 
claim. The latter determines, a priori, the methods and methodology of the research and 
the former makes no such attempt but allows these to unfold as the project progresses. The 
approach led to the research question of “What are the consequences (intended and 
unintended) of the different models adopted by Jamaica for the financing of HE?” The 
context in which the financing of HE took place also gave rise to four sub-questions for the 
research about the consequences of an unchanged model for a system that had shifted from 
a single HE provider to diverse providers, consequences of financing both a regional as 
well as a national system, the philosophical underpinnings of the RAM and the models 
available for financing HE. The nature of the questions and the data necessary to answer 
the questions led in turn to the choice of the qualitative research strategy. Since there are 
many different strategies in the field of qualitative research, more focus was placed on the 
research question and the purpose of the study. This led to the choosing of the grounded 
theory as the sub-strategy. Grounded theory research is not only a strategy but also 
provides a technique for doing research. The technique involved the theoretical sampling 
strategy and the methods of capturing and analysing the data repeatedly until satisfactory 
conclusions were reached. The grounded theory research technique also requires an 
interaction with the data to eventually derive a substantive theory. The substantive theory 
was used to answer questions posed for the financing of HE in Jamaica. 
Chapter 4 will present a summary of the findings resulting from the use of the grounded 
theory approach to data analysis. The results reveal the answers to the main question about 
the consequences of the policies that were adopted by the country. 
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CHAPTER 4

JAMAICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

FINANCING POLICIES

This chapter presents the findings, which resulted from several stages of coding and 
analyses of the interviews and documents using the grounded theory method of research. 
1962 was chosen as the base year because that was when Jamaica gained its independence 
from Britain and took charge of its own destiny, though it inherited structures, systems and 
processes that could not be changed immediately. This research is about the financing of 
HE; however, because of the manner in which the financing policies evolved in Jamaica, 
references will be made to the other types of institutions within the education sector. The 
four policies adapted by the Jamaican government are presented under the following 
headings: 
� features of the financing policy 
� Resource Allocation Method (RAM) used to harness and channel the funds 
� consequences of the policies and the RAM 
THE MIXED SYSTEM 1962-1973 
Under the mixed system there was no uniformity in financing policy or RAM of education. 
There was basically a continuation of the systems inherited from the colonial era. The 
features, which were not sector specific, are described hereunder. 
Features of the Mixed System 
Secondary Education There were two ways of financing the secondary education school 
system during the period 1962 to 1973. The technical high schools and the junior 
secondary schools (owned and operated by the government) were treated similarly to the 
primary schools and were funded totally from the national budget. Students were not 
required to pay tuition fees. Some secondary schools, referred to as traditional high 
schools, were owned and operated by the Church and Trusts but supported by the 
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government. These were operated under a system called “grant-aid” where the government 
awarded tuition scholarships to students who were successful in an examination. (See 
Appendix III for full explanation). 
Teacher Training This category was also regarded as a government priority and was also 
fully funded from the national budget. In addition to the support given to the institutions, 
grants were awarded to trainees to cover living expenses and accommodation costs. (See 
Appendix III for details). 
Technical and Further Education The College of Arts, Science and Technology (CAST) 
and the Jamaica School of Agriculture (JSA) were during that period, classified as 
technical and further education institutions and financing was a joint effort of the 
government and the students. The government awarded grants to cover recurrent and 
capital expenditure and the institutions were allowed to charge fees to supplement the 
grants. During the period 1962-1973 the government of Jamaica contributed 75% of the 
total income of CAST, and students’ fees accounted for 13%. In 1971 tuition fees at 
CAST was $50 per annum for full time students, $6 per subject hour for day release and 
evening students and boarding cost was $322 per annum per student. The Board of 
Management of the institution was responsible for setting the fees. Government also 
granted scholarships and grant-in-aide to needy students. These were intended to cover 
tuition, boarding, and other education related expenses for those students. In 1971 the 
following new provisions for scholarships were made in the national budget: 
o 12 persons annually @$80 per annum for CAST 
o 24 persons annually @ $120 per annum for JSA 
It was noted that, in that year there were 43 Scholarships at CAST and 72 at JSA. 
Higher Education During the period, the UWI was the only provider of HE for 
Jamaicans. Those who did not attend the UWI journeyed to Britain and other countries for 
that level of education. The Hon. Donald Sangster, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister 
of Finance, outlined the arrangements for funding that regional HEI, to the House of 
Parliament on 3rd September 1963, in Ministry Paper No. 351/01. See appendix IV for full 
text. 
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The main feature was that the governments of the region would fund the only HEI (UWI). 
The Minister of Finance reminded Parliament that at the Common Services Conference 
held in Trinidad, July 10-18, 1962, “The Governments of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, 
the Windward and Leeward Islands, British Honduras and the British Virgin Islands agreed 
to continue support of the University on a regional basis for at least three triennia – i.e. 
from 1st August, 1963 to 31st July 1972.” Table 4.1 shows that the contributing 
governments were largely responsible for the income of the institution. The average 
income from contributing governments was 67% of total income. Contributions ranged 
from a minimum of 60% in 1966 to a maximum of 74% in 1973. 
Table 4.1 Income Analysis of the UWI 1962­1973 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Ave. 
Govt. Cont/Total Income 71% 63% 60% 63% 60% 63% 64% 70% 71% 74% 67% 
Other Grants/Total Income 5% 5% 5% 6% 5% 4% 3% 3% 2% 1% 5% 
Hosp./Total Income 5% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 
Students Fees/Total Income 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Dept. Funds/Total Income 15% 22% 26% 23% 27% 24% 24% 19% 18% 16% 19% 
Common Service Fees/TI 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Investment Return/Total 
Income 
1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
Other Income/Total Income 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
100 
% 
100 
% 
100 
% 
100 
% 
100 
% 
100 
% 
100 
% 
100 
% 
100 
% 
100 
% 
100 
% 
In 1965 there was a doubling of the resources to fund departmental projects and research. 
This accounted for the sharp drop in the portion that government contributed in that year. 
In 1971 there were salary increases and also the establishment of the Norman Manley Law 
School both of which incurred additional costs, which were absorbed by the participating 
governments. This accounted for the increased governments’ contribution since 1971. 
The second feature was that students made a small contribution towards recurrent cost. 
Dr. Rae Davis, President of the University of Technology, Jamaica, in the interview stated, 
“Since the establishment of the University of the West Indies (UWI) in 1948 Higher 
Education was virtually free, there was a small tuition fee”(November 2003). The Hon. 
Donald Sangster, Minister of Education 1963, in his submission to Parliament pointed out 
that the University Grants Committee (UGC) had decided that as at October 1963 the 
charges for tuition and examination were £350 per person per annum (p.p.a) for medical 
students, £250 p.p.a. for engineering students and £100 p.p.a for all other categories of 
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students. Table 4.1 shows that students’ contribution to total income averaged only 4% 
p.a. for the period. 
Support was also available for the neediest students in the form of scholarships and 
bursaries. The Estimates of Expenditure for 1971, for example, had provisions as follows: 
� 250 bursaries ranging from $300 - $500 each 
� Jamaica Government exhibitions including vacation allowance - $21,944 
� Travel grants to Jamaican students at the UWI - $3,000 
� Assistance to private students - $3,000 
Towards the end of the period loans emerged as another form of support for needy 
students. The Students Loan Bureau (SLB) was established in 1970 and was given legal 
status under the 1971 Students’ Loan Fund Act of Jamaica to administer a loan scheme for 
needy students. The Act empowered the SLB to make loans to Jamaican nationals 
pursuing studies in HE at prescribed local and international tertiary institutions. This 
facility enabled students to access loans for tuition, accommodation fees, purchasing of 
learning materials, travelling expenses and other education related expenses (World Bank 
Report No. 15594-JM). 
RAM for HE under the Mixed System 
As a result of the ownership structure of the UWI, several governments decided the 
process of the resource allocation. The UGC was established as a permanent body in 1962 
to determine the resource requirements and to channel the funds from the supporting 
governments (several sources) to the UWI (one recipient) - (Ministry paper no. 351/01). 
This was unlike the system in the United Kingdom where the function of the UGC was to 
channel the funds from one source (the government) to several recipients (the universities). 
The functions (See Appendix IV) of the UGC were to: 
i.	 Examine the extent to which the university was addressing the national needs 
by its teachings and research 
ii.	 Examine University proposals for expenditure in the light of the national needs 
iii. Recommend the resource requirements to the supporting governments 
iv. Ensure that the funds that were voted were properly managed 
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v. Carry out its roles without interfering in the essential (academic and 
administrative) freedom of the university 
The UGC comprised ministers of governments from the supporting countries. 
Membership was restricted to the: 
i.	 Minister of Finance and the Ministers of Education from Barbados, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago 
ii.	 Minister of Finance or the Minister of Education from the Windward Islands 
and the Leeward Islands 
iii. Minister of Finance or the Minister of Education, from British Honduras. 
The Chairmanship of the Committee rotated amongst the Ministers of Finance of 
Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago on a triennial basis. Three persons, selected 
by the University Grants Committee who were eminent in University administration and 
not connected with the University of the West Indies, advised the Committee. They were 
called the technical advisory committee (TAC). Figure 4.1 depicts the resource allocation 
process for the unitary HE system in the West Indies. 
Figure 4.1 - The Resource Allocation Process of the Caribbean HE System 1962 - 1973 
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The funds were provided in two forms. The first was by way of an annual block grant to

cover recurrent expenditure and the second consisted of specific amounts for projects and

capital development. As stated in the Ministry Paper No.351/01, the resource
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requirements for the 1963-1965 triennia was, “on the basis agreed at the Common Services 
Conference the contributions payable towards recurrent expenditure is £4,674,7001”. The 
funds were remitted to the University in three equal instalments of £1,463,706 per annum. 
The minister also informed Parliament about the method to allocate the costs among the 
supporting governments. It was decided to adopt the formula as per the mandatory level 
formula that was used to share the cost of the Federal Government of the West Indies 
(1957-1962)2 to allocate the expenses of the university to the supporting governments. 
Equation 4.1 is a mathematical interpretation of the expenditure sharing agreement of the 
supporting governments of the UWI. 
Rj = Rlj (4.1) 
Where,

Rj = Portion of recurrent expenditure provided by Jamaica

R = Recurrent Expenditure of the University

lj = Levy rate for Jamaica

There was no set formula for sharing the costs for specific projects, capital expenditure and 
other non-recurrent items. The share of the cost of each project was specifically 
negotiated. The mathematical interpretation for Jamaica’s share is expressed in equation 
4.2. 
Nj = �(Prj) 4.2 
Where Nj = Amount for Non-Recurrent expenditure provided by Jamaica 
P = Project cost 
rj = Proportion of Jamaica’s share of the cost 
The mathematical interpretation of the total allocation Jamaica made to the cost of the 
university is therefore equation 4.3. 
Aj = Rj + Nj 4.3 
or 
1 The Sterling (£) was the currency of Jamaica until 1969 when the country adopted the dollar ($). 
2 The Federation of the West Indies was formed in 1957 and assumed full responsibility for the UWI. In 
1962 it was dissolved after Jamaica pulled out. Trinidad followed and it was thereafter determined that the 
federation was no longer sustainable. 
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Aj = Rlj + �(Prj) 
Where Aj = Total Allocation to Jamaica

Full illustration of the application to the Budget of the university is in Appendix XI.

The national institutions, CAST and JSA were awarded grants called subventions for 
recurrent and capital expenditure. The subvention was the result of negotiations which 
began with submissions from the institutions. These were reviewed and recommended by 
the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the expenditure limit approved by the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF). The submissions were based on personnel cost for teaching and 
administration, class material and overheads expenditure. The other institutions were 
given warrants. Dr. Rae Davis pointed out the difference between warrants and 
subvention. “In terms of warrants – this would specify the amount for salaries and you are 
not supposed to tamper with that. On the other hand for the subventions, you got a block 
of money and there are some requirements, obviously in terms of reporting on how you 
spend the money but you are not as bound to the line item as with the warrant.” (Interview 
November 13, 2003) Figure 4.2 shows the process that was applicable to the non-
university sector of the Jamaican tertiary education system. 
Figure 4.2- The Resource Allocation Process for the Non-HEI in the Jamaican Education System, 
1962-1973. 
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Consequences of Fee Paying 
The interviewees could not recall any problems in the financing of HE between 1962 and 
1973. According to Dr. Rae Davis “… in the early days, I think, if there were any 
problems, they were guarded. As I stated, the early days went back to UWI and I’m not 
aware of any problems with the release of funds to the UGC, to the UWI and from the GOJ 
for the other institutions…” An examination of the UWI’s records, however, revealed that 
there were several concerns about the RAM for the HE system during the period. Seven 
consequences of the RAM were identified. The first four were associated with the regional 
nature of the funding mechanism and the other three related to cost efficiency, institutional 
autonomy and access. 
First, some governments expressed the view that the financing arrangement was not 
facilitating their individual country’s priorities and started to finance specific programmes 
that would further their own interest. The Vice Chancellor in his 1972 report to the 
Council (M.A. 96.2, pg. 6-7 UWI Archives) made note of the departure from the principle 
of proportional financing with each country enjoying the privilege of participation in the 
offering of the university. Trinidad, Jamaica and Barbados undertook the financing of 
specific programmes in their territory even though the university was already offering 
those. Economics, Government and French were being offered at Mona, yet Trinidad 
started the financing of similar programmes in its own country in 1963. A similar 
approach was taken by Jamaica with the financing of its own management studies 
programme and Barbados with its offering in Biology. The expense sharing arrangement 
was further broken when in 1970 some countries decided against sharing in the recurrent 
cost. 
Second, the funding mechanism was not able to support a sustainable capital development 
programme. The UWI Vice Chancellor in the same report expressed concern that with 
minor exceptions the contributing governments were unwilling to support any capital 
development which was outside their own country. That approach, he lamented had 
retarded the growth of the institution which was further exacerbated by the reducing 
opportunities for external grants for the HEI capital development. Table 4.1 shows that 
contribution of external grants had fallen from a high of 9% in 1963 to 1% in 1973. 
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Third, the supporting governments had reacted negatively to a perceived inequity in the 
levy system of allocating the cost of the university’s operations. The task force which was 
set up to consider alternative methods of sharing the costs of the university noted that there 
was a failure in the levy ratio “ to take account of the benefits obtained by the Government 
of a campus Territory from the presence of a campus in its territory …to relate the amounts 
paid by any contributing government to the benefits received by that government in the 
form of the number of students trained, the amount of services rendered or otherwise” 
(UWI VC Report 1972 pp.7-8). The perceived inequity in the cost allocation formula led 
to a problem with receivables as some governments refused to pay the full amount of the 
money that the UGC had determined as their share (ibid.). This would suggest a 
receivables management problem. An analysis of the financial records of the institution 
for the period revealed that the receivables to government contribution had increased to 
15% in 1972, the worse it had been since 1964; the receivable to net assets had also 
increased to 4% in 1973 and to current asset it reached 57% in 1971. The year 1963 is 
excluded since it was during that time when the changes were being discussed and the 
contributing governments were unsure of the extent of their share. Details are in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 - Receivable Management Analysis of the UWI 1962 - 1973 
Receivables Management (How effectively debtors were being Managed) 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
17% 9% 6% 7% 6% 7% 6% 7% 10% 11% 
25% 12% 10% 11% 9% 11% 9% 11% 14% 15% 
3% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 
37% 24% 21% 29% 24% 41% 33% 40% 57% 48% 
1973 Ave. 
Receivables/Total Income 11% 9% 
Receivables/Governments’ 15% 13% 
Contribution 
Receivables/Net Assets 4% 2% 
Current Receivables/Current 43% 36% 
Assets 
Notwithstanding the Vice Chancellor’s concern further analyses, however, revealed that it 
was during the period of fee payment that the UWI enjoyed the best results with receivable 
management. This will be borne out in the presentation of the data of the other periods. 
Fourth, the cost effectiveness of the operations of the UWI was brought into question. The 
Commonwealth Year Book 1965 as revealed by Alexander et al (1967) published a 
comparative analysis of some HEIs which suggested inefficiencies in the operations of the 
UWI. Appendix V shows an extended analysis of the Commonwealth Year Book study. 
This showed that per student cost for the UWI (the lone HEI in Jamaica) was higher than 
only three of the selected HEIs from the developed countries, but was less than all the 
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selected developing countries. The staff/student ratio followed the same pattern. This 
seriously challenged one of the rationales for establishing a HEI in the region which was to 
reduce the cost of sending nationals abroad for their HE. 
To address this and other concerns, the Ford Foundation (New York) at the request of the 
Vice Chancellor undertook a study of a review of the university’s operations. This was 
undertaken by Alexander, et al who (1967 pp.13-15) argued against a comparative analysis 
between universities in developed and developing countries on the basis that; 
a.	 The size of the market of universities in developed countries permitted mass-
teaching and high staff/student ratios making it much easier for lower per unit 
costs. 
b.	 The inadequacy in the quality, quantity and uniformity of the secondary school 
system in developing countries placed undue burden on the university, hence 
increased cost of operations. 
c.	 There were peculiar difficulties faced by universities in developing countries 
that automatically increase their costs. Those were: 
i.	 Difficulty in recruiting and retaining academic staff, hence, the need to 
attract expatriates with the additional costs of travel, leave arrangements 
and inducement allowances 
ii.	 Non-uniformity of entry from the secondary system resulting in 
increased teaching load at the tertiary level 
iii.	 Lack of qualified technical staff forced the academics to carry out the 
work of technicians 
iv.	 Lack of local supply stores for books, equipment and repairs resulted in 
carrying of high inventory and long waiting time 
v.	 High degree of administrative and committee work required of Deans 
and Heads of Department reduced the time for academic work 
vi.	 High demand on service by academics reduced the time necessary for 
the academic work 
vii.	 The largely residential nature of the universities in developing countries 
brought about by the wide dispersion of the population resulted in high 
capital and administrative expenditure 
The above arguments led Alexander, et al (1967) to caution about interpreting the figures 
in Appendix V. 
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The fifth consequence of the funding model during this period was that it brought into 
question the autonomy of the institution. By 1968 the UWI had become concerned that the 
government of Jamaica was using funding to influence its management and direction. 
Parker (1971:377) reported from a private interview with Sir John Mordecai, Secretary, 
Development and Planning, University of the West Indies, July 23, 1970 that “The 
university did not receive its triennium grant for 1969-72 on schedule, due to the political 
upsets in 1968-69 and … the University awaits a decision by the University Grants 
Committee in September 1970 as to what it can expect in funding through 1972”. The 
background to the delay was about Walter Rodney who was a lecturer at the UWI and an 
activist for the Black Power Movement. According to Sanford in his book "New Jewel" 
Rodney attended a black writers’ meeting in Montreal and was prevented from re-entering 
Jamaica on October 15, 1968 when he tried to resume his post at the UWI. “Reaction to 
Rodney's banning was explosive and started with the students who used a variety of 
disruptive tactics. These actions spread to the streets off campus with a series of riots in 
Kingston city. The University was closed for a couple of weeks and debates raged on in 
Parliament” (http://www.multiworld.org/m_versity/althinkers/rodney.htm). The 
government thereafter delayed the remittances to the UWI in retaliation to the actions of 
the constituents of the university. 
Princess Alice of Athlone, Chancellor of the University, also expressed concerns about the 
use of funding to challenge the autonomy of the university when she made the following 
remark on February 1, 1969: 
Their great problem in the future is going to be how to retain their autonomy and 
their academic freedom while at the same time complying with the insistent 
demands of the community that pays for them. It is all very well to say that he who 
pays the piper calls the tune, but I would add that the tune must be something better 
than mere pop music. (Parker 1971, p.377.) 
The sixth consequence of the funding model during this period was the perception that the 
policy did not sufficiently result in the widening of access to HE. Alexander, et al (1967, 
p.22) suggested that access could be increased by eliminating fees. According to them, 
“Tuition fees form a very small part of the University’s income, and the possibility of 
waiving these altogether might be explored. It would be justified if it led to a marked 
increase in student entry, which in turn would reduce unit costs”. 
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Throughout this study the simple method is used to calculate the average enrolment 
growth. 1963 is selected as the base year since it was the start of the triennium for the 
UWI. The formula used for calculating the growth average was: 
{(EE - BE)/BE}1/n 
Where EE = Ending Enrolment 
BE = Beginning Enrolment 
n = Number of years 
Table 4.3 shows that for the fee paying period by 1974 the average growth rate for 
Jamaicans enrolled in HE was 21%. During the period of fee paying the rate varied 
between 12% and 17%. Jamaica’s Growth rate in HE was also consistently below that of 
the region which averaged at 19% in 1974 and varied between 13% and 19% during the fee 
paying era. 
Table 4.3 - Growth Rate in HE Enrolment during the Fee Paying Era, 1963-1973 
Jamaicans at UWI UWI 
Year to 
Year 
Growth 
Cumulative 
Growth 
Average Rate 
Relative to 
1963/64 
Year to 
Year 
Growth 
Cumulative 
Growth 
Average 
Rate Relative 
to 1963/64 
Number of 
Years 
1963/64 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1 
1964/65 14% 14% 7% 15% 15% 8% 2 
1965/66 19% 36% 12% 20% 39% 13% 3 
1966/67 N/A N/A N/A 7% 49% 12% 4 
1967/68 N/A 64% 13% 11% 65% 13% 5 
1968/69 23% 102% 17% 17% 93% 15% 6 
1969/70 -7% 89% 13% 10% 112% 16% 7 
1970/71 N/A N/A N/A 8% 129% 16% 8 
1971/72 N/A N/A N/A 15% 164% 18% 9 
1972/73 N/A N/A N/A 9% 189% 19% 10 
1973/74 N/A 226% 21% 5% 205% 19% 11 
N/A denotes that data was not available for calculation 
FREE EDUCATION 1973 – 1986 
A major policy shift in funding education in Jamaica came when Prime Minister Michael 
Manley announced the policy of free education from the primary to the higher education 
level on, 2nd May 1973. Appendix VI contains the excerpt of his speech on the 
introduction of Free Education. The policy was intended to widen access to HE in 
Jamaica. 
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Features of the Free Education System 
There were four distinguishing features of the free education system in Jamaica as 
identified by the interviewee and corroborated by the historical record. The first feature 
was that there was a single policy for the entire education system. No level of the 
education system was regarded as having a higher priority than the other. No student at 
any level was required to pay tuition fees. This was the main feature of the system in 
Jamaica as the government assumed financial responsibility for the administration, 
development and delivery of the programmes of all publicly supported educational 
institutions. 
The second feature was that there was guaranteed financing for any Jamaican student who 
was accepted to read for a degree at the UWI or to study at any TLI. The Prime Minister 
was recorded in the Daily Gleaner on May 18, 1973, as saying that, “because of the 
importance of higher skills and our determination to bring these skills within the reach of 
the poorest in the land the government would be making available free tuition for 
university education for all Jamaicans qualifying for and gaining entrance at the UWI”. 
The Hon. Maxine Henry-Wilson stated, “After the declaration of free education – persons 
were allowed to attend the University of the West Indies (UWI) free” (interview February 
13, 2004). 
The third feature was that the government accepted responsibility for the living expenses 
of all the students during their course of study. This meant that the administrative 
expenses for residential operations in secondary and post-secondary institutions became 
the responsibility of the government. Students at the then further and higher education 
levels were therefore brought on par with those in the teacher training colleges and were 
awarded Boarding Grants to cover their residential expenses whether or not they lived on 
campus. Sherlock (1986 p.59) noted that the Boarding Grant programme was a part of the 
Free Education Policy of 1973. He also noted that initially government provided: 
a.	 Full boarding to all students living in Halls of residence at UWI up to a 
maximum of $1,300 
b.	 Boarding assistance to those boarding off campus 
c.	 Some assistance to students living at home 
Cabinet changed the parameters when it took the decision on July 21, 1975 
to provide every student entering the system after September 1, 1975 a fixed 
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grant of $760 per annum ($20 per week for 38 weeks) irrespective of the 
place of abode, residence or need 
Appendix VIII details the boarding grant assistance given to students of UWI and CAST 
between 1973 and 1986. 
A fourth feature was the expansion of the students’ loan scheme to assist students to 
provide for other personal expenses related to education for example, books and 
subsistence. The SLB which began operations in 1970 continued to grant loans to students 
of recognised TLIs but since tuition and boarding were free in Jamaica it was no longer 
necessary to grant loans for those purposes to students who were studying locally. These 
types of loans, however, continued in force for those persons studying overseas. Dr. Rae 
Davis pointed out that receiving a loan from the SLB was virtually automatic because once 
someone applied, it would be granted (interview November 13, 2003). The loans granted 
during the free education era are contained in Appendix VII. 
RAM for HE during the Free Education Era 
The system of allocating the funds to the HE system continued to be via the UGC with 
advice from its TAC. As a result of the elimination of fees, students no longer took part in 
the resource allocation flow, see Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 - Resource Allocation Process for HE under Free Education, 1973-1986 
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The change in policy also resulted in an adjustment to the process for funding the national 
tertiary institutions in Jamaica, see Figure 4.4. The only change the Figure shows is that 
the students were removed from the financing flow to the institutions. 
Figure 4.4 - Resource Allocation Process for Non-HEIs under Free Education Policy, 1973-1986 
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The dissatisfaction with using the levy ratio to allocate resources to the university led to a 
change in RAM. It was decided to eliminate the levy system and use the per capita cost 
(PCC) as the basis for distributing the cost to the participating Government. Appendix IX 
summarises the various options considered at a meeting of the sub-committee of the TAC 
on April 15, 1969. The effects of the options on the proportionate contribution are shown 
in Appendix X. The UCG reviewed the various options at a meeting on March 24, 1972 
and agreed that for the triennium 1972-1975 the basis of contribution to the recurrent 
expenditure of the university should be economic cost modified by a discount of 1.9% of 
total expenditure, which was given to the Non-Campus Countries (NCC) and absorbed by 
the Campus Countries. The decision of the UGC was noted at the University Council 
meeting in April 1972. It was felt that the most equitable and realistic basis for allocating 
the recurrent cost to participating governments was economic cost but because of the 
intrinsic benefits derived by host countries where campuses were located then there was 
the discount to the NCC. It was also agreed that capital costs should be met in the first 
instance by the host country which had the right to reclaim a portion from the university 
through the budget process. They could include in succeeding budgets, amounts for 
repayment, which could be calculated by taking the interest rate on the money borrowed or 
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an agreed interest rate and amortise the total over 50 years in the case of building, 15 years 
for major equipment and 3-5 years for minor equipment and furnishing. An illustration of 
how the PCC work is outlined in Appendix XI and the mathematical interpretation of 
Jamaica’s share is as per equation 4.4. 
Aj = {�(PCCf * Efj ) + D} + �(Prj) 4.4 
Where PCCf = Cost per full time student in a given faculty 
Efj = Total Jamaican student enrolment in a given faculty 
D = Discount to NCC being absorbed by Jamaica 
Prj = Non-Capital expenditure proportion being provided 
by Jamaica 
Consequences of the Free Education Policy 
There is the perception that the Free Education policy resulted in increasing of access to 
HE. The interviewees overwhelmingly thought this to be the case. According to them 
Dealing with the “free education”, clearly, in terms of education supporting the 
economy, if you have a strong education system all the studies indicate that the 
result will be a strong economy and therefore a nation can look forward to a free 
flow from what ever level, primary straight through to higher education with no 
concern about payment for everything, then the end result would be more 
empowerment to the teaching environment, a stronger economy, so that clearly 
would benefit most of the poorer class. (Dr. Rae Davis, November 13, 2003) 
Definitely, many students benefited – those who could not afford it. They benefited 
from education so if there was any major benefit – sure it was the question of 
access. Once you qualified and there was a space in the University then you got a 
space. (Hon. Maxine Henry-Wilson, February 13, 2004) 
In fact, many people will tell you that to free education meant a lot to their career 
both at the secondary and tertiary levels. (Dr. Alfred Sangster, November 7, 2003) 
Yes, in a sense, it sought in a crude way to remove the possibility that someone 
would be excluded from tertiary education because of resources – that was a major 
factor, in our point of view towards the promotion of equity.. (Hon. Omar Davis, 
February 20, 2004) 
Table 4.4 was compiled using the formula already established for calculating the average 
growth rate in enrolment. 
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Table 4.4- Growth rate in HE Enrolment during Free Education, 1973-1986 
Jamaicans at UWI UWI 
Year to 
Year 
Growth 
Cumulative 
Growth 
Average 
Rate 
Relative to 
1963/64 
Year to 
Year 
Growth 
Cumulativ 
e Growth 
Average 
Rate 
Relative to 
1963/64 
Number 
of Years 
1972/73 N/A N/A N/A 9% 189% 19% 10 
1973/74 N/A 226% 21% 5% 205% 19% 11 
1974/75 9% 255% 21% 4% 217% 18% 12 
1975/76 6% 275% 21% 5% 232% 18% 13 
1976/77 7% 301% 21% 4% 245% 17% 14 
1977/78 9% 336% 22% 7% 270% 18% 15 
1978/79 1% 341% 21% 6% 290% 18% 16 
1979/80 6% 368% 22% 6% 312% 18% 17 
1980/81 -2% 360% 20% 1% 316% 18% 18 
1981/82 6% 386% 20% 5% 336% 18% 19 
1982/83 3% 399% 20% 0% 338% 17% 20 
1983/84 6% 431% 21% 5% 358% 17% 21 
1984/85 4% 454% 21% 5% 383% 17% 22 
1985/86 -4% 429% 19% 1% 390% 17% 23 
The average enrolment rate for Jamaicans at the UWI during fee paying ranged between 
7% and 17% which was below the institutional average of 19%. However, during the free 
education period the Jamaica average growth was above 20%. In 1985/86 the enrolment of 
Jamaican dropped by 4% relative to the previous year and this took the period average 
from 21% to 19%. It is to be noted too that the Jamaican enrolment growth rate was 
consistently above the institutional average. This was a reversal of the trend in the fee-
paying era where the Jamaican growth rate was below the institutional average. The 
analysis therefore shows that more Jamaicans were being admitted to the UWI than from 
the other supporting countries. It cannot be concluded however that free education resulted 
in improved access of Jamaicans to HE because the growth rate at the end of the period 
was 2% less that of the first year of the programme. 
The economic plight of Jamaica was a consequence of the free education policy of the 
1970s. According to Rae Davis (November 13, 2003): 
The problems started probably in the mid to late 1970’s then the weight of 
responsibility of funding all the different elements of tertiary education including 
providing a boarding grant and so on began to take its toll on the economy and 
they started thinking of a different model and from even in the early to mid 1980’s 
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studies were being done to look at an alternative to funding education in general 
and tertiary education. 
Sharpley (1984) and Killick (1984) pointed out that in keeping with the People’s National 
Party’s (PNP’s) election manifesto many new social and economic programmes were 
introduced between 1972 and 1976. The official ideology of “Democratic Socialism” 
influenced the priorities attached by the Cabinet to income distribution, inflation and the 
balance of payments. Free education was one of the wide ranging social programmes 
introduced during the first two years of office which resulted in government expenditure 
exceeding the approved estimates by over 20% in 1974/75. By 1975/76 the country had a 
budget deficit of 37% and this escalated to 75% by 1976/77. The estimates of 
consumption and investment rates for the public and private sectors showed that the total 
public sector expenditure increased from 18.6% to 26.3 of G.D.P. between 1973 and 1976. 
The increase was used mainly for consumption which included supporting the free 
education policy. The economy plunged into prolonged recession and disequilibria and 
between 1972/80 real G.D.P. per capita declined at an average annual rate of 4%, G.D.P. 
from the manufacturing sector declined on average by 3.3% annually, mining fell by 1.3% 
and there was no growth in agriculture. Other indicators also recorded negative trends 
during the period. Savings and investment rates declined, unemployment rate increased to 
an average of 23% for the 1972-1980 period, double digit inflation occurred frequently and 
domestic prices rose to an average annual increase of 25% in 1974/75 and 47% in 1978/79. 
Appendix XV shows the worsening economic indicators of Jamaica 1970 – 1980. Details 
are contained in the Fiscal Policies 1988, Jamaica and the International Monetary Fund, 
Lumsden, Mathies and Blefer 1981, Structural Adjustments of the Jamaican Economy 
1082 –1987, Sharpley 1984, Tanzi 1984. 
A third and a major consequence was that the free education policy resulted in financial 
difficulties of the HEI. The policy, which eliminated fees and increased the access rate to 
HE, had in turn led to increased cost to the Jamaican Government. The RAM also led to 
increased cost to Jamaica and the GOJ’s inability to meet such costs in a timely manner 
resulted in cash flow difficulties for the UWI. The liabilities thereafter increased as well as 
institution’s operational cost increased because of foreign exchange loss on international 
debts. This is illustrated in Figure 4.5 and detailed below. 
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Figure 4.5: Financial Problems as a Consequence of the Free Education Policy and the RAM during 
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The problem with receivables surfaced in the 1975 as can be seen from exchanges between 
the University Bursar and the Permanent Secretary (PS) of the MOE 
a.	 15th May 1975 the Bursar wrote to Deputy Financial Secretary (DFS), MOF 
with a copy to the PS MOE complaining of late remittances causing an 
overdraft of over J$500,000 
b.	 26th May 1975 PS MOE responded that he was unaware of any problem the 
university was having in obtaining its regular remittances. 
c.	 3rd June 1975 Bursar proved that monthly payments for April and May were 
made 11 and 16 days late respectively. He also pointed out that in respect to 
other projects there were also difficulties. 
d.	 13th June 1975 PS suggested that delays may have been due to the bureaucracy 
of the system in satisfying the Ministry of the Public Service (MPS) before the 
funds could have been channelled through the MOE. 
The problem became graver with the receivables from the contributing governments and 
particularly Jamaica getting worse every year. An analysis of financial records as outlined 
in Table 4.6 shows the extent of the problem. 
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Table 4.5: Analysis of the Receivables of the UWI during Free Education Era, 1973-1986 
Current 
Receivables/ 
Total 
Income 
Receivables/ 
Governments 
Contribution 
Receivables/ 
Net Assets 
Current 
Receivables/ 
Current 
Assets 
1974 10% 13% 4% 28% 
1975 11% 15% 5% 32% 
1976 11% 14% 7% 30% 
1977 13% 18% 8% 25% 
1978 22% 32% 16% 60% 
1979 12% 17% 10% 41% 
1980 14% 20% 11% 35% 
1981 17% 23% 14% 42% 
1982 30% 43% 26% 67% 
1983 35% 50% 33% 74% 
1984 28% 42% 26% 63% 
1985 36% 57% 28% 76% 
1986 35% 53% 26% 63% 
By 1985 receivables were 36% percent of total income, 57% of total government 
contributions and 76% of the current assets. The receivable level was the major reason, 
therefore, for the cash flow problems of the institution. An analysis of the institution’s 
records revealed that this was a major concern during the period. The extent of the 
problem is summarised below: 
a.	 October 5, 1977 internal receivable schedule showed balance outstanding from 
Jamaica of J$1,952,873. 
b.	 June 6, 1978, VC wrote to the PS MOE requesting that they meet with the MOF 
and the FS “to work out some strategy or arrangement for liquidating the balance 
since it would be disastrous if our published accounts had to show at year end 
Jamaica’s indebtedness to the tune of $8M or more.” 
c.	 5th September 1978 memorandum from the Bursar to the acting VC pointed out that 
the overdraft at the bank was in excess of $750,000 and would have been about 
$2M had the institution not retired a part of its investment and used funds intended 
for other purposes for operations of the Mona Campus. The memo also pointed out 
that “the situation is caused by the non-payment of the arrears due by the 
Government of Jamaica.” 
d.	 December 7, 1979 VC wrote to Minister of Finance informing him that Jamaica 
had fallen in arrears again and outstanding amount was J$5.4M. 
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e.	 Other correspondences reiterate the mounting problem. On 14th September 1980 
acting VC to the FS, filed a note of a meeting 2nd September 1980 between UWI 
led by VC and MOF led by FS about the crisis 
f.	 FS letter to VC on May 6, 1983: 
You will no doubt appreciate that generally funding has been extremely tight and 
that the Ministry of Finance and Planning has released to the Ministry of 
Education for the University as much as we have been able to provide within the 
constraints under which we are operating. I am afraid that the prospect for 
1983/84 is still a very difficult one, but we will continue to attempt to release for 
the University as much as we can within the limits of the cash constraint. 
g.	 VC wrote to Prime Minister on August 4, 1983 informing him that “the situation 
has indeed reached crisis proportions because our bankers, National Commercial 
Bank Ltd., have refused to honour any more overdrafts without the Letter of 
Comfort being established.” 
The receivables management problems were exacerbated by exposure to foreign exchange 
rate risk. This was seen in the dispute over the method of billing and further demonstrated 
in a letters to the PS of the MOE of 28th August 1978, and to FS from the Bursar on 6th 
January 1984. The 1978 letter informed that the devaluation of the Jamaican dollar had 
resulted in increased cost to the Jamaican government for the Trinidadian and Barbadian 
campuses. The devaluation had resulted in an increase debt of J$2M or 15%. This was 
because the indebtedness for the non-Jamaican campuses was being settled long after 
movements in the exchange rates. 
Conversion Rate at 1976-77 Avg. 1.8.77 1977-78 Avg. 
J$ 7,950,532 7,950,532 7,950,532 7,950,532 
TT$ 8,633,295 3,509,470 4,496,508 4,796,275 
Bds$ 3,459,923 1,687,767 2,162,452 2,306,615 
13,147,769 14,609,492 15,053,422 
The letter of 1984 further pointed out that the foreign exchange rate exposure risk had 
increased significantly. 
Consequent upon the devaluation of the Jamaican dollar, I have to inform you that 
the Government’s assessed contribution for 1983-84, covering the period 
December 1983 to July 1984, has increased by a further J$24M (approx.) based on 
J$3.15 = US$1.00 and is likely to increase as further downward movements in the 
exchange rate take place. 
The Bursar in his correspondence to the VC of January 23, 1986, gave an example of the 
cost of foreign exchange risk. According to him, 
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Unfortunately, our accounts as at 31st July, 1984 showed large amounts owing in 
TT$ - TT$16,649,462 to the St. Augustine Campus and TT$23,792,360 to the 
Government of Trinidad and Tobago, a total of TT$40,441,822 or J$45,332,216, 
whereas the Government of Jamaica owed the University J$27,089,413. As a 
result of the devaluation of the J$, the value of Trinidad and Tobago debt moved 
from J$45,332,216 to J$82,054,729, but the Jamaican debt has not changed… 
The above showed that there was a new debt to Trinidad of J$18,242,803 (i.e. 
J$45,332,216 less J$27,089,413). The exposure had caused the debt to Trinidad to 
increase by J$36,722,513 (i.e. J$82,054,729 less J$27,089,413 and the original value of 
J$18,242,803) 
By 1979 the institution was facing public ridicule over the state of its financial affairs. The 
National Target, a new paper in Trinidad, on Saturday January 29, 1979, published an 
article entitled, “UWI Running Broke”. The article placed the blame on Jamaica for not 
being able to honour its commitment for financing the university. It stated, “The main 
reason for the dismal financial plight of the university is the continued non-payment of 
monies by Jamaica. Jamaica now owes the university roughly $8M… funds allocated for 
special projects like expansion have been rerouted to defray administrative costs of running 
the university”. 
The free education policy did not fare better for CAST, which was regarded as being at the 
next level to the UWI in the education system in Jamaica. Table 4.6 shows that during the 
period it consistently operated with deficits, delayed payments to creditors and overdrafts 
and had negative working capital and accumulated fund. 
Table 4.6: Financial Results of CAST, 1974-1986 
Surplus/ 
(Deficit) 
Accumulated 
Fund 
Short Term 
Liabilities 
1974 40,977 20,328 110,271 
1975 (146,654) (126,326) 244,824 
1976 (71,029) (129,855) 236,359 
1977 89,895 (39,960) 212,982 
1978 145,430 105,470 227,968 
1979 n/a n/a n/a 
1980 n/a n/a n/a 
1981 98,997 (108,662) 166,158 
1982 (151,974) (260,636) 215,185 
1983 (643,866) (904,502) 291,722 
1984 (794,125) (1,698,627) 819,813 
1985 (641,611) (1,904,875) 1,496,166 
1986 (126,875) (2,031,750) 1,728,766 
Source: Audited Financial Records of CAST 
Working 
Capital 
86,138 
(34,682) 
(51,934) 
(3,097) 
141,629 
n/a 
n/a 
432,103 
593,026 
35,843 
(354,595) 
(768,904) 
(396,294) 
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Unpaid subvention to the institution was not regarded as receivables since the Government 
was not obligated to honour them. This was the reason for its financial problems which 
manifested themselves in deficit operation and lack of working capital rather than high 
receivables. 
Flowing from the financial difficulties was the consequence that the policy placed a strain 
on the resources for capital/infrastructural development and that was a factor which limited 
capacity and restricted access. A cause of this consequence was the responsibility placed 
on the government of the campus country to provide the funds for all capital development. 
The Hon. Maxine Henry-Wilson (Interview February 13, 2004) pointed out that she was a 
lecturer on the UWI, Mona campus during the free education era and that a significant 
impression she had was “the extent to which the physical environment of the University 
had declined”. A bursary document from the UWI entitled “Capital Needs” dated January 
1975 corroborated the minister’s recollection and supports the point that the physical 
facilities could not support burden of the free education policy. The document pointed out 
that further increase in enrolment was no longer possible because the facilities were up to 
capacity and no funding was being provided for additional infrastructure. Between 1965-
66 and 1974-75 the enrolment had doubled without increased capacity being provided. 
A fifth consequence was the threat that the instability of the funding was causing the 
quality assurance of the programmes. The Administrator of University Hospital of the 
West Indies informed the FS of the MOF in a letter dated 12th July 1983, of the threat to 
withdraw the accreditation of the medical faculty and hospital as a teaching institution if 
funding was not provided to maintain the plant and buildings. 
The method of billing the government on actual cost, or ex post pricing caused disputes. 
The cross country subsidisation of faculty cost also exacerbated the problem caused by the 
ex-post pricing strategy. The MOF in a document dated October 2, 1978 by Tyndall and 
Terrelonge contended that in the 1977-78 academic year 90% of Jamaica students were 
stationed at Mona and 10% were spread across the Cave Hill and St. Augustine campuses. 
As such they believed that the devaluation of the Jamaican dollar should have affected only 
10% of the non-Jamaican costs. On that basis they claimed that the UWI was overstating 
the bill to the Government by $3,552,073. The university refuted the claim in its 
correspondence of October 5, 1978, by stating that: 
116 
This seems to be based on the erroneous premise that the per capita cost is 
calculated separately for each campus whereas in fact it is based on the total 
expenditure in each faculty across the three campuses. In addition it has been 
agreed by UGC that in order to guarantee the university’s stability in its revenues 
in relation to its expenditure commitments, each contributing territory should be 
billed in relation to the approved expenditure at each of the three campuses in the 
currency used in the host country. 
The above exchanges show that Jamaica had perceived a disadvantage to itself in the 
faculty average method of allocating cost. 
Linking the financing of educational institutions directly to the inputs created a salary 
parity dispute within the teaching profession in Jamaica. Sherlock (1991 p.70) pointed out 
that in 1973 the MPS which was responsible for salaries and conditions of service in the 
public service carried out a reclassification exercise which “found that all teaching posts in 
all tertiary institutions, except the University of the West Indies, were comparable in terms 
of their job descriptions, duties and responsibilities”. The teaching staff of CAST and JSA 
objected to this view and in 1976 withdrew from the Jamaica Teachers Association (JTA). 
They thereafter adopted the strategy of negotiating their salaries and fringe benefits after 
the JTA had completed its negotiation. This enabled them to obtain increments above 
those of the JTA. The JTA thereafter included a clause in their agreement which states that 
“any increases granted to any other group negotiating for teachers after the JTA has 
concluded its negotiation with the government would automatically be granted to the JTA 
members of comparable categories” (ibid. p.71). In 1979 there was a protest over the fact 
that CAST and JSA were successful in negotiating increases above those of the JTA. At 
the same time the country had failed an IMF test3, the government then pleaded inability to 
pay and informed CAST and JSA that they had to be paid at the same level of JTA. This 
resulted in an industrial dispute over failure to honour the agreement with the MPS. The 
matter was referred to the Industrial Disputes Tribunal (IDT) to determine “whether there 
were differentials between Tertiary Institutions which warrant pay differentials” (ibid. 
p.72). The tribunal ruled that there were such differentials and recommended higher 
salaries for the staff of CAST and JSA than those of the teachers’ colleges. The JTA then 
struck in September 1980 and questioned the competence of the IDT to make the 
3 As a result of the economic problems Jamaica entered a three year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with the 
IMF in 1976. The assessments of compliance with conditionalities under the programme were called tests. 
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judgement it did. On September 16, 1980 the Government settled the matter by making 
the same award to the JTA. 
Another consequence was that the policy of tuition free education to the tertiary level had 
redirected needed resources from the primary and secondary levels and had caused major 
problems to the system. This was suggested in Sherlock (1986), which quoted Ministry 
Paper 10 of 1986, “a disproportionate amount of the education budget has had to be 
expended on tertiary education whereas the greatest need for funding is at the primary and 
secondary levels”. It made note that at least 50% of the school leavers at the primary level 
were functionally illiterate and that the secondary schools were inadequately equipped to 
deal with those who were deemed acceptable. 
CESS 1986 - 1992 
As a result of the problems experienced in financing the free education policy the GOJ on 
February 18, 1986, decided to charge a cess on the students of the UWI and CAST. Cess 
is defined by Oxford Concise Dictionary as a tax or a levy and is the concise version of the 
word assessment. Dr. Rae Davis (Interview November 13, 2003) explained the system as 
follows: 
The cess was imposed by the GOJ but the fee for UWI and CAST remained the 
same i.e. the tuition fee but the cess went to the GOJ who used that to provide 
subventions for the University. Of course, as far as the students were concerned it 
was more money even though they paid the cess at the Bank of Jamaica. The UWI 
and CAST didn’t actually get the cess in their hands. It came back through the 
subvention but certainly it was increased student-participation in funding their own 
education. 
Sherlock (1986) pointed out that the reasons for the change in Government policy were: 
a) Dramatic increases in the cost of education 
b) Accelerating population pressure, and consequent increases in the number of 
students at the secondary and tertiary levels of the education system 
c) A sharp fall in government revenue from the bauxite/alumina industry 
d) The need according to Ministry Paper 10 of 1986, to rebalance the educational 
budget without sacrificing the maintenance and development of the basic education 
system 
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The period of the cess coincided with CAST introduction to the arena of HE as on March 
14, 1986, The College of Arts, Science and Technology Scheme (Approval) Order 1986 
came into existence. This order, among other things gave authority to the Council of the 
College to “confer any degrees, diplomas, certificates or other marks of distinction on 
students of the College who have pursed courses of study approved by the Council and 
have passed such examinations or other tests as may from time to time be required by the 
Council”. It should be noted that the mandate did not include that of research. 
Features of the Cess 
The main feature was that students were required to pay the Government a fee (tax) that 
was pegged to the economic cost of their education. The rate was announced at 30% of the 
economic cost and as such a CAST student was asked to pay $900 p.a. and the UWI 
students’ amounts varied depending on the faculty. On the recommendation of the 
Sherlock Taskforce however the rates were reduced. CAST Students were asked to pay 
$450 and those of the UWI varying amounts as per Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7 – UWI Cess, 1986-87 
CESS Economic CESS as % of Original Level 
Cost Econ. Cost of CESS as a % 
of Econ. Cost 
Agriculture 1,650 67,223 2.4% 7.3% 
Arts & General 1,400 17,600 7.9% 28.1% 
Studies 
Education 1,400 20,500 6.8% 20.5% 
Law Year 1 2,000 67,223 3.0% 8.9% 
Law Yrs 2 & 3 1,650 21,500 7.7% 23.0% 
Medicine – Pre- 1,650 48,290 3.4% 10.2% 
Clinical 
Medicine – 1800 30,000 6.0% 20.0% 
Clinical 
Natural Science 2,000 43,000 4.6% 13.9% 
Social Sciences 1,650 22,400 7.4% 22.1% 
Engineering 1,400 17600 7.9% 23.9% 
Source: Report of the Committee on Tuition Fees, UWI, June 8, 1991 
The second feature was that the cess was restricted to students of two TLIs (UWI and 
CAST), those at teacher training colleges and the College of Agriculture (CA) were 
exempted. 
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The third feature was the abolition of automatic boarding grants for all students. Also 
along with the tax it was announced that the Boarding Grants of J$760 p.a. to the students 
of the two institutions would also be abolished. The Government later accepted the 
recommendation of the Sherlock Task force that the boarding grant should be continued 
for students who could demonstrate the need for such assistance. 
RAM During the Period of the Cess 
Notwithstanding CAST’s entrance to the HE arena the resource allocation process for this 
institution remained the same as the non-HEIs in the national tertiary education system. 
Resources were allocated to this institution on the same basis as the other national 
institutions. Salaries were determined by the bargaining procedures with the Ministry of 
Public Service (MPS) based on predetermined categories and number of persons (The 
Establishment). The allocation for overhead cost, equipment and materials had to be 
negotiated with the MOE budget division. Figure 4.6 shows the adjustment to the resource 
allocation process for CAST as brought on by the introduction of the cess. 
Figure 4.6: The Resource Allocation Flow for National TLIs during the Period of the Cess, 1986-1993 
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In addition to the change caused by the cess there were other changes to the resource

allocation process and model for the UWI. In October 1977 the government of Trinidad
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and Tobago published a white paper on “National Institute of Higher Education” which 
included, among other things, proposals for restructuring the UWI. Consequently the 
MOE of the supporting countries requested the UWI to hold discussions with the 
government of Trinidad and Tobago to reconcile any differences between the proposals 
from their Inter-Governmental committee report of 1976 and the White Paper. The 
discussions were finalised on June 22, 1984 when the “UGC received MPV 2/1982 and 
noted the details of the new financial arrangement which had been accepted by the 
previous meeting of UGC held on September 21, 1982 to come into effect as from August 
1, 1984”. This resulted in the restructuring of the university and changes to the resource 
allocation mechanism and process as hereunder explained. 
The activities of the university were separated into four categories, namely: 
�	 Campus activities 
�	 Central university activities 
�	 Specialised research and services at each campus 
� Special programmes for the non-campus countries 
The duties and responsibilities of each area are found in the minutes of the Ministerial 
Policy Committee of the UGC, Feb. 13, 1982 and summarised in Appendix XI. The four 
activities were grouped into two broad costs areas, which Beryl Miller (1987) identified as: 
�	 Campus costs – teaching costs of the faculties on the campus and the campus central 
costs for common Services and Administration. 
�	 Central university costs – university cross-campus administration; extra-mural 
activities in non-campus territories; specialist research departments (e.g. ISER) and 
other university programmes for non-campus territories. 
The PCC or economic cost was used to finance the campus costs and the university cross-
campus administration. There was a change to the methodology, which was more specific 
to both faculty and campus. Miller (1987) outlined that the PCC was calculated as follows: 
The faculty’s expenditure for the year at each campus divided by the total number of students (weighted) in the faculty at that 
campus 
PLUS 
Central expenditure/common services of the campus divided by the number 
of students (weighted) at the campus. 
PLUS 
Centre expenditure at all three campuses divided by the total number of 
students (weighted) attending the university for the year. 
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The RAM policy shift adjustment to equation 4.4 as is represented in equation 4.9. 
PCCfm = (SC/E) + (FCfm/Efm ) (4.4) 
PCCfm = (SC/E) + (SCm/Em) + (FCfm/Efm ) (4.5) 
Where 
SC = Centre expenditure or university shared costs 
SCm = Administrative cost for the campus or campus shared costs 
FCfm = Expenditure of a particular faculty on a particular campus 
E = FTE enrolment for the entire university 
Em = FTE enrolment of the campus 
Efm = FTE enrolment for the particular faculty on a particular campus 
PCCfm = Per capita cost for the particular faculty on a particular campus. 
The costs associated with the Specialised Research and Service Units were to “be kept 
separate from the regular teaching costs on the Campus” (Restructuring the UWI, 1980) 
and “be funded through schemes approved by the Central UGC” (Minute of MPC Feb. 13, 
1982). Special programmes for NCCs were also financed differently and were initially in 
the following proportion 
Non-Campus Countries 10.00% 
Trinidad and Tobago 45.00% 
Barbados 8.19% 
Jamaica 36.81% 
100.00% 
The formula for attributing the cost for the resources to be allocated to the University was 
radically changed as is seen from the mathematical representation of equation 4.10. The 
details of equations 4.6 to 4.9 and given in Appendix XI. 
Aj = �(PCCfmj* Efmj ) +Dj+ � (SRC * xj ) + (NPC *yj ) (4.10) 
Where 
Dj = Portion of discount being absorbed by campus country 
SRC = Cost for specialised research 
NPC = Cost of special programmes for NCC 
xj = SRC rate of absorption for Jamaica 
yj = NPC rate of absorption Jamaica 
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Up to July 31, 1990, the contribution to the UHWI was treated similarly to the special 
research units in that a particular rate of absorption was charged. Since August 1, 1990, 
the contribution to the UHWI was treated similarly to the teaching costs of the faculties 
and the PCC formula was applied. It was thereafter funded separately. 
There were also changes to the resource allocation process as new funding bodies were 
introduced and these resulted in a new relationship between the sponsoring governments 
and the university. The Campus Grants Committees (CGC) assumed the role of the UGC 
as can be seen from their terms of reference which according to the minutes of the 
Ministerial Policy Committee (MPC) of the UGC September 21, 1982, were to: 
a)	 Examine the extent to which the university through the activities of the campus was 
meeting the national and regional needs, both in education of students and in 
research of benefit to the campus country and the region. 
b)	 Examine proposals for expenditure at the campus in the light of these national and 
regional needs, recommend to governments the provision of the necessary finance, 
and satisfy itself that the money voted is properly managed. 
c)	 Do the above without interfering with the essential freedom of the University, 
thereby leaving the conduct of university business to the organs of academic self-
administration. 
d)	 In consultation with the Grants Committee of the other campuses, and the UGC, 
and with due regard for the specific needs of the NCCs: 
a.	 enquire into the financial needs of university education with particular 
reference to the relevant campus, 
b.	 advise the contributing government of the grant to be made towards meeting 
these needs on a triennial basis, and 
c.	 assist, in consultation with the university and other bodies concerned, in the 
preparation and execution of such plans for the development of the 
Mona/St. Augustine/Cave Hill Campus of the university as may from time 
to time be required in order to ensure that they are fully adequate to national 
and regional needs. 
The membership of the CGC was as follows (MPC September 21, 1982): 
a) A minister of government of the campus country who should be chairman 
of the CGC; 
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b) Four persons appointed by the government of the campus country; 
c) One member nominated by the government of the campus country who has 
special knowledge of university administration and/or finances; 
d) One member at ministerial level from each other campus country; 
e) Three members at ministerial level from the NCCs as a group. 
The role of the Central UGC (MPC September 21, 1982) was adjusted to be: 
i. An examination of the activities of the centre and the funding arrangements 
for these activities; agreeing on the arrangements for residual funding for 
the specialised research units 
ii. Consultation on matters of mutual interest and on university development in 
particular. This would include examination of rival claims of Campuses for 
new developments for which the regional catchment area was necessary for 
viability 
iii. Changes in the number of non-campus students which individual campuses 
agreed to admit 
iv.	 Cost sharing among campuses of the capital and/or the recurrent costs of 
new developments in particular cases 
v.	 External funds which create a continuing commitment on the university; 
vi.	 Any other matters related to university development and financing as might 
be agreed. 
An interpretation of the resource allocation process based on the TOR of the central UGC 
and the CGC and the 1984 structure of the HE system is depicted in Figure 4.7. The 
Central UGC would examine and approve the expenditure for all the areas of responsibility 
for the centre. The CGC would do similarly for the campus activities but would in 
addition incorporate a portion for central cost in its budget. The CGC would negotiate 
with the government of the campus country, as each would completely finance the costs of 
the campus in its country as well as the campus portion of central costs. Each CGC had its 
own advisory committee called the Campus Technical Advisory Committee (CTAC). The 
campus was responsible for remitting to the centre. The cess was expected to be remitted 
directly to the GOJ. 
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Figure 4.7: Resource Allocation Process of UWI, 1984-1994 
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Consequences of the RAM and the Policy of the Cess 
The announcement of the cess immediately resulted in massive student protest. Sherlock 
(1986) reported “On February 19, the day following the announcement, there were 
students’ protests and demonstrations. These continued for 3 ½ weeks. During this period 
of turbulence work at CAST and UWI was disrupted. There was widespread public 
discussion and concern”. This prompted the Cabinet on April 14, 1986 to set up a task 
force to review the issue. 
The cess was introduced to provide additional funds to allow the government of Jamaica to 
settle its obligations for HE but did not have such consequence. Instead it exacerbated the 
financial difficulties of the UWI and CAST. The receivables difficulties worsened and 
consequently made the institutions illiquid. The UWI, aided by the GOJ thereafter 
increased its dependence on loans and overdraft to finance the operations. This only 
resulted in additional cost of operations. Figure 4.8 shows the flow of the financial 
difficulties experienced by the UWI during the period of the Cess. 
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Figure 4.8: Financial Problems of the UWI during the Period of the Cess, 1986-1993 
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The cess also, instead of addressing the receivables management position of the university 
had the consequence of worsening that position. This can be seen in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8 - Receivable Management Ratios of the UWI during the Period of the Cess, 1986-1993 
Receivables/ 
Total Income 
Receivables/ Receivables/ 
Net Assets 
Current 
Governments Receivables/ 
Contribution Current Assets 
1986 35% 53% 26% 63% 
1987 68% 99% 50% 81% 
1988 73% 106% 50% 84% 
1989 83% 117% 55% 81% 
1990 52% 77% 39% 80% 
1991 54% 75% 44% 79% 
1992 68% 96% 52% 83% 
1993 64% 85% 53% 75% 
The level of income to meet operational requirements was extremely limited. The 
receivables to governments’ contribution ratios showed that in 1988 and 1989 the 
governments were not even making contributions to cover current commitments. This is 
further seen from a statement of outstanding contribution which shows that as at March 31, 
1988, the GOJ had outstanding to the university a sum of Ja $ 146M of which $39M was 
for the previous year and the balance was the entire year’s assessment of $107M. 
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Statement of Outstanding Contribution as at March 31, 1988

From the Jamaica Government

Balance outstanding 31/7/87 107,786,932.55 
Assessment 1987/88 U.W.I. 98,234,680.00 
U.H.W.I.	 8,588,434.00 106,823,114.00 
214,610,046.55 
Payments Aug-87 12,322,000.00 
Sep-87 7,500,000.00 
Oct-87 8,000,000.00 
Nov-87 7,500,000.00 
Nov-87 1,250,000.00 
Dec-87 8,000,000.00 
Jan-88 8,000,000.00 
Feb-88 8,000,000.00 
Mar-88 8,000,000.00 68,572,000.00 
J$146,038,046.55 
In 1993 the receivables to government ratio was 85% showing that the source of the 
financial problem was with the governments, the main source of income for the institution. 
On February 12, 1985 the Hospital Administrator advised the VC that as a result of the 
level of indebtedness by the government “for February, the Hospital will not be able to 
meet its payroll commitments”. On May 3, 1987 the Acting VC, L.R.B. Robinson, in a 
letter to the Prime Minister of Jamaica, linked the financial problems of the university 
directly to the RAM. 
I also pointed out that the overall situation had now altered because of the 
restructured financial arrangements which require the Government of the campus 
country to advance the funds for the campus…The new 1986/87 commitments of the 
Jamaica Government required a payment of J$8.5M per month, but payments were 
initially made for the first four months at the level of J$7.5M and later at the level 
of J$7M so that at March 31, 1987 the sum owed to the University and the 
University Hospital amounted to $92M. 
A team from the university met with the Prime Minister on May 21, 1987. In the meeting 
the Prime Minister promised to liquidate the arrears. One year after the meeting the 
promise was not fulfilled as the VC reported to the Council May 12, 1988, “the financial 
situation at Mona remained extremely difficult with the arrears of the Government of 
Jamaica at a high level and the monthly payments lagging behind the rate required by the 
agreed assessment under Restructuring”. 
The worsened liquidity problem resulting from the receivable difficulties are shown in 
Table 4.9. The cash to net assets position had worsened from an average of 10% in 1986 
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to 6% in 1993. In comparison to the current assets the cash position had moved from a 
ratio of 25% to 9%. The ratios show that the institution could not satisfy its short term 
obligations. 
Table 4.9: Liquidity Ratios of the UWI during the Period of the Cess, 1986-1993 
Cash & Short Term 
Investment/Net Assets 
Cash & Short Term Current 
Investment/Current Assets/Current 
Assets Liabilities 
1986 10% 25% 437% 
1987 5% 9% 232% 
1988 4% 7% 267% 
1989 4% 6% 287% 
1990 3% 6% 215% 
1991 3% 6% 212% 
1992 4% 6% 220% 
1993 6% 9% 191% 
The cash flow difficulties led in turn to a dependence on loans and bank overdrafts. Table 
4.10 shows that the liabilities not only grew in absolute terms but also as a percentage of 
expenditure. 
Table 4.10 - Liability Situation of UWI and CAST 1974 - 1993 
UWI CAST 
Short Term 
Liabilities/ Short liabilities/ 
Short-Term Total Term Total 
Year Liabilities Expenditure Liabilities Expenses 
1974 2,994,284 17% 110,271 8% 
1975 3,242,499 15% 244,824 14% 
1976 2,348,968 8% 236,359 11% 
1977 5,815,434 17% 212,982 8% 
1978 5,030,805 10% 227,968 8% 
1979 8,473,872 12% n/a n/a 
1980 12,776,028 15% n/a n/a 
1981 10,285,213 11% 166,158 4% 
1982 12,759,464 11% 215,185 4% 
1983 18,414,771 11% 291,722 5% 
1984 41,735,324 17% 819,813 11% 
1985 67,420,698 17% 1,496,166 18% 
1986 50,192,102 13% 1,728,766 19% 
1987 151,192,883 36% 1,851,900 14% 
1988 136,069,335 33% 3,266,063 24% 
1989 149,544,698 35% 3,867,441 21% 
1990 166,385,940 31% 6,497,693 26% 
1991 256,543,833 32% 13,427,794 41% 
1992 616,207,462 37% 9,964,493 18% 
1993 1,026,600,953 45% 12,438,440 14% 
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During the free education period the debt to total expenditure had peaked at 17% for the 
UWI and 19% for CAST. However, during the period of the cess the rate for the UWI was 
regularly above 30% and peaked at 45% in 1993. CAST peaked at 41% in 1991. In 1991 
CAST, contrary to the GOJ’s policy, instituted fees and this accounted for the change in 
1992. The past President, Dr. Alfred Sangster, stated, “Secondary schools and CAST went 
slightly through the Machiavellian method because we adjusted the so called ancillary fees 
to cover the so called fee difference” (Interview November 7, 2003) The Machiavellian 
method to which the President alluded was the charging of various user fees to the 
students. The Boich Report (1992) which did an analysis of the institution mentioned 
several types of fees collected by the institution. These included: 
�	 Part-time fees 
�	 Evening fees 
�	 Identification cards 
�	 General services 
�	 Clinic fees 
�	 Instructional material 
�	 Examination fees 
�	 Laboratory fees 
�	 Sport fees 
�	 Library fees 
�	 Degree Fees 
The dependence on loans took the form of bank overdrafts, term loans, promissory notes,

suppliers’ credits and internal borrowings. Various correspondences during the period

illustrate the gravity of the situation as follows:

a) The FS, H.W. Milner wrote to Mr. M.T.A. Payne Deputy Managing Director of the

NCB, the University’s bankers on December 10, 1986 requesting extension of a credit 
facility for the institution 
b)	 The MOF again wrote to Deputy Managing Director of NCB on March 23, 1987 
requesting an increased overdraft facility of J$5M “pending the release of this amount 
at the earliest possible date in April. Unconditional and irrevocable undertaking is 
hereby given to take the necessary action to clear the facility in the event of the UWI 
being unable to do so.” 
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c)	 The MOF wrote to PS of the MOE on June 5, 1987, proposing that for the month of 
June the university again be funded by bank credit. 
d)	 L.B. Smith, the University Bursar, wrote to the Acting VC on June 1, 1988, outlining 
the increased gravity of the situation and the GOJ’s response in securing increased loan 
facilities. 
e)	 A promissory note, dated April 1, 1989, for J$80,667,000 was issued to the UWI by the 
MOF with respect to arrears in contribution to be paid in ten equal semi-annual 
instalments, interest average of six month Treasury Bill rates. 
f)	 Mrs. M. Bucknor, Manager of NCB wrote to Bursar, Mr. L. Smith, on September 15, 
1989, informing of the bank’s inability to extend further overdraft facility because of 
lending restrictions imposed by the Central Bank on all financial institutions. The 
restriction was a condition of the measures imposed by the country’s loan agreement 
with the IMF. 
g)	 Joan McCalla of the Ministry of Finance wrote to Mrs. Bucknor of NCB on October 2, 
1989, informing her of the government’s decision to convert the overdraft to a term 
loan. 
h)	 P. Bucknor of NCB wrote on December 27, 1989, confirming the conversion of the 
facility but noting that the extent of the conversion was insufficient to deal with the 
total cash flow demands of the university. 
i)	 Karl Davis, Hospital Administrator wrote to FS on September 17, 1987, informing that 
the cash flow problems had forced the hospital into extended credit arrangements from 
suppliers 
j)	 The University Bursary recorded on May 20, 1988 that “the result of these short 
payments is that the Mona Campus is unable to transfer any funds to the other 
campuses in respect of balances due to them and has had to use its balances of special 
funds and fixed investments to finance the campus”. This showed that funds intended 
for specific purposes were being directed to assist with the day-to-day operation. 
CAST also resorted to Bank overdrafts to support its operation. Dr. Alfred Sangster, the 
then President of the institution, wrote to the then PS of the MOE, Dr. Rae Davis about the 
bank overdraft which had grown from J$7,130 in 1981, J$1,331,396 at July 31, 1986 and 
to J$8,659,572.86 as at March 31, 1991. 
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The dependence on loans and overdrafts further led to increased cost of the UWI’s 
operations as a result of interest charges, reduced negotiating powers with suppliers and 
foreign exchange losses on overseas debts. Interest cost moved considerably during the 
period. Using 1986 as the base year, interest cost had moved by 151% in 1987-88 and by 
1992-93 the cost had grown by 2071%. Table 4.11 summarises the trend. In 1986-87 
interest cost was 1% of total expenditure. This had moved to 3% in 1987-88 and by 1992-
93 it was 4.5% of total expenditure. 
Table 4.11 Interest Cost of the UWI: Random Selection of 3 years between 1986 and 1993 
1986-87 1987-88 1992-93 
August 7,732.63 863,148.59 3,890,458.37 
September 21,584.81 951,396.91 4,562,374.19 
October 34,830.56 939,696.94 5,039,003.53 
November - 896,360.38 4,815,993.60 
December 79,072.54 975,904.12 5,943,669.09 
January 246,171.89 1,044,164.92 8,802,117.27 
February 425,151.18 967,097.06 9,800,226.17 
March 562,552.72 1,092,133.04 14,215,056.00 
April 823,234.15 1,131,093.84 10,248,749.00 
May 764,129.90 1,068,626.94 10,214,298.52 
June 912,579.22 1,047,202.00 10,675,794.45 
July 913,595.39 1,069,018.00 15,804,510.58 
Total Interest 4,790,634.99 12,045,842.74 104,012,250.77 
Charges 
Trend Using 1986-87 151% 2071% 
as base year 
Karl Davis, Hospital Administrator, in a letter to FS of September 17, 1987, bemoaned the 
fact that the funding arrangement had resulted in increased cost of operations because the 
hospital was unable to use its purchasing power to benefit from economies of scale. He 
pointed out that “this unsatisfactory cash flow position in which the Hospital can only plan 
on the Ministry of Health’s contributions with any degree of certainty deprives the 
Hospital of price advantages and quality discounts normally associated with the good 
purchasing practices of goods and services.” 
Exposure to foreign exchange risk also contributed to the increased cost of operations of a 
HE system which was extended across national borders and dependent on foreign imports. 
The VC in his 1992 report stated that “At Mona, where the 1992-93 budget was drawn up 
on the basis of an exchange rate of J$7 = US$1, the Jamaican dollar has depreciated to 
131 
around J$22. Among other things, this has virtually brought the procurement of imported 
equipment and supplies to a standstill”. Again in his 1993 report he reiterated the point 
when he stated that “the increase payable from August 1992 has been seriously affected by 
the devaluation of the Jamaican dollar – from approximately J$5 = Bds $1 in 1991 to 
J$11= Bds $1 in 1992”. 
During the period of the cess CAST’s financial position had also worsened but affected 
different financial indicators from those of the UWI. See Table 4.12. The areas affected 
were profitability, reserve levels, liability and working capital. 
Table 4.12 - CAST/UTech Financial Results, 1987 - 1993 
Surplus/ Accumulated Short Term Working 
(Deficit) Fund Liabilities Capital 
1987 (415,278) (2,447,028) 1,851,900 (421,263) 
1988 (1,350,753) (3,797,781) 3,266,063 (1,018,606) 
1989 (2,086,098) (5,883,879) 3,867,441 (838) 
1990 (3,804,534) (9,688,413) 6,497,693 (2,017,526) 
1991 (8,044,630) (17,733,043) 13,427,794 (7,913,115) 
1992 3,221,975 (14,511,068) 9,964,493 1,451,531 
1993 14,830,332 319,264 12,438,440 22,058,945 
The different effect was due to the different RAM. Nonetheless, the effect was negative. 
The difficulties reached a peak in 1991 where the deficit reached J$8M, the accumulated 
fund which shows the net worth of the institution was negative J$17.7M, the short term 
liabilities was $13.4M and the working capital negative J$7.9M. As already mentioned the 
unilateral position taken by CAST to charge fees was responsible for the improved position 
since 1992. The difference in the treatment of the UWI and UTech is also seen from a 
comparison of the two institutions’ balance sheets. The manner in which funds were 
remitted to UTech did not allow it to recognise unpaid amount by the government as 
receivables hence this resulted in a deficit on the balance sheet. In the case of UWI un-
remitted funds were recognised as receivable and hence it has shown surpluses in 
operations. While CAST/UTech recorded deficits on the income statement and good 
receivables management ratios, the UWI showed poor receivable management ratio and 
surplus operation during the period of the cess. The analysis therefore shows that the 
consequence on un-remitted funds on HEIs results in either deficit operations or poor 
receivables management ratios depending on how the institution treats non-payments on its 
books. 
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The Report of the Chancellor’s Commission (1994) concluded that the 1984 RAM resulted 
starving the centre of needed funds. This was ‘because campus governments have adopted 
the practice of including their contributions to the Centre in the advances which they make 
to the campuses”. The campuses, which were receiving inadequate funds, kept that which 
they received and left the centre almost impotent. The report also made the claim that the 
RAM was destroying the regional nature of the university. According to the 
Commissioners “the pre-1984 financing arrangements were far more suited to the nature of 
UWI as a regional multi-campus institution than the present arrangements and 
consideration could usefully be given to a return to arrangement along the lines of the pre-
1984 arrangements”. 
The continued funding of HE on the basis of inputs with the resultant responsibility by the 
GOJ to determine the salaries of the staff of educational institutions also led to an 
intensification of the salary parity dispute during the period of the cess. In 1987 the JTA 
again invoked its long-standing agreement with the government when it learnt that in 1985 
the MPS had awarded higher increases to the staff of CAST. The GOJ eventually recanted 
and awarded similar increases to the academic staff of the teachers’ colleges. In May 1990 
there was an attempt to end this dispute when the Minister of Education appointed the 
Sherlock Commission to: 
i.	 Review the principles governing the classification of Jamaica’s tertiary 
education institutions. 
ii.	 Review basic principles governing the classification of staff in these institutions 
iii. Recommend criteria for classifying Jamaica’s tertiary education institutions and 
placing existing institutions within the proposed classification. 
iv.	 Recommend a staff structure along with appointment criteria and comparative 
level of emoluments for the various categories of institutions proposed under 
(iii). 
The majority opinion of Commission was that “the UWI never has been and is not now, a 
part of the Jamaican tertiary system as far as matters of pay and control are concerned”. It 
therefore recommended that in relation to the Jamaican system there should be a change 
from the single level tertiary education system and that the division be used to establish the 
hierarchy of salary payments (hence funding) to the institutions. They further stated that 
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“regardless of UWI, there is now justification for recognizing three levels of the Jamaican 
educational system for the purposes of pay” (ibid 94). Those should be as follows: 
1.	 University/Polytechnic Level, where “the fully qualified lecturer would be required to 
have teaching experience, research skills and to provide evidence of the capacity to 
generate knowledge. The duties and responsibilities would be shared between 
teaching, research, the training of researchers and writing for publications. 
2.	 College/Polytechnic Level, where “…the fully qualified lecturer is required to have a 
university degree, professional training and five year’ teaching experience. The duties 
are mainly related to teaching.” 
3.	 Primary and secondary schools, where “…the requirements of the fully qualified 
teacher is for professional training either at the graduate or undergraduate levels. No 
experience is necessary for appointment.” 
Mr. Hector Wynter offered a minority opinion which stated that it was illusionary to 
believe that the UWI is not a part of the Jamaican system. He recommended that there be 
five levels in the system, namely 
Level 5 - University of the West Indies 
Level 4 - Polytechnic – offering specialized bachelors’ degrees and some masters’ 
programmes in addition to professional courses 
Level 3 - College 11 – offering bachelors’ degree programmes in addition to 
diplomas and certificates 
Level 2 - College 1 – offering certificate and diploma programmes 
Level 1 – Secondary and primary schools offering schools leaving programmes 
The minority opinion was therefore to extend the hierarchical structure of the Jamaican 
educational system and continue funding accordingly. The majority position, however, 
was to establish a clear definition of HE, criteria for entering that arena and use the 
movement in that arena as the basis for attracting increased funding. It was on the basis of 
the majority view that CAST was accepted by the GOJ as a HEI and granted its Charter as 
of September 1, 1995. 
The RAM had also resulted in a salary parity dispute within the UWI system itself. The 
minutes of the Finance and General Purposes Committee (F & GP) meeting of the UWI, 
30th May 1988, reported that at the visit of a delegation to the Prime Minister of Jamaica 
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“the opportunity was taken to raise the issue of the low salaries being paid at the Mona 
Campus and to request that the most favourable consideration be given to upgrading the 
terms and conditions of staff”. The matter was eventually settled when the West Indies 
Group of University Teachers (WIGUT) successfully negotiated with the MPS salaries for 
the staff at Mona that would peg them to rates offered on the other campuses of the 
University. E.G. Marshalleck, PS, MPS on 20th February 1991, confirmed the position and 
outlined the immediate consequence whereby the Jamaican Government was required to 
increase its funding commitment. This was unexpected and exacerbated the country’s 
financial problems. 
The threat to the quality of the medical programmes continued to be a consequence of 
restricted and uncertain funding as was pointed out to the Prime Minister by members of 
the Mona Campus Council on May 20, 1988. The VC also alluded to poor quality of the 
university’s programmes as a result of funding in his report dated March 17, 1989, when 
he stated that “the instability and uncertainty which now prevail reflect themselves in a 
run-down physical plant, an accumulation of unfilled vacancies, grossly inadequate library 
facilities and very poor student amenities.” Infra-structural neglect also resulted from the 
system of funding which depended totally on the host campus government to fund 
capital/infra-structural development. The Acting VC, L.R.B. Robinson pointed this out to 
the Prime Minister on 3rd May 1987. The VC, in his report, March 17, 1989, stated that 
“the instability and uncertainty which now prevail reflect themselves in a run-down 
physical plant.” 
In addressing the plight of CAST to the then Permanent Secretary of the MOE regarding 
the effects of the RAM on the institution, (May 3, 1991) the then President noted that, “no 
allocation has been made for capital expenditure for CAST for several years. In the 
meantime, the institution has had to be replacing equipment and adding new ones. The 
rapid development in computing over the past several years has rendered equipment 
obsolete …” (May 3, 1991) 
It is seen from the analysis of the enrolment figures of the UWI that the Cess did not 
seriously affect the enrolment growth of Jamaicans to HE. See Table 4.13. By 1992-93 
the growth rate relative to 1963-64 had recovered to 20%. It fell for the first year and then 
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started recovering thereafter. The documents reveal that the reason for the decline in the 
first two years was due to capacity constraints rather than cost to the students. 
Table 4.13 - Enrolment Growth of HE during the Period of the Cess 
Jamaicans at UWI UWI 
Year to 
Year 
Growth 
Cumulative 
Growth 
Average 
Rate 
Relative to 
1963-64 
Year to 
Year 
Growth 
Cumulative 
Growth 
Average 
Rate 
Relative to 
1963-64 
Number 
of Years 
1985-86 -4% 429% 19% 1% 390% 17% 23 
1986-87 
1987-/88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
-3% 411% 17% 
6% 443% 18% 
6% 474% 18% 
5% 506% 19% 
6% 543% 19% 
4% 572% 20% 
4% 598% 20% 
1% 393% 16% 24 
7% 426% 17% 25 
3% 444% 17% 26 
2% 457% 17% 27 
4% 477% 17% 28 
6% 512% 18% 29 
5% 540% 18% 30 
COST SHARING 1993 – PRESENT 
As at September 1, 1993 the GOJ accepted the policy of cost sharing for all educational 
institutions from the secondary level. By so doing it gave sanction to what existed because 
several institutions out of desperation started charging fees under various guises. As 
pointed out before, after the policy was announced, the government sought to develop 
regulations for its governance. In June 1994 the MOEC published a document entitled 
“Policies and Procedures for Administering the Cost Sharing Scheme for Financing 
Secondary Education” and in October 1994 it received the Davis Task Force Report 
entitled “A Cost Recovery Programme for Tertiary Education”. This was intended to 
govern the tertiary sector. The Davis Task Force Report (1994) made several 
recommendations and though there is evidence that many aspects are in current practice 
there is no common convention or official pronouncement on the policies and procedure 
for the tertiary system. 
A review of the cost sharing policy must take into consideration the development that 
occurred during the period of CAST being officially upgraded to a university. This move 
was a direct outcome of the majority position of the Sherlock (1991) Report which 
recommended that the national tertiary system be two-tier. The Hon. Burchell Whiteman, 
Minister of Education, announced to Parliament that “As of September 1, this year, the 
College of Arts Science and Technology (CAST) is to be designated the National 
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Polytechnic University” (Daily Gleaner, May 11, 1995). CAST was thereafter renamed 
the University of Technology, Jamaica (UTech) and the main objects according to the 
Charter were to: 
a) Advance education and develop technology through a variety of patterns, levels 
and modes of study and by a diversity of means 
b) Preserve, advance and disseminate knowledge and culture through teaching, 
scholarship and research 
As at September 1, 1995, therefore, the GOJ was committed to support two HEIs with the 
same mandate. 
Features of Cost Sharing 
The bases for the cost-sharing programme for the tertiary level were contained in the Davis 
Task Force Report of 1994, which stated that: 
i.	 Funding of tertiary education was regarded as a shared responsibility between 
the state, corporate sector, students and educational institutions 
ii.	 The state, as the major partner would continue to provide a significant portion 
of the funds and would be responsible for creating policies to facilitate the 
participation of the other partners 
iii. The state would ensure the most effective use of HEI’s resources and	 equity in 
the allocation of available benefits 
To ensure that access was not denied to needy students the GOJ entered into a US$38.5M 
project with the World Bank (World Bank Report 1996, 15594-JM) to: 
a) Provide Jamaican students (especially the neediest) with adequate financing 
options to pay for their share of higher education on an ongoing basis 
b) Increase equitable access to tertiary education and improve targeting of sub-
loans 
c) Increase financial sustainability and administrative efficiency of the SLB 
through a consolidated student loan program 
A component of the World Bank Project was the provision of US$8.5M for a programme 
to provide funds for accommodation, maintenance cost and books. According to the 
Report “the project will also support a targeted grant scheme for full-time UWI and UTech 
students only to help meet a share of outlays not covered by sub-loans for students from 
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low-income families”(ibid). Qualified students receive a grant of J$35, 000 per annum. 
The distinguishing features of the cost sharing policy for tertiary education in Jamaica 
were therefore: 
a) Shared responsibilities for HE costs 
b) The state to provide major contribution and the regulatory framework 
c) Assistance was to be provided for the most vulnerable in the society by way of 
loans and grants 
RAM during Cost Sharing 
The RAM under Cost Sharing is a three-phase process, namely: 
i. Determining the total resource requirements 
ii. Deciding on the portion to be provided by government, 
iii. Determining the students’ portion 
The Davis Task Force Report (1994) noted that there were two separate arrangements for 
determining resources to the TLIs in Jamaica - one for the UWI and another for the 
national tertiary institutions. Notwithstanding UTech’s elevation to a HEI, the process for 
allocating resources to that institution remained the same as with the other TLIs. The 
process is depicted in Figure 4.9 
Figure 4.9: - Resource Allocation Process for Jamaican TLI since 1993 
T
he Institutions
The Ministry of 
Education 
The Ministry of 
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Flow of 
Funds 
Flow of 
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Students 
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The institutions continue to make their annual submissions to the MOEC which would 
review and recommend expenditure support to the MOF. The submissions were based on 
each institution’s strategic plan. 
Government provided funds to the national TLIs as per a pre-determined organisational 
structure and pay levels. There is no technical basis for determining non-academic staff 
requirements; however, the academic staff numbers are theoretically determined by a 
student/staff ratio of 12.5. There is no mechanism for reviewing the enrolment statistics 
with a view to adjust the provisions. For example, in 1997 the MOEC accepted and based 
its provision for UTech on the Chardale Report which established the organisation 
structure and personnel requirements of the new university. In 2005 funds continue to be 
allocated to the institution based on the 1997 organisational structure though the institution 
had changed considerably since. 
The students’ portion was expected to cover the other operational costs and salaries for 
staff not recognised by the MOEC. The institutions proposed the fees and “the Ministry 
endorses fees after dialogue with the institutions” (Davis 1994). Since 2002 UTech has 
charged fees based of a percentage of economic cost for each faculty as per Table 4.14. 
Table 4.14 - UTech's Bases for Tuition Fees since 2002 
2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 
Business Management 45% 45% 50% 
Engineering and 27.5% 27.5% 28.5% 
Computing 
Built Environment 23% 27.5% 28.5% 
Health and Applied 27.5% 27.5% 28.5% 
Sciences 
Education and Liberal 17.5% 17.5% 18.5% 
Studies 
Since the GOJ’s portion is not determined on the PCC basis then UTech varies the 
percentage of economic cost based on the gap that is required to be filled. This accounts 
for the year to year variation in the percentages. 
It is to be noted too that UTech used a variant of Activity Based Costing (ABC) Technique 
called “Multiple Factor Cost Allocation (MFCA) Model” to calculate its economic cost. 
This model uses several factors to allocate the shared costs and it also distributes costs for 
139 
interfaculty teaching as outlined in Table 4.15. See Appendix XV for details of the 
methodology. 
Table 4.15 - Bases for Allocating Shared Costs at UTech 
Shared Service Allocation Factors 
Service Teaching Teaching Hours 
Finance and Administration Number of Personnel (Staff and Students 
Library Full Time Equivalent Students 
Human Resource Development Staff 
Plant Maintenance Floor Space 
The formula used by UTech for calculating the economic cost is as per equation 4.11. 
PCCf = {�(SC * Wc) + FCf }/ Ef (4.11) 
Where SC = Shared costs for services 
Wc = Weight for distributing the particular shared costs 
FCf = Faculty direct costs 
Ef = Full time equivalent enrolment for the faculty 
PCCf = Per capita cost per faculty 
The formula for determining the tuition fee for the students of UTech is therefore faculty 
specific and is as per equation 4.12 
Pf = Xf% * PCCf 4.12 
Where Pf = Tuition fee student per faculty 
Xf = Faculty percentage 
In the case of the UWI the process follows a different path as per Figure 4.10 Planning the 
resource requirements for the centre and the individual campuses is done separately, 
however the institution’s strategic plan is expected to provide the direction. The resource 
requirements for the centre are first submitted to the TAC for review. The TAC then 
recommends the total budget to the UGC for approval. The requirements for each Campus 
are routed to its CTAC for detailed review. The CTAC would then recommend to the 
CGC which would again consider and make a final recommendation to the UGC. The 
UGC is responsible for approving both the centre budget and those of the campuses. It 
would then convey its decision to the respective governments and to the University 
Council. The governments are expected to be bounded by the decision of the UGC and the 
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Council approves the fees to be charged to students. The decision re fees is then conveyed 
to both the sponsoring governments and the students. 
Another difference that was identified between the RAM of the national institutions and 
the regional one was the sequence in the process. The secondary step in the national 
system was the determination of the government’s provision but in the regional system the 
next step was determining the students’ share of the cost. This observation is important as 
will be explained in the section on consequences. 
Figure 4.10: Resource Allocation Process for the UWI 1994 to 2004 
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The formula for calculating economic cost for the UWI remained as per equation 4.9. 
PCCfm = (SC/E) + (SCm/Em) + (FCfm/Efm ) (4.9) 
In 1995, however, there was an improvement in the methodology as recurrent costs 
resulting from capital investments were included in the calculation. Depreciation and 
amortisation charges which were previously ignored were therefore included in the costs. 
Tuition fee for the UWI student was established as an institutional percentage of the PCC 
as per Equation 4.13. 
Pf = X% * PCCf 4.13 
Where Pf = Tuition fee student per faculty 
X = Institutional percentage 
The original intention was that “the fee should be set at a level of 10% of economic cost 
for the academic year 1992-1993 and 15% of economic cost for the triennium 1993-94 – 
1995-96” (Committee on Tuition Fees Report 1991). The Government of Jamaica had 
hoped to incrementally increase the percentage contribution to a maximum of 35% by 
1999 but in 2005 the maximum contribution for students for that institution was less than 
20%. 
The third step in the RAM for the UWI was determining the governments’ portion. This 
was gleaned from recommendation no. 6 of the Report of the Implementation Committee 
of the Commission on Governance which stipulated that after the students’ proportion was 
determined “Government should fully fund the remaining costs” (November 24, 1995). 
Consequences of the RAM and the Cost-Sharing Policy 
The cost sharing policy led to improved financial performance of HEIs. This is seen from 
an assessment of the profitability ratios as presented in Tables 4.16 and 4.17. UTech 
which implemented cost sharing before the official pronouncement began showing positive 
results since the 1991-92 academic year where it recorded a surplus to income ratio of 6%. 
This was a reversal of a ten-year-old trend of deficits. During cost sharing there has been 
consistent surpluses averaging 12% per annum for the period. This should be regarded 
against the negative returns of the three previous periods. Cost sharing has also improved 
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the working capital as it moved from a negative $7.9M in 1991 to positive $39M in 2003. 
The positive returns for UTech’s first two years of cost sharing, 1991-1993, accounts for 
the positive average for the 1986-93 period. Table 4.16 shows that when 1991 was used as 
the beginning of cost sharing, UTech incurred an average deficit of JA$3.1 for the period 
of the Cess. The accumulated fund had also declined by an average of $3.5M p.a. and the 
working capital by $1.6M. 
Table 4.16: - UTech's Financial Results since Cost Sharing, 1994-2003 
Surplus/ 
(Deficit) 
Accumulated 
Fund 
Working 
Capital 
Surplus 
(Deficit) 
/Total 
Income 
1994 26,620,681 26,939,945 64,389,935 15% 
1995 18,607,808 45,547,753 93,073,167 9% 
1996 20,057,729 32,739,778 89,341,336 5% 
1997 21,364,664 35,944,478 78,019,065 4% 
1998 31,047,878 1,126,114,253 67,621,218 3% 
1999 306,945,640 1,156,808,817 65,369,434 29% 
2000 77,214,180 1,182,897,053 75,962,892 11% 
2001 138,997,788 1,288,191,632 22,045,503 13% 
2002 222,085,129 1,355,863,714 64,434,945 18% 
2003 169,791,260 1,381,711,093 39,341,776 11% 
Average 1963-73 (8,040) 1,282 9,105 -1% 
Average 1974-86 (200,076) (156,288) (30,484) -3% 
Average 1987-91 (3,140,259) (3,546,609) (1,582,623) (0) 
Average 1987-93 335,859 45,609 3,151,278 -6% 
Average 1994-
2003 103,273,276 138,171,109 3,934,178 12% 
The UWI did not embark on the cost sharing route as early as UTech and has not shown a 
comparable level of return. Table 4.17 shows that it had a 3% average annual surplus 
return for the period as against 1% for each of the two immediate periods. Cost sharing 
has also reversed the previous 10 years of negative accumulated fund thereby resulting in a 
positive net worth for the university. It was during this period that the UWI recorded its 
highest surplus being J$1B in 2000 and J$92M per annum average growth. The working 
capital also grew by $1B per annum, the best in the institution’s history. 
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Table 4.17 – The UWI Financial Results since Cost Sharing 
Surplus/ 
(Deficit) 
Accumulated 
Fund 
Working 
Capital 
Surplus 
(Deficit) /Total 
Income 
1994 26,477,190 (22,344,805) 60% 1% 
1995 0 23,971,235 25% 0% 
1996 (809,115,801) 38,634,837 30% -19% 
1997 46,197,759 73,452,147 29% 1% 
1998 934,718,073 326,638,371 11% 12% 
1999 940,824,965 359,786,787 18% 11% 
2000 1,064,529,069 528,600,756 12% 11% 
2001 966,474,001 554,024,989 17% 9% 
2002 532,573,787 1,056,920,589 10% 4% 
2003 (107,307,687) 923,033,399 27% -1% 
Average 1963-73 320,552 (21,300) 227,640 5% 
Average 1974-86 810,619 (77,912) 12,999,662 1% 
Average 1987-91 4,407,633 (8,069,807) 147,6333,376 
Average 1987-93 7,709,205 (2,845,924) 133,336,352 1% 
Average 1994-
2003 359,537,136 92,303,340 1,085,054,885 3% 
Cost sharing has also resulted in better management of receivables, which suggests that it 
is easier to manage students’ receivables than that from Governments. The average of 
students fees to total income for the UWI for the pervious periods were 4%, 2% and 2% 
respectively. For the cost sharing period the ratio was 12%. The receivable management 
ratios for the end of each of the four periods were as per Table 4.18. 
Table 4.18: Comparison of UWI Receivable Management Ratios 
Ending 
Year 
Periods Current 
Receivables 
/Total Income 
Receivables 
/Governments 
Contribution 
Receivables 
/Net Assets 
Current 
Receivables 
/Current 
Assets 
1973 Fee Paying 11% 15% 4% 43% 
1985 Free Education 36% 57% 28% 76% 
1993 Cess 64% 85% 53% 75% 
2003 Cost Sharing 46% 82% 27% 46% 
An analysis of the period 1994 to 2003 shows considerable improvements except for 2003 
when the benefits seem to have been reversed. When further observed it was noted that 
again outstanding contribution from the GOJ was largely responsible for the accounts 
receivable moving from J$3B to J$6.8B. Jamaica was outstanding for its entire 
commitment for 2003 which was in excess of J$2B. The other governments had also 
increased their receivables by $1B. This supports the point that had the institution been 
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more dependent on students’ contribution the problem could have been better handled. 
When 2003 is excluded from the analysis then it can be seen that cost sharing had in fact 
been beneficial for the receivable management of the institution. The receivables to total 
income ratio declined from 64% to 24% and 14% to net assets as shown in Table 4.19. 
Table 4.19: Receivable Management Ratios of UWI 1994 - 2003 
Current Receivables Receivables Current Receivables 
Receivables /Governments /Net Assets /Current Assets 
/Total Income Contribution 
1994 81% 134% 40% 86% 
1995 56% 89% 29% 77% 
1996 52% 93% 25% 71% 
1997 45% 64% 25% 66% 
1998 27% 40% 18% 50% 
1999 46% 75% 26% 57% 
2000 32% 53% 18% 45% 
2001 35% 57% 19% 66% 
2002 24% 42% 14% 30% 
2003 46% 82% 27% 46% 
The ratios show that as the institution increased its dependence on government its ability to 
manage its receivables decreases and as it reduces its dependence its ability improves. 
This conclusion is further supported by a comparison between the two HEIs. UTech that 
embarked earlier on cost sharing has had far better receivable management ratios as can be 
seen from a comparison between tables 4.19 and 4.20. The difference in treating unpaid 
commitment from government should again be noted. Previously, it was pointed out that, 
this difference affected the profitability ratios rather that receivable management for 
UTech. During cost sharing, however, the profitability ratio was not affected because there 
was less dependence on the government. This is shown in Table 4.16. 
Table 4.20: Receivable Management Ratios of UTech 1994 - 2003 
Current Receivables Receivables Current 
Receivables /Governments /Net Assets Receivables 
/Total Contribution /Current 
Income Assets 
1994 9% 19% 25% 24% 
1995 7% 15% 17% 17% 
1996 5% 9% 18% 18% 
1997 4% 7% 14% 17% 
1998 4% 6% 3% 32% 
1999 4% 6% 3% 30% 
2000 18% 33% 8% 61% 
2001 10% 19% 6% 51% 
2002 7% 13% 4% 48% 
2003 7% 15% 5% 52% 
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Cost sharing has also resulted in a change in GOJ/University relationship. Under the 
previous RAM, the GOJ was directly responsible for negotiating with the staff of the UWI. 
The salary parity dispute within the UWI across campuses and national borders resulted in 
a settlement for which the GOJ was unprepared. The GOJ had incurred an additional 
commitment outside the budgetary process of the UWI. This was noted in the financial 
report given to the F & GP Committee meeting of June 26, 1995 (FGP (M) 119). In its 
cost sharing decision for the UWI taken on October 31, 1994, Cabinet “…decided that the 
Government would no longer enter into wage negotiations with WIGUT, but would allow 
the unions to carry out negotiations with the UWI..” The working group of the 
Chancellor’s Commission on Governance dealing with Finance and Planning reported that 
it had examined the paper “Government of Jamaica’s Proposal regarding future funding for 
the University of the West Indies” and had noted that “the paper describes the University 
as a producer and governments as purchasers, each party having specific and explicitly 
stated obligations. It is proposed by this paper that the UWI must assume full 
responsibility for negotiating its input costs such as labour and bank financing” (MA 
02.20, Nov. 24, 1995). 
Attempts have been made in the University of Technology Act 1999 to capture the distinct 
government/university relationship in Section 6-(1), which stipulates that it is only on the 
Council’s recommendation that the Minister can give directions of a general nature. 
Section 7-(1) of the act also made the point that it is the university’s responsibility to 
employ and decide on the remuneration of its staff. There is, however, the stipulation that 
such remuneration should not be above the prescribed limit set by the minister. 
Notwithstanding the new government/university relationship, which emanated from the 
cost sharing policy, there emerged a new dimension to the salary parity dispute. This 
results from the lack of a uniform mechanism of allocating resources to HEIs and the two-
tier practice of treating the regional HE institution differently from the national one. 
Recall that the resources are provided to UTech only for staff costs and the UWI for a 
percentage of its overall costs. The GOJ is represented on the negotiating team with the 
UWI administration against its staff and leads the UTech’s negotiation team. With the 
implementation of Sherlock (1991) there is no longer the issue of UTech staff being paid 
on the same level with the other national TLI, however, the question now is, “why with the 
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same mission and mandate, should UTech’s staff be paid lower salaries than its 
counterparts at the UWI?” 
The Hon. Maxine Henry-Wilson attributes the current disparity in favour of the UWI to the 
higher qualification of its staff, the different functions being performed and the better 
negotiation skills of its union. As stated by her: 
To some extent, what we have now in terms of disparity, relates to qualifications 
that were required and years of involvement in teaching, research and publication. 
The UWI, of course, places much emphasis on publishing. Affecting salaries is the 
negotiation by the union representing the academic staff. There is a negotiating 
union for the UWI and they have claimed that as a regional institution they 
therefore must have equity in terms of salaries across the region but also they are 
benchmarking the UWI against certain Universities in North America and England 
because they want to see themselves as comparable and would like to recruit the 
best from outside to come in. It depends on what is negotiated and at the moment 
there is a great disparity with what the UWI gets, primarily because of negotiation 
but also because of the model they are using. It’s the benchmark against the region 
and against the kinds of qualification that is significant. (Interview, February 13, 
2004) 
The Hon. Omar Davies also opined that the difference in treatment is due to the skills of 
the UWI negotiating team which uses the regional mandate to its advantage. 
The UWI has always had a special/peculiar position because it is a regional 
institution and it utilizes that regional background to its advantage (not 
surprisingly so) I suspect that for whatever reason, as a regional institution, they 
will want to preserve it as that. There are going to be differentials not only in 
terms of salary levels and how it is dealt with. (Interview, February 20, 2004) 
Elaine Robinson pointed out that the UWI has used the strategy of coupling research and 
teaching to contract its staff and negotiate its salary level. According to her: 
The UWI is in a unique position being the only research institution, really, in 
Jamaica. I think the other institutions might be getting there – but we are funded 
as a research institution. It therefore means that essentially, we do not get any 
additional funds from the government specifically identified as research – our 
research is really built into our staff allocation in terms of work so an academic 
staff person is allocated a certain number of hours for teaching and research and is 
expected to allot a substantial amount of the summer period towards research so 
the salary structure really has built into it the research type and element in terms of 
cost. (Interview, November 18, 2003) 
She further stated, when pressed for a comparison with UTech, “I do not know if I am 
comparing apples with apples but I believe the salaries paid here are on the basis that the 
UWI is a Teaching/Research institution.” 
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Dr. Rae Davis and Dr. Alfred Sangster, President and past President of UTech, both opined 
that the system needs to recognise and support change. According to Dr. Davis: 
So here again the model that we are working with now which acknowledges the UWI to 
be at the pinnacle of the system and therefore based on that they enjoy the highest level 
within the tertiary system and they work their way down from there. The landscape has 
changed – apart from CAST being upgraded to a university (being the first major shift) 
they have a number of tertiary level institutions running university courses and if they 
are going to be allowed to do so then the quality assurance which we have embraced 
will certainly have something to say about quality of the staff and its programmes. In 
order to run degree programmes you need to have qualified people – so I don’t see 
how we are going to say because you are from UTech or of a particular College you 
are locked into this salary level. The model of determining salary on the perception of 
the levels of the institutions has to be revisited. (Interview, November 13, 2003) 
Dr. Alfred Sangster stated: 
What I do know is that the UWI has always had a favoured position in funding by the 
GOJ and Caribbean Governments so they have tended to have much higher salaries, 
much more privileged position and are now seriously challenged by a variety of 
circumstances. UTech is now on stream, NCU is a challenge, Nova, Manchester 
Business School and all the other institutions are challenging the UWI’s MBA 
programme. So all of these are making the UWI wake up to the realities and that 
waking up process is being transmitted to the policy makers…Is the University giving 
us value for money”? Those are issues that are now causing the paradigm to shift. 
(Interview, November 7, 2003) 
The GOJ inaction in completing the policy framework for cost sharing has also resulted in 
inequity in the distribution of the resources. Recall that there is a difference in the steps to 
determine the resource allocation to the Government and the students. In the case of the 
UWI the step after identifying the total resource requirement was to determine the amount 
to be absorbed by the students depending on whether the HEI is regional or national. For 
UTech the second step was that of deciding on the Government’s portion. The difference 
in approach has led to the difference in the sharing proportions. The Davis Task Force 
Report (1994) has suggested that pending the rationalisation of the tertiary system “the fees 
for students at the UWI (Mona) should constitute a reference point for determining fees for 
national tertiary institutions” (ibid. 14). Cabinet had decided (Cabinet Decision No. 41/94) 
that for the UWI the following should be the targets in relation to students’ fees: 
a) 15% ratio in September 1995 
b) Increase to 25% of economic cost in September 1996 
c) Thereafter effect annual incremental adjustments of 5% up to 35% of economic 
cost. 
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It would therefore mean that 35% of the economic cost should have been the UWI 
students’ contribution since 1998 and if that was taken as the benchmark, then 35% of 
economic cost should have been the contribution of all students in the entire tertiary 
education system since 1998. 
The reality has been that the students of the UWI (Mona) have not yet attained the 35% 
limit. In 2004-2005 they were contributing below 20% of the economic cost. The GOJ 
has supported the Council in going back on its decision of October 31, 1994. The minutes 
of the meetings of the Council April 1999, 2000 and 2001 revealed that in each year the 
council decided against the 1994 targets of the GOJ for the students’ contribution. Paper 
C.P. 6 which was accepted as setting the new basis for charging fees informed that for 
2001-2002 the fees agreed on represented 18.4% economic cost. UTech on the other hand 
which approached the setting of fees as the final step of the resource allocation process has 
been able to set fees up to 50% economic cost, thereby surpassing the target intended by 
the GOJ. This was shown in Table 4.16. 
The different bases for allocating resources have also resulted in different methodologies 
for calculating economic cost. Details of UTech’s are explained in Appendix XV. The 
UTech model seeks to capture costs where there are incurred while the UWI is more 
concerned with a basis for determining tuition fees. As such it is unconcerned about the 
distortion created by cross subsidisation whether across national boundaries or faculties. 
This raises the question of whether the model results in the calculating of “economic cost” 
or that it is a pricing mechanism. 
The RAM has also led to a lack of focus on the funding for research. This consequence is 
linked to the new salary parity dispute and the coupling of research and teaching for the 
staff of the UWI. It follows that if the salaries are determined on the basis of experience 
and qualification of the current staff and further that if current staff of one institution were 
recruited for the dual purpose of research and teaching and the other institution had 
recruited only for teaching then funding would not be provided for the latter for research. 
The process of the RAM for the national system has therefore resulted in a lack of focus on 
the funding of research. 
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The Hon. Dr. Omar Davies (Interview, February 20, 2004) believes that the problem is not 
for the Government to solve but for the market to settle. The following exchange in the 
interview with the Minister of Finance brings out the point. 
Q. Any thoughts on the funding of research in Jamaica – we don’t separate funding of 
research in the case of the UWI everything is lumped together but in the case of UTech, 
they do not get anything for the funding of research. 
The Minister’s Response: 
Well, your question betrays the problem. The assumption is that, this is 
government’s responsibility. I believe that government should make a contribution 
to basic research but I think there is a more fundamental problem. If you look in 
the United States or Canada – a large percentage of research is funded by the 
private sector. Now we have two issues: 
�	 Are the tertiary institutions aggressive enough in structuring their research to 
reflect what is needed in the private sector, whether it is in agriculture or mining 
etc.? 
�	 Is there something we need to do to increase the appreciation of the private sector 
for the value of research? 
But, one of my difficulties in dealing with lecturers at a University – be it UWI or 
UTech, is the notion that this is government’s responsibility. Interestingly, Northern 
Caribbean University (NCU) may not be of the same opinion because they are not the 
descendants of the government funding. They are much more aware of the need for 
them to do something which is more relevant, what someone should pay for. That’s my 
viewpoint – as I say the question betrays one of the deficiencies in the approach to 
tertiary education. 
The period of cost sharing has seen the most rapid growth in enrolment in HE in Jamaica. 
See Table 4.21. The growth is linked to the resolution of the first salary parity dispute. 
The encouragement to improve the salary level has pushed the staff of CAST to upgrade its 
offerings in order to ensure that they were shifted to the HE category. This has shown that 
access can best be improved with more institutions entering the arena. The average per 
annum growth rate relative to 1964 is 43%. The growth rate for Jamaicans in the UWI has 
also increased from 20% average in 1993 to 23% in 2003. The data showed that access is 
more dependent on capacity rather than fees. When the cess was introduced the growth 
declined in the first two years because of capacity constraint. This is supported by the fact 
that the decline started before the cess when it shifted from 21% in 1984/85 to 19% in 
1985/86. During cost sharing (fee) there was a phenomenal growth because more 
institutions entered the HE arena thereby building capacity. 
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Table 4.21: Enrolment Growth in Government Supported HEIs in Jamaica, 1986-2003 
UWI Average 
Total	 Jamaica Average 
Rate Relative Jamaicans Jamaicans Jamaicans Rate Relative to 
at UTech at UWI in HEI 1963/64 to 1963/64 
1964	 907 907 
1986	 4,802 4,802 19% 17% 
1987 4,634 4,634 17% 16% 
1988 4,922 4,922 18% 17% 
1989 5,209 5,209 18% 17% 
1990 5,492 5,492 19% 17% 
1991 5,835 5,835 19% 17% 
1992 6,093 6,093 20% 18% 
1993 6,333 6,333 20% 18% 
1994 6,632 6,632 20% 19% 
1995 6,374 7,055 13,429 43% 19% 
1996 6,770 7,710 14,480 45% 20% 
1997 7,102 7,883 14,985 46% 21% 
1998 6,579 8,608 15,187 45% 22% 
1999 6,055 8,646 14,701 42% 22% 
2000 7,550 8,632 16,182 46% 22% 
2001 7,375 8,488 15,863 43% 21% 
2002 6,733 8,449 15,182 40% 21% 
2003 7,187 9,161 16,348 43% 23% 
SUMMARY 
The findings on the funding policies and mechanism embarked on by the GOJ are 
hereunder summarised. 
1. Fee paying Era 
1.1. Financing Features 
1.1.1.	 The Governments of the region funded only one HE institution (UWI). 
1.1.2.	 Students made a small contribution towards recurrent cost. 
1.1.3.	 Support was available to needy students in the form of scholarships. 
1.1.4.	 Loans emerged as a form of support for needy students. 
1.2. RAM 
1.2.1.	 The UGC was established as the intermediate body to determine and 
channel the resources from the supporting governments (several sources) to 
the UWI (one recipient). 
1.2.2.	 The funds were provided as blocked grant. 
1.2.3.	 The levy ratio was used to distribute the recurrent expenses to the 
supporting governments 
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1.2.4.	 There was no set formula for sharing the costs of the non-recurrent items

1.2.5.	 The national TLIs were allocated blocked grants as per negotiation with the

MOE for both recurrent and capital expenditure

1.3. Consequences

1.3.1.	 Dissatisfaction of supporting governments with the levy ratio

1.3.2.	 Under-funding for capital development

1.3.3.	 Internal efficiency of HEI questioned

1.3.4.	 Challenge to academic independence

1.3.5.	 Access rate deemed too low

2. Free Education Period 
2.1. Changes in Financing Features

2.1.1.	 Abolition of fees for HE students

2.1.2.	 Boarding Grants provided for all HE students

2.1.3.	 Expansion to the SLB to provide loans for educational related expense

2.2. Changes in RAM

2.2.1.	 Students were not a part of the RA system

2.2.2.	 PCC replaced the levy ratio as the mechanism for distributing the expense

to the supporting governments of the HEI

2.3. Consequences

2.3.1.	 HE access increased but at a reduced rate

2.3.2.	 Capital/infrastructural neglect

2.3.3.	 Receivable management difficulties for the HEI

2.3.4.	 Economic difficulties for Jamaica

2.3.5.	 Threat to the accreditation of the medical faculty

2.3.6.	 Billing disputes between HEIs and Jamaica

2.3.7.	 Inputs aspect of the funding methodology caused the salary parity disputes

within the teaching profession in Jamaica

2.3.8.	 Redirecting of needed resources from the primary and secondary levels to

HE
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3. The Period of the Cess 
3.1. Changes in Financing Features

3.1.1.	 Students paid a tax that was pegged to the economic cost of their education

3.1.2.	 The cess was restricted to students of two tertiary level institutions

3.1.3.	 Abolition of automatic boarding grants for all students

3.2. Changes in the RAM

3.2.1.	 Devolved system where the campus had the control of the resources

3.2.2.	 CGC responsible for determining campus resources

3.2.3.	 UGC restricted to determining resource requirements for the university

centre

3.2.4.	 Campus government responsible for total financing of the campus located in

its country

3.2.5.	 Campus administration provided resources for centre

3.2.6.	 PCC was calculated per campus

3.3. Consequences

3.3.1.	 Exacerbation of the financial difficulties of the UWI and other TLIs

3.3.2.	 Dependence on loans and bank overdrafts for operational cash flow

3.3.3.	 Dependence on loan and overdrafts led to increased cost of operations

3.3.4.	 The UWI centre was starved of resources as the limited amounts remained

with the campus administration

3.3.5.	 It led to an intensification of the salary parity dispute

3.3.6.	 It caused further threat to the quality of the medical programmes

3.3.7.	 It exacerbated the infrastructural neglect of the institutions

4. Cost Sharing 
4.1. Changes in Financing Features

4.1.1.	 Financing HE was a shared responsibility between the state, the corporate

sector, students and educational institutions.

4.1.2.	 The state, as the major agent was to provide a significant portion of the

funds and was responsible for creating the policies to facilitate the

participation of the other partners.

4.1.3.	 The state was responsible for the efficient use and equitable allocation of

resources to HEIs.
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4.1.4.	 Enhanced students loan programme to assist needy students with paying

tuition

4.1.5.	 Provision of grants for the most needy students to assist with non-tuition

expenses

4.2. Changes in the RAM

4.2.1.	 The RAM became a three step process, namely:

o	 Determining the total resource requirements 
o	 Deciding on the portion to be provided by government 
o	 Determining the students’ portion 
4.2.2.	 There were difference in the sequences of the processes depending on

whether the HEI was national or regional

4.2.3.	 National institution

4.2.3.1.Submitted their annual submissions to the MOEC which reviewed and

recommend to the MOF

4.2.3.2.The students’ fees were expected to cover the other operational cost and

salaries for staff not recognised by the MOEC

4.2.3.3.Deciding on the students’ contribution was the final sequence

4.2.4.	 Regional institution

4.2.4.1.Planning the resource requirements for the centre and the individual

campuses was done separately, however the institution’s strategic plan

provided the direction.

4.2.4.2.UGC resumed authority for determining the resource requirements of

the entire university. CGC had to report to the UGC 
4.2.4.3.Deciding on government’s contribution was the final sequence.

4.2.4.4.Depreciation expenses were included for the first time in the calculation

of the PCC 
4.3. Consequence

4.3.1.	 Improvement in the financial performance of HEIs

4.3.2.	 Better management of receivables

4.3.3.	 Government assumed a diminished role in the salary negations for HE staff

4.3.4.	 New dimension to the salary parity dispute as UTech s staff seek parity with

UWI staff

4.3.5.	 Lack of uniformity in the allocation of the resources to the HEIs leading to

claim of inequity

154 
4.3.6. Lack of a common methodology of calculating PCC 
4.3.7. Lack of focus on the funding for research 
4.3.8. Highest rate of access to HE in Jamaica. 
Chapter 5 will analyse the findings of this chapter, the frameworks developed in chapter 2 
will be used as the tools for the analyses. The features of the financing policies and RAM 
as well as their consequences as identified, resulted from several stages of data coding 
analyses and interpretation. These were then subjected to another process of coding, 
analysis and interpretation and resulted in the discussions in chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5

ASSESSING THE JAMAICAN MODEL

The central research question is “What are the consequences of the different models 
adopted by Jamaica to the funding of HE?” The answers to this question led to a review of 
the various models since 1962 and the intended and unintended consequences as described 
in chapter 4. Since the first approach in 1962 the government has made three changes: the 
free education policy in 1973, the cess in 1986 and cost sharing in 1993. The 
consequences outlined in chapter 4 revealed that there are still problems with the current 
cost-sharing model. This chapter will further analyse the various models adopted and seek 
to explain the reasons why it was considered necessary to change them at the various 
points. 
The analysis of the financing options will be done using the Conditions Precedent 
Framework (Table 2.3) and its related Decision Tree (Figure 2.1) and the RAM will be 
analysed using the Resource Allocation Debate Pendulum (Figure 2.5) and the Operations 
Matrix (Table 2.10). The intention of the analysis of the financing decisions will be to 
answer the following questions: 
Why was it considered necessary to adopt the free education policy? 
Why was it considered necessary to change the free education policy? 
Why was it considered necessary to change the policy of the cess? 
What are the current concerns with the cost sharing policy? 
The questions to be answered in the analysis of the RAM are: 
What is the classification of the Jamaican RAM? 
What are the intended objectives of the RAM? 
Is the current model the most appropriate for the context of the Jamaican HE 
environment? 
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ASSESSING MODELS USED FOR FINANCING HE 
The data do not reveal any significant problems with the financing policy of fee payment 
which existed up to 1973. Both the HEI and the then technical education institution CAST 
were at liberty to set their own fees based on their budgets. However, there were no 
increases in fees between 1962 and 1973. The data also did not reveal any expressions of 
dissatisfaction or difficulty with the fees charged by the institutions. Alexander et al 
(1967) speculated that the possibility of elimination of fees might lead to increased access 
and the reduction of the unit cost. However, it was the egalitarian notion articulated by the 
then Prime Minister Michael Manley that led to the change. It was thought that fee 
payment was elitist and would lead to the exclusion of the poor and a more egalitarian 
approach would have been better. On May 31, 1973, the Prime Minister in response to the 
question of why the policy was not to allow those who could pay to do so, said “the 
fundamental, philosophical and firm answer is that the government cannot accept a school 
system based on discrimination against children who are expected to sit side by side with 
visible advantages or disadvantages of one family against another” (Daily Gleaner June 1, 
1973). The then leader of the opposition, Hon. Hugh Shearer had rejected the egalitarian 
notion in favour of a more targeted approach. He felt that the government should have 
channelled the subsidy to the SLB and to target the needy students. According to Mr. 
Hugh Shearer, “the real benefit under the proposal would be mainly to relieve some 
parents who have been paying fees, of the fees they were now paying whether they had any 
difficulty in doing so or not” (Daily Gleaner May 18, 1973). Chapter 4 pointed out that the 
empirical work of Mingat et al 1(985) and Gradstien (2003) proved that the egalitarian 
view such as that of the 1973 Michael Manley Government did not result in equity of 
access to HE by the poor but was of more benefit to the better off in the society. 
Increased access was the main reason for the change from fee paying to free education. 
Table 4.3 showed that the enrolment growth rate for Jamaican in HE up to 1974 was 21% 
relative to 1964. No figures were available for 1970-73 hence it was not possible to 
calculate the rate during the entire period of fee payment before free education was 
introduced. During free education the average growth rate relative to 1964 was 19%, 
Table 4.4. Table 4.13 showed that during the period of the cess the enrolment growth rate 
of Jamaicans in HE was 20% and Table 4.21 showed that with increased capacity 
enrolment growth rate increased phenomenally to 43%. This would therefore suggest that 
the free education policy did not achieve its objective of increased access. 
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It could also be suggested that the free education policy had taken the HEIs in the opposite 
direction in relation to its main problem at the time. The withholding of funds from the 
university as a result of the Rodney Riots and the words of caution by the then Chancellor, 
Princess Alice, would suggest that a finance model leading to less dependence on the state 
was more appropriate. Free education had eliminated a source of funding that was 
independent of political control and hence had made the HEI more susceptible to state 
control. 
Total State Financing 1973-86 
The egalitarian philosophy and the belief that it would lead to increased access resulted in 
the following consequences: 
1.	 Financial difficulties of the educational institution brought on by inadequate

funding and late remittances

2.	 Economic difficulties of the country as a result of expensive social programmes, of 
which education was the main contributor 
3.	 Limitation of the infrastructure of the HEI to cope with the demand hence a 
reduced rate of access 
Chapter 2 argued that the conditions precedent for total state funding of HE are similar to 
the conditions of a totalitarian state. This is because of the central controls that are 
necessary to deal with the equity problem and resource constants. Table 5.1 compares the 
conditions necessary against those existing in Jamaica during that period. The table 
reveals that Jamaica did not fulfil any of the preconditions and hence propagated the 
consequences that ensued. 
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Table 5:1: Assessment of the Jamaican conditions during Free Education with the Conditions

Precedent for Total State Financing of HE

Conditions Precedent Existing Conditions 
� Total state control of educational 
planning and the education productive 
processes 
o Detailed planning done only by the 
state 
o HEI operates as agent of the state 
o Enrolment controlled by the state 
(matriculation requirements and 
quantity) 
o HE staff are employees of the state 
o State dictates staffing needs of HEI 
� State supervised system of HE 
o The University was expected to interpret the 
national needs and implement programmes 
consistent with such interpretation 
o The university was established under independent 
charter 
o Enrolment was in the total control of the HEI 
o HEI had total control over its staff 
o HEI had total control of staffing needs and state 
influence was to the level of funding 
� No market competition 
o State organised staffing on rational 
bases to ensure no advantage over 
particular institutions 
o Salaries and wages determined by 
the state 
o Uniform wage rates regardless of 
job function in the HEI 
o Employers not allowed to compete 
for graduates 
o Graduates are not paid higher 
salaries than non-graduates 
o No distinction among the HEI on 
the basis of quality 
� Monopolistic Market Competition 
o The limitation of HE to only one provider 
eliminated the need to compete for staff 
o State control salaries through control of the 
bargaining mechanism 
o Non- uniform wage rates 
o Employers compete for graduates 
o Graduates are paid higher wages 
o Not applicable as there was only one HE service 
provider 
� No resource constraints � Significant resource constraints 
State control of the HE system is intended to ensure that in the absence of market 
mechanism to regulate demand for, and supply of, HE service the state does the balancing. 
State control therefore means state planning and management of the HEI. During the free 
education policy era there was no evidence of detailed state planning of the HE system. In 
fact, all decisions about matriculation and the offering of programmes, their development, 
and implementation were done by the HEI without any direct link to manpower planning 
and projections. The concept of academic freedom also dictated that the staff of the HEI 
could not be relegated to being mere agents of the state. Functioning in the aftermath of 
the Rodney Revolts of 1969 also resulted in a high level of sensitivity which prevented the 
government from moving in the direction of state control of the HE system. Enrolment 
was subjected only to capacity and matriculation requirements of the university and not to 
state dictates. Employees of the university could not be employees of the state because of 
the ownership structure (several governments) and the fact that it was a body corporate by 
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law. Staffing needs were determined only by university administration. The data showed 
that the lack of state control of the HE productive and planning system resulted in 
incoherence, hence, the inability of the infrastructure to keep pace with the demand and 
also for the resource to be redirected from the primary and secondary sectors to the HE 
(Sherlock 1986). 
In order to prevent the use of public funding for HE from causing reverse redistribution the 
state would have had to manage the entire process. Since the total cost was being borne by 
the public then total benefits should likewise accrue only to the society as a whole and 
hence conditions to prevent any private benefits from accruing. The data showed that 
instead of preventing private benefits from accruing to individuals the opposite happened 
in the Jamaican system under the free education policy. The university had to compete for 
staff on the international market and had to pay accordingly. In addition to basic salary, it 
offered advantageous accommodation to entice expatriates to reside in the territory. 
Graduates were also paid much higher salaries. The only attempt at eliminating 
competition in HE was with the government’s continued support of a single HE provider. 
The existence of market conditions under the policy of free education automatically 
restricted resources for HE because it relieved those who could afford to pay and shifted 
the responsibility to those who could not. Instead of targeting assistance to the needy, it 
depended on the taxation system. Williams (1986) reported that the taxation system in 
Jamaica up to 1986 was based on the income tax law of 1919, and since 1948 the main 
source of income for the Jamaican government was income tax, which in 1982-83 raised 
47% of the national income with 28% being derived from consumption duty and 9% from 
custom duties. Jamaica also has an inefficient tax collection system which makes it 
difficult to collect from self-employed and wealthy entrepreneurs. 
Resource adequacy was also necessary to enable the state to pay for the social services. In 
the Jamaican situation the process for determining the resource requirements for the HEI 
was based on a flawed notion that the presence of the Ministers of Finance for the 
countries of the region on the UGC automatically guaranteed the adequacy of the 
resources. Resource adequacy, however, depended on national productivity which had to 
be decided within the context of the overall country’s needs, yet the UGC made the 
decision in isolation and only focused on the work of the university. The strategy of 
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reviewing the university’s resources in isolation was more applicable to a situation where 
the government was only one of the many sources of income. In such a case, the 
institution could turn to other sources when the government could not respond. As it 
stood, there was but one provider of the resources and when the country could not satisfy 
the needs the HEI had no other avenue, hence its financial difficulties. If there was total 
state control then limits could be placed on the functions and restriction of activities within 
the resource capabilities of the supporting countries. The flawed system of resource 
allocation therefore resulted in the financial difficulties of the HEI, the quality threats to 
the programmes and the economic difficulties of the country. The government then 
adopted the policy of the cess in order to provide funds to address the HEI needs. The 
prolonged period of civil unrest that followed the announcement in 1986 showed that the 
public did not grasp the plight of the country and had believed that free education was the 
ideal for upward mobility for the poor. 
Cess: The reason it was changed 
Chapter 4 revealed that during the period of the cess the financial difficulties of the HEI 
heightened; the infrastructural neglect increased and for two consecutive years enrolment 
declined due to capacity constraints. There were also increased threats to the quality of the 
HE programmes and the institutions were forced into dependence on loans to address its 
cash flow deficiency. The dependence on loan increased the operational cost and led to 
reduced efficiency. 
The previous section argued that the consequences suffered by the HEI during the period 
of free education were as a result of the failure of the country to satisfy the conditions 
precedent. That would have meant that to address the problems the country should have 
either returned to a fee paying policy or implement the conditions precedent. The 
conditions precedent would have meant a policy of state control of the HE system, removal 
of all market conditions from HE and the provisions of adequate resources consistent with 
the demand made on the system. The country instead implemented a new tax collection 
measure (the cess) which was aimed only at addressing the resource deficiency problems at 
the systems level. The analysis of the financial records revealed that prior to this there was 
an exacerbation of the problems, hence the conclusion that the lone taxation measure was 
inadequate. For this reason in 1993 the government decided to abandon the free education 
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policy and return to fee paying. The prolonged protest at the time revealed that the policy 
decision to move to the cess rather than follow the path dictated by the decision tree was a 
political one because free education was popularly regarded as an upward mobility channel 
for the poor. As a result the consequences that were foreseen were ignored. 
Assessing the Jamaican HE Cost Sharing Policy 
The cost sharing policy as articulated by the Hon. Burchel Whiteman, Minister of 
Education to the World Bank in 1996 has three component: the sharing of cost between the 
government and the beneficiaries, the provision of a loan to needy students to cover tuition 
fee, and a grant to the very needy to cover other educational costs. According to the HE 
Financing Decision Tree (Figure 5.1) Jamaica is at the position of “up-front charges with 
mortgaged typed loans for students with inability to pay. 
Figure 5.1: Jamaica's Position on the HE Financing Decision Tree 
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General Conditions 
Jamaica’s position against the conditions precedent for cost sharing is summarised in Table 
5.2 and explained below. 
Table 5.2: Assessment of Jamaica's Conditions during Cost Sharing against the General Conditions

Precedent

General Conditions Precedent to Cost Sharing Existing Conditions 
Disequilibria between social and private rates of 
returns on educational offerings 
Education, Town Planning, Public administration, 
Nursing and Social work are in low demand.  
These are programmes with high social and low 
private rate of return 
Market-based accountability mechanisms Politically accountability – The upward 
accountability sub-category 
Students are allowed free choice of institutions Students are free to chose which institution to 
attend 
Staff are employees of the institutions and 
conditions of service are decided on by institution 
and staff 
Staff are employees of the institution and state 
involvement in the negotiation is able to exert 
undue control 
Institutions determine their own fees Institutions determine their own fees but state use 
monopsonistic control over the level of fees to be 
charged 
Government determine its own level of support 
independent of institutions’ fees 
Government support and fees are linked 
Social subsidy is necessary in an education market where there are disequilibria between 
private and social rate of returns. This is because in such markets programmes with high 
social and low private rates of returns will be neglected in favour of those with high private 
returns. The state involvement is therefore necessary to protect the socially beneficial 
programmes. In reviewing the applications for admission to the two publicly subsidised 
universities in Jamaica it was revealed that there was low demand for programmes in 
teacher training, health and applied science, social work and the arts subjects such as 
languages and history. On the other hand there were high demand for programmes in 
business administration, engineering, medicine and law. Graduates of these programmes 
are deemed to command higher salaries. 
The market-based accountability model views the citizen as consumer and the public sector 
institutions in this context would be judged by the quality of their services rather than by 
detailed monitoring on how they are using the resources. In a HE system where students 
are required to pay fees they usually do not apply to institutions giving poor service. The 
decision by government to maintain authority to approve fees has resulted in the 
politically-based accountability model as the authorities seek explanations for the level of 
fees to be charged. 
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In a market situation consumer choice is necessary to force quality and efficiency. 
Students should be able to freely choose the institution they prefer subject to capacity and 
matriculation requirements. This condition is satisfied in the Jamaican education market. 
In the centrally-planned economy the state manages costs; however, under competitive 
market conditions cost results from the interaction between demand and supply (Lipsey 
and Chrystal 2004). For this reason the condition is for staff to be employees of the 
institution. This would also allow for the interplay of suppliers of (staff) and the demand 
for labour (institutions). In Jamaica, staff of the HEIs are employees of the institutions but 
the state maintain a role in salary negotiations in order to control the level of salaries being 
paid. The state is on the negotiating team with the UWI staff and heads the negotiating 
team with the UTech’s staff. As the leaders in the CGC and the UGC the government uses 
its position to control the cost of the UWI. In the case of UTech it attempts to do so by 
reviewing the budget and threatening the institution to acquiesce to its demands for 
reduction. The consequence of the state’s position is the exertion of undue influence and 
hence, a distortion of the labour market. 
The precondition for the HEI to determine its own fees is because there should not be price 
control in an HE market. Price control is one of the mechanisms used in monopolistic 
competition to prevent abuse of power of the single supplier. As industries move towards 
free market competition price control becomes less necessary and inefficient. Within the 
HE environment the absence of price control should lead to variable fees and the 
encouragement of competition. Barr (2004) opined that the absence of price control in the 
HE market will lead to open-ended funding for the HEI and improvements in efficiencies 
through competition in the HE market. It is for this reason that this study proffers 
institutional control in the determination of fees to be charged to its students. It is 
currently the Jamaican government’s policy to set tuition fees and this means price control. 
In the discussion below the effects of price control are outlined. Fees in the Jamaican HE 
situation are, however, variable and result from negotiations. This, however, raises the 
issue of the rational basis for determining the level of fees for any institution. 
The precondition for the government to determine its level of subsidy, independent of fees 
is also made against the background of the resource constraints of the country. The linking 
of the subsidy and fees is another method of price control. In the case of the UWI the state 
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pays the difference between the per unit costs and the amount charged to students. This 
policy perpetuates central control since government is committed to the difference. In the 
case of UTech the commitment of the state is to cover staff costs. James and Williams 
(2004) observed “much of the psychology of willingness to pay tuition in the public 
tertiary institutions is based on the 20% of economic costs charged and the assumption that 
government must price education to ensure social goals are met”. They also proffered that 
as the state’s resources are reduced the de-linking would allow fees to be based on the 
supply cost and the consumers’ willingness to pay thereby enabling the institutions to 
apply managerial creativity to ensure sustainability. 
Issues from the General Pre-Conditions 
The issue of government’s role in a HE market arises because of government control of 
both price and cost of HE. The aim for this type of control is to ensure affordability for the 
poor. However, the strategy of minimising both price and cost is responsible for the 
inefficiencies in the HE market. This is demonstrated by using break even analysis 
(Douglas 1992), where revenue (R) is equal to Price (P) multiplied by quantity (Q). In 
order to break even total revenue is the average variable cost (AVC) multiplied by quantity 
plus the total fixed cost (TFC). The equation is therefore 
P (Q) = AVC (Q) + TFC 
By way of substitution 
P (Q) – AVC (Q) = TFC 
Therefore 
Q (P – AVC) = TFC

Q = TFC/ (P – AVC) (5.1)

To demonstrate Table 5.3 was constructed. 
Table 5.3: Illustration of the Effects of Cost Control 
Original 
Assumptions 
Fixed Cost 
Reduced 
Average 
Variable 
Cost 
Reduced 
Both Elements 
of Cost 
Reduced 
P $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 
Q 3,000 2,750 2,400 2,200 
AVC $60,000 $60,000 $50,000 50,000 
TFC $120,000,000 $110,000,000 $120,000,000 $110,000,000 
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With the original assumptions about P, AVC and TFC (column 1), 3,000 students could be 
educated. If TFC is reduced by 10% with AVC and P being constant then only 2,750 
students could be educated. A reduction of AVC by 10% with P and TFC being constant 
would reduce the student number to 2,400. When both elements of cost are reduced with P 
being constant then there is the worst effect on enrolment to 2,200 students. 
The equation, therefore, supports the view that a reduction in both cost and price of HE 
will result in a reduction in quantity, that is restricting access. The data showed that in 
Jamaica in the 1970s access was restricted because of capacity constraints to absorb those 
who were qualified for matriculation to HE. The data also revealed that the rate of access 
that was achieved was at the expense of the deficits on the institution’s balance sheet. 
Access would have been more affected if deficits were not created to maintain the levels of 
outputs. The data analysis showed that since 1973 when the government took control of 
the financing of HE and continued to make access its priority in order to maintain growth, 
it allowed the university to build up deficits. The deficits were expressed in the negative 
net worth of the accumulated fund of the institution, the high liabilities provided by bank 
loans and the high receivables due to the governments’ inability to live up to its 
commitments. A third problem, that of a threat to quality also occurred as a result of the 
strategy of direct price control. The equation also shows that in order to maintain the 
levels of output while attempting to minimise or eliminate the deficit, an institution will be 
forced to reduce quality. In Jamaica the threats to quality were exemplified in the 
inadequate equipment, overcrowded classrooms, inadequate library resources and poor 
study environment. 
The cess was not designed to change the strategy as its purpose was only to provide a new 
source of income to enable the government to maintain its position of control. In adopting 
cost sharing the government continued its monopsonistic approach by maintaining control 
over of the two elements in the cost-revenue equation. This is implicit in its policy to 
approve fees and its role in the salary negotiations as well as its grip over the budgets of 
the HEIs. By so doing it has continued a policy to do one of, or a combination of, the 
following: 
a. Restricted access 
b. Contributed to the poor financial performance of HEIs or 
c. Placed the quality of the programmes at risk. 
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The effect of price control on the equity problem is another issue to be addressed. The 
purpose for maintaining the responsibility to approve fees was also to protect the poor from 
being denied access to HE. There are three problems with the strategy, however. First, 
because the purpose is to protect the poor, fees have to be set at levels perceived to be 
affordable by the poor. Table 5.4 reveals that the majority of the people in the 17-24 years 
age cohort who are qualified for HE are from the richest quintile of the Jamaican society: 
72.2%, 25.9% was from quintile 4 and 46.3% from quintile 5 while only 16.5% are from 
the poorest quintile, 5.8% from quintile 1 and 10.7% from quintile 2. This supports the 
view that an across the board strategy was more beneficial to those needing less protection. 
Table 5.4: School Enrolment by Age Group and Consumption Quintile 
Quintile 
5-11 Year Old Attending 
Primary or Higher 
12-19 Year Old 
Attending Secondary 
or Higher (excl 
Tertiary) 
17-24 Year Old in 
University 
17-24 Year in Other 
Tertiary 
1992 1998 2002 1992 1998 2002 1992 1998 2002 1992 1998 2002 
Poorest 93.4 97.2 98.8 49.2 47.6 49.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.9 1.0 
2 96.0 99.1 99.1 50.5 60.0 58.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.8 2.7 1.8 
3 98.0 98.9 99.3 59.9 63.6 64.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.6 2.6 2.3 
4 96.9 99.0 99.8 62.5 68.9 66.4 0.9 1.0 1.0 3.0 4.6 5.5 
5 99.0 99.2 99.3 69.4 76.0 70.1 1.3 5.1 8.1 5.2 10.7 9.9 
Jamaica 
96.3 98.7 99.2 57.5 63.3 61.6 0.5 1.5 2.1 2.2 4.7 4.3 
Source: James and Williams 2004 
The second problem is that since the government is committed to bridging the gap between 
total cost and students’ fees (the case of the UWI), and because resources are limited, then 
the country would again be faced with the three fold problem of limitation to access, deficit 
financing of HEIs and poor quality institution. The third problem has to do with the 
practice of ex post pricing and its link to cost control. In the Jamaican system, price is 
equal to cost and hence when cost is reduced, price is reduced. When cost is reduced then 
access is affected as was demonstrated by table 5.3. 
The purpose of price control in any market should be to protect the consumers as a whole 
from the unfair practices of the entrepreneurs. Price control is not a suitable strategy for 
protecting a section of the consumption market because it is likely to end up subsidising 
that aspect that does not need the subsidy. A better way of supporting the poor would be to 
allow the institutions to decide on their own fees and the government being free to channel 
167 
its resources to assist those students who cannot afford to pay. This would also allow for 
targeting assistance to those programmes with high social and low private returns. It is in 
this context that the recommendation to de-link subsidy and fees is made. 
Another aspect of the equity problem is that of equal treatment for the HE consumers. It 
should be pointed out that the difference in treatment has been a consequence of the 
evolutionary nature of the development of HE in Jamaica. The Jamaican system has 
compartmentalised the HE service providers and so different processes have evolved for 
dealing with the regional institution as against the national ones. Chapter 4 revealed that 
the difference in the processes and treatment of deciding on fees has led to students of one 
HEI absorbing a higher percentage of the economic cost than the other. With the UWI the 
government first decides on the percentage of the economic costs to be absorbed by the 
students and in the case of UTech, the students’ fees are determined after the subsidy is set. 
In the case of the former the philosophical underpinning is on affordability of the poorest 
quintile in the population. This led to a small percentage for the students and a large 
percentage for the government. The result is a deficit for the institution when the 
government cannot fill the gap. In 2003 and 2004 the rise in the receivables for the UWI 
was attributed to this factor. 
The philosophical underpinning in the latter case is on resource constraints by the 
government and the students are left to pick up the balance. As a result of limited 
resources and conflicting priorities small amounts are determined for the government’s 
portion and the students therefore end up paying a higher percentage of the economic cost. 
The different result is dependent on whether a student is attending the regional as against 
the national institution and is market distortion. All consumers in a market should be given 
equal treatment and the state’s role should be to correct inefficiencies and support equity 
not to be the cause of the opposite. The inequity in treatment of the HE consumers 
therefore is a consequence of an unchanged financing model for a system that has shifted 
from a single provider to diverse providers. 
Sub-Routes to Cost Sharing 
The general preconditions, discussed above, were designed to provide market efficiency 
and to protect the social programmes that would suffer under imperfect market conditions. 
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They do not, however, address all the issues relating to equity of access. The literature 
suggests one or a combination of the options in Table 5.5 to address further the equity 
problems. It was argued in Chapter 2 that the choice of the options (sub-routes) was also 
dependent on a country’s ability to satisfy certain conditions precedent. The extent to 
which Jamaica has satisfied the conditions precedent is summarised in Table 5.5 and 
explained below. 
Table 5.5 Assessment of Jamaica's conditions for the sub-routes of cost sharing against the conditions 
precedent 
Conditions Precedent for the Sub-Routes Existing Conditions 
Up-Front Charges 
� Severe Budgetary constraints � Severe Budgetary Constraints 
Mortgaged Type Loan Programme 
� Institution specialising in lending for human 
capital development 
� Large enough capital fund for the loan 
programme 
� Labour market certainties in the absence of 
specialised lending institutions 
� The Students Loan Bureau was established to 
specialise in loans for HE studies 
� Loan pool enhanced in 1995 by World Bank 
programme but still considered insufficient 
� Relatively high labour market uncertainty hence 
dependence of specialised lending institutions 
Income Contingent Loan Programme 
� National budget can manage up-front cost of 
university operations 
� Taxation system is able to track all citizens 
throughout their lifetime 
� Information to encourage participation from 
low-risk high return graduate 
� Opting out provision for early repayment 
� Provision for society to absorb risk for non-
payment 
� National budget cannot manage up-front cost of 
universities operations 
� Taxation system is unable to successfully track 
citizens’ income 
� National information technology system is at its 
infancy stages 
� Not applicable in the absence of a programme 
� Not applicable in the absence of a programme 
Graduate Taxes 
� Mandatory participation 
� Efficient income tax collection system 
� Not applicable in the absence of a programme 
� Income tax collections system is inefficient 
It was also argued in Chapter 4 that deferred payments schemes were more equitable for 
access because they provided free education at the point of delivery and enabled the 
beneficiaries to repay when they are most able to do so. Mortgaged type loans were 
deemed to be costly because of the high risk of non-repayment and the underdeveloped 
market for loans for human capital development. A Graduate Tax (GT) system was 
deemed to be most efficient and egalitarian (Gracía-Peñalosa and Wälde 2000) but 
psychologically discouraging because repayment was indefinite. There would also have to 
be mandatory participation to achieve lowest risk and highest returns. Income contingent 
loan (ICL) with an opting out clause for early repayment was considered the best option to 
avoid the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Jacobs 2002). The primary 
preconditions for ICL therefore are up-front support for HEIs and efficient taxation and 
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information systems. The secondary preconditions are the early opting out provision and 
the ability of the society to absorb the risk for the graduates with difficulties. Jamaica has 
a very inefficient tax administration system (Final Report of the Tax Policy Review 
Committee to the Government of Jamaica 2004) and hence is not in a position to undertake 
a deferred payment scheme. 
It was already pointed out that Jamaica had significant resource constraints which have 
prevented it from financing HE. For this reason a scheme based on up-front charges was 
the most practicable option. The 1996 Jamaica Student Loan Project with the World Bank 
enhanced the pool of funds of the SLB and further enabled it to provide loans for HE. 
Nonetheless, the pool was still not large enough resulting in a restriction to only provide 
loans for tuition fees. 
The labour market uncertainty is demonstrated in the country’s high unemployment rate, 
which in 2003 was 12.8%, moving from the 2002 level of 14.8% 
(http://www.statinja.com). The 2003 rate is very high compared to the world average of 
6% (http://laborsta.ilo.org). Labour market uncertainty is the reason for the reluctance of 
the banking sector to engage in lending for human capital development. 
Issues from the Sub-Routes of Cost Sharing 
The analysis shows that equity of treatment for HE consumers is an issue. The political 
rather than the systems approach in deciding on students’ fees leads to inequity of the 
treatment of the students of the regional institution as against those of the national ones. 
The political approach caused the government to deal directly with the individual 
institutions rather than collectively. 
Equity of access is the second issue because the strategy employed is giving unintended 
results. The stated priority of the government of Jamaica is to increase access in HE. 
However, the data showed that the opposite was achieved. As suggested by the literature a 
mortgage type loan scheme is not the best option to redress the equity imbalance in access 
to HE. This is because of the inability of the poor to provide collateral, the high risk to the 
lending institutions and the high costs to the borrowers. Tables 5.6 to 5.9 show that the 
current cost sharing policy is not adequately addressing the issue of equity of access to HE. 
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Table 5.6 shows that the richest quintile in the Jamaican population benefits most from 
tertiary education. In 2001 the ratio of the richest to the poorest was 11.5:1. This, 
however, was an improvement over the ratio of 14.5:1 in 1992 before the cost sharing 
policy. 
Table 5.6: Mean Annual Per Capita Consumption of Education of Tertiary Households by

Consumption Quintile, 1992-2002 

Year 
Quintile (J$) Ratio of Q5 to Poorest 
Poorest 2 3 4 5 
1992 75 166 246 398 1085 14.5 
2001 1117 1569 2507 4689 12849 11.5 
Source: James and Williams 2004- Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 
Table 5.7 shows that the loan solution was also most beneficial to the richest sector of the 
Jamaican society. Only a very small percentage of those who seek and receive assistance 
from the SLB are from the poorest quintile; 4.8% and 2.4% respectively. The highest 
percentage of those seeking and receiving assistance are from the richest quintile; 65.7% 
and 69.1%. 
Table 5.7: Source of Applications to SLB and Distribution of Benefits by Quintile, 2002 
Loan/Grant Benefits 
Quintile 
Applications Received 
Poorest 4.8 2.4 
2 6.0 6.8 
3 7.3 4.5 
4 16.1 17.2 
5 65.7 69.1 
Jamaica 100.0 100.0 
Source: James and Williams 2004 - SLC 2002 
Table 5.8 shows that most people (72.2%) of the poorest quintile who had matriculated to 
the tertiary level were not attending that level institution. This was in contrast to the 
richest quintile where only 54.6% of that sector who had matriculated were not attending. 
This shows that more effort needs to be made to assist the poorest sector of the population 
to access further and higher education. 
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Table 5.8: Distribution of Matriculated Students (Age Group 17-24 yrs) 
Quintile Not Yet Attending 
Tertiary 
Attending or Completed Tertiary Total Matriculated 
Poorest 72.2 27.8 100.0 
2 75.9 24.1 100.0 
3 73.8 26.2 100.0 
4 56.5 43.5 100.0 
5 42.5 57.5 100.0 
Jamaica 54.6 45.4 100.0 
Source: James and William 2004 - SLC 2002 
James and Williams (2004) also use data from the Survey Living Conditions (SLC) to 
support the view that one of the solutions to the equity of access problem for Jamaica was 
to shift resources from the tertiary sector to support primary and secondary education. 
That, they thought, would enable more people from the poorest sector to matriculate to HE. 
Table 5.9 shows that of those out of school the majority belong to the poorest quintiles. 
This was applicable for all the age groups. The figure has declined since the cost sharing 
policy of 1993; however, the decline has been higher for the richest quintiles. 
Table 5.9: Out of School Rate by Age Group and Consumption Quintile 
Quintile 
Age Group 
5-11 Year Old 12-16 Year Old 17-24 Year Old 
1992 1998 2002 1992 1998 2002 1992 1998 2002 
Poorest 6.6 2.8 1.2 18.0 17.0 14.3 94.5 92.8 92.5 
2 4.0 0.9 0.9 13.3 9.4 8.4 91.4 88.5 91.0 
3 2.0 1.1 0.7 9.0 5.8 6.1 87.9 86.8 85.7 
4 3.1 1.0 0.2 5.2 3.8 3.1 88.3 81.6 84.0 
5 1.0 0.8 0.7 4.3 2.0 2.4 82.3 70.4 71.9 
Jamaica 3.7 1.3 0.8 10.5 7.5 6.8 89.0 81.5 84.5 
Source: James and Williams 2004 - SLC various years 
Table 5.10 shows that the main problem of the poorest groups was that of not attaining the 
matriculation requirements for further and higher education. This supports the view for 
attention to be focused at the lower levels to enable the poorest to be in a position to enter 
HE. 
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Table 5.10 Highest Qualification of Persons out of School (Age Group 17-24 yrs) 2002 
Satisfy Tertiary Matriculation Requirements 
Below 
Quintile Matriculation Total Not Yet 
Enrolled in Completed Total 
Requirements Attended 
Tertiary Tertiary Matriculated 
Tertiary 
Poorest 94.2 4.2 1.4 0.2 5.8 100.0 
2 89.3 8.1 2.0 0.6 10.7 100.0 
3 86.9 9.6 2.6 0.8 13.1 100.0 
4 74.1 14.7 7.0 4.3 25.9 100.0 
5 53.7 19.7 19.1 7.5 46.3 100.0 
Jamaica 78.6 11.7 6.9 2.9 21.4 100.0 
Source: James and Williams 2004 - SLC 2002 
The sub-routes of cost sharing were designed to address further the equity of access issue. 
The analyses above have supported the view that up-front charges with mortgage type loan 
do not adequately address the issue. It is being argued, however, that given the country’s 
inability to manage the other options that was the best option at the time. The assessment 
against the conditions precedent also supported the view. It is, therefore, suggested that 
deliberate actions be taken to enable the country to fulfil the conditions precedent for the 
better options. 
The study will now address the manner in which the country has channelled the state’s 
support to the HEIs. 
ASSESSING THE JAMAICAN RAM 
According to the RAM Debate Pendulums the Jamaican HE RAM is classified as an ad 
hoc-negotiated RAM which awards funds as block grants and is supply-side driven. There 
are several bases for the placement. 
First, the allocations to the two government supported universities result from separate 
bilateral discussions. This was outlined in Chapter 4 where it was shown that in the case of 
the UWI the UGC is the forum for negotiations and for UTech the discussions are expected 
to take place with the MOE. Salary negotiations are also part of the system as the staff 
unions within each institution have to negotiate with the government and the institutions. 
This aspect is significant as salaries account for more that 60 % of HE expenditure. Here 
again there are differences as the staff of the UWI negotiate directly with the 
administration of that institution, with representatives from the MOF being on the team and 
the staff of UTech negotiate directly with the MOF with members of the university 
administration being on the team. 
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Supply-Side 
Second, the funding is activity-linked, input-based but not formula-driven. This means 
therefore that it is ad hoc. The UWI presents its expenditure proposals to the UGC which 
examines the line items and approves accordingly. UTech and the other national tertiary 
level institutions use programme budgeting but the expenditure is still determined by line 
items. Expenditure for staff salaries takes precedence over all the other expenditure. In 
agreeing to the limits the authorities do not take enrolment in consideration. Also, in the 
case of the UWI where funding is provided for research, this is done on the basis of the 
expenditure budgets for the research projects and not on the outcomes of the research. 
General research is funded as part of the teaching function of the UWI where staff are 
employed for both teaching and research and those activities are computed in the salaries. 
Third, there is also no discernable mathematical basis for the resource allocation. The 
formulae that were presented in Chapter 4 were designed to compute and allocate cost to 
the supporting governments. They were not used to determine the operational 
budget/resource level which is completely needs-driven. It could be suggested that the 
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staff/student ratio is used to determine the funding for academic staff. There are talks 
about a 1:12.5 ratio for academic staffing, however the analysis showed that the ratio was 
not being used in the allocation process. There are also no established ratios for non-
academic staff and no quantitative bases for allocating resources for the other activities 
such as maintenance and teaching materials. In 1997 as part of the exercise to grant 
university status to UTech a staff establishment was agreed on with the Ministry of 
Education. There was however no objective basis for the establishment nor mechanisms 
for review. In pursuit of its strategic objectives the institution has changed its structure 
several times since and the staff complement has also increased but there has been no 
increase in the funding to reflect the increased staff complement. 
Fourth, neither institution is required to return unused funds to the government. Within the 
national budget the funds are granted under the category called Grants and Contribution 
and this furthers the point of block grant funding. 
The fifth basis is the fact that it is not a voucher system and funds are awarded directly to 
the institution without reference to the students. Even if the “money follow” concept is 
used, the Jamaican system would still fall in the category of supply-side driven RAM as 
neither enrolment nor graduation numbers are used to determine the level of resources. 
Locating the Jamaican RAM 
The institutional flexibility discussion as guided by the “earmarked-block grant” debate in 
Chapter 2 revealed that blocked grant funding allowed the institution to retain savings from 
efficiency gains or the flexibility to vire funds to more needy areas as the course of 
operations dictate. The Jamaican RAM, in so far as its funds are “block grant” aids in 
institutional flexibility, however, further analysis is needed to ascertain whether other 
elements of the funding mechanism mitigate this intention. 
The discussion in Chapter 2 also suggested that a strictly demand-side driven RAM would 
result in control being placed in the hands of the students to direct the public funds to their 
choice of HEI. The Chilean experiment was cited as giving no evidence that the voucher 
system resulted in improved quality. On the contrary, it led to inefficiencies and 
perpetuated reverse redistribution. The voucher system/demand-side driven RAM was 
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noted, however, to be the best example of how the state may participate in a HE free 
market. The real issue, however, is that given the externalities in HE the state would have 
to ensure that programmes with high social and low private returns are protected. It is for 
these reasons why the supply-side driven RAM is preferred to the demand-side RAM. The 
Jamaican RAM is clearly not a voucher system and given the preference for a Supply-Side 
system the analysis would have to focus on how the other features of the Jamaican RAM 
address the issues intended by a Demand-Side Driven RAM – efficiency, quality control, 
equity. 
The comments so far cover the two latter parallel debates on the RAM Debate Pendulums 
(Figure 5.2). The discussion will now focus on the Transparency/Production aspect of the 
Debate. Chapter 2 establishes that a RAM should result from a transparent process, be 
consistent with the institution’s governance and management practices, and encourage 
efficiency and quality. The assessment, therefore, will be guided by the following 
questions drawn from the operations management matrix and the RAM debates: 
1.	 Is the process transparent? 
2.	 Does the RAM result in accountability practices consistent with the Governance 
and management models? 
3.	 Does the RAM have an in-built mechanism to encourage efficiency? 
4.	 What is the relationship of the RAM to the matter of quality of the HE offerings? 
Jamaican RAM and Transparency 
Since 1962 the authorities have sought to provide transparency to the resource allocation 
process by requiring the HEIs to submit their needs for assessment and funding. Figures 
4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.9 illustrate the processes. As articulated in the taskforce 
report on cost sharing for tertiary education it was envisaged that the strategic planning 
approach to budgeting would be the basis for transparency in the negotiations for funds as 
at 1993. The analysis, however, indicated that while the institutional plans did not prove 
problematic when there was only a single HE provider, it was not adequate to satisfy the 
transparency issue in the case of multiple providers. It is difficult to judge transparency 
when the two HEI strategic plans are submitted to two different bodies with no stated 
guidelines for basing judgement. In such circumstance, allocations are deemed arbitrary 
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and without basis. The state in this regard leaves itself vulnerable to the criticism of being 
biased when this may not be the case. 
Also in 1962 the UGC was established as the intermediate body with specific terms of 
reference for channelling the resources. The intention was to avoid political interference 
and allow for independent assessment of the HEI’s work. The structure and terms of 
reference were crafted to suit a single provider of HE for several countries. The nature of 
HE service delivery has changed significantly since 1962, yet the system was not changed 
to enable an intermediate body to assess and channel resources to several HE service 
providers. The lack of a review of the structure and nature of the intermediate body/bodies 
is also cause for concern about transparency and objectivity in the resource allocation for 
HE. England is cited as an example of a system that had separate intermediate bodies for 
channelling resources. The resources for the former polytechnics were channel through the 
Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) and the universities were funded by 
the Universities Funding Council (UFC). When the polytechnics were granted university 
status they and the original universities were funded by a new funding council, the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE). The new body was expected to provide 
transparent and objective grounds for funding the older as well as the newer universities. 
As at September 2005 there will be another entrant in the HE arena in Jamaica when Mico 
Teachers’ College becomes a university college. Other institutions will follow in the near 
future. Hence, the country needs to establish a structure to deal with the transparency issue 
of how the funds are channelled to multiple HE service providers. 
The structure of the negotiating process is another point for discussion for the HE system 
in Jamaica. Historically because of its superior mission with teaching and research, the 
UWI administration was awarded higher level of resources than the national TLI. The 
chairman of the government negotiating team (The UGC) with which the regional 
institution deals is the Minister of Finance. The national institutions deal with the finance 
officers of the Ministry of Education. It is suggested that the national institutions are at a 
disadvantage because of the assumption that commitments made by the Minister of 
Finance would take precedence over the commitments of junior officers of another 
ministry. It could also be argued that the difference in the process was as a result of the 
specific mission of the single provider, but when diversification occurred in the HE service 
there should have been changes in the process to enable equal treatment to all the 
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providers. The difference in treatment, therefore, raises the issue of inequity and, hence, 
inbuilt inefficiency in the HE market. 
The continued use of the hierarchical structure to compensate staff of the different HEI has 
also made it difficult to benchmark operational efficiency in the Jamaican HE market. The 
largest component of HEI cost is salary and if such is artificially determined then there can 
be no meaningful comparison. It can be claimed that low cost did not result from 
managerial action, but was imposed by the RAM. 
Jamaican RAM and HE Market Issues 
The observation is made about the peculiar practice in the HE RAM of ex post pricing, that 
is, price charged being equal to actual cost. The normal practice is for ex ante pricing 
where businesses make the best estimate of costs and add a margin or mark-up. In the case 
of “For Profit” organisation, the margin is intended for shareholders’ return and future 
business expansion. With the “Not for Profit” organisation, the surplus is intended for 
future business development. The allocation and costing equations in Chapter 4 are 
mathematical interpretations of the ex post pricing practice of the Jamaica HE system. 
Regardless of the period since 1962 the process has been two-fold as follows 
1.	 Budget was used as indicative cost and price to the participating governments and 
remittances were regarded as prepayments. 
2.	 Billing was based on actual cost and adjustments were made against the 
prepayments. 
Equations 4.1 to 4.3 depicted the pricing structure under the levy system where cost was 
distributed according to predetermined ratios. Equations 4.4 to 4.8 showed the change to 
per unit pricing per faculty across the campuses. The intention of the change was for price 
to be charged to the parent governments in proportion to student numbers. The structure, 
however, had an inbuilt cross-country subsidy. The third change was depicted in equations 
4.9 to 4.10 where there was an attempt to eliminate the cross-country subsidy and prices 
were specific to the cost per country. The last change was with the components of expense 
data when depreciation for capital upgrade was included. 
At each stage there have been issues raised with the ex post pricing practice. With the levy 
system the concern was with measurement of benefits. Participating governments wanted 
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to link their payments directly to the benefits in relation to the number of their students 
being educated at the university. The change to per capita costing dealt with that concern 
to an extent, and then the issue of cross-country subsidisation was raised. This was 
implicit in the billing disputes between the Jamaican government and the university’s 
administration. The country specific calculation, as depicted in the third change, addressed 
this concern but the billing process and the components of the expense data became the 
next focus. The billing process required the governments of the campus countries to 
advance the payments to the university and recoup from the beneficiary countries. This 
caused delays and exacerbated the receivables management problems of the university. It 
was realised that since the campus country was responsible for capital development it was 
not being recompensed by the beneficiaries of the non-campus countries since that was not 
included in the billing. 
It is suggested that the practice of ex post pricing in HE in Jamaica has minimised the 
responsibility of the management of the university for its future development. Since 
pricing is equal to cost then there has been little or no room for the administrators of the 
university to initiate expansion and development. Such would have to be from additional 
grants, consultancies and other third party funding. The records revealed, however, that 
the opportunities for these were limited. A change in the pricing practice could, therefore, 
open another avenue for real entrepreneurialism in the management practice of HE because 
it could open the avenue of loan funding for capital development. 
A second suggestion is that the ex post pricing practice does not encourage internal 
efficiency. In making this point a comparison is being made with the English practice of 
ex ante pricing. HEFCE predetermines prices per subject clusters. Institutions are paid 
accordingly, and the practice of block grants enables them to gain or lose according to their 
operational cost. They are therefore encouraged to operate within or below price in order 
to achieve savings. Jamaica practices blocked grant funding but the intention of efficiency 
gain is mitigated by the practice of ex post pricing. There is little to be gained from 
operating below price since price is equal to cost. 
A third suggestion about the ex post pricing practice is that it resulted in state-controlled 
governance and hence a contradiction of the state supervisory intention of the governing 
instruments. This argument is based on the idea that since there is little incentive for 
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efficiency, the state finds it necessary to track and monitor cost. For this reason the state’s 
involvement is very crucial to the internal budgeting and salary negotiations processes of 
the universities. As a result, the universities are subjected to the procurement processes of 
the state where expenditure over certain amounts must be approved by the MOE and the 
Cabinet. 
The second issue about the relationship between the Jamaican RAM and the HE market is 
with the input bases for the negotiations for funding. Funding the institutions on the input 
method and particularly human resource inputs is the main reason for the continuation of 
the salary parity dispute. The academic staff union of UTech is currently requiring the 
government to explain why the staff of one institution with the same mission and mandate 
as the other is compensated at a lower level. The explanation given by the Ministers of 
Finance and Education of qualification, functional and institutional position differences 
(see Chapter 4) have not been accepted by the staff. The Minister of Education attributed 
the difference to higher qualification levels, but this was refuted by the past and current 
presidents of UTech. The Minister of Finance opined that the difference was due to a 
difference in the skills of the negotiating teams which raises the issues of objectivity and 
transparency of the process. The Bursar of the Mona Campus of the UWI suggested that 
there was a difference in the job functions of the staff of the two universities, hence the 
difference in compensation. However, closer examination revealed that members of staff 
of both institutions are required to do research as well as teaching. 
The Ministers also opined that the difference could be due to the stakeholder structure, one 
institution being regional and the other national, the regional institution having to compete 
for its staff more in the international arena than the other. This argument could stand, 
however, if the decision was left to the market and not the state. There is no empirical 
evidence to support the notion. The issue of salary differentials would not arise in the 
context of ex ante pricing and the lack of state involvement in the HE negotiation process. 
This would allow the institutions to negotiate on the basis of ability to pay. Government’s 
involvement in the compensation issue and its input funding strategy are the causes of the 
continued salary parity disputes. 
A change from negotiated ad hoc input funding to formulaic input funding could possibly 
solve the salary-parity problem. The money follows the student concept could result in 
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funding by enrolment rather than expenditure categories. This, however, would not 
address the efficiency or quality issues. Institutions could achieve increase in funding by 
simply increasing enrolment and be unconcerned about the quality of delivery or the 
amount of time it took for a student to graduate. The experience of the Czech Republic 
that was forced to include an output factor in its funding model to encourage better 
completion rate is cited. For this reason an output method of funding would be better, as it 
would solve all three problems. A taxi-meter model, like Denmark’s; an enrolment model 
with a claw-back mechanism like that of England; or the Czech system of dual input-
output factors could be considered. 
Jamaican RAM and Accountability 
The discussion in chapter 4 argued in favour of a relationship between accountability, 
governance and management in public sector institutions. The point was made that the 
accountability model is required to create the balance between the governance 
requirements and the management practice. As a result, it was concluded that a balance 
between state supervised governance system and management by initiates could best be 
provided by the market type accountability model. Conversely, the balance between a 
state control governance system and “rule-led” management practice can be balanced by 
the upward accountability model. 
The Governance model as suggested by the charters of the universities is that of state 
supervision. This was supported by the paper on “Government of Jamaica’s proposal 
Regarding future funding of the UWI” when it was noted the state described its role as 
purchaser of the university’s services. Based on the governance instrument (the charter) 
Richardson and Feilden (1997:10) placed the Caribbean university system at the state 
supervisory end of the Van Vught continuum, see (Figure 5.3). The positioning was done 
of seven regions around the Commonwealth median. The regions were United Kingdom, 
Mediterranean, Australasia, Asia, Africa, North America (Canada) and the Caribbean. 
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Figure 5.3: Van Vught Continuum on measuring Governance of Commonwealth Universities 
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Based on the notion of academic freedom, the strategic management practices of the 
universities and the charters, the Jamaican institutions could best function with the 
principle of management by initiative. The administration, therefore, should be free to 
make decisions based on broad-based principles and not be confined by detailed state rules 
and procedures. 
The governance instrument and the management requirement, therefore, support a market-
based accountability model for the Jamaican HE system. The data suggest, however, that 
the input aspect of the RAM has served to pull the HE accountability practice away from 
the market based accountability model to the politically based spectrum, and consequently, 
the governance and the management being drawn in the opposite directions to state control 
and “rule-led” respectively. Figure 5.4 illustrates the effects on the Jamaican HE system 
where the requirements for state supervised governance and management by initiatives 
point to the market based accountability model. However, the input-based RAM has 
resulted in the accountability model being pulled in the politically based direction and 
consequently the Governance model moving in the direction of State control and the 
management practice being shifted to “Rule-led”. 
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Figure 5.4: Effects of the Jamaican RAM on Accountability, Governance and Management of HEI 
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The basis for the above is Ferlie et al’s (1996) description of the various forms of public 
sector accountability models which places the Jamaican HE practice in the politically 
based category and specifically in the accountability upwards sub group (see Table 4.8). In 
the area of finance, the HEI administrations are accountable to their Councils which, in 
turn, are accountable to the MOE, then to Cabinet and eventually to Parliament. It was 
such modelling that led to the ex ante control mechanisms for procurement and salary 
negotiations. A recent event in the procurement of library services for UTech confirmed 
Ferlie et al’s (1996) point that this type of system is “unrealistic given the complexity and 
scale of modern government and limited time and expert knowledge available to MPs”. 
The salary negotiation system and its effectiveness have already been presented. The 
procurement process requires all institutions that receive government funds to be subjected 
to the following approval limits: 
� J$4M (UK£35,000) – HEI 
� Between J$4M and J$15M (UK£134,000) – Permanent Secretary of the MOE 
� Above J$15M (UK£134,000) – Cabinet 
Submissions were made to the MOE requesting permission to renew the subscriptions to 
database engines for the university’s library. The submissions were returned to the 
institution requiring several quotations for each. This was in accordance to the rules laid 
down by the Parliament. The librarian had to eventually appear before the Procurement 
Sector Committee of the MOE to explain that in one case the supplier was the publisher, 
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hence, further quotation would not be necessary and the other services were being provided 
by the only two stable and financially sound companies in the business. It took several 
months to provide the explanation, during which the subscriptions for the institution lapsed 
and the students were left with inadequate library facilities. 
With the negotiated-input system of resource allocation the GOJ has been dependent on ex 
ante control mechanisms to ensure adequate use of resources. As explained by Göbbels-
Dreyling (2003) ex ante control assumes that the mechanisms themselves are expected to 
guarantee in advance that an institution will function effectively. These salary negotiation 
systems via the MOF and the procurement process are the chief ex ante control mechanism 
currently being used. The two HEIs complained that the process reduced their ability to be 
responsive in a timely and efficient manner to their operational demands as it takes a long 
time for decision making to travel the bureaucratic channels. 
Jamaican RAM and HE Quality Assurance Mechanism 
The RAM-Quality nexus is not as clear-cut as the association with efficiency and 
accountability. This is because of the difficulty in measuring quality and the possibility of 
the quality trap where under-funded institutions may remain with poor quality because they 
lack the ability to attract resources for improvement. Based on the discussion in chapter 2 
the Jamaican RAM-Quality relationship will be analysed using Massy (1996) and Orr 
(2005). The two significant points of Massy (1996 pp.317-322) were: 
1.	 Linking funding to performance offered good incentives to organisations that were 
quality conscious and operating near or at the quality frontier. This was because 
they would perceive that a fall-off in quality would lead to funding losses. 
2.	 Linking funding to performance did not offer any incentives to those organisations 
operating far below the quality frontier provided that the enhancement necessary 
was sufficiently realistic. 
This therefore leads to two questions for the Jamaican RAM-Quality analysis: 
1.	 What are the HEIs discretions on quality? Are they operating at or below the 
quality frontier? 
2.	 Does the RAM support the HEIs discretions on quality? 
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A review of the accreditation reports (the case of UTech), market survey reports, and the 
level of international acceptance of the certifications of the two state-supported Jamaican 
universities indicate that they are operating at the quality frontier. This then leads to the 
second question of the RAM and its linkage to performance. The answer is negative as 
was seen previously the negotiated ad hoc input RAM was not performance driven. Three 
reactions are drawn from the results of the Massy analysis of the Jamaican RAM-Quality 
nexus. First, the HEIs may not need any incentives for performance since they are 
performing well anyway. However, they would lack the opportunity for reinforcing the 
commitment to quality. Second, it may be necessary to encourage better performance for 
those programmes that are close to but not at the quality frontier and as such there is no 
incentive for that added push. Third, there may need to be some form of encouragement to 
maintaining the standards of the high quality programmes rather than allowing a lapse 
through laissez-faire attitude. 
Orr (2005) argued that the funding provided a steering function for the HEI while the 
quality assurance mechanisms are used for mapping or to explain the performance of the 
Figure 5.5: Jamaica’s Position on the Orr 2005 Trajectory 
of Funding-Quality Assurance link 
Vouchers/ -
Fees -
-
+ Jamaica s RAM 
* Jamaica’s QAM 
S
ta
te
 f
u
n
d
in
g
 m
e
th
o
d


S
ta
te
fu
n
d
in
g
m
e
th
o
d
-
Performance- -
*
based steering
funding
-
-
-
Discretionary
budget + 
- - - - - mapping - - - - -
Input Output Marketing /
control control Ranking
Quality assurance regime
universities. As such, he deemed that the quality assurance mechanism provided 
information to judge the effects of the RAM. The Jamaican RAM falls in Orr’s 
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“Discretionary Budget” funding category. Jamaica uses accreditation as its quality 
assurance mechanism however participation is voluntary. The UWI for instance has not 
submitted any of its programmes to the University Council of Jamaica (UCJ) for 
accreditation. Orr explained (email May 23, 2005) that if the accreditation system is 
compulsory, then the state uses it as a method of controlling input as input standards would 
be set for the universities to achieve. If the accreditation system is voluntary then the 
university will choose to take part so that it can place itself better in the market. The 
university could also use it as a benchmark to improve internal performance but also as a 
marketing tool. The UWI does not suffer adversely from its non-participation in the 
accreditation system and it is suggested that this is because of the market’s acceptance that 
it is the leader in the Jamaican system. Based on the above, therefore, the Jamaican quality 
assurance regime would fall in Orr’s Marketing/Ranking category. The Jamaican 
positioning is illustrated in Figure 5.5. 
The Jamaican RAM does not correlate with the QAM, on the Orr Trajectory. Further 
analysis revealed that the information provided by the quality assurance process was not 
directly used by the funding providers or vice versa. The answer, therefore, to Orr’s 
second question is that the QAM does not enhance the information provided via the 
funding method. As Orr pointed out “it may be seen as appropriate to assess the longer-
term effects of the funding on quality of HE performance”. The analysis on the Orr 
trajectory supports the analysis of the RAM’s effect on the accountability-governance-
management relationship. Both analyses support the view the RAM points to direction of 
state control governance. State control governance is contrary to the charters of the 
Jamaican universities, hence, here again it is suggested that the RAM is unsuitable to the 
context. With regards to Orr’s second question of the use of the information by the 
steering and mapping mechanism, it is observed that there is a duplication of effort in the 
Jamaican HE system as a result of a lack of correlation between the two. The ex ante 
control mechanisms to track the use of funds has not informed the authorities about the 
effects of its funding on the quality of HE. 
The Massy (1996) framework suggests that it may be necessary for the Jamaican RAM to 
offer some incentives for adhering to quality and the Orr (2005) analysis points to the need 
for direct links between the Quality Assurance Mechanism and the RAM at least to 
ascertain the effects of the funding on the quality of HE. 
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Conclusion 
The deliberations in this chapter have been to assess the questions posed in the 
introduction. The answers will be summarised by addressing the questions more directly. 
The first set of answers is about the questions dealing with the financing of HE: 
�	 Why was it considered necessary to adopt the free education policy? 
The free education policy was adopted because of the then government’s wish to 
increase access and the belief that such would be achieved with the egalitarian 
approach. Prime Minister Michael Manley articulated the view in his speech to 
parliament and his responses to reporters’ questions. Free education was thought to 
provide equal opportunity for everyone regardless of social status to access HE. 
Under this circumstance it was believed that no one would be concerned about the 
availability of funds to finance the cost. 
�	 Why was it considered necessary to change the free education policy? 
The free education policy was unsustainable as it led to operational deficit for the 
HEI, contributed to the economic problems of the country and caused financial 
hardships for the single HEI of the time. Furthermore un-sustainability was as a 
result of the country not meeting the preconditions necessary to provide equity and 
market efficiency. 
�	 Why was it considered necessary to change the policy of the cess? 
The Cess had to be abandoned because it was not designed to address the real 
issues of the pre-conditions necessary. The equity and efficiency issues dictate pre-
conditions to the financing options. The cess was devised to provide the 
government with funds. It was also a guise to suggest that the free education policy 
was continuing. 
�	 What are the current concerns with the cost sharing policy? 
The current policy of cost sharing has not sufficiently addressed the issues of equity 
and efficiency because of the continuation of the strategy of cost and price control. 
There is still lack of equity in access because of the different treatment of students 
depending on whether the institution attending is regionally or nationally owned. 
This led to different payment structures for the students. The regional/national 
ownership structure has also resulted in different levels of subsidies to the HEIs. 
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To the questions about the RAM the answers are as follows: 
�	 What is the classification of the Jamaican RAM? 
The Jamaican RAM for HE is classified as an Ad hoc-negotiated-input model. This 
is according to the RAM debate pendulum. There is a different negotiation process 
for the regional as against the national HEI. The regional institution negotiates at 
the political (policy) level and the national institutions negotiate at the level of the 
civil service (technocratic) level. The negotiation process is further complicated by 
the input element which causes direct involvement of the state in the internal affairs 
of the universities. Funds are not allocated on a formulaic basis thereby raising the 
concern about lack of transparency of the process. 
�	 What are the intended objectives of the RAM? 
The objectives of the RAM are increased access, accountability, efficiency and 
quality. These have been articulated by the policy makers and are implicit in the 
strategies adopted for implementing various policies. The strategies are price 
control and monitoring of costs through ex ante measures. The strategies, however, 
are incompatible with the HE environment, governance instrument and 
management requirement, hence, the opposite results are being achieved. 
�	 Is the model the most appropriate for the current context of the Jamaican HE 
environment? 
The model is inappropriate because the emanating strategies lead to results that are 
opposite to the objectives. 
Chapter 6 will suggest changes for financing HE and for allocating resources to the HEI. 
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS,

RECOMMENDATIONS AND

REFLECTIONS

ADDRESSING THE QUESTIONS 
The main question of the research is: 
What are the consequences (intended and unintended) of the different models 
adopted by Jamaica for the financing of HE?” 
Four sub-questions followed from the main question, which were: 
o	 What are the consequences of an unchanged financing model for a system that 
has shifted from a single provider to diverse providers? 
o	 What are the consequences of financing both a national higher education 
system and a regional one? 
o	 What have been the philosophical underpinnings of the allocation of resources 
to HE in Jamaica? 
o	 What models are available to the Jamaican government for allocating resources 
to HE? 
The questions were addressed in detail in the body of the research and are now 
summarised. The intended consequences of the various financing policies were to improve 
access, especially for the poor, allocate resources to the HEIs efficiently, and provide 
institutional flexibility and sustainability for the HEIs. The intention to improve access 
was communicated especially by the free education policy of the 1970s, the introduction of 
changes to the student loan programme and the implementation of the scholarship and 
grant programmes. The signals about allocative efficiency were communicated by the 
various formulae instituted to share the cost of the operations of the regional HEIs, the 
policy changes from free education to the cess and then to cost sharing and the introduction 
of the UGC and subsequently the CGC as channelling mechanisms for the state funds. The 
practice of granting the funds as block grants indicated the intention for institutional 
flexibility and sustainability for HEIs. 
However, in addition to, or instead of, the desired consequences there were several 
unintended consequences such as capacity constraints, contradictions between the 
governance requirement and management practice, financial difficulties for the country and 
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the HEIs, inefficient allocation of resources, inequity in access to HE, inequity in the 
allocation of resources and threat to the quality of the programmes (chapter 4). 
The unintended consequences of inefficient allocation of resources and inequity of access 
were due partially to the unchanged model of allocating resources to HEIs even though the 
system changed from one provider to multiple providers. Under the single provider a 
hierarchical structure was designed to categorise education institutions according to the 
level of teaching. The UWI was at the top of the structure offering HE and the other 
institutions which did not award degrees, were ranked lower. Compensation was arrived at 
based on the institutions’ position in the apex structure. A different negotiation process 
was also designed for the only HEI as against the other TLIs. When the system changed to 
multiple providers the institutions that previously had inferior mandates remained in their 
categories for the purpose of compensation. The reason given was that the regional 
institution should be treated differently from the national ones. The maintenance of 
improved compensation packages and the separate negotiation mechanisms on the basis of 
regional versus national ownership also contributed to the unintended consequences of 
inequity and allocative inefficiency (Chapter 4). 
It was also recognised that the unintended consequences were due to some of the 
philosophical underpinnings of the RAM. The philosophy of egalitarianism led to the free 
education system of the 1970s and 1980s. The country, however, did not satisfy the 
preconditions for such a system and this led to the financial difficulties, inequity and 
inefficient allocation of resources. Another philosophy was efficiency through cost 
containment and price control. This led to the practice of ex post pricing where cost is 
equal to price. It was demonstrated that such a practice led to restriction in capacity as 
well as resource constraints. There were also the conflicting signals of state control and 
state supervision. The charters of the universities stipulated that the governance 
requirement was that of state supervision. This was supported by the practice of block 
grant funding. The analysis showed that the practice of LIB (ad hoc-negotiated-input 
RAM) led however to the politically-based accountability model which, in turn, caused the 
governance mechanism to move to the state control end of the pendulum and the 
management practice in the direction of rule-led rather than management by initiative 
(Figure 5.4). 
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In financing HE the government had the options of total state financing, privatisation or 
shared responsibility. Within the arena of shared responsibility there were the further sub-
routes of upfront charges with a mortgage type loan or ICL to support poor students or 
deferred payment, with graduate taxes or ICL. In distributing the funds, the country had 
the option of formulaic funding either by enrolment or graduation rate or it could have 
adopted the fixed formula approach. Formulaic funding by output, however, was deemed 
to be the best option for accountability and supporting efficiency and quality (Chapter 2). 
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
The assumptions underlying the examination of the data and answering the research 
questions were: 
o	 HE is not a purely social good but provides both social and private returns. 
o	 The purpose of the state involvement in HE within the context of a market 
economy is to ensure equity and efficiency (Barr 2004). 
o	 The principles of equity and efficiency lead to protecting those programmes 
with high social and low private returns from the disappearing market. 
The consequences were analysed against the conditions precedent and the RAM debate 
pendulum, and given the above assumptions, the following are the conclusions: 
�	 Cost containment strategies restrict access because quantity is a function of cost. This 
was demonstrated by the application of the breakeven analysis and the results of 
Jamaican experience of using this strategy for over forty years. The cost containment 
strategy did not allow the institution to build its capacity in order to respond to demand. 
�	 Ex post pricing restricts managerial action and initiative because under this system 
price is equal to cost and hence the HEIs do not benefit from efficiency gain. This was 
concluded from the analysis of the financial problems of the HEIs over the period 
studied. The assessment of the marginalist pricing strategy as suggested by Douglas 
(1992) also points to this conclusion. 
�	 Cross the board subsidy leads to inequity as those in the higher earning categories 
derive more benefits. This is concluded from the analysis of the SLC data by James et 
al (2005) which also supported the earlier works of Mignat et al (1985), Eicher (1998), 
Jacobs (2002), Gradstien (2003) and Barr (2003 and 2004). 
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�	 The preconditions for total state financing of HE are central planning and control. If 
the function of government is to ensure efficiency in the allocation of resources and 
equity of access then it would have to assume total control to ensure that no individual 
is at an advantage over another because of the use of state funding. 
�	 The RAM can direct the accountability-governance-management relationship. This 
was demonstrated in chapter 5 where it was shown that notwithstanding the enabling 
legislation and the management requirement the RAM has resulted in the financial 
operations of the HEI behaving as if it is an agent of the state. 
�	 Government will find it difficult to justify paying HEI staff different levels of salaries 
based on regional versus national ownership as long as the institutions have the same 
mandates and missions. 
�	 Upfront charges with mortgage-type loans do not adequately address the issues of 
equity of access to HE. This is because of the high cost of borrowing and collateralised 
lending policy result from the high risk of non-payment. 
The conclusions form the philosophic underpinnings to changes to the financing and 
resource allocation methodology for HE in Jamaica. Given the assumptions and 
conclusions therefore, changes are proposed as hereunder. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendations for Changes to the Financing of HE 
First, the policy of “cost-sharing” should be changed to “social support” for HE. Cost is 
the responsibility of the supplier and the Jamaican Government has determined that its role 
is that of a purchaser of the HE service (MA 02.20, Nov. 1995). As a purchaser the state 
should be concerned about price, which is the mark-up of cost. It was illustrated with the 
break-even analysis (Table 5.3) showing that a cost containment strategy leads to 
restriction of access. This strategy also led to the accountability mechanism pulling the HE 
system to rule-led management and the governance arrangement away from state 
supervision to state control (Figure 5.4). 
A “social support” policy could lead to a change in the nature of the state’s relationship in 
the HE market. The notion of support conveys the idea of assistance with payment; hence, 
a change would shift the state from a cooperative relationship with the institution to one 
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with the population in general. Such a change is even more necessary as the HE 
environment changes from a single provider to multiple providers. 
A policy of “social support” would also allow the state to determine its own priorities 
because it would enable the resources to be channelled according to stated intentions. The 
specific way in which cost sharing is shaped in Jamaica does not allow for targeted support 
because the attention is on institutional survival rather than on the individuals and 
programmes that are in need of assistance. With a social support policy the state could 
direct its resources away from those with high private and low social returns towards those 
with high social and low private returns thereby avoiding the problem of the disappearing 
market. 
Second, the state should abandon its cost containment strategy and allow the HEIs to 
manage their costs. This follows directly from the first recommendation. The cost 
containment strategy was the reason for the state’s continued involvement in salary 
negotiations of the staff of the HEIs even though they are not employees of the state. As a 
result, the state cannot plead inability to pay when it compensates the staff of one 
institution at a higher level than the other. The issue is more complicated when the 
institution with the higher level of salary is also complaining that it is unable to attract staff 
on the international market because of the salary restriction that is placed on it by the 
governments of the Caribbean. 
The abandonment of the cost containment strategy should put an end to the salary-parity 
disputes that have been dogging the Jamaican HE arena for over twenty years. It was 
pointed out in chapter 5 that the salary differential was a major reason why efficiency 
cannot properly be measured in the Jamaican HE environment. 
As argued in Appendix XV, activity-based costing (ABC) is the most appropriate costing 
strategy for educational programmes. If the state, according the Cabinet’s decision of 
October 31, 1994, truly allows the HEIs to freely negotiate with their staff then this area of 
cost could be considered along with the others as being on competitive ground. ABC 
could then be used to ascertain the cost of each programme and the results to be 
benchmarks in measuring institutional efficiency. As it stands, a comparison could not 
give a true picture of efficiency because staff cost which is the major portion of 
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expenditure is managed artificially. It could also be argued that the per student cost was 
lower for one HEI because of the imposed lower salary and not through efficient use of 
resources. 
Thirdly, it is recommended that the HEIs should practice ex ante pricing. Chapter 5 
charged that the current practice of ex post pricing is inefficient, leads to complicated 
arrangements, minimises HEI managerial responsibilities, and contradicts governance 
requirement. Institutions should charge fees based on their estimates of cost plus a mark-
up. The mark-up should be used for future expansion and development, with particular 
emphasis on quality improvements. The consumers who in this case would be the state and 
the direct beneficiaries would be persuaded to accept the pricing structure based on (1) the 
expected improvement in employment prospects and the expected social rate of return in 
the case of the state, and (2) the expected improvement in individual employability and 
private returns as well as the related ability to pay in the case of the individual. This 
implies a strong marketing effort on the part of the HEIs and decisive efforts to keep down 
costs or raise quality. 
Douglas (1992) outlined the cost-plus pricing formula as: 
P =AVC +X (AVC) (6.1) 
where P is Price; AVC is Average Variable Cost; X is the Mark-up percentage chosen 
By substituting AVC for Per Capita Cost (PCC), the pricing formula could be rewritten as 
follows: 
Pp = PCCp + X (PCCp) (6.2) 
or 
Pp = PCCp (1+ X) (6.3) 
where subscript p represents the specific programme 
The issue then becomes the matter of determining X. In equation 6.1, Douglas (1992) 
determined X by using the price elasticity of demand. In chapter 2 it was observed that the 
tuition fee is inelastic therefore price elasticity cannot be the factor to use in estimating X. 
James advocates that instead of price elasticity, the expected social rate of return (r) should 
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be used to estimate X. He outlined the process for calculating the substitute for r, which he 
deemed to be approximated by the internal social rate of return (ISRR) over the working 
life of the people currently receiving HE (Interview, March 25, 2005; James et al 2004). 
The first step is to calculate the net present value (NPV) from the date of initiation of the 
investment flow. Here, 
(R � C)
NPV = � y (6.4)

y
 (d � r) 
where R = Expected revenues (Wages and other benefits). Taxes and work with 
social returns are excluded at this stage. 
C = Cost of education defined to include direct outlays by the state and the 
individuals being educated, and the economic costs of wages and other earnings 
foregone because of the investment. 
d = Depreciation (or replacement) rate and is usually set equal to 1. 
r = Internal social rate of return. 
y = Expected number of years of working life (or benefit). 
If taxes and other social benefits and costs are excluded, the above formulas result in the 
private rate of return. However, this rate is perhaps better estimated by regression methods, 
as in the work of James, et al (2004) and James (2005) on Jamaica. 
The second step is to find the IRR that is the value of r such that the NPV is equal to zero. 
This is done with the NPV formula by manipulating (r) until NPV is zero. The estimated 
IRR would then be used as the substitute for X. Equation 6.5 would then be used to 
calculate the general price. 
Pp = PCCp (1+ IRRp) (6.5) 
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The price would be the return to the HEI. The government would pay a portion and the 
students the balance, depending on how the private and the social rates balance and 
depending on government’s capacity to fund its social policy. The determination of the 
state’s portion will be discussed more fully in the recommendations under the RAM. If 
fees are set according to this recommendation then there would be less need for price 
control and the state could allow variable fees, which could be regulated. This would be in 
line with state supervised governance mechanism as dictated by the various charters. 
Since the private rate of return is an attractor to the individual student, then fees can be 
allowed to vary in various programs according to how the private rate differs from the 
social rate. With variable fees, the HEI would be able to compete on quality. Students 
would pay higher fees based on their perception of the quality of institutional offering 
(Barr 2003b; James, 2005). This would also fit within the Orr (2005) trajectory where the 
QAM of marketing is consistent with the fee payment system. 
Mark-up pricing would also enable the HEIs to sustain themselves since the margin can be 
set aside for infrastructure improvements and equipment replacement and or staff training 
and development. Instead of waiting for funding from the state for building capacity each 
institution would be able to set aside in an incremental fashion for its future. If the need is 
immediate then the institution could use the mark-up information in a cash flow projection 
to negotiate funding from financial institutions. 
Jamaica’s assessment against the conditions precedent chart (Figure 5.5) indicates that in 
order to assist needy students, it has only met the conditions for up front charges with 
mortgage type loans. For this reason the recommendation is being made to continue this 
policy for the medium term. Efforts, however, need to be made to move the country in the 
direction of providing income contingent loans to ensure a more favourable equity of 
access to HE. This would mean improving the tax management and collection system to 
track all citizens. It would also mean building a reserve so that the country can deal with 
the up front payments to the HEIs pending the repayment from the beneficiaries. The risk-
pooling scheme would also need to be in place to deal with inability to repay. 
For the medium-term, support should be given to James’ (2005) recommendations to assist 
the poor to access HE. 
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o	 Government to guarantee the loans for the poor instead of requiring them to have 
private guarantees. This is the major hindrance to their participation and has 
allowed the benefit to go to the richest quintile. 
o	 The grant that is provided to assist the poor should be adjusted annually in line with 
inflation. This would allow them to maintain value. The amount has never been 
adjusted since it inception in 1996. 
o	 Loans should be provided to cover living and material expenses during the course 
of study. 
Recommendation for changes to RAM 
Privatisation and demand-driven RAM achieve the same results because they enable the 
individual to make the decisions, choose the programmes and signal to the HEIs what 
should be offered. The arguments proffered against privatisation and demand-driven RAM 
were discussed in chapter 2. The disadvantages suggest that Jamaica should continue 
supply-side resource allocation to HE. Block grant funding should also be continued 
because it enhances institutional flexibility. However, these mechanisms should be 
supported by changes in the production/transparency aspect of the RAM (see RAM debate 
pendulums, Figure 5.2) 
First, the country should adopt formulaic funding and abandon the ad hoc-negotiated-input 
funding arrangements. This would convey the notion of objectivity in the allocation and 
provide mechanisms that would better support quality, efficiency and accountability. 
Fixed formulae funding is not considered appropriate because it does not support quality, 
efficiency and accountability. The question then is, should the formula be input-driven, 
output-driven or should it have elements of both input and output? It was argued in 
chapter 2 that output-driven formulae provided the best basis to judge accountability, 
efficiency and quality. 
Output RAM, however, may result in cash flow difficulties for HEIs and may pose an 
ethical dilemma. The cash flow problem could arise because payments for outputs are 
after processing is complete and expenses are incurred. The institutions would require 
advance funding to undertake its teaching and research and would be required to claim 
afterwards. If advance funding is not provided then the HEI may be forced out of 
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operation. If it has to borrow then the cost would increase the cost of education. The 
ethical dilemma may be caused by the temptation of HEIs to pass students simply for the 
sake of funding and not be concerned about the quality of the education. These issues have 
caused some scholars to advocate the use of enrolment formula funding. This type of 
funding, however, has the problem of inefficiency as countries practising this RAM have 
identified that under this system throughput and completion rates are poor. The Czech 
Republic adjusted its enrolment formula to include an output element for this reason. 
The Czech Republic and England are two of the countries that have attempted to address 
the above concerns from different perspectives. The Czech solution is to have a formula 
with both input and output factors (see equation 6.6). 
AHEI = (base * Ci * Nrstu) + (Ng * baseg) (6.6) 
Where base = The amount determined per student/graduate per year 
Ci = Co-efficient of the programme 
Nrstu = Number of students in an accredited programme 
Ng = Number of graduates 
The programmes are grouped into seven clusters according to cost. The study in the 
humanities for instance has a co-efficient of 1, arts a co-efficient of 5.9 and an English 
language course, 3. The first element of the formula is input-related as it is based on 
enrolment while the second element is output-related as it is based on the graduation rate. 
The result is that partial funding is provided for the student who is enrolled but the balance 
is not paid until he completes. 
A simplified mathematical representation of the English system is the first part of equation 
6.6 which forms the basis of the initial remittance to the HEI. To address the issue of 
completion rate another element is added to the formula to reduce the amount of 
subsequent grants if “the institutions are unable to recruit or retain the numbers of students 
for which the previous year’s grant was allocated” (HEFCE 2003 p.13). In the English 
case therefore the claw-back mechanism results in non-funding of incomplete students. By 
providing the funds by enrolment the English system, therefore, addresses the cash-flow 
needs of the institution and the claw-back mechanism transforms the arrangement into an 
output system. The ethical dilemma is addressed not by the funding formula but by the 
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QAM which tests the evaluation systems of the HEI. If Jamaica is to adopt the English 
system then it has to ensure that the RAM is consistent with the QAM (Orr 2005). 
Second, the state should de-link subsidies from the apex classification and students’ 
portion. The ad hoc-input-negotiated RAM is linked to the apex classification system 
where institutions are pre-classified and funds negotiated according to their position in the 
structure. This may have been suitable to a system with one HE provider and the other 
TLIs offering programmes below the HE level. It must, however, be recognised that there 
are now multiple providers which makes it difficult to justify different financing levels for 
institutions with the same mandate and function. Linking subsidies to fees suggests that 
whatever the charge, the balance must be provided by the state. In an atmosphere of 
resource constraints, however, this is not always possible, thereby forcing the HEI into 
deficit financing, as was seen from the Jamaican experience (Chapters 4 and 5). It is 
therefore proposed that funding be allocated to HEIs according to the following factors: 
o	 Support level – The number of students the state is willing to support according to 
the manpower projections. The planning authority may, for instance, project that in 
the next ten years 20,000 doctors, 10,000 engineers, 60,000 teachers in specific 
subject areas and 20,000 business professionals will be needed in the country. 
Based on age and other factors of those currently in the system, the migration 
patterns of the country, attrition and other characteristic of the professions, 
calculations can be done to determine the amount of persons to be trained for the 
various professions to meet the projected demand for the ten year horizon. The 
government therefore can determine the support level through this process. State or 
any kind of funding should not be open-ended but be linked to plans. The purpose 
of the state in HE as stated before should be to ensure equity of access and 
protection of the social programmes and this is a mechanism to perform these 
functions. Support level because of its importance in planning national needs 
should be a major factor in determining resources to HEI. 
o	 Price weighting – The relative price of programmes with each other should be 
another factor because all programmes do not cost the same and are charged 
different prices. To guard against cross subsidisation and to encourage equity then 
relative pricing should be built in the formula. 
o	 Priority factors – The level of importance of the particular profession to the society 
is the third factor. This is proposed as a means to protect the social programmes 
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and to safeguard against the disappearing market. If teachers or social workers are 
important to the society yet such professionals earn relatively low salaries then high 
priority coefficients could be placed on those programmes thereby ensuring that 
more resources are directed to support those programmes. 
o	 Resource level – The total amount of funding available for allocation should also 
be a factor since resources are limited. 
Table 6.1 illustrates how such a system would work in relation to allocation for teaching. 
Table 6.1: Illustration of allocating funds for teaching to HEIs 
Clusters Support 
Level 
(D) 
Price 
Weights 
(C) 
Priority 
Weighting 
(p) 
Relative 
Numbers 
(D*C*p) 
Allocated 
Amounts 
Amount 
per 
Student 
A 750 4.5 1 3,375 375,000,000 500,000 
B 2,000 2 1 4,000 444,444,444 222,222 
C 5,000 1.5 0.75 5,625 625,000,000 125,000 
D 10,000 1 0.5 5,000 555,555,556 55,556 
17,750 18,000 2,000,000,000 
In Table 6.1 it is assumed that the state will fund 17,750 students in HEIs. The support is 
distributed according to four programme clusters. The prices of the programmes relative to 
each other are in column 3 showing a relation to cluster D. Column 4 shows the priority 
weightings where the programmes in clusters A and B are deemed to be most important, 
hence, they are given a priority weighting of 1 each. The values placed on the other 
clusters signify their relative priority. It is also assumed that only J$2B are available to the 
HE sector. The amounts allocated to each cluster (column 6) are calculated as per equation 
6.6. 
(D	 * C * p) 
Fund Pool	 (6.7)Ap = 
�(D * C * p) 
Ap is the allocation per programme cluster. 
Each institution would be allocated funds based on the number of students it has in each 
cluster at the rates specified in the table. The total amount of funds available for HE would 
be determined by the government based of the resources it has at its disposal and the other 
functions that it must provide to the country. The contribution per student would be 
calculated as per equation 6.8 and shown in Column 7 of Table 6.1. 
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CSp = Ap/Dp (6.8) 
CSp is the contribution per student and Dp is the number of places in the cluster that the 
government would support. 
Institutions would thereafter be allocated resources based on the number of students per 
cluster that has been awarded. Equation 6.9 would be the final stage in the process. 
AHEI = (CSc X DHEI) (6.9) 
Where AHEI is the allocation to the particular institution, CSc is the contribution per student 
for a particular cluster and DHEI is the number of places in the cluster that the state would 
support for the particular HEI. See Table 6.2 for illustration. 
Table 6.2: Illustration of the final allocation to HEI 
Cluste 
r 
Contribution 
per Student 
Places 
Awarded 
to HEI 
Allocation 
A 500,000 250 125,000,000 
B 222,222 1200 266,666,667 
C 125,000 2000 250,000,000 
D 55,556 4000 222,222,222 
7450 863,888,889 
In Table 6.2 it is assumed that institution X was awarded 7450 places; 250 in cluster A, 
1200 in cluster B, 2000 in cluster C and 4000 in cluster D. Of the J$2B it would be 
awarded J$864M based on the methodology outlined above. 
The model is called the relative weighting resource allocation model of RW-RAM. This is 
because the allocation is determined on the bases of factors that are relative to each other. 
The following are adjuncts to the recommendation on de-linking subsidies for institutional 
bias and fee levels: 
o	 The fund pool is to be adjusted annually by the rate of inflation to ensure that the 
value to the institutions is not depleted over time. 
o	 Any increase in the support level should be accompanied with a proportional 
increase in the level of the pool. This is also to ensure that the value is not depleted 
over time at the expense of the HEI. 
o	 HEIs would have the freedom to charge variable fees and to fill excess capacity 
with full fee paying students. This would allow for an extra source of funding for 
improving quality and maintain or improving its efficiency levels. 
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o	 Price and priority weightings should be determined empirically in order to guard 
against subjectivity. 
Third, there is to be separate funding for research. HE in Jamaica is defined in relation to 
teaching and research; hence, such institutions should be funded accordingly. There is 
much debate about the inter-relationship between teaching and research. Those who think 
that they influence each other also believe that there should not be a separate funding 
arrangement for each. Research output, however, is assessed differently from teaching 
output and is easier to quantify. It is recommended that the country adopt the English 
system of allocating funds for research where allocation would be based on funds level, 
price weighting, research active staff and quality rating (HEFCE 2003). 
Fourth, it is proposed that there be a unified process for allocating resources to HEIs, 
regardless of whether they are regionally- or nationally-owned. The current difference in 
treatment is a result of the historical roots of HE in the Caribbean. Conditions dictate 
equal treatment for the regional as well as the national institutions. Both are committed to 
the national development of, and have the same mandate for, Jamaica. It is therefore 
irrational and inefficient to maintain a direct resource allocation process for each. As such, 
it is recommended that Jamaica establish a Higher Education Funding Authority (HEFA) 
with the following terms of reference to: 
1.	 manage the allocation of the state’s funding for teaching and research to HEIs, 
2.	 monitor the financial activities of the HEIs on behalf of the state, 
3.	 advise the government on the level of the resource pool, 
4.	 propose adjustments and changes to the RAM, 
5.	 assess the effects of the level of funding on the quality of HEI performance, 
6.	 regulate the pricing of the HE programmes, 
7.	 interpret the state’s priorities in relation to manpower needs (in relation to assigning 
the priority co-efficient) and 
8.	 provide benchmarking information against national and international targets for 
Jamaican HEI performance 
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Figure 6.1: Proposed Unified Process for Resource Allocation in the Jamaican HE System 
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Funding 
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Process Flow Money Flow 
The proposed unified process is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The planning authority is 
expected to signal the future manpower needs of the country. This would be set in the 
framework of the country’s long-term projections. The Ministry of Education would 
thereafter extract from the central long-term plan, the medium-term goals of the 
government. These would be communicated to the funding authority as the priorities of 
the government for the specific period. The funding authority would thereafter assign the 
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priority weighting to the particular educational programmes and indicate the number of HE 
places that the government would be supporting. It could also negotiate the level of the 
funding pool with the Ministry of Finance and calculate the amount of contribution per 
student that the pool would provide. 
The HEIs could then bid for places and be funded according to the number of places 
awarded. The students through their own private resources or by way of the students’ loan 
scheme would be expected to finance the difference between the contribution provided by 
the government and the price being changed by the HEIs. Similarly to the English system, 
it is proposed that the HEIs enter into a contract with HEFA to produce at least the number 
of students awarded and if they fail to do so then refund to the state would be expected. It 
is also proposed that if the institutions have excess capacity over that which is supported 
by the state then this could be awarded to full-fee paying students. 
Figure 6.1 also suggests that the QAM should be a part of the RAM where funding is only 
awarded for programmes that are accredited. This would be similar to the system in the 
Czech Republic. 
REFLECTIONS 
On reflection, the research has raised the level of academic and professional development 
of the investigator. These are summarised under the following headings 
� Research methodology 
� Higher education management 
� Resource allocation in HE 
Research Methodology 
The first issue the researcher faced was wrestling with the role that epistemology should 
play in the research. It was difficult to agree with the view that one’s personal knowledge 
claim should determine whether one uses quantitative, qualitative or mixed method 
research. This was the view of Creswell (2000). Eventually the approach that seemed 
204 
logical and reasonable was that of being driven by the research question. Punch (1998) 
argued the latter point. However, the debate about epistemology as a prerequisite to 
research is still not answered in the researcher’s mind. This could be due to nature of the 
research that was undertaken and the belief that knowledge claim as a basis for the 
methodology seems to be more applicable to basic rather than applied research. Basic 
research is “to gain more comprehensive knowledge or understanding of the subject under 
study without specific applications in mind” 
(www.genomicglossaries.com/content/research_genomics.asp). Applied research “is done to 
solve specific, practical questions; its primary aim is not to gain knowledge for its own 
sake” (encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/Researcher). The objective of applied research to 
solve specific and practical questions suggests the appropriateness of the research question 
driving the investigation rather than epistemology. The experience of this research project, 
therefore, though not settling the epistemology debate, has led the researcher to believe 
that the Cresswell approach fits basic research while the Punch suggestion is more suitable 
for applied research. 
After the decision about the approach to the research, the next issue was getting the 
research question right. It was first thought that the focus should be on developing a model 
for funding HE in Jamaica. As a result, the question that was developed was, “What model 
should the Jamaican government adopt for the financing of HE?” That would have 
assumed that whatever was in existence was inappropriate and hence prejudicial. It was 
eventually decided to investigate the Jamaican practice and allow the investigation to 
determine the issues at the various stages and the eventual recommendations. This 
objective led to the question about the consequences of the various models used by the 
country. The lesson about the importance of the research question was therefore a major 
development for the researcher. 
The project also enabled the researcher to learn the techniques involved in using grounded 
theory to do research. The use of the inductive logic technique and the coding of 
qualitative data were learnt during the project. Other techniques for analysing data and 
developing frameworks for probing data were also acquired. As a result, the conditions 
precedent chart, the RAM debate pendulum and the governance-management-
accountability trajectory were developed. A problem that was encountered in the initial 
stages of analysis was to understand Strauss and Corbin (1998) coding procedures and to 
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determine when one was doing open, axial and selective coding. In reviewing Flick (2002) 
circular model of the research process the issue was eventually solved. It was decided not 
to concentrate on the types of coding but to realise that the analysis was going through 
several stages of data collection, interpretation and comparison until conclusions were 
reached. 
Higher Education Management 
The research also wrestled with some of the questions about the management of HEIs. 
These included questions such as 
� What is the role of the administrator versus the academicians in an HEI? 
� Are academics automatically qualified to be administrators of HE? 
� Is there a need for specific training to be an administrator for HEI? 
The research revealed that there are links between the various disciplines and an 
appreciation of such links can assist the management of HEIs to address the various 
problems that are encountered. The research was about a financial issue but in examining 
such an issue there had to be consultations from perspectives such as economics, 
accounting, strategic management, human resource management, change management and 
governance. For this reason it is thought that there should be generic training programmes 
for HE administrators so that the clear links can be identified and capabilities can be 
improved for the effective administration of HE. 
It is a common practice in the management of education institutions in Jamaica to only 
promote good teachers and researcher to leadership. Sometimes this is done to the 
detriment of the individuals and their institutions because they were not equipped to 
manage. The observation is also made that those individuals with only management 
training may not understand the dynamics of the educational environment and may lead the 
institutions in the wrong direction. The research however suggests that regardless of the 
professional orientation of the leadership of HEI (pedagogic or pure management) there 
must be a point where supplementary training is required. The educational professionals 
need management training and the management professionals need to understand the 
principles and processes of pedagogy. Specifically, this researcher is from a 
finance/management background and had to understand the educational principles in order 
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to address the problems of financing and resource allocation to HEI. The research also 
showed how economic principles such as elasticity of demand, financial concepts such as 
net present value (NPV) and rates of return and managerial accounting concepts such as 
activity-based costing (ABC) can be used to address issues in the management of 
educational institutions. 
Resource Allocation in HE 
Probably the most important lessons had to do with the philosophical underpinnings to 
resource allocation at the systems level and its link with the overall financing of HE. At 
the outset it was thought to limit the scope of the research to resource allocation. However, 
because of the primacy of the research question, it was realised that consideration had to be 
given instead to the total issue of financing HE before focusing on the narrow angle of how 
the funds are channelled. 
The analysis of the philosophical underpinnings to resource allocation also led to the 
development of the RAM debate pendulum. The conditions precedent chart and the 
decision tree for the financing options resulted from the examination of the issues of equity 
of access and efficiency in the use and allocation of resources. It is now realised by the 
researcher that financing HE and allocating resources to HEIs are more than mathematical 
functions because the philosophy should first be determined in order to direct the 
development of the mathematical functions. It is the intention that drives the formulae for 
allocation and distribution. The recommendations contained in this chapter resulted from 
this realisation. 
Also, in examining the issue of financing HE a question of whether the matter should be 
treated as an art or a science is raised. As an art the emphasis is on negotiation skills in the 
resource allocation process. The negotiation skill and the relative political position of the 
HEI leadership are important in a system where the resource allocation is treated as an art. 
The amount of resources that the leader is able to attract for his institution is dependent on 
his ability to persuade. In the formulae funding environment as is recommended by this 
study financing HE would have to be regarded as a science. Manpower planning and 
projection, rates of return analyses and costing and managerial principle are more 
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important to attract income (funding and demand for the product). Such an environment 
would also require more formal training for the HEI leadership to enable positive results. 
CONCLUSION 
Higher education has undergone considerable changes in its reach and delivery mode since 
its introduction to the Caribbean in 1948. Notwithstanding the changes in the programme 
and academic contents the government of Jamaica has maintained only one model of 
resource allocation to the HEIs and has tried four modes of financing HE. The government 
has also implemented several bureaucratic structures to ensure a link between its resource 
allocation model and the issues of accountability, institutional efficiency and quality. This 
thesis 
�	 Analysed the different financing methods adopted against those available 
�	 Explored the various RAMs available and their links to accountability, efficiency and 
quality 
�	 Identified and examined the RAM used in Jamaica 
�	 Considered the consequences of the financing and resource allocation methods 
�	 Recommended changes for the Jamaican system 
It is hoped that the study will assist the HEIs and the government of Jamaica to address the 
issues identified, understand the changes necessary and implement the recommendations 
accordingly. 
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APPENDIX I

ALLOCATIONS TO JAMAICAN TLIS

SINCE 1995

1998/99 1999/2000 
Ja $ ’000 
1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 
1,373,491 1,808,623 2,593,979 UWI 
167,524 299,962 500,958 UTech 
1,541,015 2,108,585 3,094,937 
2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 
1,612,698 1,623,671 1,623,671 
674,668 835,057 825,057 
2,287,366 2,458,728 2,448,728 
84,581 102,914 102,914 
129,295 170,897 166,497 
2,103,719 
972,110 
3,075,829 
79,353 
152,796 
1,731,142 
542,747 
2,273,889 
84,740 
159,534 
College for Visual & Performing Arts 
Edna Manley 38,660 60,948 76,321 
College 
College for Agricultural Education 
CASE 57,997 86,088 129,817 
Multi-Disciplinary 
Colleges 
Brown's 
Town 
EXED 
Knox 
Montego Bay 
Portmore 
Moneague 
Bethlehem 
176,997 263,845 339,455 
Teachers' Colleges 
Church 26,408 38,185 45,234 
G.C. Foster 17,053 25,687 29,726 
Mico 69,149 98,176 122,219 
St. Joseph's 22,345 32,026 37,830 
Shortwood 38,181 55,310 68,227 
Sam Sharpe 26,253 36,065 45,902 
199,389 285,449 349,138 
Break out not available 
319,448 379,685 405,732 485,560 474,744 
47,445 51,007 51,823 63,639 61,919 
29,768 30,705 32,009 48,726 47,810 
119,549 130,555 136,146 149,678 146,424 
37,451 40,526 43,317 53,572 52,066 
67,469 75,288 77,675 90,601 88,538 
45,883 51,182 52,194 62,359 60,126 
347,565 379,263 393,164 468,575 456,883 
3,974,991 3,277,111 3,300,138 3,686,674 3,649,766 2,014,058 2,804,915 3,989,668 
Source: Estimates of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Jamaica 
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APPENDIX II

ENROLLMENT IN JAMAICAN TLIS IN

SINCE 1995

1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 
University Education 
UWI 7,704 7,867 8,543 8,689 10,421 8,571 9,969 
UTech 6,832 7,129 6,268 6,009 7,550 6,540 6,733 
14,536 14,996 14,811 14,698 17,971 15,111 16,702 
College for Visual & Performing Arts 
Edna Manley 
College 
734 922 536 294 268 342 177 
College for Agricultural Education 
CASE 573 536 329 672 690 716 610 
Multi-Disciplinary Colleges 
Brown's Town 1,084 1,094 1,100 769 713 713 792 
EXED 2,852 2,411 2,142 1,953 1,787 2,038 1,811 
Knox 1,385 1,519 1,519 1,405 1,345 1,393 1,888 
Montego Bay 790 918 709 893 815 1,000 1,058 
Portmore 1,225 861 710 1,044 868 1,052 1,065 
Moneague 470 466 524 885 923 863 985 
Bethlehem 396 424 459 458 628 648 642 
8,202 7,693 7,163 7,407 7,079 7,707 8,241 
Teachers' Colleges 
Church 350 359 379 406 388 376 379 
G.C. Foster 172 200 199 241 245 312 130 
Mico 1,087 1,087 974 1,080 1,044 901 858 
St. Joseph's 260 261 300 325 345 518 571 
Shortwood 567 548 657 627 627 563 600 
Sam Sharpe 386 386 504 563 619 669 577 
2,822 2,841 3,013 3,242 3,268 3,339 3,115 
Total TLI 26,867 26,988 25,852 26,313 29,276 27,215 28,845 
Source: Statistics Section, Planning and Development Division of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Culture, Jamaica 
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APPENDIX III

EXCERPTS FROM THE ESTIMATES

OF EXPENDITURE RE FINANCING

SECONDARY AND TEACHER

EDUCATION

The following statement occurred as explanation accompanying all the provisions for 
secondary education: 
This provision is intended to finance the operations of 40 grant-aided high schools 
to the extent that the Government has accepted liability for such financing. All 
these schools are managed by Boards of Governors and receive some revenue from 
fees payable by fee-paying students. The bulk of their revenue comes, however, 
from public funds in the form of fees payable in respect of students awarded 
scholarship, free places or grant places on the basis of performance in common 
entrance examinations which are held annually, and also for pupils from Junior 
Secondary Schools who graduate at age 15 and pass a test as to their suitability for 
further secondary education of the academic type. The fees which are payable 
from public funds are related to the per capita cost of teachers’ salaries, a per 
capita grant towards the cost of general administration and maintenance and per 
capita grants for class materials. Other special grants are also made from public 
funds to assist the schools in financing their operations.” (Source: GOJ, Estimates of 
Expenditure 1970) 
Teacher Training 
Existing policy provides for free tuition for all students attending any teacher 
training college. Those students who live in accommodation provided at the 
colleges or in hostels operated by the colleges also receive free board and lodging. 
Other students who live in private homes are paid an allowance at the rate of $10 a 
week towards their living expenses.” (Estimates of Expenditure 1970, pg. 528) 
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APPENDIX IV

FINANCING THE UWI,MINISTRY

PAPER NO. 351/01

Presented by Hon. Donald B. Sangster, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of

Finance, Jamaica

rd 
3 September 1963

UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES

On the 13th November, 1962, I laid on the Table of the House of Ministry Paper 
No. 56 along with a Report on the Common Services Conference held in Trinidad from 
10th to 18th July, 1962, and indicated the following decisions taken by the conference about 
the University of the West Indies:-
(i)	 The Governments of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the Windward and 
Leeward Islands, British Honduras and the British Virgin Islands agreed to 
continue support of the University on a regional basis for at least three 
triennia – i.e. from 1st August 1963 to 31st July 1972. For the first 
triennium, these territories would contribute to the recurrent cost of the 
University net of all other receipts; British Honduras and the British Virgin 
Islands would contribute towards this net cost in the same proportions as 
they are contributing now (i.e. 2.2% and 0.19% respectively) and the former 
Federated territories would meet the remainder – the contributions from 
these territories to be paid in the same proportion as that used for the 
mandatory levy; 
(ii)	 the present arrangement under which a Triennial Advisory Committee of 
Government representatives deals with the University budget, will cease. In 
future, the review of the University budget should be undertaken in two 
stages – before a Technical Committee of Civil Servants nominated by the 
Governments and then before a Policy Committee of Ministers to whom 
Governments should delegate the right to decide how much money the 
University is to receive, and to make final commitments. The name of the 
Ministerial Committee should be the “University Grants Committee”; 
(iii)	 proposal relating to the future size of the University would be considered in 
the normal way by the University Grants Committee whose first meeting 
was expected to take place in November, 1962. 
2. I now wish to report to the House on matters dealt with by the University Grants 
Committee as well as other important decisions taken by the Council of the University 
since November last year, all of which are of the greatest concern to us in Jamaica. 
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3. Prior to the dissolution of the Federation there were firm arrangements for 
financing an agreed budget of the University for a three year period which ended on the 
31st July, 1963. Members of the House will know that funds were contributed to the 
University by the participating Governments by way of the mandatory levy which was paid 
to the Federal Government. British Honduras, British Guiana and the Virgin Islands made 
separate payments to the Federal Government for payment to the University. In addition to 
these payments it will be recalled that Jamaica had agreed to pay £150,000 for each of the 
three years ending 31st July, 1963, to meet an increase in the University’s recurrent 
expenditure over and above the amount to which the participating Governments had 
originally been committed. Trinidad had also agreed to pay £138,889 and Barbados 
£100,000. 
4. There is also the University Hospital which must be considered along with the 
University when discussing the financial arrangements. The present arrangement for 
financing this Institution is that Jamaica pays 68% of the net recurrent costs while the 
participating Governments including Jamaica contribute the remaining 32% in the same 
proportion as that used for the mandatory levy. The future financing of the Hospital is for 
consideration of the University Grants Committee. 
MEETING OF THE UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMITTEE 
5. The University Grants Committee composed of Ministerial representatives of West 
Indian Governments which maintain the University met in January and February last to 
decide what amount would be contributed by the territories for the three year period 1st 
August, 1963, to 31st July, 1966. The Estimates which were put before the Committee had 
been previously examined and reported on by a Technical Committee of Civil Servants. 
The meeting met against the background of firm decisions already reached at the Common 
Services Conference; the important points that emerged may be summarised as follows:-
(i)	 The University should receive from the West Indies Territorial 
Governments a block grant of £3.85 million towards recurrent expenditure 
and £200,000 should be provided for capital expenditure in order to 
maintain existing activities. 
(ii)	 The Government of British Guiana through its representative at the 
Conference, agreed to pay £303,000 as the cost of teaching British Guianese 
students for the next three years, and £40,000 for the succeeding two years, 
when they will no longer be contributing to the cost of maintaining the 
University. These figures were arrived at on the basis of a charge of £1,000 
per student per annum at which time the present students from British 
Guiana will have all left U.W.I. 
(iii)	 British Honduras and the Virgin Islands would not contribute any more than 
at present. 
(iv)	 The Governments of Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica would be 
prepared to contribute, in the agreed proportions of the Federal mandatory 
levy, to the recurrent cost of the Liberal Arts Colleges and evening studies 
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at Mona to be established in the respective territories limited to £300,000 in 
the last year of the triennium. 
(v)	 The sum of £110,000 for capital needs would be paid to the University over 
the period of the triennium in carrying out the scheme for medical students 
to do part of their training at hospitals in Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados 
in order to increase the output of doctors from 50 a year to 80 or 90 a year. 
(vi)	 All representatives of the territories except the Governments of Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Barbados, declined to commit their Governments to pay the 
agreed proportionate share of the increased costs of the University of the 
West Indies, mainly on the ground of the financial stringency being 
experienced by the respective Governments. 
(vii)	 The United Kingdom Government is prepared in principle to assist in 
financing University expenditure during the next three years by -
(a)	 providing £52,000 per annum towards the recurrent expenditure of 
the Faculty of Agriculture; 
(b)	 providing up to 20% of approved schemes for capital expenditure if 
Jamaica and Trinidad together put up the balance of 80% shared as 
to 42% for Jamaica and 38% for Trinidad; the cost of schemes not to 
exceed £350,000; 
(c)	 providing a grant of up to £400,000 for the establishment of a 
Liberal Arts College in Barbados; 
(d)	 providing £343,550 towards the expenses of the Regional Research 
Centre; 
(e)	 providing £23,746 towards the expenses of the Seismic Research 
Unit; 
(f)	 providing £62,412 towards the expenses of the Trinidad Regional 
Virus Laboratory. 
In addition, the United Kingdom Government is prepared to consider further 
assistance to the grant-aided territories to meet their share of the increased recurrent costs 
of the University. 
(viii)	 Special provision had to be made for future students from British Guiana as 
follows: 
From October 1963: 
(1)	 The number of undergraduate students admitted in any 
year from any country not supporting the University’s 
budget should not exceed one per cent of that years entry 
of undergraduate students. There should be no restriction 
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of postgraduate students with first degrees from 
Universities approved by the University of the West Indies. 
(2)	 That the Examination and Tuition fees payable by such a 
student, excepting a student from British Guiana, for any 
Degree, Diploma or Certificate course, undergraduate or 
postgraduate, should be £100 a year, except for:-
a.	 Engineering, undergraduate £250. 0 .0. 
b.	 Agriculture, postgraduate students sponsored by 
the Governments of the United Kingdom and the 
Commonwealth Afro-Asian countries who should 
pay the same fees as West Indian students. 
c.	 Medicine, undergraduate £350. 0. 0. 
(3)	 That examination and tuition fees payable by students from 
British Guiana for any Degree, Diploma or Certificate 
course, undergraduate or postgraduate, should be four 
times the fee paid by a student from any country 
supporting the University’s budget except for: 
a.	 Engineering, undergraduate £250. 0. 0. 
b.	 Medicine, undergraduate £350. 0. 0. 
(4)	 That for this purpose students from countries supporting 
the University’s budget would include: 
a.	 nationals of these countries; 
b.	 students whose parents reside in these countries; 
c.	 students who have resided in these countries for 
two years before applying to the University; 
d.	 students who are, and continue to be in full-time 
employment in these countries; 
e.	 nationals of the United Kingdom, of the United 
States of America, and of Canada. 
The Vice-Chancellor reported to the Committee that he had written to the 
Department of Technical Coop oration making a special case for the British Government to 
increase the grant-in-aid to the Windward and Leeward Islands Governments to enable 
them to meet the additional University subvention during the next triennium. 
He proposed that the Governments of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
should agree to pay their share of the subvention to the University, based on the mandatory 
levy and that it be left to the University to negotiate with the British Government and the 
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Windward and Leeward Islands for their shares, and if there were a shortfall during this 
triennium the University would meet it as best it could. The proposal was agreed to by the 
Ministers. 
Contributions 
6.	 It was agreed that the grants to be made to the University for the three year period 
1963-1966 should be on the following basis:-
(a) Recurrent Expenditure 
Existing Services 
Liberal Arts 
£3,850,000 
824,700 
(b) Regional Schemes – Capital & Recurrent 
Trinidad Regional Virus Laboratory 
Seismic Research 
Regional Research Centre 
113,475 
97,690 
474,300 
(c) Capital Expenditure 
i. Main Budget 
ii. Teaching in Eastern Caribbean Hospitals 
Total 
200,000 
110,000 
£5,670,165 
On the basis agreed at the Common Services Conference the contributions payable 
towards recurrent expenditure £4,674,700 (£3,850,000 & £824,700) would be as follows – 
Block grant	 £4,674,700 
Less amounts payable by British Guiana 
(excluding Hospital contribution £76,905) £226,095 
British Honduras 51,588 
British Virgin Islands 5,898 283,581 
Net Total: £4,391,119 
Annual average contribution:	 £1,463,706 
Distribution 
COUNTRY PERCENT AMOUNT 
Antigua 1.3374 £19,575 
Barbados 8.5562 125,238 
Dominica 1.6250 23,785 
Grenada 1.6969 24,838 
Jamaica 43.1119 631,031 
Montserrat 0.2732 3,999 
St. Kitts 1.7256 25,258 
St. Lucia 1.7400 25,468 
St. Vincent 1.3086 19,154 
Trinidad & Tobago 38.6252 565,360 
£1,463,706 
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Jamaica’s contribution 1963/64 
7.	 Jamaica’s contribution to all the services of the University for 1963/64 may be 
summarised as follows:-
(a) Recurrent expenditure 43.1119% of £1,463,706 £631,031 
(b) Regional Schemes 
(i) Trinidad Regional Virus Laboratory 2,210 
(ii) Seismic Research 8,549 
(iii) Regional Research Centre 17,400 
(c) Capital Expenditure 
(i)	 Main Budget 42% of £66,667 28,000 
(ii)	 Teaching in Eastern Caribbean Hospitals 
42% of £29,334 15,400 
(iii)	 Evening Studies at Mona 152,300 
Total £854,890 
8.	 Jamaica’s annual contribution was £410,195 including the special contribution 
mentioned before; on the basis set out above the annual contribution of this 
government under the new arrangements would be increased by £292,395 i.e. 
£854,890 less non-recurrent capital evening studies of £152,300 = £702,590. 
Permanent University Grants Committee 
9.	 Having settled the amounts that should be granted to the University there 
remained to be decided what permanent body should be established in order to 
provide a liaison between the University and the contributing territories and in 
order to ensure the smooth flow of contributions. The questions were raised 
whether the University Grants Committee (U.G.C.) should be a permanent 
body, meeting more frequently than once every three years and should have 
more to do with the University than at present; and whether the method of 
financing the University should be reconsidered by the U.G.C. in relation to the 
position of the smaller territories in the face of needs for increasing 
contributions. 
10.	 It was decided to establish the U.G.C. on a permanent basis with a Secretariat 
established in Jamaica. I agreed to provide the Secretariat and the Secretary as I 
do not consider that the duties will involve the services of a full time officer. 
The arrangements for the permanent U.G.C. are set out below:-
Function and Terms of Reference 
(i)	 The University Grants Committee should – 
(b)	 examine the extent to which the University is meeting the national 
needs, both in the education of students and in research of benefit to 
the region; 
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(c)	 examine University proposals for expenditure in the light of these 
national needs, to recommend to Governments the provision of the 
necessary finance and to satisfy itself that the money voted is 
properly managed; 
(d)	 do both these things without interfering with the essential freedom 
of the University, thereby leaving the conduct of University business 
to the organ of academic self-administrations. 
(ii)	 The terms of reference of the University Grants Committee should be: 
“To enquire into the financial needs of University education; to advise 
the contributing Governments of the grant to be made towards meeting 
them and to assist in consultation with the University and other bodies 
concerned, in the preparation and execution of such plans for the 
development of the University as may from time to time be required in 
order to ensure that they are fully adequate to national needs.” 
Composition and Secretariat 
( iii )(a) The membership of the committee should be as follows: 
( a )	 Two members, the Ministers of Finance and the Ministers of 
Education, or their nominees as necessary, from – 
Barbados 
Jamaica 
Trinidad & Tobago 
( b )	 One member, a Minister of Finance or a Minister of 
Education, or his nominee, as necessary from – 
The Windward Islands 
The Leeward Islands 
( c )	 One member, the Minister of Finance or the Minister of 
Education, or his nominee, as necessary from – 
British Honduras 
This proposal should be reviewed in the context of any new 
Federation which may be formed in the Eastern Caribbean Islands. 
( iii )(b)	 The Committee should have as advisors, not more than three persons 
eminent in University administration not connected with the 
University of the West Indies, selected by the University Grants 
Committee, to advise on the triennial allocation. 
( iii )( c )	 The Committee should have powers to co-opt and should normally 
work through specialist sub-committees. 
( iii )(d)	 The Chairmanship of the Committee should rotate amongst the 
Ministers of Finance of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago 
on a triennial basis. 
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( iii )(e)	 The Committee should rotate its meetings among the various 
campuses of the University. 
( iii )(f)	 The Secretariat should be provided by the Ministry of Finance in 
Jamaica, and the Secretariat should be a senior member of that 
Ministry, nominated by the Minister. 
( iii )(e)	 Representatives from any four Governments shall constitute a 
quorum. 
General 
( iv )	 The Committee should work through visitations and seek to be in 
close and friendly touch on the one hand with the University, and on 
the other hand with the contributing Governments. It should 
endeavour to study the needs of the contributing Governments 
adequately and to keep in touch with University developments 
overseas. 
( v )	 The Committee would be geared to deal with any situation arising 
from a shortfall in Government’s contributions to the University. 
( vi )	 The Committee’s approval shall be sought by the University for 
acceptance of any outside grants which would create a continuing 
commitment. 
( vii )	 One of the first jobs of the Committee should be to reconsider the 
method of financing the University in relation to the position of the 
smaller territories in the face of needs for increasing contributions. 
( viii )	 ( a ) Any costs of running the Committee should be regarded as 
part of the costs of the University and shared in the same manner as 
University costs. 
( b ) The costs of their representatives attending meetings of the 
University Grants Committee should be to the charge of the 
individual Governments concerned. 
( ix )	 A specialist sub-committee of the University Grants Committee 
(sec. (iii) ( c ) above) working in conjunction with the Ministry of 
Finance in Jamaica, should examine the financing of the Hospital. 
CHANGING ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY IN RELATION TO THE WEST 
INDIAN COMMUNITY 
11.	 The decisions of financial matters having been made by the U.G.C. the Council 
of the University concerned itself with the role that the University should play 
in relation to the West Indian community that it was designed to serve. There 
was expressed a general concern that in the developments in general degree 
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studies for evening teaching at Mona and day and evening teaching at St. 
Augustine and in Barbados the programme should not be arranged on the lines 
of the present U.W.I. general degree. These and other matters which will 
determine how far the University will make an impact on the community are set 
out in the following paragraphs. 
Liberal Arts and Evening Studies 
12.	 It was agreed that the most efficient way in which Liberal Arts facilities may be 
provided at the main centres of population in the area served by the University 
was by the provision of Day and Evening Classes at St. Augustine in Trinidad, 
day classes in a college to be created in Barbados and by the provision of 
Evening Classes at Mona. While the recurrent cost of those studies is included 
in the recurrent budget of the University, the capital costs are to be met by the 
Governments concerned except in the case of Barbados which will be met from 
a special grant from Her Majesty’s Government. The general degree courses in 
the Liberal Arts colleges and in the Evening Studies at Mona would be fairly 
similar and the ordinary general degree for other students at U.W.I. would be 
revised accordingly. 
13.	 Evening Studies at Mona: In the case of Mona the University had submitted 
estimates in the sum of £171,000 to provide the necessary facilities. These 
estimates have been closely scrutinized to ensure that there is no duplication of 
the existing facilities. As a result it has been agreed that subject to a further 
review, expenditure on such facilities should be confined to a sum not 
exceeding £152,300. 
14.	 Three Advisory Committees consisting of members of the staff of the 
University and representatives from other interested bodies have been set up by 
the University to assist the University in effectively planning programmes for 
these new developments which are scheduled to begin in October, 1963. 
Caribbean Studies 
15.	 It was considered that in planning the programmes for October 1963 a high 
priority should be given to compulsory courses for all students in the new 
degree which would provide general surveys in the social sciences, humanities 
and natural sciences and with specific instructions in Caribbean affairs. This 
was considered essential if the countries concerned were to obtain the cadre of 
graduates required for general service by any country taking its full place in the 
international community. It was agreed to be put to the Senate: 
( i )	 that there should be offered in the three following subjects courses 
which must be taken in Year 0 (preliminary) and Year 1 of the 
degree course:-
(a)	 English 
(b)	 The development of civilization (including a 
survey of the humanities and the development 
of science & technology) 
(c)	 Historical development of the Caribbean; 
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( ii )	 that the Caribbean studies should be compulsory for all students in 
years II and III except those students offering two or more science 
subjects. 
Future of Extra Mural Work 
16.	 Council accepted the following basic principles in respect of Extra-Mural 
Work:-
(i)	 With the establishment of Colleges in Barbados and in Trinidad and 
Tobago the expenditure on Extra-Mural Work in the larger territories 
should be reduced (due regard being had, however, to the size of 
Jamaica). 
(ii)	 The emphasis on Extra-Mural work should be concentrated on the 
smaller islands and on British Honduras. 
(iii)	 The programme of Extra-Mural work in the Leeward and Windward 
Islands and in British Honduras should follow, as far as possible the 
curricula for general studies in the three constituent Colleges with 
special emphasis on the compulsory courses in English Civilization and 
Caribbean Studies. 
(iv)	 The Extra-Mural work in the Leewards and Windwards and in British 
Honduras should pay special attention to the Trade Unions, Social 
Welfare and the Civil Servant. 
(v)	 Extra-Mural activities in those smaller territories should, to the greatest 
extent possible, emphasize extension work by the professional schools 
of the University. 
(vi)	 The Extra-Mural work in the smaller territories should also emphasize 
non-degree courses and on the basis of the success achieved in Jamaica 
and British Honduras with regard to lectures should give special 
attention to courses in Citizenship, Independence, International Affairs, 
Political Education and World Economic Problems and Developments 
which are slowly strangling the economy of the smaller territories. 
(vii)	 The Advisory Committee on Evening Studies at Mona and for the 
Liberal Arts Colleges should consider the organisation of non-degree 
courses based on the curriculum of the Colleges. 
It was agreed that a conference should be held in Antigua (subject to 
agreement by that Government) about September 1963 to consider and 
report on :-
( i )	 the detailed organisation of future University extension work 
in the smaller territories; and 
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( ii )	 the staff requirements (including itinerant staff) for that 
work. 
Besides officials of the University a representative of each territory 
concerned would attend at their country’s expense. The Government of 
Jamaica would be requested to release the High Commissioner for 
Jamaica in Port of Spain to attend the Conference. 
It was further agreed:-
To request Senate to examine in detail and on a long-term basis for 
report to Council two questions raised by the Director of Extra-Mural 
Studies:-
(i)	 The possibility of introducing either external degrees or a 
system of credits for courses based on the curriculum of the 
Liberal Arts Colleges; 
(ii)	 The establishment of “Junior Colleges” in the smaller 
territories. 
Training of Lawyers 
17.	 Over the past years the question of the establishment of a Department or 
Faculty of Law has from time to time been raised with the University. A 
Faculty of Law was costed by the University amongst the possible new projects 
for the triennium 1963/66 which were put before the University Grants 
Committee in January of this year, and for which the contributing governments 
then felt unable to provide funds. The University in any case then felt unable to 
recommend a high priority for this Faculty, in view of the uncertainties 
regarding future needs for, and practice by, the students who would graduate 
from a Law Faculty. 
18.	 The Council considered that the University must continue actively to play its 
proper part in arriving at a satisfactory decision on this matter. It therefore 
agreed:-
( a )	 To establish a Committee on Legal Training to consider and make 
recommendations to Council on the assistance which the U.W.I. as 
part of its service to the West Indian Community and in light of its 
responsibility for satisfying the intellectual and professional needs of 
the West Indies, should provide for training in the West Indies of 
Legal practitioners with a view to ensuring their admission to 
practise and the right of audience before the courts of the West 
Indies. 
( b )	 To request the Governments to meet the expenses of this 
Committee. 
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Conference on West Indian Archives 
19.	 The attention of Council was drawn to the importance of making available in 
the West Indies information from the West Indian Archives abroad. 
Accordingly Council RESOLVED THAT:-
( a )	 Council agrees to invite the Government of Jamaica, in the light of 
the international reputation of the Institute of Jamaica, to convene 
not later than 1965 in collaboration with the U.W.I. a conference of 
West Indian Governments and scholars to discuss the possibility of 
making the extensive archives of the West Indian territories and 
famous books on the West Indies available to West Indians in the 
West Indies and to be host to the conference. 
( b )	 Council directs that the assistance of UNESCO and appropriate 
philanthropic foundations be sought for this project. 
( c )	 Council agrees that invitations to conference should be issued to the 
Governments of the U.K., U.S.A., France and Holland. 
( d )	 Council appoints the following committee to make preparations for 
the conference, and to report back to the Council in February 1964: 
The Pro-Chancellor 
The Vice-Chancellor 
The Members of Council for: 
Jamaica 
Barbados 
Trinidad & Tobago 
The Windward Islands 
The Leeward Islands 
British Honduras 
Mr. Archbald MacLeish 
( e )	 Council appoints a Working Party to report to the main Committee, 
on which the following are to be invited to serve: 
The Librarian of U.W.I. 
The Professor of History (as Chairman of the Archives 
Committee of U.W.I.) 
A nominee from the Institute of Jamaica 
The Archivist of Jamaica 
Revision of Charter, Statutes and Ordinances 
20.	 It was early realised that proposals for changes in the Charter Statutes and 
Ordinances of the University had to be considered in the light of developments 
in the area which had occurred since the Council in June 1961 had agreed to 
petition Her Majesty the Queen for the new Charter which had been granted on 
April 2, 1962. This matter was deferred for further consideration. 
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Other Matters 
21. Other matters on which the Council will make further recommendations are:-
(a)	 Survey of Manpower Needs; 
(b)	 Organization (including decentralisation) of 
University Administration. 
22.	 A Resolution seeking the endorsement of the House for the proposals contained 
herein will be moved by me in due course. 
D.B. Sangster

Deputy Prime Minister & Minister

of Finance

3rd September, 1963 
M.P. No. 351/01 
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APPENDIX V

EXCERPT FROM COMMONWEALTH

YEAR BOOK 1965

UNIVERSITY COUNTRY YR. STUDENT STUDENT/STAF COST STAFF/ COST 
ESTB NUMBER F PER STUDEN PER 
. S STUDEN T STUDEN 
T RELATIV T 
E TO UWI RELATIV 
E TO UWI 
ADELAIDE AUSTRALIA 1874 6,400 14.00 £415 8.00 605 
QUEENSLAND AUSTRALIA 1909 7,712 9.90 £400 3.90 620 
TASMANIA AUSTRALIA 1890 1,364 9.60 £620 3.60 400 
W. AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIA 1911 3,640 12.00 £550 6.00 470 
AUSTRALIA OVERALL AUSTRALIA £425 (6.00) 595 
ACADIA CANADA 1838 1,355 14.70 £450 8.70 570 
U.B.C. CANADA 1908 14,500 10.90 £520 4.90 500 
DALHOUSIE CANADA 1816 2,850 8.70 £570 2.70 450 
MCMASTER CANADA 1887 4,355 17.50 £500 11.50 520 
QUEEN'S CANADA 1841 3,776 7.40 £580 1.40 440 
GUELPH CANADA 1964 1,776 5.80 £1,570 (0.20) (550) 
OTAGO NEW 1869 3,042 10.90 £565 4.90 455 
ZEALAND 
AUCKLAND NEW 1882 4,582 14.70 £267 8.70 753 
ZEALAND 
MASSY NEW 1964 1,080 20.80 £600 14.80 420 
ZEALAND 
HULL U.K. 1927 2,378 8.70 £469 2.70 551 
LEICESTER U.K. 1918 1,949 8.50 £480 2.50 540 
IMPERIAL COLLEGE U.K. 1907 3,025 6.60 £1,140 0.60 (120) 
KING'S COLLEGE U.K. 1829 2,238 8.50 £550 2.50 470 
Q. MARY'S COLLEGE U.K. 1887 1,418 8.10 £640 2.10 380 
WYE COLLEGE U.K. 1893 241 8.10 £1,360 2.10 (340) 
LONDON OVERALL U.K. 5.10 £910 (0.90) 110 
U.K. OVERALL U.K. £670 (6.00) 350 
HONG KONG HONG KONG 1911 1,998 8.70 £600 2.70 420 
NAIROBI AFRICA 1961 568 4.60 £1,160 (1.40) (140) 
MAKERERE AFRICA 1949 862 5.40 £1,050 (0.60) (30) 
GHANA AFRICA 1949 1,397 5.70 £1,090 (0.30) (70) 
KWAME NKRUMAH AFRICA 1951 808 5.50 £1,860 (0.50) (840) 
IBADAN AFRICA 1948 2,014 6.20 £1,080 0.20 (60) 
IFE AFRICA 1961 465 5.90 £1,170 (0.10) (150) 
FOURAH AFRICA 1960 518 6.00 £1,090 0.00 (70) 
WA AFRICAN AFRICA 5.65 £1,186 (0.35) (166) 
UNIVERSITIES 
UWI WEST INDIES 1948 1,854 6.00 £1,020 0.00 0 
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APPENDIX VI

EXCERPT OF FROM BUDGET

SPEECH

MAY 2,1973

Prime Minister Michael Manley’s announcement OF Free Education to 
Parliament 
We believe that education is not only the right of the people, but we believe this is the only 
way by which a people can lift themselves out of their suffering and begin to realize their 
ambition. Therefore, we do not believe that children who have had the skill to fight their 
way through the system should have to pay to supply us with the skills that we need. I 
think there is another way they can serve and the principle of the system should be clear. 
Therefore, I am very pleased to announce that the Government of Jamaica is announcing a 
scheme for free secondary education which will commence in September of this year. 
I am announcing further, Mr. Speaker, that this year September, all school fees in 
secondary schools in Jamaica will be abolished and supplied by the Government and next 
year September, all other fees, such as games fees and other kinds of fees will be abolished 
in Jamaica. 
I have given the smallest part of the package first. Now, we are talking about education, 
we are talking about galvanising Jamaica. We are going further and then you will see how 
it all fits together to indicate the watershed in our history. 
We are going further, Sir, and for those children that can fight through the Primary system, 
fight through the Secondary system, fight to ‘O’ Levels, fight all the examinations to reach 
University at the end to get the final touches of skills that we need, we are also abolishing 
the fees of Jamaican children at the UWI. 
(Hearn, ed. 1976:92) 
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APPENDIX VII

SLB LOANS,1970 - 1994

Loan Approvals 
Loan 
a/ 
Disbursements Average Loan Size 
of Approved Loans 
Year 
Number 
of 
Loans 
(current 
J$'000) 
Constant 
b/ 
1994 
J$'000) 
Constant 
1994 
J$'000 
As% of 
Approved 
Loans 
Current 
(J$)’000 
(constant 
1994 
J$'000 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
467 
1,006 
1,002 
1,121 
1,129 
744 
1,380 
1,491 
1,609 
1,055 
70,188 
123,109 
126,204 
116,056 
59,950 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1,594 150,195 
1,372 122,375 
1,488 125,952 
1,435 103,592 
934 53,100 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1,691 
1,838 
1,943 
2,346 
1,796 
2,791 
3,758 
2,654 
5,267 
2,215 
134,467 
165,865 
104,855 
154,414 
50,347 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1,651 79,625 
2,045 90,242 
1,366 53,100 
2,254 65,820 
1,233 28,033 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/85 
2,192 
2,319 
2,576 
2,644 
2,677 
3,070 
3,663 
4,466 
4,815 
5,100 
54,671 
57,260 
65,599 
62,242 
49,716 
51,726 
54,864 
60,648 
58,397 
47,066 
94.6 
95.8 
92.5 
93.8 
94.7 
1,401 24,941 
1,566 24,692 
1,734 25,465 
1,821 23,541 
1,905 18,571 
1985/86 
1986/87 
1987/88 
1988/89 
1989/90 
2,160 
2,394 
2,481 
2,582 
2,315 
5,080 
7,747 
9,199 
10,856 
10,107 
39,650 
54,271 
61,227 
66,437 
53,858 
35,185 
51,633 
55,944 
57,451 
56,620 
88.7 
95.2 
91.4 
86.5 
105.7 
2,352 18,357 
3,236 22,670 
3,708 24,679 
4,294 26,281 
4,366 23,147 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
1993/94 
1994/95 
to Oct. 1994 
2,593 
3,121 
3,179 
3,162 
2,298 
13,533 
17,629 
22,703 
28,104 
22,306 
57,939 
46,107 
35,682 
35,722 
22,306 
50,390 
38,193 
29,219 
33,402 
-
87.0 
82.9 
81.9 
93.5 
-
5,219 22,344 
5,648 14,773 
7,142 11,224 
8,888 11,297 
9,707 9,707 
Sources (World Bank, Report No. 15594-JM, July 1, 1996) 
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APPENDIX VIII

BOARDING GRANT 1973 - 1986

Financial UWI CAST Total No. Value $ 
Year of Grants 
Disbursed 
1973/74 322 114 436 unavailable 
1974/75 511 872 1,383 908,755.35 
1975/76 1,075 1,467 2,542 1,575,113.00 
1976/77 1,908 1,292 3,200 2,452,658.15 
1977/78 2,069 1,320 3,389 2,528,509.31 
1978/79 2,095 1,257 3,352 2,555,911.99 
1979/80 2,126 1,253 3,379 2,626,056.86 
1980/81 1,973 1,229 3,202 2,501,107.38 
1981/82 2,146 1,187 3,333 2,528,782.52 
1982/83 2,168 1,366 3,534 2,584,529.65 
1983/84 2,278 1,484 3,762 2,799,183.86 
1984/85 2,252 1,626 3,878 3,247,485.81 
1985/86 2,028 1,586 3,614 3,118,260.31 
29,426,354.19 
(Source Sherlock 1986:63) 
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APPENDIX IX

UWI COST ALLOCATION PROPOSAL

PRE 1972

Schemes 
Proposed 
Description Reactions 
A Each participating 
government bearing its 
share based on National 
Income per capita 
The methods of computing National Income figures varied according 
to economists hence disputes would surround final figures 
B Each participating 
government bearing its 
share based on "gross 
domestic product" statistics. 
Not a good measure as GDP figures are not necessarily linked with 
either resources or welfare of a country. 
C Each participating 
government bearing its 
share based on "population" 
statistics. 
Simple but challenged on the grounds of inequity in that the 
population basis presumes that there will be relative equality of public 
opportunity to benefit from university training. Distribution of 
students was not on population hence the benefit was not 
proportionate to population. This basis also did not equitably reflect 
the ability to pay. 
D Each participating 
government bearing its 
share based on "true 
revenue" figures. 
As a single index it does not necessarily preserve real equity since 
levels both of direct and indirect taxation and fiscal structure of each 
country varied widely in the Caribbean 
E Each participating 
government bearing its 
share based on "a mean of 
population and true revenue 
figures". 
Same as C and D 
F Each participating 
government bearing its 
share based on full 
economic cost per student. 
Gives an equitable basis but would be difficult to operate unless a 
quota system to each government was introduced 
G Continuation of the levy 
contribution ratios with the 
proviso that a discount be 
arrived at for credit to those 
territories where no campus 
were sited 
Simple to operate and had the advantage of lightening the financial 
burden on the smaller territories. 
Source: UWI Archives
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APPENDIX X

PROJECTED EFFECTS OF THE UWI

PROPOSAL

Territories Mandatory Real National G.D.P. Reven Popula Mean Econo Discount 
Levy Contribu Income (4) ue (5) tion (6) REV- mic Basis 
Formula tion Per POP. Cost 
(1) Basis (2) Capita (7) 
(3) 
% % % % % % % % % 
Antigua 1.3374% 1.2640% 5.05% 0.77% 1.88% 1.62% 1.75% 1.28% 1.1003% 
Dominica 1.6250% 1.5358% 4.23% 0.73% 1.02% 1.77% 1.39% 1.22% 1.3369% 
Grenada 1.6969% 1.6037% 3.62% 0.93% 1.37% 2.52% 1.94% 1.95% 1.3960% 
Montserrat 0.2732% 0.2582% 3.58% 1.33% 0.42% 0.38% 0.40% 0.31% 0.2248% 
St. Kitts-Nevis- 1.7256% 1.6309% 3.94% 0.64% 1.13% 1.57% 1.35% 1.23% 1.4196% 
Anguilla 
St. Lucia 1.7400% 1.6445% 3.39% 0.95% 1. 2.82% 2.11% 1.38% 1.4315% 
39% 
St. Vincent 1.3086% 1.2367% 3.18% 0.75% 1.06% 2.34% 1.70% 1.50% 1.0765% 
9.7067% 9.1738% 26.99% 6.10% 8.27% 13.02 10.64 8.87% 7.9856% 
% % 
Bahamas -2.8800% 2.8800% 29.38% 12.11% 11.69 3.59% 7.64% 2.16% 2.5069% 
% 
Br. Honduras -2.2000% 2.2000% 6.01% 1.71% 2.00% 2.79% 2.40% 1.12% 1.9149% 
Cayman -0.2200% 0.2200% 5.67% 0.13% 0.34% 0.24% 0.29% 0.07% 0.1915% 
Islands 
Br. Virgin -0.1900% 0.1900% 6.30% 0.13% 0.32% 0.23% 0.27% 0.29% 0.1654% 
Islands 
Barbados 8.5562% 8.0865% 7.05% 4.50% 6.13% 6.46% 6.30% 6.25% 8.2665% 
Trinidad & 38.6252% 36.5047 10.22% 32.99% 30.60 25.94 28.27 33.08 37.3174 
Tobago % % % % % % 
Jamaica 43.1119% 40.7450 8.38% 42.33% 40.65 47.73 44.19 48.16 41.6518

% % % % % %

100% 100% 100.% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Notes 
1	 The percentages shown in brackets (totalling 5.49%) represent the shares borne by those territories 
who were not a part of the Federation. The money figures based on these percentages were 
deducted from the agreed total subvention, the balance being met on the basis of the mandatory 
Levy. In short, only 94.51% of the subvention is met on the Mandatory Levy basis. 
2	 The shares referred to in note 1 are distributed among the other participating territories in the ratio in 
which they contributed 
3 Based on available statistics. 
4 Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost 1965 
5 Revenue figures for 1967 
6 Population figures based on 1965 Census. 
7 Based on 1968/69 student numbers and per capita costs. 
Source TAC Report April 15, 1969 
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APPENDIX XI

THE UWI EXPENSE SHARING

MODELS

Mathematical interpretation of the models adopted since 
1963 
1963 – 1973 – RAM during the Mixed Period 
Rj = Rlj (4.1) 
Where,Rj = Portion of recurrent expenditure provided by Jamaica 
R = Recurrent Expenditure of the University 
lj = Levy rate for Jamaica. 
This resulted in the 1962/63 allocation of the recurrent expenditure as follows: 
Country Percent Amount 
Antigua 1.3374% £19,575 
Barbados 8.5562% £125,238 
Dominica 1.6250% £23,785 
Grenada 1.6969% £24,838 
Jamaica 43.1119% £631,031 
Montserrat 0.2732% £3,999 
St. Kitts 1.7256% £25,258 
St. Lucia 1.7400% £25,468 
St. Vincent 1.3086% £19,154 
Trinidad & Tobago 38.6252% £565,360 
£1,463,706 
There was no set formula for sharing the costs for specific projects, capital expenditure and 
other non-recurrent items. The share of the cost of each project was specifically 
negotiated. The mathematical interpretation for Jamaica’s share is expressed in equation 
3.2. 
Nj = �(Prj) 4.2 
Where Nj = Amount for Non-Recurrent expenditure provided by Jamaica 
P = Project cost 
rj = Rate at Jamaica decided to share cost 
The mathematical interpretation of the total allocation to Jamaica of the cost of the 
University is derived in equation 3.3. 
Aj = Rj + Nj 4.3 
or 
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Aj = Rlj + �(Prj) 
Where Aj = Total Allocation to Jamaica 
For 1963/64 the result as outlined by the Minister of Finance, was 
a) Recurrent expenditure 43.1119% of £1,463,706 631,031 
b) Regional Schemes 
i. Trinidad Regional Virus Laboratory 2,210 
ii. Seismic Research 8,549 
iii. Regional Research Centre 17,400 
c) Capital Expenditure 
i. Main budget 42% of £66,667 28,000 
ii. Teaching in Eastern Caribbean Hospitals 
42% of £29,334 15,400 
iii. Evening Studies at Mona 152,300 
Total: £854,890 
Item a) is represented by Rj or Rlj and items b) and c) and represented by Nj or �(Prj). 
1973 – 1984 – RAM During the Free Education Era 
For the purpose of illustration of the changes, the triennium 1975/78 is being used. A letter 
to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Education on 27th August 1975 pointed out 
that the grants approved by the UGC were divided in two categories as follows: 
1. Recurrent Expenditure 
Triennium Annual 
a) Continuation and consolidation of existing activities 55,266,108 18,422,036 
b) Regrading of Non-academic staff – Mona 7,628,770 2,542,924 
c) Regrading of Non-academic staff – St. Augustine 3,565,798 1,188,599 
d) Expansion & New Developments 2,585,136 955,045 
e) Faculty of Law Capital 96,250 96,250 
69,142,062 23,204,854 
2. Other Grants 
a) Seismic Research – including capital 634,475 237,820 
b) Advanced Nursing 201,717 67,239 
c) Subsidy for Accommodation 1975/76 343,810 343,810 
d) University Hospital 39,184,189 13,061,396 
40,364,191 13,710,265 
The first task was to determine the economic cost and Items a), b) and c) were those used 
in such calculation. The Development and Planning Unit document dated August 7, 1981, 
stated that 
the economic cost is essentially the average cost to the University through its 
recurrent budget for maintaining teaching Departments, Institutes, Libraries, Extra 
Mural and Administration for the number of students registered…In addition since 
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the number of students per teacher (the student/staff ratio) and the level of 
ancillary services vary from one activities which are regarded as related to the 
whole operation or cannot justifiably be allocated to a specific teaching 
commitment are grouped together as an administration cost to be applied to the 
total student population. We thus arrive at a unit faculty cost and a unit 
administrative cost which together make up the economic cost for the appropriate 
faculty. 
The examination of the billing records also revealed that the economic cost was 
determined in two stages. The first stage was that of calculating the PCC for the faculty on 
the individual campus. Such calculation can be represented by the mathematical formula 
as follows: 
PCCfm = (SC/E) + (FCfm/Efm ) (4.4) 
Where 
SC = Total Administrative (Shared) Cost for the University 
E = FTE Enrolment for the University 
FCfm = Costs directly attributed to the Particular Faculty on a Campus 
Efm = FTE Enrolment for the particular Faculty on a Campus 
PCCfm = Per Capita Cost for the particular Faculty on a Campus. 
The summation of the PCC of the faculty on each campus then becomes the PCC of the 
faculty as represented by equation 3.5. 
PCCf = PCCfn + PCCfc + PCCfa (4.5) 
Where 
PCCf = Per Capita Cost for the Faculty 
PCCfn = Per Capita Cost of the Faculty on the Mona Campus 
PCCfc = Per Capita Cost of the Faculty on the Cave Hill Campus 
PCCfa = Per Capita Cost of the Faculty on the St. Augustine Campus 
It was the PCC of the faculty was used to determine the cost allocation to each 
government. This caused equation 3.1 to change to 3.6 
Rj = �(PCCf * Efj ) (4.6) 
Where Efj = FTE Enrolment of Jamaican Students per Faculty 
When the discount afforded to non-campus countries is taken into account then equation 
3.7 is derived. 
Rj = �(PCCf * Efj ) + D (4.7) 
Table below shows the result of the billing for 1975/76 for the recurrent portion. 
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Calculation of PCC for 1975/76 
Actual # 
Efj 
FTE 
PCCfm 
J$ 
PCCfa 
TT$ 
PCCfc PCCf Rj 
Bds$ J$ J$ 
Arts & General Studies 897 781.45 1,834.52 1,920.05 738.25 2,908.57 2,272,901.21 
Social Sciences 658 566.75 1,834.52 1,920.05 738.25 2,908.57 1,648,431.45 
Natural Sciences 924 858.45 2,652.16 2,119.20 1,050.96 3,944.95 3,386,538.91 
Education 154 134.00 2,532.40 1,181.74 412.58 3,174.45 425,376.53 
Medicine - Pre-Clinical 165 151.00 7,737.23 1,181.74 412.58 8,379.28 1,265,271.54 
Medicine - Clinical 119 119.00 3,560.88 1,181.74 412.58 4,202.93 500,148.88 
Agriculture 53 53.27 1,224.32 6,923.77 412.58 4,074.84 217,066.98 
Engineering 167 170.83 1,224.32 6,261.71 412.58 3,820.21 652,605.85 
Law 140 139.50 1,389.76 1,472.36 2,625.06 3,149.26 439,321.97 
3,277 
Discount 
Total Recurrent Contribution 
2,974.25 10,807,663.32 
232,463.32 
11,040,126.65 
There was no change to the formula for calculating Jamaica’s portion of the non-recurrent 
expenditure as the share was negotiated on a project by project basis. Equation 3.2 
therefore remained and the results for 1975/76 is shown in Table below 
Nj = �(Prj) 4.2 
Jamaica's Share of Non-Recurrent Expenditure for the UWI 1975/76 
Formula Amount 
Capital - Law Prl 37,298 
Capital - Expansion Prl 17,899 
Hall Subsidy Prh 201,665 
Advance Nursing Education Prn 33,876 
Study & Travel Grant Prs 156,615 
University Hospital Prh 1,695,059 
University Hospital Reserve Prh 267,644 
Post Medical Studies Prd 120,000 
Teaching of the Deaf Prx 10,633 
Seismic Research Regrading Prx 3,777 
Total Other Costs �(Prj) 2,544,466 
The formula for calculating the allocation of cost to Jamaica therefore changed from 3.3 to 
equation 3.8. 
Aj = Rj + Nj 4.3 
Aj = {�(PCCf * Efj ) + D} + �(Prj) 4.8 
= 11,040,126.65 + 2,544,466

= 13,584,593
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1984- 1994 RAM During the Period of the CESS 
In October 1977 the Government of Trinidad and Tobago published a White Paper on 
“National Institute of Higher Education” which included among other things, proposals for 
restructuring the U.W.I. Consequently the Ministers of Education of the supporting 
countries requested the UWI to hold discussions with the government of Trinidad and 
Tobago to reconcile any differences between the proposals from their Inter-Governmental 
committee report of 1976 and the White Paper. The discussions were finalised on June 22, 
1984 when the “UGC received MPV 2/1982 and noted the details of the new financial 
arrangement which had been accepted by the previous meeting of UGC held on September 
21, 1982 to come into effect as from August 1, 1984”. This resulted in the restructuring of 
the university and changes to the resource allocation mechanism and process as hereunder 
considered. 
The activities of the university were separated into four categories, namely 
�	 Campus Activities 
�	 Central University Activities 
�	 Specialised Research and Services at each Campus 
� Special Programmes for the Non-Campus Countries 
The duties and responsibilities of each area are found in the Minutes of the Ministerial 
Policy Committee of the UGC, Feb. 13, 1982 and summarised in Appendix XIV. The 
December 4, 1980 Report defined the responsibilities of each area: 
Campus Activities: The change resulted in a devolved management structure and with the 
exception of Common Services; each of the three campuses was responsible for all the 
programmes and projects in its territory. The individual campus was expected to plan the 
development of the facilities sited on its campus as well as the establishment of new 
facilities. In so doing it was expected to consult with the other Campuses, the Centre and 
where appropriate, the individual non-Campus member countries. Where there were 
differences of opinion as to the new direction, it was obligator for the divergent views to be 
presented to the Campus UGC. The final decision however rest with the Campus and its 
UGC (Restructuring the UWI, Dec. 4, 1980). 
Central University Activities were common services and these were defined as: 
a.	 The granting of degrees, diplomas and certificates 
b.	 The maintenance of common academic standards; 
c.	 The policy with regard to admission requirement; 
d.	 Making appointments above the grade of senior lecturers, Directors/Heads 
of Institutes, Schools, Departments and analogous units; 
e.	 Advising on promotions to the grade of senior lecturer and above on tenure; 
f.	 Undertaking extra-mural outreach and similar programmes mounted for and 
undertaken in the NCCs; 
g.	 Planning new, and the development of existing, university programmes. 
Specialised research and service units were physically located on a particular Campus 
but undertook research for and provide services to the region as a whole. They could 
however have small units in different countries, as did the Tropical Metabolism Research 
Unit, the Seismic Research Unit and the Institute of Social and Economic Research. 
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Special Programmes for the Non-Campus Countries: The Centre was also responsible 
for planning and executing programmes in and for the NCCs. Such could be done with the 
assistance of the campus authorities and if they could not accede to the request then the 
reasons should be conveyed to the Campus UGC. 
Miller (1987) outlined that the Per Capital Cost was calculated as follows 
The Faculty’s Expenditure for the year at each Campus divided by the total 
number of students (weighted) in the Faculty at that Campus 
PLUS 
Central Expenditure/Common Services of the Campus divided by the 
number of students (weighted) at the Campus. 
PLUS 
Centre Expenditure at all three Campuses divided by the total number of 
students (weighted) attending the University for the year. 
The RAM policy shift caused an adjustment to equation 3.4 as is represented in equation 
3.9. 
PCCfm = (SC/E) + (FCfm/Efm ) (4.4) 
PCCfm = (SC/E) + (SCm/Em) + (FCfm/Efm ) (4.9) 
Where 
SC = Centre Expenditure or University Shared Costs 
SCm = Administrative Cost for the Campus or Campus Shared Costs 
FCfm = Expenditure of a particular Faculty on a particular Campus 
E = FTE Enrolment for the entire University 
Em = FTE Enrolment of the Campus 
Efm = FTE Enrolment for the particular Faculty on a particular Campus 
PCCfm = Per Capita Cost for the particular Faculty on a particular Campus. 
The need for equation 3.5 to arrive at a University average for PCC was thereafter 
unnecessary. 
The costs associated with the Specialised Research and Service Units were to “be kept 
separate from the regular teaching costs on the Campus” (Restructuring the UWI, 1980) 
and “be funded through schemes approved by the Central UGC” (Minute of MPC Feb. 13, 
1982). Special programmes for NCCs was also financed differently and was initially in the 
following proportion 
Non-Campus Countries 10.00% 
Trinidad and Tobago 45.00% 
Barbados 8.19% 
Jamaica 36.81% 
100.00% 
The formula for attributing the cost for the resources to be allocated to the University was 
radically changed as is seen from the mathematical representation of equation 3.10. 
Aj = �(PCCfmj* Efmj ) +Dj+ � (SRC * xj ) + (NPC *yj ) (4.10) 
Where 
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Dj = Portion of discount being absorb by Campus country

SRC = Cost for Specialised Research

NPC = Cost of Special Programmes for NCC

xj = SRC rate of absorption for Jamaica

yj = NPC rate of absorption Jamaica

1994 – Cost Sharing 
Tuition fee for the UWI student was established as an institutional percentage of the PCC 
as per Equation 3.13. 
Pf = X% * PCCf 4.13 
Where Pf = Tuition Fee Student per Faculty 
X = Institutional percentage 
The original intention was that “the fee should be set at a level of 10% of economic cost 
for the academic year 1992/1993 and 15% of economic cost for the triennium 1993/94 – 
1995/96” (Report on Committee on Tuition Fees 1991). The Government of Jamaica had 
hoped to incrementally increase the percentage contribution to a maximum of 35% by 
1999 but in 2005 the maximum contribution for students for that institution was less than 
20%. 
The third step in the RAM for the UWI was determining the Governments’ portion. This 
was gleaned from recommendation 6 of the Report of the Implementation Committee of 
the Commission on Governance which stipulated that after the students proportion was 
determine “Government should fully fund the remaining costs”. 
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UWI ENROLMENT

Growth in On-Campus Student Registration,1948-2002 
YEAR UNIVERSITY CAMPUS YEARS INCREASE 
Male Female Total C.H. MO. St. A. Univ. C.H. MO. St. A. 
1948/49 23 10 33 33 
1949/50 54 16 70 37 
1950/51 104 37 141 71 
1951/52 152 53 205 64 
1952/53 175 79 254 49 
1953/54 212 90 302 48 
1954/55 275 109 384 82 
1955/56 299 145 444 60 
1956/57 325 169 494 50 
1957/58 354 201 555 61 
1958/59 391 231 622 67 
1959/60 446 249 695 73 
1960/61 657 320 977 n/a 910 67 282 n/a 215 67 
1961/62 852 416 1268 n/a 1172 96 291 n/a 262 29 
1962/63 954 468 1422 n/a 1422 146 154 n/a 250 50 
1963/64 1465 722 2187 118 1486 583 765 118 64 437 
1964/65 1661 862 2523 185 1558 780 336 67 72 197 
1965/66 1966 1072 3038 226 1902 910 515 41 344 130 
1966/67 2047 1212 3259 222 2073 964 221 (4) 171 54 
1967/68 2330 1284 3614 293 2234 1087 355 71 161 123 
1968/69 2657 1559 4216 385 2564 1267 602 92 330 180 
1969/70 2914 1713 4627 429 2687 1511 411 44 123 244 
1970/71 3102 1914 5016 459 2886 1671 389 30 199 160 
1971/72 3482 2296 5778 615 3301 1862 762 156 415 191 
1972/73 3739 2587 6326 843 3516 1967 548 228 215 105 
1973/74 3926 2734 6660 938 3608 2114 334 95 92 147 
1974/75 3871 3057 6928 991 3735 2202 268 53 127 88 
1975/76 3994 3263 7257 1065 3963 2229 329 74 228 27 
1976/77 4052 3489 7541 1140 4091 2310 284 75 128 81 
1977/78 4320 3765 8085 1235 4361 2489 544 95 270 179 
1978/79 4485 4046 8531 1362 4508 2661 446 127 147 172 
1979/80 4782 4229 9011 1497 4599 2915 480 135 91 254 
1980/81 4704 4385 9089 1587 4579 2923 78 90 20 8 
1981/82 4830 4713 9543 1601 4798 3144 454 14 219 221 
1982/83 4704 4869 9573 1564 4884 3125 30 (37) 86 19 
1983/84 4844 5182 10026 1641 5188 3197 453 77 304 72 
1984/85 5007 5565 10572 1790 5354 3428 546 149 166 231 
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Growth in On-Campus Student Registration,1948-2002 
YEAR UNIVERSITY CAMPUS YEARS INCREASE 
Male Female Total C.H. MO. St. A. Univ. C.H. MO. St. A. 
1985/86 5082 5636 10718 1902 5088 3728 146 112 (266) 300 
1986/87 5017 5772 10789 2007 4979 3803 71 105 (109) 75 
1987/88 5285 6209 11494 2103 5235 4156 714 96 256 364 
1988/89 5336 6560 11896 2185 5502 4209 402 82 267 53 
1989/90 5403 6777 12180 2264 5769 4147 284 79 267 (62) 
1990/91 5459 7169 12628 2408 6083 4137 448 144 314 (10) 
1991/92 5716 7659 13375 2562 6284 4529 747 154 201 392 
1992/93 5938 8058 13996 2547 6502 4947 621 (15) 218 418 
1993/94 6298 8933 15231 2811 7229 5191 1235 264 727 244 
1994/95 6120 9484 15604 2870 7503 5231 373 59 274 40 
1995/96 6376 10177 16553 3105 8136 5312 949 235 633 81 
1996/97 6646 10867 17513 3232 8274 6007 960 127 138 695 
1997/98 6969 11895 18864 3568 8993 6303 1351 336 719 296 
1998/99 6894 12451 19345 3641 9070 6634 481 73 77 331 
1999/2000 7025 12800 19825 3993 8972 6860 480 352 (98) 226 
2000/01 6805 12660 19465 3740 8758 6967 -360 (253) (214) 107 
2001/02** 7001 13270 20271 3977 8653 7641 806 237 (105) 674 
2002/03 7708 14755 22463 4359 9440 8664 2192 382 787 1,023 
**The total student population (comprising on-and off-campus students) for the 2002/2003 academic year was 26,796 with 
8,762 males and 18,034 females. In the previous academic year, the total was 24,255 with 7,924 males and 16,331 females. 
Source: UWI Internal Statistics
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Total 
1986 3,475 
1987 3,630 
1988 4,126 
1989 4,694 
1990 5,416 
1991 5,484 
1992 5,611 
1993 5,916 
1994 5,945 
1995 6,374 
1996 6,770 
1997 7,102 
1998 6,579 
1999 6,055 
2000 7,550 
2001 7,375 
2002 6,733 
2003 7,187 
CAST was given authority under the CAST Scheme of 1986 to grant degrees. At such 
time it entered HE in that year. Not all the programmes however where HE programmes 
and they were phased in over time. After 1995 there was a structured effort to convert all 
programmes from Under Graduate to Graduate. The total conversion was achieved in 
2001. 
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APPENDIX XIV

JAMAICA'S ECONOMIC INDICATORS

1970 – 1980
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a) b) c) 
1970 12.1% 10.6% 31.4% 72.6% 50.1% n/a 7.7% 95.6 80.3 
1971 2.9% 1.4% 27.8% 75.2% 50.0% n/a 5.1% 132.2 82.0 
1972 9.6% 8.1% 25.5% 81.0% 52.4% 23.0% 8.2% 88.7 96.0 
1973 0.9% -0.6% 25.8% 78.3% 53.8% 22.0% 28.9% 76.1 150.4 
1974 -4.1% -5.6% 22.0% 86.1% 54.0% 21.2% 22.1% 130.2 243.3 
1975 -0.7% -2.2% 23.6% 84.8% 55.8% 20.5% 11.4% 58.5 353.0 
1976 -6.6% -8.1% 16.7% 90.4% 56.6% 22.4% 8.3% (181.4) 421.5 
1977 -1.6% -3.1% 11.7% 89.6% 55.6% 24.2% 16.1% (196.0) 452.4 
1978 -0.3% -1.8% 13.4% 83.5% 52.2% 24.5% 47.0% (447.0) 1,138.4 
1979 -2.0% -3.5% 17.6% 82.6% 51.9% 27.8% 24.3% (758.0) 1,290.8 
1980 -5.4% -6.9% 15.7% 88.1% 51.7% 27.4% 24.7% (821.2) 1,544.9 
Source Department of Statistics, National Income and Product 1980 and Statistical Abstract of Jamaica 1979; Bank of 
Jamaica, Statistical Digest, December 1981 
Notes 
a) The average population growth rate of 1.5% annually has been applied throughout to avoid yearly fluctuations in 
the rate of emigration 
b) January - January 
c) Year end figures 
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Presented at Conference of the Bursars’ Association of Jamaica

November 27, 2003

THE PURPOSE OF COSTING 
Having established our operational budget (See Appendix 1) it is important to translate that 
budget into a per student cost. In other words we need to know how much it takes to 
educate a student using the budget we have established. By so doing we are led into a 
branch of accounting called costing. This is defined by Horngren and Sundem (1993) as 
“the techniques used to determine the cost of a product or service by collecting and 
classifying costs and assigning them to cost objects”. It is very important to go through 
this exercise because it provides useful information for: 
1.	 Benchmarking. Institutions’ operational inefficiencies can be camouflaged in total 
expenditures, which give no information on per unit cost. In order to favourably 
compare institutions of varying sizes it is important to provide the common basis 
on which to do such. Costing provides the basis for such comparison. 
Institution Expenditure Student Numbers Per Student Cost 
A $ 2,000,000 20 $ 100,000 
B $ 3,000,000 25 $ 120,000 
2.	 Control. In a typical organization there are many control systems – for example 
Production Control, Quality Control, and Inventory Control. Cost control however 
monitors the results of all activities and control systems in the organization. This is 
because it captures 
�	 The detailed analysis and location of all expenditure 
�	 The calculation of job and product costs 
�	 The analysis of losses and scrap 
�	 The monitoring of labour and departmental efficiency and the other 
outputs of the system. 
3.	 Decision Making. In choosing between alternatives an important factor is the 
financial implications. Information on costs is therefore a key factor in signifying 
the financial implication on an alternative. 
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4.	 Pricing. In determining the price to charge the market for our product one has to 
be clear on the cost of production. After ascertaining such information then there 
are the other factors to be considered such as the type of market the institution is 
operating in, the degree of competition, demand, and the state of the economy. 
AVERAGE METHODS 
The simplest way of calculating the cost per student is to divide the total expenditure by 
the amount of students. However because there are different modes of delivery it is first 
necessary to convert all modes to one common factor. 
Full Time Equivalents (FTE) 
Traditionally universities have used the Full Time Equivalent method. A full time student 
is considered as one unit and a part time student is considered in proportion to the full time 
based on an agreed factor. In the example that is being used lecture hours per programme 
is used as the factor. If a full time programme has a total lecturing hours of 40 per week 
and a part time has 10 hours per week then the FTE student is 0.25. Another factor that 
can be used is the credit hours per course. This paper will concentrate on the lecturing 
hour factor, as there is no uniform system of credits in Jamaica at this time. 
Simple Average 
In using simple average the following steps are taken: -
Step 1 Ascertain the full time and part time hours. 
Fd = Full time hrs for an academic department 
Pd = Part time hrs for the programmes in an academic department 
Step 2 Calculate the Full time Equivalent for each academic department FTEd 
FTEd = Fd + Pd/Fd 
Step 3 Calculate the FTE for the institution FTE 
FTE = Σ FTEd 
Student Numbers for Institution X 
Home 
Econ 
English Science Math Total 
Full Time Numbers 50 100 75 80 305 
Part Time Numbers 10 20 5 20 55 
Hr. Full time 40 40 40 40 160 
Hr. Part time 20 15 15 10 60 
PT - FTE 3.75 7.5 1.875 7.5 21 
FTE 54 108 77 88 326 
243 
Step 4 Calculate the per student cost C 
C	 = E / FTE Where E= The tuition related expenditures 
C	 = 112,963,400 / 326

= 346,913

The methodology is very simple, however its gives an average for the institution and does 
not differentiate between costs for programmes. Efficiency could be compromised, as the 
low costing programmes would mask any inefficiency of the high cost ones. 
ALLOCATING THE COSTS. 
Before allocating costs, the institution would first group the elements of cost into 
categories and then seek to appropriate the support service costs into the revenue 
producing centres. In the final stage the per unit cost is calculated. 
STAGE ONE: - GROUPING THE ELEMENTS OF COSTS WITHIN THE UNIVERSITY.

The budget is divided into operational areas each of which is called a “Budget Centre”. In

analyzing the centres it can be seen that they can be grouped into four areas. These are:

1.	 Core Function Revenue producing areas: These are those centres, which provide 
the core function of the institution – teaching and research, and from which most of 
the income of the institution is derived. In the example being used the academic 
departments are: 
i.	 Home Economic 
ii.	 English 
iii. Science 
iv. Mathematic 
Expenditure of the Academic Departments 
Home Econ English Science Math 
Compensation 
Academic 3,600,000 9,600,000 7,200,000 9,600,000 
Administrative 750,000 750,000 750,000 750,000 
Technician. 500,000 0 1,000,000 0 
Ancillary 0 0 0 0 
4,850,000 10,350,000 8,950,000 10,350,000 
Travelling 
Upkeep 360,000 960,000 720,000 960,000 
Mileage 79,200 211,200 158,400 211,200 
Foreign 100,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 
539,200 1,221,200 928,400 1,221,200 
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Home Econ English Science Math 
Rental	 10,000 0 15,000 0 
Utilities 
Telephone	 18,000 30,000 12,000 14,400 
Water 
Electricity 
18,000 30,000 12,000 14,400 
Other good & 
Services 
Uniform	 150,000 270,000 270,000 270,000 
Reference Material 
Class Material 1,000,000 50,000 750,000 75,000 
Repairs - Machinery 200,000 100,000 120,000 50,000 
Repairs - Building 
Grounds Upkeep 
Sanitation 
Consultancies 
Advertising 
Postal & Courier 
Security 
Audit 
Motor Vehicle 
Depreciation 7,500,000 3,750,000 7,500,000 3,750,000 
Misc.	 221,250 104,250 216,000 103,625 
9,071,250 4,274,250 8,856,000 4,248,625 
Banking Activities 
Retirement Benefits 242,500 517,500 447,500 517,500 
Grants & 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 
Contributions 
Total Recurrent 14,780,950 16,442,950 19,258,900 16,401,725 
2.	 Support Centres: Those which solely exist to provide centralized support mainly 
to the revenue producing areas and by so doing allow those areas to share costs for 
indirect expenditure. The example shows three Budget Centres would fall in this 
category. 
i.	 Administration – (Principal’s Office, Bursary, Central Admin.) 
ii.	 Library 
iii. Maintenance 
Expenditure for the Support Centres 
Library Admin Maintenance 
Compensation 
Academic 0 0 0 
Administrative 3,750,000 5,250,000 1,500,000 
Technician. 0 0 0 
Ancillary 0 0 7,500,000 
3,750,000 5,250,000 9,000,000 
Travelling 
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Upkeep 240,000 480,000 120,000 
Mileage 52,800 52,800 26,400 
Foreign 30,000 150,000 0 
322,800 682,800 146,400 
Rental 0 0 0 
Utilities 
Telephone 18,000 48,000 18,000 
Water 120,000 
Electricity 240,000 
18,000 48,000 378,000 
Other good & Services 
Uniform 150,000 210,000 810,000 
Reference Material 3,000,000 
Class Material 
Repairs - Machinery 50,000 100,000 200,000 
Repairs - Building 2,000,000 
Grounds Upkeep 500,000 
Sanitation 500,000 
Consultancies 500,000 
Advertising 200,000 
Postal & Courier 25,000 
Security 120,000 
Audit 400,000 
Motor Vehicle 200,000 
Depreciation 11,250,000 1,875,000 2,625,000 
Misc. 361,250 82,750 173,875 
14,811,250 3,392,750 7,128,875 
Banking Activities 100,000 
Retirement Benefits 187,500 262,500 450,000 
Grants & Contributions 50,000 50,000 50,000 
Total Recurrent 19,139,550 9,786,050 17,153,275 
3.	 Self-Financing Centres: Budget Centres under this classification charge directly 
for the services they provide, recover fully for such services and have surplus as a 
motive. Only two budget centres are identified. They are: 
i.	 Cafeteria 
ii.	 Housing and Accommodation 
STAGE TWO: - ALLOCATION OF COSTS TO THE CORE FUNCTION REVENUE PRODUCING AREAS 
The Self-Financing Centres are not considered as part of this costing exercise because 
direct payments are received and the tuition fees (subvention or students contribution) are 
not expected to cover their costs. The main challenge then is to allocate the Support 
Service costs to the Core Function Revenue Producing areas. The following diagram 
demonstrates what is to be done. 
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Allocating Support Service Costs to the Core Function Revenue Producing Centres 
Home 
Economics 
English 
Science 
Mathematics 
Administration 
Library 
Maintenance 
The basis for allocating the overhead costs is the main focus of this paper as it seeks to 
argue for a most equitable method for such allocation. 
Methods for Allocating Shared Costs to the Revenue Producing Areas 
There are several bases on which support service costs may be allocated. The rule of 
thumb is that cost should be allocated based on the nature of the activity or the causes for 
the costs - the cost driver. Educational institutions have traditionally argued for and used a 
lump sum system. The traditional approach is called Absorption costing and is the process 
by which service/overhead costs are absorbed into the revenue producing areas using one 
or two factors. FTE is such a factor. The steps are: 
Step 1: Calculate the students’ weight for each academic department. This was done 
above. FTEd 
SWd = FTEd / FTE 
FTEd FTE Weights 
Home Econ. 54 0.1651 
English 108 0.3301 
Science 77 0.2361 
Math 88 0.2687 
FTE 326 1.0000 
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Step 2:Identify the Direct cost for each academic department (See above)

FTEd 
Direct Cost 
Home Econ. 54 14,780,950 
English 108 16,442,950 
Science 77 19,258,900 
Math 88 16,401,725 
326 $ 66,884,525 
Step 3: Sum all the Shared cost SC

FTEd Direct Cost Shared Cost 
Home Econ. 54 14,780,950 
English 108 16,442,950 
Science 77 19,258,900 
Math 88 16,401,725 
Library 19,139,550 
Admin 9,786,050 
Maintenance 17,153,275 
Total 326 66,884,525 46,078,875 
Step 4 Use the SWd to allocate the total indirect cost 
Indirect cost 
Absorb by a 
FTE Direct Cost Indirect Cost Single Factor 
Home Econ 54 14,780,950 7,606,110 
English 108 16,442,950 15,212,220 
Science 77 19,258,900 10,878,506 
Math 88 16,401,725 12,382,039 
Library 19,139,550 
Admin 9,786,050 
Maintenance 17,153,275 
Total 326 66,884,525 46,078,875 46,078,875 
For the Department of Science, the portion of the shared costs that it would absorb would 
be calculated as follows:-
SCs	 = SC * SWd

= $46,078,875 * 0.2361

= $ 10,878,506

Step 5:- Compute Total Departmental Cost TCd 
TCd = DCd + SCd 
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E.g. Department of Science 
TCs	 = DCs + SCs 
TCs	 = $19,258,900 + $10,878,506 
= $30,137,406 
Indirect cost Total Cost after 
Absorb by a Single Factor 
FTE Direct Cost Indirect Cost Single Factor Allocation 
Home Econ. 54 14,780,950 7,606,110 22,387,060 
English 108 16,442,950 15,212,220 31,655,170 
Science 77 19,258,900 10,878,506 30,137,406 
Math 88 16,401,725 12,382,039 28,783,764 
Library 19,139,550 
Admin 9,786,050 
Maintenance 17,153,275 
Total 326 66,884,525 46,078,875 46,078,875 112,963,400 
Stage 6 Calculating the per unit cost – using SFCA 
The cost per student for each academic department (Cd) is found as follows 
Cd = TCd / FTEs 
Cs = TCs / FTEd 
Cs	 = $30,137,406 / 77

= $ 392,031

Indirect cost Total Cost Cost per 
Absorb by a after Single Student 
Indirect Single Factor based on 
FTE Direct Cost Cost Factor Allocation SFCA 
Home Econ 54 14,780,950 7,606,110 22,387,060 416,503 
English 108 16,442,950 15,212,220 31,655,170 294,467 
Science 77 19,258,900 10,878,506 30,137,406 392,031 
Math 88 16,401,725 12,382,039 28,783,764 328,957 
Library 19,139,550 
Admin 9,786,050 
Maintenance 17,153,275 
Total 326 6,884,525 46,078,875 46,078,875 112,963,400 346,913 
Assessment of the traditional absorption costing 
The main advantage in using the traditional absorption costing method is that it is 
relatively simple. However there are some problems, which are described hereunder. 
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1.	 The methodology does not however address high-powered equipment use 
programmes as well as that commanding high volume plant usage. 
2.	 It ignores maintenance and physical resource costs for the self-financing and 
subsidized areas. 
3.	 As a direct method of allocation it “ignores other service departments when any 
given service department is allocated to the revenue producing (operating) 
department”. 
4.	 The issue of service being rendered between the Core Function Revenue Producing 
Areas is not addressed. The English Department is required to teach that subject to 
all other departments. The matter of charging the other departments for this service 
is not dealt with. 
Multiple Factors Cost Allocation Model (MFCA) or Activity Base Costing (ABC) 
The Multiple Factors Cost Allocation Model (MFCA) is now being created to address the 
points raised above. In this model FTE is still necessary. However instead of having this 
as the only factor there are several other variables used to allocate shared cost, several 
steps in allocation and re-allocation, and a final allocation among the Revenue Producing 
areas for services rendered between them. 
Step 1: - Allocate the shared service using the factors mentioned. 
Basis for Allocating Shared Educational Costs 
Shared Service Allocation Factor 
Service Teaching Teaching Hours 
Administration Number of Personnel 
(Staff and Students) 
Library Number of Personnel) 
Maintenance Floor Space 
Final Stage of Shared Cost FTE 
See Appendix II for the statistical information. When the allocation is done the following 
is the result: 
Allocation of Costs using the Multiple Factor Cost Allocation Model 
Home Econ English Science Math Library Admin Maintenance Direct Cost 
Home Econ 14,780,950 2,466,443 4,814,725 1,640,173 2,835,042 1,918,833 3,363,387 14,780,950 
English 8,221,475 - 1,640,173 5,621,828 959,417 1,681,694 16,442,950 
Science 3,288,590 12,518,285 4,100,431 4,143,987 1,918,833 3,363,387 19,258,900 
Math 2,466,443 1,925,890 9,020,949 4,656,707 959,417 1,681,694 16,401,725 
Library 241,280 2,878,250 5,045,081 19,139,550 
Admin 337,792 479,708 840,847 9,786,050 
Maintenance 1,302,913 671,592 1,177,186 17,153,275 
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Total 14,780,950 16,442,950 19,258,900 16,401,725 19,139,550 9,786,050 17,153,275 112,963,400 
Step 2: - Re-Allocate the residual cost from the support centres to the CFRPA using FTEd 
Cost after Library Admin Maintenance Cost after 
first final 
absorption absorption 
Home Econ 31,819,553 1,347,709 273,739 520,241 33,961,241 
English 18,124,586 2,695,419 547,477 1,040,481 22,407,963 
Science 29,333,514 1,927,538 391,510 744,065 32,396,627 
Math 20,711,099 2,193,945 445,621 846,903 24,197,569 
Library 8,164,611 
Admin 1,658,347 
Maintenance 3,151,690 
Total 112,963,400 8,164,611 1,658,347 3,151,690 112,963,400 
Stage 3 Calculating the per unit cost – using MFCA 
The cost per student is calculated as follows: 
Cd = TCd / FTEd 
Cs = $ 32,396,627 /77

= $ 421,420

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The alternative to cost allocation is to charge expenses directly for service immediately on 
occurrence. In this case everything would become direct cost and the FTE could be used 
to calculate the per student cost per programme. This is the only way to be 100% sure 
about the total cost to operate the core function revenue producing area. To do this 
however would incur additional cost. The cost for administrating such a system would 
increase dramatically as there would be the need for more accounting, procurement and 
administrative staff to maintain the system. The idea of gaining from economies of scale 
would also be illuminated. 
In allocating costs, this paper has considered the traditional absorption costing technique 
and Activity Based Costing. The traditional technique was termed “the Single Factor Cost 
Allocation Model” and the ABC was coined “The Multiple Cost Allocation Model. A 
comparison of cost between the three models as follows: 
Absorption 
Simple Average Costing Method MFCA or ABC 
Home Econ 346,913 416,503 631,837 
English 346,913 294,467 208,446 
Science 346,913 392,031 421,420 
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BUDGET FOR INSTITUTION X

Home English Science Math Library Admin Maintenance Total 
Econ 
Compensation 
Academic 3,600,000 9,600,000 7,200,000 9,600,000 0 0 0 30,000,000 
Administrative 750,000 750,000 750,000 750,000 3,750,000 5,250,000 1,500,000 13,500,000 
Technician. 500,000 0 1,000,000 0 0 0 0 1,500,000 
Ancillary 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,500,000 7,500,000 
4,850,000 10,350,000 8,950,000 10,350,000 3,750,000 5,250,000 9,000,000 52,500,000 
Travelling 
Upkeep 360,000 960,000 720,000 960,000 240,000 480,000 120,000 3,840,000 
Mileage 79,200 211,200 158,400 211,200 52,800 52,800 26,400 792,000 
Foreign 100,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 30,000 150,000 0 430,000 
539,200 1,221,200 928,400 1,221,200 322,800 682,800 146,400 5,062,000 
Rental 10,000 0 15,000 0 0 0 0 25,000 
Utilities 0 
Telephone 18,000 30,000 12,000 14,400 18,000 48,000 18,000 158,400 
Water 120,000 120,000 
Electricity 240,000 240,000 
18,000 30,000 12,000 14,400 18,000 48,000 378,000 518,400 
Other good & 0 
Services 
Uniform 150,000 270,000 270,000 270,000 150,000 210,000 810,000 2,130,000 
Reference 3,000,000 3,000,000 
Material 
Class Material 1,000,000 50,000 750,000 75,000 1,875,000 
Repairs - 200,000 100,000 120,000 50,000 50,000 100,000 200,000 820,000 
Machinery 
Repairs - 2,000,000 2,000,000 
Building 
Grounds Upkeep 500,000 500,000 
Sanitation 500,000 500,000 
Consultancies 500,000 500,000 
Advertising 200,000 200,000 
Postal & Courier 25,000 25,000 
Security 120,000 120,000 
Audit 400,000 400,000 
Motor Vehicle 200,000 200,000 
Depreciation 7,500,000 3,750,000 7,500,000 3,750,000 11,250,000 1,875,000 2,625,000 38,250,000 
Misc. 221,250 104,250 216,000 103,625 361,250 82,750 173,875 1,263,000 
9,071,250 4,274,250 8,856,000 4,248,625 14,811,250 3,392,750 7,128,875 51,783,000 
Banking Activities 100,000 100,000 
0 
Retirement 242,500 517,500 447,500 517,500 187,500 262,500 450,000 2,625,000 
Benefits 
0 
Grants & 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 350,000 
Contributions 
Total Recurrent 14,780,950 16,442,950 19,258,900 16,401,725 19,139,550 9,786,050 17,153,275 112,963,400 
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STATISTICAL INFORMATION OF THE HYPOTHETICAL DEPARTMENTS 
Home 
Econ English Science Math Library Admin Maintenance Total 
Staffing 
Academic 3 8 6 8 0 0 0 25 
Administrative 1 1 1 1 5 7 2 18 
Technician. 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 
Anciliary 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 25 
5 9 9 9 5 7 27 71 
Student 
Full Time 
Numbers 50 100 75 80 0 0 0 305 
Part Time 
Numbers 10 20 5 20 0 0 0 55 
Hr. Full time 40 40 40 40 0 0 0 160 
Hr. Part time 20 15 15 10 0 0 0 60 
Space Occupied 20,000 10,000 20,000 10,000 30,000 5,000 7,000 102,000 
FTE Student 
Full Time 
Numbers 50 100 75 80 305 
Part Time 
Numbers 10 20 5 20 55 
PT - FTE 3.75 7.5 1.875 7.5 21 
FTE 54 108 77 88 326 
Students + Staff 58.7500 116.5000 85.8750 96.5000 5.0000 7.0000 27.0000 397 
Personnel Weights 
Students Weights 
0.1481 
0.1651 
0.2937 
0.3301 
0.2165 
0.2361 
0.2433 0.0126 0.0176 
0.2687 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0681 
0.0000 
1 
1 
Space Occupied 0.1961 0.0980 0.1961 0.0980 0.2941 0.0490 0.0686 1 
Teaching 
Programme 
Home Econ 
English 
Science 
Math 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.000 
0.15 
0.50 
0.20 
0.15 
1.000 
0.25 
0.00 
0.65 
0.10 
1.000 
0.10 
0.10 
0.25 
0.55 
1.000 
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APPENDIX XVI

UTECH’S FINANCIAL RECORDS

UTech’s Income and Expenditure Statements Mixed Financing

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Income 
Subvention 26,130 40,092 52,400 68,349 79,569 85,049 96,770 
Students Fees - Local 
Students 1,635 2,687 5,544 8,955 
Ministry of Education 4,515 2,034 2,508 2,235 
6,150 4,721 8,052 11,190 12,024 15,542 15,036 
Residential 
Students 0 300 1,350 1,920 
Ministry of Education 0 3,500 2,500 2,230 
0 3,800 3,850 4,150 4,050 4,150 6,701 
Investment Returns 0 0 0 0 714 
Other Income 1,500 1,942 3,305 3,587 3,456 6,109 8,620 
1,500 1,942 3,305 3,587 3,456 6,109 9,335 
Total Income 33,780 50,555 67,607 87,276 99,099 110,850 127,842 
Expenditure 
Salaries 
Teaching 17,426 32,748 48,027 59,353 67,735 71,780 90,320 
Non-Teaching 2,335 3,401 3,005 1,225 1,340 1,638 2,714 
Total Staff Cost 19,761 36,150 51,032 60,578 69,075 73,418 93,034 
Non Staff Costs 8,642 14,755 18,446 21,493 25,340 30,006 40,461 
Total Expenditure 28,402 50,904 69,478 82,071 94,415 103,424 133,495 
Surplus/(Deficit) 5,378 (349) (1,871) 5,205 4,684 7,426 (5,653) 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Income 
Subvention 97,279 104,011 106,502 213,385 318,660 438,633 559,751 
Students Fees Local 11,687 15,102 24,755 54,219 65,019 84,491 107,157 
Residential Fees 7,280 7,250 7,871 17,334 29,826 57,840 75,089 
Investment Returns 988 1,222 1,193 3,024 3,027 2,449 4,765 
Other Income 10,595 11,879 12,254 23,857 27,666 32,796 39,550 
Total Income 127,829 139,464 152,575 311,819 444,198 616,209 786,312 
Expenditure 
Salaries 
Teaching 82,885 92,139 94,034 210,502 305,933 372,789 486,666 
Non-Teaching 3,370 3,813 4,185 8,659 12,302 16,683 21,112 
Total Staff Cost 86,255 95,952 98,219 219,161 318,235 389,472 507,778 
Non Staff Costs 41,368 47,672 53,464 130,743 167,518 264,742 266,532 
Total Expenditure 127,623 143,624 151,683 349,904 485,753 654,214 774,310 
Surplus/(Deficit) 206 (4,160) 892 (38,085) (41,555) (38,005) 12,002 
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UTech’s Income and Expenditure Statements for Free Education Era

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Income 
Subvention 1,081,209 1,295,982 1,707,967 2,215,056 2,609,334 N/A N/A 
Students Fees – Local 88,666 132,343 189,635 180,013 229,509 N/A N/A 
Residential 98,570 85,540 128,316 138,248 69,081 N/A N/A 
Investment Returns 5,247 11,456 7,436 6,816 9,641 
Other Income 82,506 100,571 142,609 162,282 246,288 
Total Income 1,356,198 1,625,892 2,175,963 2,702,415 3,163,853 N/A N/A 
Expenditure 
Salaries 
Teaching 867,626 1,074,140 1,331,690 1,636,122 1,850,961 
Non-Teaching 36,494 52,595 69,293 75,551 88,495 
Total Staff Cost 904,120 1,126,735 1,400,983 1,711,673 1,939,456 N/A N/A 
Non Staff Costs 411,101 645,811 846,009 900,847 1,078,967 N/A N/A 
Total Expenditure 1,315,221 1,772,546 2,246,992 2,612,520 3,018,423 N/A N/A 
Surplus/(Deficit) 40,977 (146,654) (71,029) 89,895 145,430 N/A N/A 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Income 
Subvention 4,087,098 4,394,284 4,507,116 5,674,362 5,854,764 7,081,013 
Students Fees - Local 
Students 281,765 357,767 475,600 470,699 
Other Students 146,908 140,002 
Fees 
281,765 334,853 357,767 431,559 622,508 610,701 
Residential 129,131 202,284 290,964 
Other Income 313,325 403,891 319,809 417,596 796,874 788,017 
Total Income 4,805,159 5,268,672 5,313,823 6,670,571 7,476,430 8,770,695 
Expenditure 
Salaries 
Teaching 2,381,624 2,833,820 3,151,867 4,530,343 4,570,919 4,798,012 
Non-Teaching 326,589 404,841 396,336 425,017 458,741 560,031 
Total Staff Cost 2,708,213 3,238,661 3,548,203 4,955,360 5,029,660 5,358,043 
Non Staff Costs 1,997,949 2,181,985 2,409,486 2,509,336 3,088,381 3,539,527 
Total Expenditure 4,706,162 5,420,646 5,957,689 7,464,696 8,118,041 8,897,570 
Surplus/(Deficit) 98,997 (151,974) (643,866) (794,125) (641,611) (126,875) 
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UTech’s Income and Expenditure Statements for the Period of the Cess

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Income 
Subvention 
Students Fees - Local 
10,086,546 9,050,323 12,890,503 17,566,877 18,667,944 25,572,317 
Students 
Other Students Fees 
Residential 
Students Fees -
Overseas 
Investment Returns 
Other Income 
1,201,863 
(54,180) 
1,147,683 
342,453 
880,877 
1,527,345 
167,692 
1,695,037 
345,544 
1,256,412 
1,404,132 
1,404,132 
379,128 
455,248 
792,354 
1,483,884 
1,483,884 
482,780 
664,915 
1,131,318 
3,021,847 
3,021,847 
360,351 
604,047 
2,116,186 
2,236,534 
4,291,678 
6,528,212 
571,073 
6,276,974 
18,724,566 
Total 12,457,559 12,347,316 15,921,365 21,329,774 24,770,375 57,673,142 
Expenditure 
Salaries 
Teaching 
Non-Teaching 
Total Staff Cost 
Non Staff Costs 
7,886,504 
646,476 
8,532,980 
4,339,857 
7,525,232 
665,164 
8,190,396 
5,507,673 
10,632,847 
822,879 
11,455,726 
6,551,737 
14,840,872 
1,394,801 
16,235,673 
8,898,635 
17,819,023 
1,295,853 
19,114,876 
13,700,129 
31,935,212 
1,419,527 
33,354,739 
21,096,428 
12,872,837 13,698,069 18,007,463 25,134,308 32,815,005 54,451,167 
Surplus/(Deficit) (415,278) (1,350,753) (2,086,098) (3,804,534) (8,044,630) 3,221,975 
UTech’s Income and Expenditure Statement for the Cost Sharing Period

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Income 
Subvention 65,503,515 92,345,890 113,730,778 273,619,696 242,392,661 
Students Fees - Local 
Students 6,775,984 54,145,509 62,748,633 91,191,389 135,964,094 
Other Students Fees 14,111,586 7,375,938 12,319,879 17,432,270 46,452,658 
20,887,570 61,521,447 75,068,512 108,623,659 182,416,752 
Residential 880,475 1,264,810 1,761,481 5,284,393 
Students Fees - 9,626,695 14,392,405 16,952,547 17,686,436 15,389,319 
Overseas 
Investment Returns 3,585,045 16,899,384 18,723,163 36,142,049 31,899,905 
Other Income 6,137,633 16,001,306 11,196,697 21,626,879 3,011,545 
Total 106,620,933 202,425,242 237,433,178 462,983,112 500,929,086 
Expenditure 
Salaries 
Teaching 55,269,300 98,309,097 103,543,288 228,915,711 219,155,348 
Non-Teaching 706,533 1,066,355 1,407,208 1,752,024 19,174,152 
Total Staff Cost 55,975,833 99,375,452 104,950,496 230,667,735 238,329,500 
Non Staff Costs 35,814,768 76,429,109 113,874,874 212,257,648 241,234,922 
91,790,601 175,804,561 218,825,370 442,925,383 479,564,422 
Surplus/(Deficit) 14,830,332 26,620,681 18,607,808 20,057,729 21,364,664 
257 
UTech’s Income and Expenditure Statement for the Cost Sharing Period

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Income 
Subvention 638,890,528 938,679,046 433,366,836 646,622,746 792,248,091 824,579,947 
Students Fees - Local 
Students 194,752,323 210,051,736 215,558,268 365,748,060 412,134,522 514,348,460 
Other Students Fees 14,111,627 21,939,748 21,839,515 33,016,825 53,204,843 66,807,002 
208,863,950 231,991,484 237,397,783 398,764,885 465,339,365 581,155,462 
Residential 25,381,721 40,460,318 1,612,986 13,602,291 12,138,105 13,499,482 
Students Fees - Overseas 17,835,658 19,627,495 10,684,564 
Investment Returns 37,315,809 94,208,375 70,932,223 97,361,294 106,025,598 132,910,117 
Other Income 9,545,355 24,847,372 55,855,360 57,521,150 62,069,448 100,647,099 
Total 937,833,021 1,349,814,090 809,849,752 1,213,872,366 1,437,820,607 1,652,792,107 
Expenditure 
Salaries 
Teaching 613,004,273 734,277,879 481,432,943 709,881,880 814,657,686 965,417,359 
Non-Teaching 19,862,733 39,997,485 30,867,583 17,876,670 14,455,218 
Total Staff Cost 632,867,006 774,275,364 512,300,526 727,758,550 829,112,904 965,417,359 
Non Staff Costs 273,918,137 268,593,086 220,335,046 347,116,028 386,622,574 517,583,488 
906,785,143 1,042,868,450 732,635,572 1,074,874,578 1,215,735,478 1,483,000,847 
Surplus/(Deficit) 31,047,878 306,945,640 77,214,180 138,997,788 222,085,129 169,791,260 
UTech’s Balance Sheets during Mixed Financing

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Grants and Funds 4,000 818 336 6,332 590 
Accumulated Fund 5,378 5,029 3,158 8,362 13,046 20,472 14,132 
Total Funds and Provisions 9,378 5,029 3,158 9,180 13,382 26,804 14,722 
Current Assets 
Inventory 283 130 
Accounts Receivable 2,685 684 1,139 2,483 175 3,803 2,170 
Cash and Short-Term 13,149 14,494 5,534 21,618 27,321 42,276 21,555 
Deposits 
Total Current Asset 16,117 15,178 6,673 24,101 27,496 46,079 23,855 
Short-Term Liabilities 6,739 10,149 3,515 14,921 14,114 19,275 9,133 
Working Capital 9,378 5,029 3,158 9,180 13,382 26,804 14,722 
Net Assets 9,378 5,029 3,158 9,180 13,382 26,804 14,722 
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UTech’s Balance Sheets during Mixed Financing

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Grants and Funds 808 616 871 36,284 61,127 92,140 86,051 
Accumulated Fund 14,772 10,612 11,505 (15,075) (56,630) (86,015) 14,099 
15,580 11,228 12,376 21,209 4,497 6,125 100,150 
Current Assets 
Inventory 125 166 101 332 1,426 1,242 6,083 
Accounts Receivable 6,438 4,551 2,246 401 4,814 9,211 60,611 
Cash and Short-Term 34,574 24,949 33,691 39,105 37,727 63,600 125,909 
Deposits 
41,137 29,666 36,038 39,838 43,967 74,053 192,603 
Short-Term Liabilities 25,557 18,438 23,662 18,629 39,470 67,928 92,453 
15,580 11,228 12,376 21,209 4,497 6,125 100,150 Working Capital 
Net Assets 15,580 11,228 12,376 21,209 4,497 6,125 100,150 
UTech Balance Sheet during Free Education

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Grants and Funds 65,810 91,644 77,921 36,863 36,159 N/A N/A 
Accumulated Fund 20,328 (126,326) (129,855) (39,960) 105,470 N/A N/A 
86,138 (34,682) (51,934) (3,097) 141,629 N/A N/A 
Current Assets 
Inventory 5,080 24,262 30,974 17,905 34,996 
Accounts Receivable 75,389 65,221 71,379 70,812 88,011 
Cash and Short-Term 115,940 120,659 82,072 121,168 246,590 
Deposits 
196,409 210,142 184,425 209,885 369,597 N/A N/A 
Short-Term Liabilities 110,271 244,824 236,359 212,982 227,968 
Working Capital 86,138 (34,682) (51,934) (3,097) 141,629 N/A N/A 
Net Assets 86,138 (34,682) (51,934) (3,097) 141,629 N/A N/A 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Grants and Funds 540,765 853,662 940,345 1,344,032 1,135,971 1,635,456 
Accumulated Fund (108,662) (260,636) (904,502) (1,698,627) (1,904,875) (2,031,750) 
432,103 593,026 35,843 (354,595) (768,904) (396,294) 
Current Assets 
Inventory 46,053 39,046 36,348 38,370 51,997 53,449 
Accounts Receivable 46,028 110,061 78,387 67,516 61,962 144,163 
Cash and Short-Term Deposits 506,180 659,104 212,830 359,332 613,303 1,134,860 
598,261 808,211 327,565 465,218 727,262 1,332,472 
Short-Term Liabilities 166,158 215,185 291,722 819,813 1,496,166 1,728,766 
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Working Capital 432,103 593,026 35,843 (354,595) (768,904) (396,294) 
Net Assets 432,103 593,026 35,843 (354,595) (768,904) (396,294) 
UTech’s Balance Sheet during the Period of the CESS

1987 1988 1989 
Grants and Funds 2,025,765 2,779,175 5,883,041 
Accumulated Fund (2,447,028) (3,797,781) (5,883,879) 
(421,263) (1,018,606) (838) 
Current Assets 
Inventory 55,856 81,296 41,457 
Accounts Receivable 135,973 852,579 1,499,381 
Cash and Short-Term 1,238,808 1,313,582 2,325,765 
Deposits 
1,430,637 2,247,457 3,866,603 
Short-Term Liabilities 1,851,900 3,266,063 3,867,441

Working Capital (421,263) (1,018,606) (838)

Net Assets (421,263) (1,018,606) (838)

1990 1991 1992 
Grants and Funds 7,670,887 9,819,928 15,962,599

Accumulated Fund (9,688,413) (17,733,043) (14,511,068)

(2,017,526) (7,913,115) 1,451,531 
Current Assets 
Inventory 29,264 132,426 549,591 
Accounts Receivable 2,106,791 1,442,049 4,366,107 
Cash and Short-Term 2,344,112 3,940,204 6,500,326 
Deposits 
4,480,167 5,514,679 11,416,024 
Short-Term Liabilities 6,497,693 13,427,794 9,964,493

Working Capital (2,017,526) (7,913,115) 1,451,531

Net Assets (2,017,526) (7,913,115) 1,451,531 
UTech’s Balance Sheet during Cost Sharing

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Grants and Funds 21,789,681 44,026,601 57,165,270 71,283,413 45,520,209 
Reserves & Provisions 29,144,142 44,896,209 
Accumulated Fund 319,264 26,939,945 45,547,753 32,739,778 35,944,478 
22,108,945 70,966,546 102,713,023 133,167,333 126,360,896 
Current Assets 
Inventory 677,303 2,007,231 3,598,122 5,078,099 2,876,032 
Accounts Receivable 8,688,572 17,399,550 17,427,734 24,464,242 17,908,051 
Cash and Short- 25,131,510 52,760,756 80,558,214 105,500,253 85,568,816 
Term Deposits 
34,497,385 72,167,537 101,584,070 135,042,594 106,352,899 
Short-Term Liabilities 12,438,440 7,777,602 8,510,903 45,701,258 28,333,834 
Working Capital 22,058,945 64,389,935 93,073,167 89,341,336 78,019,065 
Investments 50,000 6,576,611 9,639,856 43,825,997 48,341,831 
Net Assets 22,108,945 70,966,546 102,713,023 133,167,333 126,360,896 
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UTech’s Balance Sheet during Cost Sharing

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Grants and Funds 63,870,013 98,220,565 131,954,125 105,808,811 127,810,799 146,736,966 
Long Term Liabilities 116,515,289 115,713,452 
Reserves & 93,098,369 370,605,718 434,526,987 579,242,013 725,614,113 861,242,795 
Provisions 
Accumulated Fund 1,126,114,253 1,156,808,817 1,182,897,053 1,288,191,632 1,355,863,714 1,381,711,093 
1,283,082,635 1,625,635,100 1,749,378,165 1,973,242,456 2,325,803,915 2,505,404,306 
Current Assets 
Inventory 2,682,620 3,808,013 4,259,353 3,511,354 3,054,752 3,802,299 
Accounts 36,467,137 53,439,010 142,210,696 121,845,733 102,387,419 119,905,757 
Receivable 
Advances 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cash and Short- 73,140,638 119,511,673 88,344,683 114,692,564 107,951,504 106,014,063 
Term Deposits 
112,290,395 176,758,696 234,814,732 240,049,651 213,393,675 229,722,119 
Short-Term 44,669,177 111,389,262 158,851,840 218,004,148 148,958,730 190,380,343 
Liabilities 
Working Capital 67,621,218 65,369,434 75,962,892 22,045,503 64,434,945 39,341,776 
Investments 132,329,139 390,710,504 410,117,773 527,896,638 694,931,947 917,698,663 
Long Term 
Receivable 
Fixed Assets 1,083,132,278 1,169,555,162 1,263,297,500 1,423,300,315 1,566,437,023 1,548,363,867 
1,215,461,417 1,560,265,666 1,673,415,273 1,951,196,953 2,261,368,970 2,466,062,530 
1,283,082,635 1,625,635,100 1,749,378,165 1,973,242,456 2,325,803,915 2,505,404,306 
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APPENDIX XVII

UWI’S FINANCIAL RECORDS

UWI’s Income and Expenditure Statements - Mixed Financing

1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Income 
Governments Contribution 2,091,632 2,150,426 2,100,470 3,056,582 3,005,658 3,546,890 
Other Grants 247,602 205,902 251,834 196,000 241,900 292,750 
Hospital - Pathological Serv. 145,998 159,546 171,888 199,802 212,286 214,068 
Students Fees 65,648 85,458 106,484 150,884 189,284 230,156 
Special Projects 245,124 263,472 285,582 633,392 1,053,934 1,532,618 
Investment Returns 23,822 27,026 31,022 34,648 62,730 57,474 
Other Income 87,810 1,518 2,482 3,690 1,080 1,988 
Total Income 2,907,636 2,893,348 2,949,762 4,274,998 4,766,872 5,875,944 
Expenditure 
Staff Costs 2,192,428 2,389,266 2,523,522 3,163,402 3,713,772 4,037,440 
Projects 245,124 263,472 285,582 633,392 1,053,934 1,532,618 
Total Expenditure 2,437,552 2,652,738 2,809,104 3,796,794 4,767,706 5,570,058 
Surplus before provision and non-
recurrent 470,084 240,610 140,658 478,204 (834) 305,886 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Income 
Governments Contribution 4,488,718 4,887,985 5,218,682 5,869,584 7,397,089 7,920,731 10,283,313 
Other Grants 424,630 411,433 356,564 299,790 268,170 220,848 193,767 
Hospital - Pathological 
Serv. 250,496 256,286 262,966 268,952 306,143 327,319 393,437 
Students Fees 251,134 280,784 324,186 348,272 378,355 454,058 493,146 
Special Projects 1,635,346 2,168,680 2,018,824 2,173,673 2,047,128 2,037,147 2,233,928 
Investment Returns 62,966 123,434 153,506 164,695 172,534 164,446 161,450 
Other Income 7,608 8,048 4,922 3,762 25,164 29,781 150,962 
Total Income 7,120,898 8,136,650 8,339,650 9,128,728 10,594,583 11,154,330 13,910,003 
Expenditure 
Staff Costs 4,839,224 5,255,392 5,980,572 6,623,247 8,610,350 8,861,813 11,297,358 
Projects 1,635,346 2,168,680 2,018,824 2,173,673 2,047,128 2,037,147 2,233,928 
Total Expenditure 6,474,570 7,424,072 7,999,396 8,796,920 10,657,478 10,898,960 13,531,286 
Surplus before provision 
and non-recurrent 646,328 712,578 340,254 331,808 (62,895) 255,370 378,717 
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UWI’s Income and Expenditure - FREE EDUCATION Period

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Income 
Governments Contribution $13,457,810 $15,957,328 $23,050,823 $26,184,133 $35,978,631 $53,423,240 $59,650,362 
Other Grants $138,839 $117,506 $184,402 $193,618 $187,250 $257,771 $0 
Hospital - Pathological Serv. $532,858 $524,288 $652,738 $813,403 $860,804 $1,052,476 $1,268,352 
Students Fees $563,810 $689,398 $766,006 $1,033,669 $1,337,365 $1,760,121 $1,655,836 
Special Projects $3,670,403 $4,727,093 $4,554,935 $6,980,305 $12,321,179 $16,323,595 $21,450,190 
Investment Returns $169,289 $199,903 $242,984 $258,700 $391,870 $482,703 $679,161 
Other Income $61,270 $14,112 $57,427 $71,092 $76,250 $154,828 $126,481 
Total Income $18,594,279 $22,229,628 $29,509,315 $35,534,920 $51,153,349 $73,454,734 $84,830,382 
Expenditure 
Staff Costs $14,315,907 $16,904,961 $24,324,083 $28,113,964 $38,040,905 $56,389,200 $62,675,576 
Projects $3,670,403 $4,727,093 $4,554,935 $6,980,305 $12,321,179 $16,323,595 $21,450,190 
Total Expenditure $17,986,310 $21,632,054 $28,879,018 $35,094,269 $50,362,084 $72,712,795 $84,125,766 
Surplus before provision 
and non-recurrent $607,969 $597,574 $630,297 $440,651 $791,265 $741,939 $704,616 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Income 
Governments Contribution $70,753,664 $81,305,428 $116,412,619 $163,528,744 $254,844,501 $261,049,095 
Other Grants $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Hospital - Pathological 
Serv. $1,394,129 $1,585,229 $1,895,262 $1,953,146 $2,458,814 $2,609,473 
Students Fees $2,008,881 $2,228,373 $2,207,930 $3,316,587 $6,699,609 $6,947,621 
Special Projects $23,471,530 $29,094,815 $43,340,547 $74,371,787 $131,059,580 $110,861,153 
Common Service Fees $0 $1,475,795 $1,385,505 $2,287,822 $3,660,027 $7,078,707 
Investment Returns $876,705 $1,158,062 $1,169,207 $1,810,009 $3,667,752 $3,467,502 
Other Income $178,575 $121,056 $171,969 $604,071 $612,699 $850,476 
Total Income $98,683,484 $116,968,758 $166,583,039 $247,872,166 $403,002,982 $392,864,027 
Expenditure 
Staff Costs $74,234,427 $86,820,442 $122,424,634 $173,058,220 $271,866,513 $279,347,073 
Projects $23,471,530 $29,094,815 $43,340,547 $74,371,787 $131,059,580 $110,861,153 
Total Expenditure $97,705,957 $115,915,257 $165,765,181 $247,430,007 $402,926,093 $390,208,226 
Surplus before provision 
and non-recurrent $977,527 $1,053,501 $817,858 $442,159 $76,889 $2,655,801 
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UWI’s Income and Expenditure Statement - The Period of the CESS

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Income 
Governments Contribution $284,879,670 $289,416,223 $299,572,482 $372,409,999 $573,359,376 $1,164,361,633 
Other Grants $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Hospital - Pathological Serv. $3,390,988 $3,944,000 $4,419,000 $4,871,922 $5,626,099 $10,292,000 
Students Fees $7,615,425 $9,747,617 $9,313,787 $10,790,988 $12,605,560 $33,261,570 
Special Projects $108,194,796 $106,810,837 $96,395,268 $136,922,539 $169,226,265 $398,906,571 
Common Service Fees $8,309,266 $9,120,919 $8,602,108 $11,608,539 $19,897,059 $39,164,489 
Investment Returns $3,710,518 $2,631,673 $4,095,408 $9,558,232 $11,748,195 $6,459,059 
Other Income $609,976 $611,990 $453,332 $720,803 $915,277 $3,051,883 
Total Income $416,710,639 $422,283,259 $422,851,385 $546,883,022 $793,377,831 $1,655,497,205 
Expenditure 
Staff Costs $307,915,486 $308,257,516 $325,034,114 $398,698,883 $622,612,265 $1,267,128,949 
Projects $108,194,796 $106,810,837 $96,395,268 $136,922,539 $169,226,265 $398,906,571 
Total Expenditure $416,110,282 $415,068,353 $421,429,382 $535,621,422 $791,838,530 $1,666,035,520 
Surplus before provision 
and non-recurrent $600,357 $7,214,906 $1,422,003 $11,261,600 $1,539,301 ($10,538,315) 
UWI Income and Expenditure Statement - Cost Sharing Era

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Income 
Governments Contribution $1,740,602,803 $1,915,122,637 $2,726,708,461 $2,350,643,024 $4,149,323,976 
Other Grants $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Hospital - Pathological Serv. $9,251,493 $33,623,986 $54,815,356 $63,381,501 $75,593,948 
Students Fees $47,597,750 $353,188,374 $412,438,670 $475,120,799 $579,643,539 
Special Projects $460,548,257 $759,286,497 $1,017,986,857 $1,190,499,388 $974,314,241 
Other Projects $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Commercial Operations $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Common Service Fees $43,225,908 $61,536,280 $81,707,626 $81,166,299 $32,098,660 
Investment Returns $13,333,884 $39,818,292 $40,692,800 $43,990,996 $70,562,034 
Other Income $2,522,094 $4,491,618 $9,608,756 $12,933,990 $12,066,457 
Total Income $2,317,082,189 $3,167,067,684 $4,343,958,526 $4,217,735,997 $5,893,602,855 
Expenditure 
Staff Costs $1,814,069,352 $2,381,303,997 $3,325,971,669 $3,836,352,410 $4,873,090,855 
Projects $460,548,257 $759,286,497 $1,017,986,857 $1,190,499,388 $974,314,241 
Total Expenditure $2,274,617,609 $3,140,590,494 $4,343,958,526 $5,026,851,798 $5,847,405,096 
Surplus before provision 
and non-recurrent $42,464,580 $26,477,190 $0 ($809,115,801) $46,197,759 
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UWI Income and Expenditure Statement - Cost Sharing Era

1998 1999 2000 
Income 
Governments Contribution $5,114,945,765 $5,399,111,057 $6,019,734,899 
Other Grants $0 $0 $0 
Hospital - Pathological Serv. $90,722,360 $99,047,500 $98,108,000 
Students Fees $912,004,827 $1,107,608,499 $1,265,208,792 
Special Projects $1,094,380,812 $1,425,779,164 $1,672,158,861 
Other Projects $0 $0 $0 
Commercial Operations $0 $0 $0 
Common Service Fees $214,577,131 $191,327,108 $234,809,599 
Investment Returns $224,733,039 $332,597,500 $400,974,681 
Other Income $43,785,496 $172,877,396 $211,892,434 
Total Income $7,695,149,430 $8,728,348,224 $9,902,887,266 
Expenditure 
Staff Costs $5,666,050,545 $6,361,744,095 $7,166,199,336 
Projects $1,094,380,812 $1,425,779,164 $1,672,158,861 
Total Expenditure $6,760,431,357 $7,787,523,259 $8,838,358,197 
Surplus before provision and 
non-recurrent $934,718,073 $940,824,965 $1,064,529,069 
UWI Income and Expenditure Statement - Cost Sharing Era

2001 2002 2003 
Income 
Governments Contribution $6,625,157,386 $7,304,827,683 $8,308,652,009 
Other Grants $0 $0 
Hospital - Pathological Serv. $109,557,000 $129,162,000 $134,429,000 
Students Fees $1,372,504,319 $1,562,207,465 $1,918,097,794 
Special Projects $1,685,835,939 $700,041,284 $776,345,670 
Other Projects $0 $1,345,766,398 $1,876,019,664 
Commercial Operations $0 $759,362,323 $921,780,414 
Common Service Fees $234,516,970 $0 $0 
Investment Returns $559,061,865 $410,742,318 $493,551,442 
Other Income $333,705,772 $459,259,877 $432,947,776 
Total Income $10,920,339,251 $12,671,369,348 $14,861,823,769 
Expenditure 
Staff Costs $8,268,029,311 $11,438,754,277 $14,192,785,786 
Projects $1,685,835,939 $700,041,284 $776,345,670 
Total Expenditure $9,953,865,250 $12,138,795,561 $14,969,131,456 
Surplus before provision and 
non-recurrent $966,474,001 $532,573,787 ($107,307,687) 
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BALANCE SHEETS 
UWI Balance Sheets - Mixed Financing 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Grants and Funds 15,983,046 17,229,148 18,634,928 19,544,666 21,127,850 22,772,008 
Long Term Liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Provisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Accumulated Fund 707,290 1,279,968 1,309,586 971,362 1,351,404 1,955,916 
Total Funds and Liabilities 16,690,336 18,509,116 19,944,514 20,516,028 22,479,254 24,727,924 
Current Assets 
Inventory 95,516 87,436 91,290 88,826 143,338 95,540 
Accounts Receivable 515,890 381,300 288,408 397,752 412,048 542,874 
Advances 230,408 252,120 180,434 49,798 71,654 76,996 
Cash and Short-Term Deposits 557,944 890,048 842,600 837,348 1,057,832 620,208 
1,399,758 1,610,904 1,402,732 1,373,724 1,684,872 1,335,618 
Short-Term Liabilities 722,852 813,858 796,306 991,308 1,380,922 1,053,204 
Working Capital 676,906 797,046 606,426 382,416 303,950 282,414 
Investments 3,244,366 4,199,862 4,799,246 4,668,782 5,735,366 6,621,600 
Long Term Receivable 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fixed Assets 12,769,064 13,512,208 14,538,842 15,464,826 16,439,938 17,823,910 
16,013,430 17,712,070 19,338,088 20,133,608 22,175,304 24,445,510 
Net Assets 16,690,336 18,509,116 19,944,514 20,516,024 22,479,254 24,727,924 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Grants and Funds 28,114,634 30,409,786 31,868,811 33,156,092 35,821,562 
Long Term Liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 
Provisions 0 2,237,615 2,921,854 2,345,359 2,786,797 
Accumulated Fund 2,071,886 26,055 (276,811) (324,375) (234,298) 
Total Funds & Liab 30,186,520 32,673,456 34,513,854 35,177,076 38,374,061 
Current Assets 
Inventory 98,700 110,137 101,986 161,713 167,892 
Accounts Receivable 462,272 672,401 1,026,008 1,181,634 1,562,547 
Advances 65,334 169,696 410,876 619,212 932,212 
Cash and Short-Term Deposits 761,946 709,670 258,382 475,209 1,006,115 
1,388,252 1,661,904 1,797,252 2,437,768 3,668,766 
Short-Term Liabilities 1,219,112 1,277,042 1,188,689 1,860,107 1,164,722 
Working Capital 169,140 384,862 608,563 577,661 2,504,044 
Investments 7,714,764 7,590,606 8,197,960 8,413,634 8,875,092 
Long Term Receivable 0 0 0 0 0 
Fixed Assets 22,302,616 24,697,988 25,707,331 26,185,781 26,994,925 
30,017,380 32,288,594 33,905,291 34,599,415 35,870,017 
Net Assets 30,186,520 32,673,456 34,513,854 35,177,076 38,374,061 
266 
UWI Balance Sheets for the Era of Free Education

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Grants and Funds $38,163,679 $40,344,367 $43,065,632 $46,865,099 $57,514,094 $69,508,308 $81,944,706 
Reserves & Provisions $2,923,202 $4,037,096 $6,008,815 $12,121,425 $15,240,780 $20,567,620 $23,751,654 
Accumulated Fund ($837,530) ($416,793) ($86,576) ($160,173) ($473,697) ($874,779) ($890,874) 
Total Funds and 
Liabilities $40,249,351 $43,964,670 $48,987,871 $58,826,351 $72,281,177 $89,201,149 $104,805,486 
Current Assets 
Inventory $333,649 $428,781 $472,467 $586,936 $1,016,363 $1,485,250 $1,842,520 
Accounts $1,794,345 $2,342,807 $3,301,861 $4,768,956 $11,336,174 $8,931,520 $11,895,034 
Receivable 
Advances $346,545 $600,454 $826,882 $942,232 $2,172,958 $1,463,078 $5,545,101 
Cash and Short- $3,979,907 $3,863,865 $6,591,315 $12,704,381 $4,472,567 $10,103,596 $14,746,034 
Term Deposits 
$6,454,446 $7,235,907 $11,192,525 $19,002,505 $18,998,062 $21,983,444 $34,028,689 
Short-Term Liabilities $2,994,284 $3,242,499 $2,348,968 $5,815,434 $5,030,805 $8,473,872 $12,776,028 
Working Capital $3,460,162 $3,993,408 $8,843,557 $13,187,071 $13,967,257 $13,509,572 $21,252,661 
Investments $7,935,875 $9,312,643 $9,696,022 $12,339,203 $17,113,230 $25,370,870 $23,504,850 
Long Term Receivable 
Fixed Assets $28,853,314 $30,658,619 $30,448,292 $33,300,077 $41,200,690 $50,320,707 $60,047,975 
$36,789,189 $39,971,262 $40,144,314 $45,639,280 $58,313,920 $75,691,577 $83,552,825 
Net Assets $40,249,351 $43,964,670 $48,987,871 $58,826,351 $72,281,177 $89,201,149 $104,805,486 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Grants and Funds $90,009,054 $98,490,626 $110,575,441 $150,157,327 $324,551,333 $323,023,855 
Long Term Liabilities $22,985,658 $42,419,894 $48,076,888 
Reserves & Provisions $25,408,934 $35,279,461 $65,725,801 $87,049,432 $156,619,047 $161,561,085 
Accumulated Fund ($1,554,034) ($692,371) ($51,939) $1,468,519 ($814,363) ($1,012,855) 
Total Funds & 
Liabilities $113,863,954 $133,077,716 $176,249,303 $261,660,936 $522,775,911 $531,648,973 
Current Assets 
Inventory $2,108,959 $2,621,057 $2,462,212 $3,305,405 $6,290,701 $6,246,938 
Accounts $16,347,066 $35,011,337 $57,845,129 $69,278,838 $146,299,467 $139,080,577 
Receivable 
Advances $4,275,750 $6,841,876 $6,808,116 $12,483,602 $16,415,994 $20,002,176 
Cash and Short-Term $16,417,023 $8,113,794 $11,066,049 $25,556,879 $23,765,188 $53,858,018 
Deposits 
$39,148,798 $52,588,064 $78,181,506 $110,624,724 $192,771,350 $219,187,709 
Short-Term Liabilities $10,285,213 $12,759,464 $18,414,771 $41,735,324 $67,420,698 $50,192,102 
Working Capital $28,863,585 $39,828,600 $59,766,735 $68,889,400 $125,350,652 $168,995,607 
Investments $21,423,652 $26,152,470 $46,893,076 $76,073,826 $129,111,365 $99,208,687 
Fixed Assets $63,576,717 $67,096,646 $69,589,492 $116,697,710 $268,313,894 $263,444,679 
$85,000,369 $93,249,116 $116,482,568 $192,771,536 $397,425,259 $362,653,366 
Net Assets $113,863,954 $133,077,716 $176,249,303 $261,660,936 $522,775,911 $531,648,973 
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UWI Balance Sheets for the Period of the Cess

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Grants and Funds $339,957,198 $352,999,496 $369,026,509 $450,786,045 $582,408,085 $1,285,443,654 
Long Term Liabilities $45,348,912 $45,341,346 $45,372,926 $52,296,711 $70,790,231 $154,032,716 
Reserves & Provisions $182,152,015 $212,365,631 $226,145,348 $243,303,550 $334,781,078 $743,299,157 
Accumulated Fund ($1,832,571) ($2,592,474) ($3,472,751) ($5,072,577) ($7,823,497) ($40,344,034) 
Total Funds & $565,625,554 $608,113,999 $637,072,032 $741,313,729 $980,155,897 $2,142,431,493 
Liabilities 
Current Assets 
Inventory $5,473,890 $5,701,030 $5,916,084 $7,575,456 $12,557,955 $27,922,374 
Accounts Receivable $282,949,910 $306,317,218 $349,385,261 $286,909,390 $428,977,735 $1,121,886,029 
Advances $31,867,765 $26,788,118 $46,829,309 $41,837,550 $67,719,279 $117,008,041 
Cash and Short-Term $31,050,738 $23,967,090 $27,559,878 $21,419,625 $33,707,943 $87,557,900 
Deposits 
$351,342,303 $362,773,456 $429,690,532 $357,742,021 $542,962,912 $1,354,374,344 
Short-Term Liabilities $151,192,883 $136,069,335 $149,544,698 $166,385,940 $256,543,833 $616,207,462 
Working Capital $200,149,420 $226,704,121 $280,145,834 $191,356,081 $286,419,079 $738,166,882 
Investments $70,880,457 $66,048,951 $53,678,227 $151,838,366 $155,210,399 $182,958,881 
Long Term Receivable 
Fixed Assets $294,595,677 $315,360,927 $303,247,971 $398,119,282 $538,526,419 $1,221,305,730 
$365,476,134 $381,409,878 $356,926,198 $549,957,648 $693,736,818 $1,404,264,611 
Net Assets $565,625,554 $608,113,999 $637,072,032 $741,313,729 $980,155,897 $2,142,431,493 
UWI Balance Sheets for the Cost Sharing Period

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Grants and Funds $1,614,658,670 $4,759,453,900 $5,635,722,565 $6,188,260,884 $6,462,821,511 
Long Term Liabilities $331,016,242 $442,958,050 $757,861,474 $1,257,121,468 $1,515,395,347 
Reserves & Provisions $881,181,123 $1,181,639,635 $2,008,857,527 $1,298,866,586 $2,325,060,816 
Accumulated Fund ($19,921,469) ($22,344,805) $23,971,235 $38,634,837 $73,452,147 
Total Funds & Liabilities $2,806,934,566 $6,361,706,780 $8,426,412,801 $8,782,883,775 $10,376,729,821 
Current Assets 
Inventory $34,559,407 $44,873,469 $42,281,681 $49,298,101 $46,909,518 
Accounts Receivable $1,478,187,606 $2,562,937,902 $2,430,374,828 $2,189,635,049 $2,643,525,137 
Advances $267,367,501 $138,038,890 $414,945,566 $631,657,390 $755,437,666 
Cash and Short-Term 
Deposits $179,840,901 $249,628,049 $268,254,070 $224,481,302 $553,803,720 
$1,959,955,415 $2,995,478,310 $3,155,856,145 $3,095,071,842 $3,999,676,041 
Short-Term Liabilities $1,026,600,953 $1,885,439,326 $1,107,696,887 $1,488,060,123 $1,716,107,798 
Working Capital $933,354,462 $1,110,038,984 $2,048,159,258 $1,607,011,719 $2,283,568,243 
Investments $458,730,086 $562,870,143 $916,954,957 $824,121,502 $1,542,988,243 
Long Term Receivable 
Fixed Assets $1,414,850,018 $4,692,186,071 $5,461,298,586 $6,351,750,554 $6,550,173,335 
$1,873,580,104 $5,255,056,214 $6,378,253,543 $7,175,872,056 $8,093,161,578 
Net Assets $2,806,934,566 $6,365,095,198 $8,426,412,801 $8,782,883,775 $10,376,729,821 
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UWI Balance Sheets for the Cost Sharing Period Cont’d

1998 1999 2000 
Grants and Funds $6,124,656,494 $7,656,223,460 $9,041,332,277 
Long Term Liabilities $1,978,610,966 $2,828,630,711 $3,096,600,756 
Reserves & Provisions $3,183,765,547 $4,559,311,760 $4,590,678,136 
Accumulated Fund $326,638,371 $359,786,787 $528,600,756 
Total Funds & Liabilities $11,613,671,378 $15,403,952,718 $17,257,211,925 
Current Assets 
Inventory $57,373,006 $71,971,279 $74,262,653 
Accounts Receivable $2,047,967,654 $4,040,598,626 $3,188,990,496 
Advances $169,363,856 $346,764,804 $255,182,011 
Cash and Short-Term 
Deposits $1,833,081,015 $2,680,802,935 $3,554,562,672 
$4,107,785,531 $7,140,137,644 $7,072,997,832 
Short-Term Liabilities $774,765,655 $1,416,645,308 $1,052,822,754 
Working Capital $3,333,019,876 $5,723,492,336 $6,020,175,078 
Investments $1,123,539,523 $1,437,511,760 $2,438,746,510 
Long Term Receivable 
Fixed Assets $7,157,111,979 $8,242,948,622 $8,798,290,337 
$8,280,651,502 $9,680,460,382 $11,237,036,847 
Net Assets $11,613,671,378 $15,403,952,718 $17,257,211,925 
2001 2002 2003 
Grants and Funds $10,311,405,494 $3,106,504,787 $3,866,107,627 
Long Term Liabilities $3,154,028,734 $3,626,871,384 $4,718,000,105 
Reserves & Provisions $5,434,845,641 $13,522,208,983 $16,073,056,073 
Accumulated Fund $554,024,989 $1,056,920,589 $923,033,399 
Total Funds & Liabilities $19,454,304,858 $21,312,505,743 $25,580,197,204 
Current Assets 
Inventory $82,586,947 $115,050,768 $128,914,639 
Accounts Receivable $3,778,253,700 $3,040,276,636 $6,802,699,393 
Advances $378,482,506 $381,890,875 $409,164,348 
Cash and Short-Term Deposits $1,499,921,335 $6,482,288,646 $7,578,107,249 
$5,739,244,488 $10,019,506,925 $14,918,885,629 
Short-Term Liabilities $1,696,030,870 $1,184,645,778 $4,068,336,779 
Working Capital $4,043,213,618 $8,834,861,147 $10,850,548,850 
Investments $5,835,621,068 $1,594,078,188 $2,193,619,283 
Long Term Receivable $4,305,705 $4,343,984 
Fixed Assets $9,575,470,172 $10,879,260,703 $12,531,685,087 
$15,411,091,240 $12,477,644,596 $14,729,648,354 
Net Assets $19,454,304,858 $21,312,505,743 $25,580,197,204 
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APPENDIX XVIII

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND

OBJECTIVES

ACTIVITY 1 - Review of Jamaica’s Funding Policies 
Objectives 
(v)	 To identify the Higher Educational (HE) funding strategies tried in the 
past. 
(vi)	 To identify the problems encountered with each strategy. 
(vii)	 To assess the current HE funding Strategy. 
(viii)	 To ascertain the reasons for the various policies adopted by 
Jamaica. 
QUESTIONS To Be Answered In ACTIVITY 1 
1.	 What were the Higher Education funding policies used by the Government of 
Jamaica prior to 1990? 
2.	 How were the mechanisms of these policies worked out and implemented? 
3.	 What problems were encountered? 
4.	 Can you identify any benefits of the policies? 
5.	 Describe the current policy of government funding of Higher Education in 
Jamaica? 
6.	 What is your assessment of this policy? 
7.	 What are the problems experienced with the current policy? 
8.	 How are the problems being dealt with? 
9.	 What are the benefits being derived from the current policy? 
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10.Since salary is linked to the current funding model, what do you think of the 
differing salary levels negotiated by government for the HEIs in Jamaica? 
11.How has the economic problems being experienced by Jamaica influenced its 
funding policies? 
12.What do you think are the reasons for Jamaica to have adopted the policy it 
has? 
ACTIVITY 3 – Defining the Criteria for the Jamaican Model 
Objectives: 
viii.	 To determine some criteria from the Jamaican experience. 
ix.	 To suggest some criteria for the Jamaican Model from the experience of 
other countries. 
x.	 To ascertain the current and future priorities of the Jamaican

Government for Higher Education.

xi.	 To establish the links between funding strategies, Government priorities 
and the criteria. 
xii.	 To identify the issues relating to the management of Higher Educational 
Institutions (HEI) and how funding policies can assist in good 
management. 
xiii.	 To identify the statutory, legal and other obligations as they relate to the 
management and funding of HEIs 
xiv.	 To establish the economic issues relating to the financing of Higher

Education.

QUESTIONS To Be Answered In ACTIVITY 3 
1.	 What are/should be the expectations of the Jamaican Government in relation to 
Higher Education? 
2.	 How do you see the Higher Educational Institutions (HEI) fulfilling these 
expectations? 
3.	 How do you see Government funding influencing these expectations? 
4.	 What factors should Government use in determining a funding policy for HEI in 
Jamaica? 
5.	 How are the following issues relating to the management and funding of HEIs 
all over the world pertinent to HEIs in Jamaica?

� Cost

�	 Productivity 
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�	 Quality 
�	 Equity 
�	 Efficiency 
�	 Access 
� Entrepreneurship

� GATS

�	 Governance 
�	 Social Responsibility 
6.	 How can a Jamaican Government funding model influence the above issues? 
ACTIVITY 2 - REVIEW OF FUNDING METHODOLOGIES

AROUND THE WORLD

Objectives 
vi.	 To identify and categorise the different methodologies. 
vii.	 To examine the benefits and challenges associated with each 
viii. To ascertain the factors that influence the funding policies 
ix.	 To investigate the possible link between funding strategy and Economic 
Development 
x.	 To investigate the link between Government priorities and their funding 
policies. 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR ACTIVITY 2 
1.	 Describe the Higher Education funding policy/model of your country. 
2.	 Describe the mechanics of this policy. 
3.	 Why did your country adopt this model? 
4.	 How has this model/strategy/policy benefited your country? 
5.	 What are the problems being experienced with this policy? 
6.	 What is the current level of economic development of your country? 
7.	 In your opinion, are the effects of the level of economic development on the 
funding model adopted by your country? 
8.	 What are the stated priorities of your Government for Higher Education? 
9.	 Do you perceive a link between the funding policy and the priorities? 
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Persons interviewed for activity 2 were: 
�	 Helena Šebková (Director), Marek Melichar (Researcher), and Ondrej 
Svaton (Head Research Department) - Center on Higher Education 
Studies (CHES) Czech Republic 
�	 Josef Benes – Director of HE Department, Ministry of Education Czech 
Republic 
�	 Karel Rais – Pro-Vice Chancellor, Planning Brno University of 
Technology, Czech Republic. 
�	 Professor Jan Stanek, Vice Rector Institute of Chemical Technology, 
Prague 
�	 Dr. Mathias Patzold – Secretary General of the Academic Advisory 
Council of Lower Saxony, Germany 
�	 Dr. Dominic Orr, (Researcher) Higher Education Information System 
(HIS), Germany 
�	 Dr. Karl-Ernst Fichter – Ministry of Science and Culture, Lower 
Saxony, Germany 
�	 Jeroen Husiman, Hans Vossensteyn, Carlo Salerno, and Egbert de Weert 
(Researchers) – Centre on Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS), 
Netherland. 
�	 Ian Lewis and Gerry Taggart – Higher Education Funding Council of 
England. 
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APPENDIX XIX: LIST OF DOCUMENTS

NUMBER CODE ISSUES DATES SOURCE 
M1 Feature CAST Council Meeting 1961-11-06 UTech's Archives 
M2 Feature CAST Council Meeting 1961-12-04 UTech's Archives 
M3 RAM Ministry Paper No. 351/01 re 1963-09-03 25/6 - UWI 
financing the UWI Archives 
M4 Consequence Bursar to FS re problem to 1963-11-07 25/6 - UWI 
relating to multiple ministries for Archives 
remittances 
M5 RAM Billing to the Jamaican 1964-03-13 25/9-51 - UWI 
Government for the Seismic Archives 
Research Project for 1963/64 
M6 RAM Jamaica's agreement to 1967-05-01 25/6 - UWI 
reimburse UWI for increase cost Archives 
for salary increase for 1966-69 
M7 RAM Billing to the Jamaican 1967-10-20 25/6 - UWI 
Government for UWU Archives 
M8 RAM Billing to the Jamaican 1969-01-15 25/6 - UWI 
Government for UWU Archives 
M9 RAM Bursar to FS re Billing - 1969-70 1969-11-06 25/6-191 - UWI 
Archives 
M10 RAM Report of TAC re Expenditure for 1969-11-13 25/6 - UWI 
1969-72 Archives 
M11 RAM Expansion and Financing of UWI 1970-01-09 MA 96.2 - UWI 
Archives 
M12 RAM Bursar to FS re Billing 1970-09-15 25/6 - UWI 
Archives 
M13 RAM Special Project Planned 1972-01-31 C.P. 6 - UWI 
Expenditure 1972-75 Archives 
M14 Consequence VC Report to Council 1972 re 1972-04-30 MA 96.2 - UWI 
change to the formula for Archives 
distributing the cost of UWI 
FE1 RAM Proposal to change the levy 1971-07-01 C28/22 UWI 
system Archives 
FE2 RAM Financing the Development of 1971-07-01 CP16-32-1972 
UWI - CP 16-32 1972 UWI Achieves 
FE3 RAM Staff/student Ratio - Question of 1971-07-01 25/6 UWI 
efficiency cp 16-32 1972 Achieves 
FE4 RAM Plans to finance research 1972 - 1971-07-01 CP16-32-1972 
75 CP 16-32 1972 UWI Achieves 
FE5 RAM Senate meeting of 8 July 1971 re 1971-07-01 C28/22 UWI 
proposed financial contribution Achieves 
formula 
FE6 RAM Decision on the Econ. Cost 1971-07-01 C28/22 UWI 
Allocation Model Achieves 
FE7 Feature Education to be Free 1973-05-07 Daily Gleaner 
FE8 Problem Former PM reaction to Free 1973-05-18 Daily Gleaner 
Education Policy 
FE9 Feature Education : Time for massive 1973-06-01 Daily Gleaner 
Effort 
FE10 Feature Free Education Policy an 1973-06-22 Daily News 
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NUMBER CODE ISSUES DATES SOURCE 
Expected Move 
FE11 TLI Govt. allocation 1974/75 to TE 1974-05-01 Estimates of 
and Boarding grant for FE Expenditure, 
1974, MOF 
FE12 Problem Diff. between MOF & University 1974-10-01 25/6-156 UWI 
on application of new RAM 74 Achieves 
FE13 Problem Expression of capital needs 1975-01-01 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
FE14 RAM 73/74 billing to Jamaica - April 1975-04-02 25/6 UWI 
1975 Achieves 
FE15 Problem Exchange between PS MOE and 1975-05-15 25/6 UWI 
Bursar re delays in remittances Achieves 
FE16 RAM 75-78 allocation - Application of 1975-08-01 25/6 UWI 
the RAM - Mar. 1975 Achieves 
FE17 RAM 74/75 billing to Jamaica 1976-03-16 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
FE18 TLI 76/77 allocations to other TLIs 1976-05-01 Estimates of 
Expenditure, 
1976, MOF 
FE19 RAM 77/78 billing to Jamaica 1976-10-26 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
FE20 RAM 1975/76 Economic Cost 1977-03-09 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
FE21 RAM 76/77 billing to Jamaica 1977-03-10 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
FE22 RAM Contribution for Council on Legal 1977-05-02 25/6 UWI 
Education Achieves 
FE23 RAM Description of the billing and 1977-07-01 25/6 UWI 
remittance process Achieves 
FE24 Problem Receivables to July 31, 1977 1977-09-23 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
FE25 RAM 1976/77 Economic Cost 1978-03-02 25/8-III-87 UWI 
Archives 
FE26 TLI 78/79 allocations to other TLIs 1978-05-01 Estimates of 
Expenditure, 
1978, MOF 
FE27 Problem VC to PS MOE re financial crisis 1978-06-06 25/6 UWI 
due to arrears Achieves 
FE28 RAM Description to economic costing 1978-08-28 25/6 UWI 
method under 76 change Achieves 
FE29 Problem Bursar's notice of overdraft crisis 1978-09-01 25/6 UWI 
78 Achieves 
FE30 Problem MOF disagreement with the 1978-10-01 25/6 UWI 
application of the RAM Achieves 
FE31 Problem FS & VC deliberations over the 1978-10-02 25/6 UWI 
application of the RAM Achieves 
FE32 RAM 1978/79 assessed contribution 1978-11-06 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
FE33 Problem Report in National Target news 1979-01-01 National Target 
paper in TT re financial problems No. 43, Saturday 
of the UWI January 1979 
FE34 RAM 1976/77 Economic Cost 1979-04-05 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
FE35 Problem VC to Min. Fin outlining problem 1979-07-01 25/6 UWI 
and request intervention July 79 Achieves 
FE36 Problem VC to Min. Fin re continued 1979-12-01 25/6 UWI 
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NUMBER CODE ISSUES DATES SOURCE 
problem with arrears Dec. 79 Achieves 
FE37 TLI 80/81 allocations to other TLIs 1980-05-01 Estimates of 
Expenditure, 
1980-81, MOF 
FE38 Solution VC to FS proposing solution to 1980-07-01 25/6 UWI 
problem - July 1980 Achieves 
FE39 Problem Notes of meeting with MOF & 1980-09-01 25/6 UWI 
University proposed solution - Achieves 
Sept. 1980 
FE40 Solution MOF acceptance of the UWI 1980-10-01 25/6 UWI 
proposal Oct. 1980 Achieves 
FE41 RAM restructuring - planning unit 1981-01-02 25/6 UWI 
summary Achieves 
FE42 RAM Restructuring of the University 1982-02-01 25/6 UWI 
and the RAM Feb - Sept. 1982 Achieves 
FE43 RAM Jamaica's position on the 1982-02-03 25/6 UWI 
devolution Achieves 
FE44 RAM restructuring - MPC meeting 1982-02-13 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
FE45 RAM Decision on the 1984 1982-09-15 25/6 UWI 
restructuring of the UWI Achieves 
FE46 Problem Delay in approving triennium 1982-09-17 MPC 22 - 1982, 
estimates caused arrears of all UWI Archives 
governments. Sept 1982 
FE47 RAM restructuring - sub-committee of 1982-09-21 25/6 UWI 
Council Achieves 
FE48 RAM 81-84 allocation final 72 RAM 1982-10-01 25/6 UWI 
system Achieves 
FE49 TLI Boarding Grant - 1983-1984 1983-05-01 Estimates of 
Expenditure, 
1983-84, MOF 
FE50 Problem MOF declared inability to meet 1983-05-01 25/6 UWI 
remittance target - July 1983 Achieves 
FE51 Problem Effect of the financial problem on 1983-07-01 25/6 UWI 
the quality assurance process of Achieves 
UHWI - July 1983 
FE52 Solution VC understanding of proposed 1983-07-01 25/6 UWI 
solution July 1983 Achieves 
FE53 Problem Bank refused to extend O/D 1983-08-04 25/6 UWI 
without further LOC from MOF - Achieves 
Aug. 1983 
FE54 Solution LOC from MOF outline overdraft 1983-08-29 25/6 UWI 
limits and accepting liability for Achieves 
cost Aug. 1983 
FE55 Problem MOF analysis of arrears by 1983-11-17 25/6 UWI 
Jamaica. 1983-84 Achieves 
FE56 Problem Effect of Jamaica. Monetary 1984-01-06 25/6 UWI 
policy on the fin of UWI - Achieves 
Devaluation Jan 1984 
FE57 Problem Effect of Jamaica. Monetary 1984-02-02 25/6 UWI 
policy on the fin of UWI - Achieves 
IMP/BOJ restriction on lending 
LOC invalid Feb. 1984 
FE58 Problem PM intervention but restriction by 1984-03-06 25/6 UWI 
F & GP still a Problem - Mar. Achieves 
1984 
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NUMBER CODE ISSUES DATES SOURCE 
FE59 Problem LRS propose solution inadequate 1984-04-12 25/6 UWI 
- April 1984 Achieves 
FE60 Problem LRS propose solution inadequate 1984-05-02 25/6 UWI 
- May 1984 Achieves 
FE61 Solution BOJ to purchase LRS of 1984-05-03 25/6 UWI 
University - May 1984 Achieves 
FE62 Problem Devaluation, increase Jamaica 1984-06-14 25/6 UWI 
student numbers increase Achieves 
Jamaica portion of cost - June 
1984 
FE63 RAM restructuring - TOR CGC 1984-08-20 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
FE64 TLI Education Tax - How assisting fin 1985-01-01 25/6 UWI 
of ed. Achieves 
FE65 Consequences Financial problems at UHWI 1985-02-12 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
FE66 RAM discussion on computation of per 1985-07-24 25/6 UWI 
capita grant Achieves 
FE67 RAM Description of 1984 RAM - July 1985-07-30 25/6 UWI 
1985 - costing explained Achieves 
FE68 Problem Balance outstanding schedule 1985-08-20 25/6 UWI 
31/7/85 Achieves 
FE69 RAM Billing 84/85 - July 1985 1985-10-01 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
FE70 Consequences Effect of devaluation 1986-01-23 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
FE71 Problem arrears 84/85 April 1986 1986-04-04 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
FE72 RAM Effect of the new RAM on the 1987-05-20 25/6 UWI 
Jamaica contribution - May 1987 Achieves 
C1 Consequences extension of credit at request of 1986-12-10 25/6 UWI 
MOF Achieves 
C2 Consequences Increase in overdraft facilities 1987-02-23 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C3 Consequences Guarantee for overdraft 1987-03-23 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C4 Consequences Appeal to PM 1987-05-03 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C5 Consequences Cash flow problems 1987-05-04 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C6 Consequences Discussion with PM Jamaica 1987-05-26 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C7 Consequences Authority to fund by bank credit 1987-06-05 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C8 RAM assessment 1986/87 under 1987-07-31 25/6 UWI 
devolved system Achieves 
C9 RAM Cost Structure of UWI consultant 1987-08-28 25/6 UWI 
report Achieves 
C10 Consequences Financial problems at UHWI 1987-09-17 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C11 RAM Comments on the consultants 1987-09-30 25/6 UWI 
cost structure report Achieves 
C12 Consequences Interest on overdraft to July 1987 1987-12-15 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C13 Consequences Outstanding contributions from 1987-12-16 25/6 UWI 
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NUMBER CODE ISSUES DATES SOURCE 
Jamaica Achieves 
C14 Consequences Outstanding contributions from 1988-03-31 25/6 UWI 
Jamaica Achieves 
C15 Consequences Access and tuition fees 1988-04-08 MA 96.2 UWI 
Archives 
C16 Consequences Interest charged on account to 1988-04-13 25/6 UWI 
March 1988 Achieves 
C17 Consequences VC Report on the overall financial 1988-05-12 25/6 UWI 
situation Achieves 
C18 Consequences Outstanding contributions from 1988-05-20 25/6 UWI 
Jamaica Achieves 
C19 Consequences Report of visit of the PM Jamaica 1988-05-30 25/6 UWI 
at F & GP Achieves 
C20 Consequences Outstanding contributions from 1988-06-01 25/6 UWI 
Jamaica Achieves 
C21 Consequences Interest charged on account to 1988-06-13 25/6 UWI 
May 1988 Achieves 
C22 Consequences Notes of Meeting with PM 1988-06-15 25/6 UWI 
Jamaica Achieves 
C23 Consequences MOF proposal to deal with 1988-06-29 25/6 UWI 
outstanding contribution Achieves 
C24 RAM Explanation of increase for 1988-07-11 25/6 UWI 
estimate 1987-90 Achieves 
C25 RAM Remittances by Jamaica 1987- 1988-08-12 25/6 UWI 
1990 Achieves 
C26 RAM Contributions & Assessment 1988-08-17 25/6 UWI 
1987/1989 Achieves 
C27 Consequences Arrears reported at F & GP 1988-12-14 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C28 Consequences problems with collecting from 1989-01-13 25/6 UWI 
Gov. to pay bank Achieves 
C29 Consequences Arrears statement to F & GP 1989-03-15 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C30 Consequences VC Report on the overall financial 1989-03-17 25/6 UWI 
situation Achieves 
C31 Consequences Arrears by Jamaica 1989-03-21 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C32 Consequences Promissory note from MOF 1989-04-01 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C33 Consequences MOF acknowledgement of arrears 1989-05-15 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C34 Consequences Bursars summary of the MOF 1989-05-25 25/6 UWI 
response Achieves 
C35 Consequences VC personal concerns on MOF 1989-05-31 25/6 UWI 
response Achieves 
C36 Consequences Minister's details about dealing 1989-06-19 25/6 UWI 
with arrear Achieves 
C37 Consequences Problem cases in remittances 1989-07-17 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C38 RAM assessment 1988/89 under 1989-07-31 25/6 UWI 
devolved system Achieves 
C39 RAM statement of contributions 1989-07-31 25/6 UWI 
1988/89 Achieves 
C40 Consequences notes of meeting UWI/MOF 1989-08-04 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
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NUMBER CODE ISSUES DATES SOURCE 
C41 Consequences effect of credit restrictions on 1989-09-15 25/6 UWI 
overdraft Achieves 
C42 Consequences Overdraft conversion proposal 1989-10-02 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C43 Consequences Problem with collecting capital 1989-10-10 25/6 UWI 
grants Achieves 
C44 Consequences Overdraft converted to loan but 1989-12-27 25/6 UWI 
subject-IMF guidelines Achieves 
C45 Consequences Overdraft interest rate 1989-12-27 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C46 Consequences Overdraft - UWI concern about 1990-01-04 25/6 UWI 
interest rates Achieves 
C48 Consequences VC Report on the overall financial 1990-04-06 25/6 UWI 
situation Achieves 
C47 RAM Separation of Central and 1990-04-06 MA 96.2 UWI 
Campus Administration Archives 
C49 RAM assessment 1989/90 under 1990-07-31 25/6 UWI 
devolved system Achieves 
C50 RAM Billing for 1989/90 1990-11-13 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C51 Consequences Salary parity issue with the other 1991-02-20 25/6 UWI 
territories Achieves 
C52 Consequences arrears as at July 31, 1990 1991-04-11 25/6 UWI 
Jamaica paid off arrears Achieves 
C53 Consequence Report of the Committee on 1991-06-08 MA 96.2 UWI 
Tuition Fees Archives 
C55 RAM assessment 1990/91 under 1991-07-31 25/6 UWI 
devolved system Achieves 
C54 RAM UHWI contributions paid through 1991-07-31 25/6 UWI 
MOE Achieves 
C56 Consequences Overdraft $75,029,438.37 1991-08-27 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C57 Consequence University Bursar to Principal 1992-01-14 25/6 UWI 
Mona overdraft Achieves 
C58 Consequence Principal to Min of Education re 1992-01-17 25/6 UWI 
additional funding Achieves 
C59 Consequence Additional Funding 1992-02-11 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C60 Consequence MOF to NCB on overdraft 1992-02-24 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C61 Consequences VC Report on the overall financial 1992-04-01 25/6 UWI 
situation Achieves 
C62 Consequence VC to Min of Fin on arrears 1992-04-21 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C63 Consequence VC to PS re loans for 1992-04-22 25/6 UWI 
development Achieves 
C64 Consequence Min of Fin to VC on arrears 1992-04-28 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C65 Consequence University Bursar to VC on 1992-06-26 25/6 UWI 
arrears Achieves 
C66 RAM assessment 1991/92 under 1992-07-31 25/6 UWI 
devolved system Achieves 
C67 Consequence UWI Council Meeting on Tuition 1992-09-08 MA 02.20 UWI 
Fees Archives 
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NUMBER CODE ISSUES DATES SOURCE 
C68 Consequence Min of Fin to Principal re arrears 1992-10-16 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C69 Consequence MOF to Bursar Promissory Note 1993-01-25 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C70 Consequence Deputy Bursar to Principal -
Arrears 
1993-03-12 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C71 Consequences VC Report on the overall financial 
situation 
1993-03-31 CP 1 VC Report 
UWI Archives 
C72 Consequence Minutes of UGC 1993 1993-04-01 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C73 RAM Allocation of Cost 1993-06-22 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C74 Consequence Campus Bursar to University 
Bursar on devaluation 
1993-07-09 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
C75 Consequence PS to Bursar 1993-07-28 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS1 Consequence Financial Report 1993-09-26 FGP (M) P.1 
1993/94 UWI 
Archives 
CS2 Consequence NCB to Bursar on overdraft 1993-11-10 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS3 Consequence Notes of meeting with Min of Fin 1993-12-14 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS4 Consequence NCB to VC on overdraft 1993-12-14 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS5 Consequence Min of Fin to Campus Principal on 
Fin situation 
1993-12-16 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS6 RAM GOJ contribution 1993-12-28 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS7 Features Policies and Procedures for 
administering The Cost Sharing 
Scheme for Financing Education 
1994-06-01 School of 
Education, 
Document Centre 
CS8 RAM Report on Chancellor's 
Commission on Governance 
1994-07-01 UWI Archives 
CS9 RAM Campus Bursar to Uni. Bursar re 
GOJ Proposal to fund UWI 94/95 
1994-09-29 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS10 Features VC to FS-GOJ proposal to fund 
UWI 1994/95 
1994-09-30 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS11 Features A cost recovery programme for 
Tertiary Education 
1994-10-01 MOEYC 
CS12 Features Cabinet Decision on UWI No. 
41/94 
1994-10-31 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS13 Features Min of Fin to VC - GOJ proposal 
to fund UWI 94/95 
1995-01-16 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS14 Consequence Campus Bursar to Uni. Bursar re 
overdraft 
1995-01-23 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS15 Consequence Bursar to NCB re overdraft 1995-02-07 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS16 Features VC to Min of Fin on GOJ proposal 
to fund UWI 
1995-04-07 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS17 Consequence CAST to become National 
Polytechnic University 
1995-05-11 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
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NUMBER CODE ISSUES DATES SOURCE 
CS18 Consequence Financial Report 1995-06-26 Daily Gleaner & 
Daily Observer 
CS19 RAM Hospital Administrator to MOE re 1995-06-28 FGP (M) P.119 
GOJ Proposal to Fund UHWI 1994/95 UWI 
Archives 
CS20 Consequence Institutional Assessment Report 1995-07-12 25/6 UWI 
on CAST Achieves 
CS21 Features Commission on Gov. - 1995-11-24 UTECH Files 
Implementation Committee 
CS22 RAM Commission on Gov. - Finance & 1995-11-24 MA 02.20 UWI 
Planning Achieves 
CS23 RAM Working Groups Report on 1995-11-24 MA 02.20 UWI 
Chancellor's Commission on Achieves 
Governance 
CS24 Features Bursar to UGC of GOJ proposal 1995-12-29 MA 02.20 UWI 
to fund UWI Achieves 
CS25 Consequence Financial Report 1996-01-22 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS26 Consequence Overdraft 1996-01-31 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS27 Consequence Financial Report 1996-02-26 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS28 Consequence Financial Report to Council with 1996-04-19 UWI Annual 
proposed tuition fees 95/96 Report, UWI 
Achieves 
CS29 Consequence VC Report on Financial Situation 1996-04-19 UWI Annual 
Report, UWI 
Achieves 
CS30 Consequence Campus Bursar to MOF 1996-04-29 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS31 Consequence Beso Report on UTECH 1996-06-07 UTECH Files 
CS32 Features Min of Ed to World Bank on GOJ 1996-06-10 World Bank 
Cost Sharing Policy - World Bank Report 1996 
SLB Report 15594-JM 
CS33 Consequence Principal to Min of Education 1996-06-19 25/6 UWI 
shortfall on Budget Achieves 
CS34 RAM Outcomes of Chancellor's 1996-07-01 25/6 UWI 
Commission on Governance Achieves 
CS35 Consequence Financial Report 1996-07-23 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS36 Consequence Financial Report 1996-11-22 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS37 Consequence Financial Report 1997-01-21 FGP (M) P.36 
1996/97 
CS38 Consequence Financial Report 1997-02-19 FGP (M) P.42 
1996/98 
CS39 Consequence Variance notes 94/95 & 95/96 1997-04-17 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS40 Consequence VC to Min of Fin re arrears 1998-02-12 25/6 UWI 
Achieves 
CS41 Features Tuition Fees 98/99 1998-04-24 UWI Annual 
Report, UWI 
Achieves 
CS42 RAM Streamlining the allocation of 1998-04-28 25/6 UWI 
Recurrent Contributions Achieves 
CS43 RAM Recurrent contribution for period 1998-05-04 25/6 UWI 
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NUMBER CODE ISSUES DATES SOURCE 
ending July 1998 Achieves 
CS44 Consequence VC to Min of Fin on funding the 1998-11-11 25/6 UWI 
UWI 98/99 Achieves 
CS45 RAM Fin. Service Manager to Bursar re 1998-12-08 25/6 UWI 
allocation of receipts Achieves 
CS46 Consequence Extracts from Minutes of Council 1999-04-01 UWI Annual 
meeting Report, UWI 
Achieves 
CS47 Consequence Extracts from Minutes of Council 2000-04-01 UWI Annual 
meeting Report, UWI 
Achieves 
CS48 Features Profile of Mona Campus 2001-03-31 UWI Annual 
1994/2000 Report, UWI 
Achieves 
CS49 Consequence Extracts from Minutes of Council 2001-04-01 UWI Annual 
meeting Report, UWI 
Achieves 
CS50 RAM Tuition Fees 01/02 2001-04-01 UWI Annual 
Report, UWI 
Achieves 
CS51 RAM Campus Bursar to Campus 2001-10-01 25/6 UWI 
Registrar re data on sponsored Achieves 
students 
CS52 RAM Protocol for UTECH/Central 2003-03-13 UTECH Files 
Government Interaction 
CS53 RAM Enrolment in Community Colleges 2003-03-31 MOEYC 
By Sex 2001/2002 
CS54 RAM Enrolment in Teacher Training 2003-03-31 MOEYC 
Programmes 2001/2002 
CS55 RAM Shortwood Teachers College 2003-03-31 MOEYC 
Statistics 1995 - 2003 
CS56 RAM Enrolment in Community Colleges 2003-03-31 MOEYC 
By Sex 2000/2001 
CS57 RAM Enrolment in Teacher Training 2003-03-31 MOEYC 
Programmes 2000/2001 
CS58 RAM Profile of Mona Campus 2004-04-01 UWI Files 
2000/2003 
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